Junior Seminar of the Department of Economics

Aims of the seminar series:

The purpose of this seminar is to provide PhD students and early-career researchers (post-docs, assistant professors, etc.) with a dedicated space to present their ongoing academic research. The aim is to allow participants to engage with an academic audience in preparation for future presentations at external conferences and seminars, or for submission to scientific journals and books. These seminars offer a valuable opportunity to receive constructive feedback from peers and senior researchers, with the goal of improving both the quality of the research and the clarity of its presentation.

Agenda

Seminars usually take place on Thursdays from 4.15 to 5.30 p.m. Announcements are made on the Monday before the seminar takes place, and a detailed schedule is available on this website. Please direct enquiries to Elsa Gautrain.

 

Junior Seminars 2026

  • May

    May 21,
    Presenter: Bakhtawar Ali, Aix-Marseille School of Economics,
    Room: E130
    Abstract: 
    The strategic use of the judiciary against political rivals, often termed as lawfare, has historically characterized authoritarian regimes and is now increasingly a source of concern in democracies. The central empirical challenge lies in distinguishing between neutral enforcement of the law versus selective prosecution based on political alignment.  Using a regression discontinuity design and newly assembled data from Pakistan’s corruption courts, we provide causal evidence on the existence and extent of lawfare. We document that political opponents of the government are significantly more likely to be prosecuted and convicted for corruption. These effects are large enough to crowd out other anti-corruption efforts. In contrast, government affiliates facing comparable allegations are less likely to be convicted, underscoring the asymmetric nature of law enforcement. These disparities carry profound implications for political competition. Convictions of opposition politicians eliminate the typically observed incumbency advantage, undermining the ability of opposition politicians to contest on equal footing in subsequent elections. In doing so, institutions tasked with upholding the rule of law are redeployed as instruments of political victimization, distorting both justice and electoral competition. That these patterns persist under both civilian and military regimes underscores a deeper institutional fragility: democratization alone may not be sufficient to safeguard the neutrality of courts.

    May 28,
    Presenter: Gildas Magbondé, UniFR
    Room: E040

Contributions

This seminar is intended for PhD students and early-career researchers (post-docs, assistant professors, etc.) in economic and social sciences. Each session lasts approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes, with presentations typically lasting 45 minutes to allow time for questions during the talk and a 15-minute discussion.

Presentation slots can be reserved on a first-come, first-served basis. Priority is given to PhD students and early-career researchers (post-docs, assistant professors, etc.) in the Department of Economics at the University of Fribourg, but junior researchers from other Swiss and international universities are also welcome to present their work. Presentations should be based on research at an advanced enough stage to allow a clear presentation of the research question, methodology, and main results.

All presentations must be in English, and slides must be in English as well. Participants may present thesis chapters or research papers in progress. While the seminar primarily focuses on academic research presentations, alternative formats may be considered if they better suit the speaker's needs.