Publications in Peer-Reviewed Academic Journals

Lüchinger, Simon, Mark Schelker and Lukas Schmid (2024). Measuring Closeness in Proportional Representation Systems. Political Analysis 32, 101-114, 2024. link

Berset, Simon, Martin Huber and Mark Schelker (2023). The Fiscal Response to Revenue Shocks. International Tax and Public Finance, 30: 814-848.  link / PDF / Online Appendix

Benesch, Christine, Rino Heim, Mark Schelker and Lukas Schmid (2023). Do Voting Advice Applications Change Political Behavior? Journal of Politics, 85 (2): 684-700. link /  CESifo Working Paper No. 8868

Berset, Simon and Mark Schelker (2023). Decentralization and Progressive Taxation. Public Finance Review, 51(2): 171-310.   link  / CESifo Working paper No. 8862

Huber, Martin, Mark Schelker and Anthony Strittmatter (2022). Direct and Indirect Effects Based on Changes-in-Changes. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 40 (1): 432-443. link / Online Appendix / CESifo Working Paper No. 7855  

Berset, Simon and Mark Schelker (2020). Fiscal Windfall Curse. European Economic Review, 130, 103592. link / Online Appendix / CESifo Working Paper No. 7795 

Deuchert Eva, Martin Huber and Mark Schelker (2019). Direct and Indirect Effects Based on Difference-in-Differences with an Application to Political Preferences Following the Vietnam Draft Lottery. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 37 (4): 710-720. link / CESifo Working Paper No. 6000

Schelker, Mark (2018) Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable. Journal of Comparative Economics, 46 (1): 131-144. link / Online Appendix /  CESifo Working Paper No. 3523

Schelker, Mark and Marco Schneiter (2017). The Elasticity of Voter Turnout: Investing 85 Cents per Voter to Increase Voter Turnout by 4 Percent. Electoral Studies, 49: 65-74. link / Online Appendix / CESifo Working Paper No. 5617

Lüchinger, Simon, Mark Schelker and Alois Stutzer (2014). Governance, Bureaucratic Rents and Well-Being Differentials Across U.S. States. Oxford Economic Papers 66 (2): 443-464. link

Schelker, Mark (2013). Auditors and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Public Sector. Kyklos 66 (2): 275-300. link

Schelker, Mark (2012). Auditor Expertise: Evidence from the Public Sector. Economics Letters 116 (3): 432-435. link

Schelker, Mark (2012). The Influence of Auditor Term Length and Term Limits on US State General Obligation Bond Ratings. Public Choice 150 (1): 27-49. link

Kirchgässner, Gebhard and Mark Schelker (2011). Federalism and Exit Costs. Constitutional Political Economy 22: 191-197. link

Schelker, Mark and Reiner Eichenberger (2010). Auditors and Fiscal Policy: Empirical Evidence on a Little Big Institution. Journal of Comparative Economics 38 (4): 357-380. link

Eichenberger, Reiner and Mark Schelker (2007). Independent and Competing Agencies: An Effective Way to Control Government. Public Choice 130: 79-98. link

Schelker, Mark and Reiner Eichenberger (2003). Starke Rechnungsprüfungskommissionen: Wichtiger als direkte Demokratie und Föderalismus? Ein erster Blick auf die Daten. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 139 (3): 351-373. link