Peter Anderson berichtet aus der orthodoxen Welt

Seit vielen Jahren verfolgt Peter Anderson aus Seattle USA die Entwicklungen in der orthodoxen Welt. Nicht im Auftrag einer Zeitung, sondern aus persönlicher Liebe zu den Ostkirchen und im Einsatz für die Communio von Ost und West gibt er Einblicke in neue Entwicklungen. Mit Zustimmung von Peter Anderson werden seine E-mail-Nachrichten auf der Homepage des Zentrums St. Nikolaus dokumentiert.

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NEWS 2024

• 12 November 2024: The UOC and Trump & other news

  The victory of Donald Trump and his vice president-elect JD Vance will likely have an effect on the religious situation in Ukraine.  Of all of the members of the U.S. Congress, Vance has been the most outspoken against Draft Law 8371, now Law 3894.  The following is a very short video of Vance speaking about Draft Law 8371 in the U.S. Senate on April 23, 2024.  https://spzh.live/ru/news/81181-amsterdam-v-ssha-pokazyvajut-film-pro-honenija-na-upts-s-uchastiem-vensa   In the video, he states that some of the churches in Ukraine may be too close to Russia, “but you don’t deprive a whole religious community of their religious freedom because some of its adherents do not agree with you about the relevant conflict of the day.”  When Vance made this statement, he was only a senator.  Now, as the future vice president, he will be close to the president and can potentially influence the president’s views with respect to the religious situation in Ukraine.  

  At the present time, the plans of Trump with respect to Ukraine, including future military funding from the United States, are not clear.  The Zelensky government will obviously seek to maintain good relations with Trump and will probably avoid actions that might damage that relationship.  In my opinion, it would be foolhardy for the Ukrainian government at this point to take new actions on the religious front that would attract international attention and would give rise to more claims that the government is violating religious freedom.  It is now in the interests of the Ukrainian government to maintain a very low profile with respect to Law 3894.  Consistent with this, there has been almost no news from Ukraine about Law 3894 in the last few months.  A People’s Deputy has stated on social media that the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers has now approved a procedure submitted by DESS with respect to conducting studies on the presence of signs of affiliation of religious organizations with the Russian Church.   https://t.me/oleksiihoncharenko/43928  However, the preparation of procedures and protocols is being done very quietly without any official announcements being made.

  It is becoming increasingly clear that Trump is interested in negotiations with the Russian Federation with respect to stopping the war in Ukraine.  Trump has already had a telephone conversation with Putin. The prospect of negotiations probably raises the hopes of the wing of the UOC which favors close ties to Moscow.  The expectation of this wing is that Russia will be able to negotiate guarantees for the UOC.   In the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in 2022, Russia sought protection for the UOC.  Now, it is almost certain that in any negotiations, Russia will take up the cause of the UOC.  From Russia's perspective, it is an opportunity for Moscow and the Moscow Patriarchate to be portrayed as the “saviors” of the UOC so as to help counteract the great damage to the relationship between the Moscow Patriarchate and the UOC caused by the war against Ukraine and Patriarch Kirill’s support of the war.  For those in the pro-Moscow wing of the UOC, the election of Trump means that the likelihood of the Ukrainian government vigorously enforcing Law 3894 has been decreased and the likelihood of a negotiated settlement with guarantees for the UOC has increased. For them, what makes the most sense is to do nothing now and wait and see. 

  However, for the wing of the UOC hoping for autocephaly for the UOC, now may be a critical time to take action before the status of the UOC becomes enmeshed in political negotiations.  This wing may well believe that it is important to show publicly that the UOC is serious and determined in maintaining complete independence from Moscow.  Thus, when Metropolitan Onufry and UOC Holy Synod failed to condemn the Moscow Patriarchate for removing Metropolitan Hilarion of Donetsk without the approval of the UOC, 33 metropolitans and archbishops of the UOC, led by the very influential Metropolitan  Agafangel of Odesa and Izmail, posted on October 31 on the website of the Odesa Eparchy a protest against the actions of the Moscow Patriarchate in removing Hilarion.  https://t.me/odeparh/23702   Agafangel, who is 86 years old, has been a permanent member of the UOC Holy Synod since 1992.   

  Those belonging to the "do nothing now and wait and see" wing would logically disagree with this protest.  Indeed, if one hopes that Moscow will save the UOC, one would be inclined not to irritate Moscow.  Thus, on November 7, Metropolitan Luke of Zaporozhie, a permanent member of the UOC Synod, posted on November 7 a strong criticism of discussions relating to the removal of Hilarion.  https://orthochristian.com/164433.html   In his message, Luke states:  “And to us who so excitedly talk about this news, or are disdainful of the reason for Vladyka Hilarion’s being sent into retirement, I would like to wish that we have faith in God and in His good Providence; for He knows better than us how best to determine people’s destinies.”   Over the years, Luke has been close to Moscow, although his brother was killed fighting with the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the current war. 

  Rather than "do nothing and wait and see," Agafangel continues to play a very active role and to exercise leadership.  On November 6, he sent a two-page letter to President-elect Trump.  The entire letter, which is in English, can be read on the Facebook page of the Odesa Eparchy. https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=1103217987836878&set=pcb.1103218041170206  The following is an excerpt from the letter:

  On behalf of the clergy and faithful of the vast congregation of the Odesa Diocese of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, on behalf of the entire South of Ukraine, and from me personally, we express you, Honorable Mr. President, our heartfelt congratulations on your brilliant victory in the U.S. presidential elections!

  You have repeatedly been a witness to God’s love for you. Throughout your life, the Lord has shown His divine mercy by preserving you in difficult times. Today, on this Election Day, when truth and strength, victory are with you, the Lord has once again proven that He is by your side.

  The Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which I represent, is the largest religious institution in Ukraine.  We have got with great joy the news of your election as one of the most distinguished statesmen of the United States.  At all Ukrainian holy sites, we pray for your health and your esteemed wife, Melania.

  We believe that with your election as President of the great nation of the United States, peace will come not only to the long-suffering land of Ukraine but to the entire world.  We also believe it will improve the treatment of the suffering millions within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which today endures great trials and tribulations while remaining steadfast in its devotion to its people and the Ukrainian State.  Our Church clearly understands that peace is a blessing, while war is a grave evil.  We hope the Ukrainian Orthodox Church will rise again and, as before, continue its timeless mission alongside other denominations within Ukraine, fostering interfaith and civilians’ peace for the good of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian State.  In unity lies our strength!

  In this excerpt, there are a number of items that particularly interest me.  Agafangel offers congratulations not only on behalf of his eparchy but also on behalf of “the entire South of Ukraine.”  He expresses the hope that the UOC will be “fostering interfaith…peace.”  It is also interesting that Agafangel takes it upon himself to congratulate Trump while Metropolitan Onufry and the UOC Holy Synod have been completely silent.

  Andrey Kuraev, the Russian Orthodox deacon who was defrocked by the Moscow Patriarchate but reinstated by Ecumenical Patriarchate, has given a very long interview on the subject of the UOC. https://diak-kuraev.livejournal.com/4688075.html  Although Kuraev is very controversial, he is very intelligent as well.  I personally highly recommend the reading of this interview.  Others, far more knowledgeable than I, agree that it is an interesting interview.  One of his suggestions is that the UOC visit the various Local Orthodox Churches, not for the purpose of declaring autocephaly unilaterally, but to express the desire for autocephaly and to seek the aid of the various Local Orthodox Churches in obtaining it.  This has never been done by the UOC.  He also suggests that it is not too late for the UOC to reconsider the possibility of a second unifying council in Ukrainian.  When asked about the canonical aspects of the participation of the OCU with the UOC, Kuraev discussed at length the teachings of Archbishop Hilarion (Troitsky) of Verey, who was canonized by the Moscow Patriarchate in 1999 through the efforts of the now Metropolitan Tikhon (Shevkunov).  (A short description of the life of Troitsky is found at https://orthochristian.com/33316.html )   According to Kuraev, the teachings of Troitsky on receiving people into the Church can be used to justify the actions of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Ukraine.  Kuraev also discusses many more points of interest.

  As reported in my last newsletter, Archbishop Sylvester (Stoichev), rector of the Kyiv Theological Academy and Seminary, has recommended that the UOC establish regular communications with all of the Local Orthodox Churches so that they can "see our de facto independence and come to the conclusion that we need to be recognized as an autocephalous Church."   https://kdais.kiev.ua/event/dopovid-17-10-2024/  

  In another development, the Journal in Montenegro has reported that it has received confirmation from several sources that “consultations regarding the regulation of church order in Ukraine between local Orthodox churches have begun.”  https://zurnal.me/zhurnal-saznae-pochele-konsultatsie-pomesnikh-tsrkava-o-regulisau-situatsie-u-ukraini/  It adds that “representatives of Phanar and the Russian Church are directly participating in the consultations” and that the Serbian Orthodox Church is facilitating these consultations.  I have seen no other confirmation of this report.  However, there has been at least one event where some communication between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ecumenical Patriarchate could have occurred.  Both Patriarchates were present at the “Global Summit of Religious Leaders on the margins of COP29” held in Baku, November 5-6.  Metropolitan Anthony (head of the DECR of the Moscow Patriarchate) and Elder Metropolitan Emmanuel of the Ecumenical Patriarchate participated in the meeting.  https://interfaithclimate-baku.org/participants   Also present was Cardinal Claudio Gugerotti, prefect of the Vatican’s Dicastery for the Eastern Churches.  Cardinal Gugerotti, who is known as a bridge builder, was nuncio to Belarus (2011-2015) and to Ukraine (2015-2020).  Hopefully, opportunities such as this will lead to some dialogue.

  The Holy Synod of the OCU met on November 7.  https://www.pomisna.info/uk/vsi-novyny/ofitsijne-povidomlennya-pro-zasidannya-svyashhennogo-synodu-7-lystopada-2024-r/?fbclid=IwY2xjawGZ7ttleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHTG19GbWcfbTZyRlvEDX8S7DQ2AP5osfBGC2HkndIgxah0EpHO0NieBiig_aem_GHuPSGyPKl9zvwPtY01ZLA  The Synod heard a report from Metropolitan Epifany about the visit of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s delegation to Kyiv, August 21-29 and the exchange of letters between Bartholomew and Epifany concerning the visit.  However, the minutes are silent with respect to any reaction of the OCU Synod to this visit.  The Synod also stated that it was “deeply disappointed” by the lack of response by the UOC to the appeal by the OCU for dialogue. 

  There are a number of indications and reports that the view now prevailing at the Phanar is that Metropolitan Epifany and OCU have over the years not worked sufficiently hard to create Orthodox unity in Ukraine.  During the visit of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s delegation to Kyiv in August, there were discussions between the delegation and Metropolitan Onufry and other representatives of the UOC.  The fact that such communications are now occurring with the Ecumenical Patriarchate may give encouragement to the wing of the UOC desiring autocephaly that conversations with the various Local Orthodox Churches may yield some positive results including determining the future relationship between the UOC and the OCU.

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 3 November 2024: Now 33 UOC bishops have protested ROC's action & other news

  On October 24, 2024, the Holy Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate decided to retire a bishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), Metropolitan Hilarion (Shukalo) of Donetsk and Mariupol.  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6167692.html (Journal entry 107).  In his place, the Synod appointed Metropolitan Vladimir (Samokhin), age 44, who had been the head of the Vladivostok diocese and who had no prior experience in Ukraine.  Donetsk and Mariupol are cities now occupied by Russia.  The day prior to this decision, the Holy Synod of the UOC had met, but the minutes of this meeting still have not been made public. 

  On the evening of October 31, a surprising statement protesting the retirement of Hilarion was posted on the Telegram channel of the Odesa Eparchy of the UOC. https://t.me/odeparh/23702   It was signed by 31 bishops of the UOC.  The first to sign the protest was Metropolitan Agafangel of Odesa and Izmail.  Agafangel is a permanent member of the UOC and has been so since 1992.  In the past, he has been considered to be very pro-Russian.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agafangel_(Savvin)  It is reported that he is a very close friend of Hilarion of Donetsk.  Because Agafangel is such an important person in the UOC, it is very unlikely that the Holy Synod of the UOC will take any action against him for the protest.  With Agafangel leading the protest, it is also unlikely that the other signers will be subject to adverse action.  The “Statement of the Hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church regarding the actions of the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church regarding the dioceses of the UOC in the temporary occupied territories of Ukraine” provides as follows:

  On October 24, 2024, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church adopted a decision to relieve Metropolitan Hilarion of Donetsk and Mariupol from the administration of the Donetsk diocese of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and send him to retirement.  Previously, hierarchs of other dioceses of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the territories temporarily occupied by Russia were relieved in a similar manner.  These decisions were made unilaterally, without any agreement with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is canonically independent according to the Tomos (Letter) of Patriarch Alexy II of October 27, 1990, and confirmed by the decision of the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church on May 27, 2022.

  We, the hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, strongly condemn this decision, which is anti-canonical, since church law regulates canonical relations between the Orthodox Churches.  The second canon of the Second Ecumenical Council emphasizes the need to respect jurisdictional boundaries, warning against any attempts by one Church to take control of the territory of another.  The eighth canon of the Third Ecumenical Council expressly forbids any bishop from interfering in the jurisdiction of another bishop.

  In addition, this decision is aimed at undermining the independence of Ukraine and the very existence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the difficult conditions of military operations on the territory of Ukraine.  After all, the anti-canonical dismissal of Metropolitan Hilarion, a Ukrainian by origin, the builder of the Donetsk eparchy, a long-time archpastor in the Donetsk region, and the appointment of a Russian bishop in his place testifies precisely to Moscow's desire to annex the canonical territory of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in order to destroy its independence and autonomy.

  We do not agree with this decision, demand its immediate cancellation, call for the rejection of the aggressive church policy towards the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and its long-suffering flock, for respect for the borders of the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

  The statement was signed by 16 metropolitans who head eparchies and by 15 vicar bishops.  On Saturday, November 2, one more metropolitan (Panteleimon of Uman) and one more vicar bishop (Veniamin, vicar of Kherson) had signed the statement.  Of the 17 metropolitans who have now signed, nine are located in western Ukraine, eight are located in central Ukraine, and none in eastern Ukraine.  Some of the more well-known eparchies whose metropolitans have signed are Odesa, Vinnytsia, Sumy, Lviv, Lutsk, Mukachevo,  Zhytomyr,  and Khmelnytskyi.  In the last statistics (end of 2022) given by the UOC, the UOC has 53 eparchies.  https://news.church.ua/2022/12/24/zvit-keruyuchogo-spravami-ukrajinskoji-pravoslavnoji-cerkvi-za-2022-rik/#2024-11-02    At the present time, some of these eparchies are in occupied territories including three in Crimea.  The metropolitans who have signed the statement so far represent more than one-third of the UOC metropolitans in unoccupied Ukraine.

  The Ukrainian service of the BBC and the Ukrainian publication Left Bank have written articles about the statement.  https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/articles/c3e84npzznzo;  https://lb.ua/society/2024/11/02/643045_bunt_upts_mp_get_vid_moskvi_chi.html  It appears that the statement was issued without the consent of Metropolitan Onufry and the UOC Holy Synod.  No permanent members of the Holy Synod have signed the statement except for Metropolitan Agafangel.  On November 2, Vladimir Legoida, chairman of the Synodal Department for Church-Society and Mass Media Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, responded to the statement.  https://ria.ru/20241102/legoyda--1981546872.html;  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6171564.html   The foregoing RIA article includes the following:

  "Decisions on the order of governing dioceses in the territories of Donbass and Novorossiya are made by the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church in the special conditions of military action, when the course of church life urgently requires such decisions. The outstanding merits of His Eminence Metropolitan Hilarion in organizing the life of the Church in the Donetsk land, in the construction of many churches, the education and ordination of numerous clergy do not raise any doubts and are duly noted in the synodal resolution.  However, the current situation in the region, where fighting is ongoing and people are dying every day, dictates the need for change," Legoida said on his Telegram channel.

  The precedent for resolving such situations, he recalled, is the decree of Patriarch Tikhon of Moscow, the Holy Synod and the Supreme Church Council of 1920 [Decree No. 362 of November 7, 1920].  This decree contains a provision that if a diocese, due to the movement of the front or a change in the state border, finds itself outside of any communication with the church leadership, its head must immediately contact the heads of neighboring dioceses to organize the highest authority of church authority in them.

  In other news, the important international human rights organization Human Rights Watch has criticized Ukrainian Law 3894.  https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/10/30/ukraine-new-law-raises-religious-freedom-concerns  Its statement includes the following observation:  “Ukrainian authorities are within their right to investigate and prosecute any individual, regardless of their religious affiliation, when there is credible evidence to indicate their specific actions are illegal and pose a threat to public safety and state security,” Williamson [Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch] said.  “However, religious affiliation on its own can't be considered such evidence.”   As discussed in my prior newsletters, Law 3894 bans the UOC if there is any “sign” of “affiliation” with the Russian Orthodox Church.  See generally   https://www.unifr.ch/orthodoxia/de/assets/public/files/Dokumentation/Anderson/LAW 3894 OF UKRAINE.pdf  As indicated by Williamson, affiliation alone cannot be the basis for banning.  Human Rights Watch also stated:  The Ukrainian government should suspend implementation of the law and request the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters, and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe’s’ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights to provide expert analysis of the law that would be the basis for its rights-respecting revision.

  Archbishop Sylester (Stoichev), rector of the Kyiv Theological Academy and Seminary, has written an interesting article entitled “Ways to autocephaly: the global and Ukrainian contexts.”   https://kdais.kiev.ua/event/dopovid-17-10-2024/  Near the end of his article, he states:

  The Ukrainian Orthodox Church already exists as fully independent after 27 May 2022.   And we expect other Local Churches to see our de facto independence and come to the conclusion that we need to be recognised as an autocephalous Church.   So, to my mind, today we should first of all establish regular communication with the Patriarchate of Constantinople and all the other Local Churches.   We should actively inform the primates of all the Local Churches of the decisions taken at the Council at Feofaniia and explain the true meaning of these decisions.

  In this way, we will be able to prepare a solid ground for future decisions at the pan-Orthodox level.

  I was particularly interested in the suggestion that the UOC should establish “regular communications with the Patriarchate of Constantinople.”  The first step in this regard has probably already been taken when the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s delegation met with Metropolitan Onufry on August 22, 2024.  On November 13, 2018, the Holy Synod of the UOC ruled that:  “the clergymen of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church shall suspend Eucharistic communication with the clergy of the Constantinople Patriarchate, and the laity shall abstain from participation in the Sacraments performed in the churches of the Constantinople Patriarchate.”  https://sinod.church.ua/2018/12/07/zhurnali-zasidannya-svyashhennogo-sinodu-ukrajinskoji-pravoslavnoji-cerkvi-vid-13-listopada-2018-roku/#more-1556  However, a prohibition on clergymen of the UOC participating in Eucharistic communication with clergymen of the Ecumenical Patriarchate does not seem to prohibit "regular communications" such as letters, conversations, and non-Liturgical meetings between the UOC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

  Lastly, there is the sad news that Father, Professor, and Doctor Ernst Suttner died on October 22, 2024, at the age of 91.  https://pow.bistum-wuerzburg.de/aktuelle-meldungen/detailansicht/ansicht/professor-em-dr-ernst-christoph-suttner-gestorben/ ; https://okk-ktf.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/p_ostkirchenkunde/Artikel/Trauer_um__Prof._Suttner_Kathpress_23.10.24.pdf   He was for many years a member of the Catholic theological faculty of the University of Vienna, where he taught patrology and Eastern Church studies.  He was a member of the Joint International Commission for Theological Dialogue between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches from its founding in 1979 until the Baltimore (Emmitsburg) plenary in 2000 – a period of 21 years.   From 1993 to 1999, he was a part-time pastor of the German-speaking Catholic community in Moscow and a lecturer at the newly founded Catholic and Orthodox theological colleges in Moscow and St. Petersburg.  He received three honorary doctorate degrees from Romanian universities.  He donated his research library on the Eastern Churches to the Institute for Ecumenical Studies at the University of Fribourg.  May his Memory be Eternal!

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 28 October 2024: Vatican's "Final Document" on synodality & other news

  On October 26, 2024, the XVI Ordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops of the Catholic Church issued its Final Document on the subject, “For a Synodal Church: Communion, Participation, Mission.”  At the present time, the Final Document is only available in Italian and can be read at https://www.synod.va/content/dam/synod/news/2024-10-26_final-document/ITA---Documento-finale-26.10.pdf .  Official translations in other languages will be available in the near future.  However, in the meantime, I have attached a Google  English translation of the Final Document.

  The Final Document is the culmination of a long process that began three years ago and included consultations at the diocesan, national, and continental levels.  In a change from past practice, the voting participants at the General Assembly included not only bishops but also other religious and laypersons.  The names of those participating in the Assembly are listed at  https://www.synod.va/en/the-synodal-process/phase-2-the-discernment-of-the-pastors/the-second-sessionofthe-XVI-assembly1/list-of-participants.html.  There were four non-voting “fraternal delegates” at the Assembly from the Local Orthodox Churches of the Byzantine Tradition.  Although these delegates did not vote, they spoke during the Assembly.  They were:  Metropolitan Job of Pisidia (Ecumenical Patriarchate); Metropolian Gennadios of Libya (Alexandrian Patriarchate); Bishop Nektarije of London, Great Britain and Ireland (Serbian Patriarchate); and Metropolitan Iosif of Middle and Eastern Europe (Romanian Patriarchate).  There were also four fraternal delegates from the Oriental Orthodox Churches.  See the above link at pp.19-20.

  In the past, Pope Francis has stressed that the Catholic Church can learn from the Orthodox and other Eastern Churches about synodality.   On November 24, 2013, he stated in his Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium that “in the dialogue with our Orthodox brothers and sisters, we Catholics have the opportunity to learn more about the meaning of episcopal collegiality and their experience of synodality.”  As recently as September 28, 2024, Pope Francis stated in a meeting with Belgium Jesuits:  “The Easterners have not lost synodality; we have lost it.”  https://www.laciviltacattolica.com/do-not-be-afraid/  Sadly, the final document says nothing about learning from the Orthodox or Eastern Churches about synodality.  The word “Orthodox” is found nowhere in the 51-page document.

  The question remains as to whether the final document brings the Catholic Church closer or further away from the Orthodox Church.   During the first session of the Assembly last October, Metropolitan Job spoke and stated that “a synod is a deliberative meeting of bishops, not a consultative clergy-laity assembly.” He added: “In light of this, we could say that the understanding of synodality in the Orthodox Church differs greatly from the definition of synodality given by your present assembly of the Synod of Bishops.”  https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/255617/eastern-orthodox-synods-are-bishops-only-metropolitan-tells-delegates   He did give some examples of lay participation in Orthodox decision-making, but these are exceptions.  In the Final Document, the statement is made:  “Encouraging the widest possible participation of the whole People of God in decision-making processes is the most effective way to promote a synodal Church.”  See Paragraph 87.  One could argue that the foregoing statement is closer to the Protestant model than the Orthodox model.

  However, other aspects may bring the Catholic Church closer to the Orthodox Church.  For example, normally, the assembly of the synod of bishops concludes with an Apostolic Exhortation issued by the Pope.  The Exhortation becomes the authoritative document of the synod.  However, on October 26, Pope Francis stated that he did not intend to publish such an exhortation.  https://www.synod.va/content/dam/synod/assembly2024/document/2610/2024_10-26_CG17_SALUTO-SANTO-PADRE_ENG.pdf  The Final Document of the Synod issued on October 26 thus becomes the authoritative document.  This is consistent with the Orthodox practice where the decision of the synod is the authoritative document.   Of particular interest to Orthodox is the section of the Final Document relating to the “Bishop of Rome.”  This is found in paragraphs 130 – 139.  Paragraph 134 discusses “decentralization.”  Paragraph 135 states in part:  “Before publishing important normative documents, the Dicasteries are urged to initiate a consultation of the Episcopal Conferences and corresponding bodies of the Eastern Catholic Churches.”  With respect to this statement, I immediately think of Fiducia Supplicans, the declaration very recently issued by the Dicastery for the Doctrine of Faith covering the blessing of same-sex couples.  If such a consultation had occurred, the strong opposition of the African and Eastern Churches conferences would have been apparent, and this may have affected the issuance of the declaration.

  The Final Document does not include any of the major changes that many of the more conservative Catholics had feared.  The Final Document also disappoints the more liberal Catholics and the more liberal media who had hoped for major changes.  An interesting overview of this "soft landing” is found in an article by the Vatican expert journalist, John Allen.  https://cruxnow.com/news-analysis/2024/10/in-the-end-pope-francis-steered-his-synod-toward-a-soft-landing 

  On a completely different subject, Professor Volodymyr Burega, vice-rector for scientific and theological work at the Kyiv Theological Academy (UOC), has written an outstanding article on the ideology “Russian world.”  https://kdais.kiev.ua/event/17-10-2024-dopovid/  I have read articles by Professor Burega before and have been very impressed by his insights and accuracy.  In this article, he traces the historic development of the ideology beginning in the 1990s.  He acknowledges that the ideology is now used to justify the military aggression in Ukraine.  He concludes:  “And although Patriarch Kirill tried to give this ideology features of church teaching, it is quite obvious that the concept of 'Russian world' has a completely different nature.  In the speeches of Patriarch Kirill, the ideology of the 'Russian world' turned into a so-called civil religion, which cannot be confused with divinely revealed teaching.”  Although this is not a long article, it is the most informative article that I have read on “Russian world.”  I highly recommend it.

  The very pro-UOC website, Union of Orthodox Journalists, has just published a commentary severely criticizing as uncanonical the decision of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Holy Synod to remove Metropolitan Hilarion as head of the Donetsk diocese.  https://spzh.live/ru/zashhita-very/82716-avtonomija-upts-i-smeshchenie-donetskoho-mitropolita    This removal was discussed in my last newsletter.  See https://www.unifr.ch/orthodoxia/de/dokumentation/anderson/ (26 Oct. 2024)

  Finally, the Holy Synod of the Romanian Patriarchate issued a decision on October 25 providing as follows:  “With regret, the Synod acknowledged the unjustified postponement by Ukrainian authorities of legal recognition for the “Romanian Orthodox Church in Ukraine” religious association despite its compliance with all applicable Ukrainian laws.  The Synod approved continued efforts with central authorities in Romania and Ukraine to resolve this legitimate request.”  https://basilica.ro/en/holy-synod-announces-2026-focus-on-family-pastoral-care-and-commemoration-of-holy-women-sets-plans-for-centennial-events/ 

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

   

• 26 October 2024: Solution remains elusive for Ukrainian churches & other news

  On October 22, 2024, the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate met at the Phanar.  The Ecumenical Patriarchate uses a 6-month rotation system for Synod members.  The members of the Synod as of the October 22 meeting are listed at https://orthodoxtimes.com/new-composition-of-holy-and-sacred-synod-of-the-ecumenical-patriarchate/#:~:text=In%20line%20with%20the%20standard,presidency%20of%20Ecumenical%20Patriarch%20Bartholomew.  The press release for the first day of this meeting is found at https://ec-patr.org/%ce%b1%ce%bd%ce%b1%ce%ba%ce%bf%ce%b9%ce%bd%cf%89%ce%b8%ce%ad%ce%bd-%ce%b3%ce%b9%ce%b1-%cf%84%ce%b9%cf%82-%ce%b5%cf%81%ce%b3%ce%b1%cf%83%ce%af%ce%b5%cf%82-%cf%84%ce%b7%cf%82-%ce%b1%ce%b3%ce%af%ce%b1-29/  This release includes the following statement:  “During the midday break of work, the Patriarch and the members of the holy body received with cordiality and honor the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, His Excellency Mr. Andrii Sybiha  and his colleagues, after which they had a long and informative discussion on both sides.”  The Telegram channel of the Sofia Brotherhood (a Ukrainian organization consisting of members of both the UOC and the OCU) has stated with respect to this meeting the following:  “It became known from insider sources that during the recent meeting of the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and the members of the Synod with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Andrii Sybiga, the Patriarch asked the diplomat to facilitate the visit of the heads of both Ukrainian Orthodox churches and their delegations to the Phanar.”  https://t.me/s/sofiyske_bratstvo  I have not found further confirmation of this statement.

  On October 23, a meeting of the Holy Synod of the UOC was held at the residence of Metropolitan Onufry at Feofania.  https://uoc-news.church/2024/10/23/vidbulos-zasidannya-svyashhennogo-sinodu-ukrajinskoji-pravoslavnoji-cerkvi-2/#2024-10-25  The posting on the UOC website has only the following one-sentence statement with respect to the subjects discussed at the meeting:  “During the work of the Holy Synod, the bishops considered the issue of church life of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.”  This was the first meeting of the UOC Holy Synod since April 10, 2024.

  On October 25, the pro-Constantinople website The Orthodox Times posted an article that has immediately commanded considerable attention.  https://orthodoxtimes.com/disappointment-at-the-phanar-over-the-ukrainian-issue-upd/  The following is an excerpt from this article:

  There was a sense of disappointment during the session of the Holy and Sacred Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate regarding the progress of the so-called “Ukrainian” issue.  According to well-informed sources of orthodoxtimes.com, on the second day of the Holy and Sacred Synod session, a 50-page report was presented by the three-member delegation that visited Ukraine in August.  The atmosphere during the ensuing discussion was tense, as the Synodal Hierarchs seemed to conclude from the report that the delegation’s visit did not yield any positively assessable results.  In particular, it was noted that there seemed to be no prospect for dialogue between the two sides in Ukraine, as both Metropolitan Epifaniy and Metropolitan Onufriy seemed unwilling to budge from their respective positions in order to find common ground.

  Indicative of the prevailing atmosphere was the fact that some hierarchs even raised the possibility of convening a new unifying council.  Meanwhile, some Synodal Hierarchs expressed doubt that the choice of Metropolitan Epifaniy as head of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine was ultimately the right one.  During the session, the view of Metropolitan Sawa of Warsaw was also heard, who suggested that a new leader should be found for the Autocephalous Church of Ukraine. 

  Additionally, during the same session, a letter sent by Metropolitan Epifaniy of Kyiv to the Synod was read.  According to orthodoxtimes.com, Metropolitan Epifaniy in his letter criticized the Exarch of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Kyiv, Bishop Michael of Comana.  He also spoke disparagingly about the three-member delegation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate that visited Kyiv, as well as their actions and the outcome of the visit by the three envoys of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.  As if that were not enough, the Exarch of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Kyiv, Bishop Michael of Comana, also sent a letter in which he presented his perspective on the current situation within the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, making negative comments about Metropolitan Epifaniy.

  I have seen no confirmation of the above report from other sources.

  On October 25, Major Archbishop Sviatoslav, primate of the UGCC, met with the Ecumenical Patriarch at the Phanar.  https://ugcc.ua/data/glava-ugkts-zdiysnyv-ofitsiynyy-vizyt-do-konstantynopolskogo-patriarha-varfolomiya-5748/  The discussions included the present situation in Ukraine. 

  From all of the foregoing, it appears that a major breakthrough has not occurred as a result of the visit of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s delegation to Ukraine last August.  It appears highly unlikely that either Epifany or Onufry will take steps to improve significantly the relationship between the OCU and the UOC.  If progress is to be made, it may require some major new steps by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew.

  The Holy Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate met on October 24, 2024.  The minutes may be read at http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6167692.html.  In Journal entry 114,  Bishop Euthymius of Lukhovitsy is transferred from his position as Chairman of the Synodal Missionary Department to become the Vicar of the Exarchate of Africa.  The Exarchate will now have two Russian bishops, but no African bishops.

  In Journal entry 107, Metropolitan Hilarion (Shukalo) of Donetsk and Mariupol is retired based on his health, and Metropolitan Vladimir (Samokhin) is transferred from Vladivostok to head the Donetsk Diocese.  Metropolitan Vladimir is 44 years old, was born in the Ryazan Region (Russia), and appears to have no prior experience in Ukraine.  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1649431.html  Hilarion was born and raised in Lviv.  The UOC still considers Hilarion to be a member of its church, and there is no indication that the UOC has approved the retirement of Hilarion or the appointment of Vladimir.   Hilarion’s attitude toward the Moscow Patriarchate has been ambiguous.  However, I have not found any reports that the Donetsk Diocese has formally requested Patriarch Kirill to assume direct jurisdiction over the Diocese, and the website of the Diocese does not seem to indicate that the Diocese is under the direct jurisdiction of Moscow.  See  https://eparhiadonetsk.ru/   The Journal entry does not state that the retirement was requested by Hilarion, and Hilarion at age 73 has not yet reached the age of 75 when the submission of a retirement letter is required.  With respect to the Synod's statement relating to Hilarion's health, it appears from the website of the Diocese that Hilarion has recently been serving Liturgies at many different parishes.  Hilarion attended remotely the UOC Council in May 2022, and there he stated that the Donetsk Diocese will not leave the UOC and wants to remain part of the UOC, although he cannot agree with the decisions made at the Council.  It remains to be seen whether the UOC will protest the Moscow Synod’s actions with respect to Donetsk.

  In Estonia, Interior Minister Lauri Läänemets has proposed to the Estonian parliament a new law prohibiting the operation of certain religious organizations.   The complete text of his statement to the parliament can be read at https://www.err.ee/1609500181/laanemets-eestis-tegutsev-kirik-ei-tohi-olla-seotud-soda-toetava-organisatsiooniga .  Included in the statement is the following:  “Therefore, as the Minister of the Interior, I propose to the government to supplement the Law on Churches and Congregations in such a way that it excludes a church, congregation, union of congregations, monastery or other religious association operating in Estonia from having relations with any foreign organization, which, for example: - poses a threat to public or constitutional order in Estonia; - supports military aggression or calls for war; - encourages terrorism or violent behavior in any way.”  I have not found the text of the proposed new Estonian law.  However, from this brief description, the proposed law may well violate international guarantees of freedom of religion by making a mere relationship with the Moscow Patriarchate a ground for banning.

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 21 October 2024: Church involvement in Moldovan election & other news

  On October 20, a very important election was held in Moldova.  In the election for president, the current president Maia Sandu received 42% of the vote and will face a November 3 runoff against Alexandr Stoianoglo, who received 26%.  However, the greatest media attention has been focused on a referendum which posed the following question to the voters:  “Do you support the amendment of the Constitution with a view to the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union?”  With almost all of the votes counted, the "yes" votes are prevailing by an unexpectedly close margin -- 50.39%.  https://apnews.com/article/moldova-elections-eu-referendum-russia-325cb2c13beb1d76565a6e2aadef971a   As shown by the foregoing link, the media has also focused on many allegations of Russian interference with the election. 

  Allegations of interference have also been directed at the Orthodox Church of Moldova (“OCM”), which is part of the Moscow Patriarchate.  One source of these allegations is the smaller Metropolis of Bessarabia (“Metropolis”), which is part of the Romanian Patriarchate.  On September 26, the Metropolitan Petru, head of the Metropolis, issued an extremely strong statement which was clearly directed at the OCM without specifically mentioning the OCM by name.  https://www.mitropoliabasarabiei.md/comunicat-mitropolia-basarabiei-condamna-implicarea-politica-a-clerului-din-republica-moldova-in-campaniile-electorale/   The first part of the statement reads:

  With unspeakable pain and concern, we note the intensification of the actions lacking discernment and spiritual tact of some hierarchs and clerics from the Republic of Moldova, belonging to an ecclesiastical structure aligned with secular and imperialist ideologies, who have engaged unhindered in electoral political propaganda.   These actions, deeply offensive to the Christian and Romanian soul, are clearly directed against the spiritual and national unity of the people between the Prut and Dniester and represent a serious violation of the values of the Gospel, the love of the nation and the authentic mission of the Orthodox Church.

  From both media sources and on the ground, I have learned with indignation that in recent weeks these church figures have been actively engaged in a hostile political mission.  This involvement deepens the spiritual, social and political fractures in the Republic of Moldova, contributing to the destabilization of all Orthodox communities in the country.  More seriously, this scandalous agitation takes place within the Holy Altars and from the Holy Pulpits of the cathedrals and churches erected by the sacrifice and love of our forefathers, who loved their language, nation and faith, defending them with martyrdom at the cost of blood.

  Just as the Soviet atheistic regime profaned the holy places, using them to spread the ideology of hatred and the destruction of everything that was holy, Romanian and Christian, today we observe a repetition of this cruelty, through the infiltration of the same relentless imperialist aspirations by the Russophile hierarchs who continues a political agenda, this time masked under the appearance of a Church that should defend the Orthodox faith, but which serves other purposes, animated rhetorically under false victimizing calls "to prayer and fasting for peace,"  admired by idolaters of appearances that deceive the masses.

  I could not find any statements on the website of the OCM specifically refuting these allegations.  Metropolitan Petru himself, in a letter urging the faithful to vote in the election, did state:  In current times, Romania and the European space are essential landmarks for our trajectory, both culturally and spiritually.  Our belonging to the European space is more than a political or economic objective, but concerns the preservation and consolidation of our Romanian and European identity values.   https://mitropoliabasarabiei.md/comunicat-mitropolitul-basarabiei-indeamna-crestinii-sa-si-exercite-dreptul-la-vot-ca-o-marturisire-a-grijii-pentru-viitorul-tarii/   Although subtle, these remarks indicate that Metropolitan Petru is in favor of the constitutional amendment.

  As you may recall, Metropolitan Vladimir, the head of the OCM, wrote a very strong letter in September 2023 to Patriarch Kirill with a series of grievances against the Russian Church.  See https://www.unifr.ch/orthodoxia/de/dokumentation/anderson/ (newsletter of 20 October 2023)  There was then speculation that the OCM might seek to leave the Russian Church.  However, this speculation has now subsided.  It appears that the Moscow Patriarchate has taken steps to respond to at least some of the grievances.  For example, Moscow has allowed the OCM to nominate its own bishops (subject to the approval of the Moscow Holy Synod) and to have the episcopal ordinations occur in Moldova.  At the present time, it appears that the pro-Moscow elements of the OCM are in control.

  Beginning last summer, the Moscow Patriarchate has provided free pilgrimages for OCM clergy to visit the holy places of Russia and to strengthen fraternal ties between OCM and the Russian Church.  The OCM has denied that these pilgrimages have any electoral or political goals.  https://ortodox.md/patriarhia-rusa-organizeaza-pelerinaje-gratuite-pentru-clerul-moldovean-initiativa-spirituala-nu-politica/   As of early October 900 priests and faithful of the OCM have participated in these pilgrimages.  https://ortodox.md/intaistatatorul-bisericii-ortodoxe-din-moldova-ips-mitropolit-vladimir-a-luat-parte-la-pelerinajul-la-locurile-sfinte-din-rusia/  On October 2, Metropolitan Vladimir, primate of the OCU, was at the Trinity Monastery of St. Sergius with 150 priests and parishioners of the OCM.  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6163394.html 

  In other news, the Ukrainian government has recently said very little about Law 3894 as the U.S. presidential election approaches.  A People’s Deputy has stated on the social media that the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers has now approved a procedure submitted by DESS with respect conducting studies on the presence of signs of affiliation of religious organizations with the Russian Church.   https://t.me/oleksiihoncharenko/43928   While there has been relatively few recent events relating to Law 3894, there have sadly been violent confrontations recently between members of the OCU and the UOC with respect to control of the cathedral in Cherkasy.  The factual version of the UOC with respect to these events can be read at https://uoc-news.church/2024/10/20/v-cherkaskij-jeparxiji-opublikuvali-zayavu-pro-grubi-porushennya-prav-lyudini-pobittya-viryan-upc-pid-chas-rejderskogo-zaxoplennya-svyato-mixajlivskogo-kafedralnogo-soboru-v-m-cherkasi/#2024-10-21.  The events from the perspective of supporters of the OCU can be read at https://religionpravda.com.ua/  .

  On October 6, Pope Francis named 21 new cardinals-elect who will become cardinals at a consistory on December 7.   https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2024-10/pope-francis-announces-consistory-for-creation-of-new-cardinals.html   Included in the list of new cardinals is UGCC Bishop Mykola Bychok, CSsR., of Melbourne of the Ukrainians.  He is 44 years old and will be the youngest in the College of Cardinals.  A very detailed description of his life, including his service at Prokopievsk near Novosibirsk, can be read at https://synod.ugcc.ua/data/vladyka-mykolay-bychok-3324/ .   He has now given several interviews.  In one of the interviews  (https://risu.ua/velika-vidpovidalnist-i-mozhlivist-donositi-pravdu-pro-ukrayinu-intervyu-z-kardinalom-nominantom-mikoloyu-bichkom_n151623), there was the following question and answer:  

  Vladika, immediately after the announcement of the cardinal nomination by the Holy Father, questions began to spread on social networks, why was the Head of the Church not declared a cardinal, but a bishop from Australia?  Did you have a chance to talk to His Beatitude Sviatoslav about your appointment?  What did he tell you?

  — Yes, I had the opportunity to talk with His Beatitude Sviatoslav, to talk about this appointment, which really raises a lot of different questions.  However, as we know, this is a personal initiative of the Pope.  And the Pope chooses those whom he deems necessary.

  Only the Lord God knows how my name appeared there.  But I want to tell all our faithful that my appointment as a cardinal in no way puts me above the Patriarch and the Head of our Church.  His Beatitude Sviatoslav is our father, he is our Patriarch.  The fact that the Holy Father chose me as a cardinal does not mean that I will not fulfill my duties as a bishop.  I will continue to be the bishop of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania and will continue to serve as long as God entrusts me.

  The appointment, as stated by Bishop Mykola, raises many questions.  Why has Pope Francis continued not to name Sviatoslav a cardinal when the three prior primates of the UGCC (Slipy, Lubachivsky, Husar) were cardinals?  If Pope Francis wished the appointment to be a sign of papal support of the Ukrainian people in their sufferings in the current war, why did he select a bishop in peaceful Australia, rather than one sharing the struggles of the Ukrainian people in their war-torn nation?  Why was such a young bishop appointed?  I know of no answers to these questions, except that Pope Francis continues to break traditions and expectations in his appointment of cardinals.  For example, the bishop of Mongolia is a cardinal, but the archbishops of Milan and Turin are not.

  In the eleven years prior to the naming of the new 21 cardinals-elect on October 6, Pope Francis had refrained from naming as a cardinal any active head of an episcopal see in Eastern Europe except for one – Archbishop Grzegorz Ryś of Łódź (Poland).  On October 6, the Holy Father named  Archbishop Rolandas Makrickas,  Archpriest Coadjutor of the Basilica of St. Mary Major in Rome, to be a cardinal.  Archbishop Makrickas is a Lithuanian, but there continues to be no cardinals currently heading any episcopal see in the three Baltic nations, including Catholic Lithuania.  In another surprise, Pope Francis on October 6 named as a cardinal Archbishop Ladislav Nemet of Belgrade (Serbia).  Belgrade will become the only episcopal see headed by a cardinal in the nations that were part of the former Yugoslavia.  Orthodox Serbia will have a cardinal heading an episcopal see but Catholic Croatia and Slovenia will not.

  On October 17, the Moscow website of RAPSI, https://rapsinews.ru/incident_publication/20241017/310331262.html, posted an article entitled: “’Evidence’ of Metropolitan Hilarion's guilt turned out to be fake.”  This is followed by the statement: “RAPSI has initiated an official forensic examination of the video and audio materials published by Georgy Suzuki with the aim of discrediting Metropolitan Hilarion: the experts have put an end to attempts to incriminate the respected cleric.”   RAPSI is the Russian Agency of Legal and Judicial Information.  It was founded in 2009 in coordination with the Russian Constitutional Court, the Russian Supreme Court, the Russian Supreme Commercial Court, and RIA Novosti.  It covers Russian and international legal news and provides exclusive information directly from the press services of courts of all levels and competencies.  https://www.rapsinews.com/docs/about/index.html   The article states that RAPSI had retained the Center for Law and Forensic Expertise "ISTINA" (https://www.istinaexpert.ru/) to examine the videos and recordings used by Suzuki in his claims against Hilarion.  The article quotes in detail the findings of Istina that the videos had been edited and contain parts of “artificial origin” and that the audio recordings had also been changed through digital editing.  Immediately after the posting of the article, the state news agency RIA Novosti contacted Metropolitan Hilarion concerning the report.  The Metropolitan’s comments were then reported at https://ria.ru/20241017/ekspertiza-1978589115.html.  According to the Metropolitan, the published forensic examination of fragments of audio and video materials published to make accusations against him indicate that the files were manipulated and the recordings were unreliable.

  Over the past month, Suzuki has posted five separate videos on YouTube in which he strongly attacks Metropolitan Hilarion.  These videos have been publicized by Andrey Kuraev on his blog.  Kuraev has now publicized a sixth video in which Suzuki has commented on the expert examination of the videos and recordings.  https://diak-kuraev.livejournal.com/  Kuraev states:  “Georgy rightly says that these Russian ‘experts’ could not have had access to the original of his recordings (that is, to his phone, which is in Japan), and therefore they could only work with fragments of them, located on the open network and specially prepared for publication.”  All of this involves matters that are far beyond my own personal expertise.  However, the Istina report acknowledges that it was dealing with fragments (presumably the incriminating parts of the videos). The question remains in my mind as to why it was necessary to edit within those fragments.  

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 4 October 2024: Russian Church's view of important meeting in Egypt - a ray of hope?

  On October 3, Hieromonk Stefan (Igumnov), who was one of the two representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate at the recent Oriental Orthodox Churches – Orthodox Church meeting sponsored by Coptic Pope Tawadros II on September 16-17, gave an interview concerning the meeting to RIA-Novosti.  https://ria.ru/20241002/paskha-1975799356.html   I have pasted a Google translation of the interview below.  Not surprisingly, Father Stefan does not characterize the meeting as “a meeting of the commission for dialogue between the Orthodox Church and the ancient Eastern Churches, in which one of the chairmen is a representative of Constantinople.”  Regardless how the meeting is characterized, it was a meeting in which most of the Local Churches of the Orthodox Church and the most of the Oriental Orthodox Churches participated and in which the participants stated a common position on the issue of family (same-sex marriage) and a common Pascha date.  It was made possible by the respect in which Pope Tawadros is held.  If such a meeting was held once, there is no reason why a second such meeting could not be held to address other issues facing our world.   I personally believe that holding future meetings of this nature (perhaps also sponsored by Pope Tawadros) could be a very positive step forward in helping to heal the divisions now existing in the Orthodox world and also in giving the world the benefit of a united Orthodox vision on important world issues. .

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

   

  – Father Stefan, please tell us about the meeting of Churches that took place in Cairo .

  – The meeting, which took place in Egypt, took place in the monastery of St. Paisios the Great in the Nitrian desert and was of a historic nature.  For more than 30 years, representatives of the Orthodox and ancient Eastern Churches had not gathered at such a level.  The event took place at the invitation and on the personal initiative of His Holiness Patriarch Tawadros II of Coptic Church, who pays great attention to dialogue in this format, and the organization of this meeting was the result of his efforts over the past few years.  At the same time, this format of the event, held at the invitation of the Coptic Patriarch, made it possible for a delegation of the Russian Orthodox Church to participate in it.  This was not a meeting of the commission for dialogue between the Orthodox Church and the ancient Eastern Churches, in which one of the chairmen is a representative of Constantinople.

  – How was the interaction with representatives of the Constantinople, Alexandria, Cyprus and Greek churches, with whom the Russian Church currently has no prayerful communication, structured at the meeting in Cairo?

  – As is known, by decision of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, our representatives cannot participate in events where there is such co-chairmanship. But this meeting had a completely different format.  For the first time in history, such a meeting was held at a round table without chairmen with equal participation of representatives of all Churches.  This is a unique format, and the stated goal of the event – a conversation about the future of relations between the Orthodox and ancient Eastern Christian world – not only made it possible for the delegation of the Russian Orthodox Church to participate in this meeting, but also became an important milestone in the context of the efforts that the Russian Orthodox Church itself has been making for many years to promote this dialogue and to develop relations with the churches of the ancient Christian world, such as the Coptic Church, the Ethiopian Church, the Malankara Church of India , the Syrian Orthodox Church, the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Eritrean Church.

  – The conference communiqué was adopted by all participants, including the Churches with which the Russian Church currently has no communication.  Can we hope that at least in such ethical issues as the protection of traditional values, which was discussed in the document, there is unanimity among them, and were negotiations conducted directly with them about this?

  - The adopted communiqué contains very important provisions, including in defense of traditional moral values and the institution of the family in its Christian understanding.  There was also a call for Western Christians to return to the Orthodox tradition of celebrating Easter on the day that corresponds to the decision of the First Ecumenical Council.  All these important provisions and formulations were included in the communiqué with the active participation of representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church.  This was not the result of bilateral negotiations between us and representatives of those Greek Churches with whom we have suspended communication to date - it was the result of common efforts and a common consensus of representatives of the Churches who took part in this meeting.  I would like to emphasize once again that the Coptic Church played a huge role in its organization and holding.

  – Pope Francis also recently called for the celebration of Easter on the same day from 2025 and the coincidence of dates .  Can we say that there really is a consensus among Christians in the world that Easter should be celebrated on the same day by everyone?

  – Indeed, the topic of celebrating Easter by all Christians on one day is heard today from different people and in different contexts.  It is very important to distinguish the fundamental points in such proposals.  The idea voiced in the communiqué of the meeting of representatives of the Orthodox and ancient Eastern Churches in Cairo is that those Christian communities, primarily in the West, which follow an alternative Paschalion, should return to the date of celebrating Easter that is sacredly observed by the Orthodox Churches and ancient Eastern Churches, and which is based on the decision of the First Ecumenical Council.  This idea is all the more relevant since next year will mark the 1700th anniversary of the First Ecumenical Council, therefore the Orthodox Churches and ancient Eastern Churches are calling not just for a single date for celebrating Easter, but specifically for the acceptance by all of that Paschalion that has always been observed by the Orthodox Church and the ancient Eastern Churches.

  – In Cairo, at a round table provided by the Coptic Patriarch, Churches with which the Russian Church currently has no prayerful communion gathered.  Could this become a model for a future dialogue platform where the current division in Orthodoxy could be overcome?

  - This idea is not being discussed yet. The meeting in Egypt had a specific goal: to discuss issues that concern local Orthodox and ancient Eastern Churches. The agenda of inter-Orthodox dialogue was not included in this meeting.

  – The Commission for Dialogue between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ethiopian Church also recently met in the Ethiopian capital  Addis Ababa.  Could you tell us about the agenda of its meeting?

  – There were no theological issues on the agenda of the meeting, but many topics were devoted to the development of bilateral cooperation, such as interaction in supporting Christians who are persecuted in different regions of the world, including in Ukraine, the topic of joint protection of traditional values, cooperation in the academic sphere in the field of student exchange, the topic of church art, the humanitarian sphere and many others.

  This was already the third meeting of the commission, and bilateral relations between the Russian Orthodox and Ethiopian churches have been developing very actively in recent years in line with the tradition that was laid down in the 19th and 20th centuries by many of their outstanding representatives.

• 1 October 2024: Important aspects of the resumption of the Orthodox - Oriental Orthodox dialogue

  At the invitation of Pope Tawadros II, primate of the Coptic Church, a meeting was held last month between representatives of the Oriental Orthodox Churches (sometimes referred to as the Ancient Oriental Churches) and the Orthodox Churches.   In my opinion, this was an extremely important meeting, although it has received very little attention in the media.  As you know, the Oriental Orthodox Churches are those churches that did not accept the Council of Chalcedon (451) but accepted the prior three ecumenical councils.  The Orthodox Churches are those that did accept the Council and follow the Byzantine tradition.  The meeting was held at the famous Coptic Monastery of Saint Bishoy located in Wadi El Natrun, 110 km northwest of Cairo on September 16 and 17.  The official communique issued at the end of the meeting can be read in English at the website of the Coptic Church,  https://copticorthodox.church/en/2024/09/17/meeting-of-the-orthodox-churches-representatives-at-the-papal-residence-in-saint-bishoys-monastery/ .  The Moscow Patriarchate reported the meeting at https://mospat.ru/ru/news/92262/ .  The Romanian Patriarchate reported the meeting at  https://basilica.ro/en/dialogue-between-orthodox-church-and-oriental-churches-resumes-after-31-years-in-cairo/ .  

  The Moscow Patriarchate’s website reported the churches attending the meeting as follows:  “On the Orthodox side, delegates from the Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, Russian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Cypriot, Greek, Polish, Albanian Orthodox Churches and the Orthodox Church in America took part in the work of the Conference.  On the Ancient Oriental side, there were representatives of the Coptic, Syrian Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic (Etchmiadzin and Cilician Catholicates) and Eritrean Churches.”   The Orthodox Churches that were not present were those of Serbia, Georgia, and Czech Lands and Slovakia, as well as the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Church of North Macedonia.  Those Oriental Orthodox Churches that were not present were the Ethiopian and Malankara Churches.   The Coptic Churches website describes the attendees as follows:  “Each Church was represented by two members who were from Russia, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus, Jerusalem, Syria, Lebanon, Armenia, Poland, Egypt, Eritrea and Albania.”  The two representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate were “Bishop Kirill of Sergiev Posad and Dmitrov, abbot of the Holy Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius, rector of the Moscow Theological Academy, and Hieromonk Stefan (Igumnov), secretary of the Department of External Church Relations for inter-Christian relations.”   The two representatives of the Romanian Patriarchate were “Bishop Benedict of Bistrița, assistant bishop of the Archdiocese of Vad, Feleac, and Cluj, and Fr. Viorel Ioniță, honorary patriarchal counsellor.”

  According to the official communique, this was “a preparatory meeting of the Orthodox Church and the Oriental Orthodox Churches “For the love of Christ compels us” (II Corinthians 5:14), dedicated to the unity of the Orthodox Churches.”  The communique stated in part:

  Gathered in the name of the Triune God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, the members of the meeting attended a prayer, at the Transfiguration Church, led by His Holiness Pope Tawadros II, who welcomed everyone with sincere joy and emphasized: “building relations of love in Christ, deepening our understanding of each other, continuous dialogue, and relentless prayers would […] take us all to the heart of Our Lord Jesus Christ,” and that “ we need to have one Orthodox voice built on a mutual view of global social issues that are forming a great concern now for our churches.”

  His All-Holiness the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, underlined in his message: "Our concern for and our dedication to the task of Christian unity […] springing from a sense of responsibility and from the conviction that mutual understanding and cooperation are of fundamental importance if we never wish to ‘put an obstacle in the way of the gospel of Christ,’ (I Cor. 9:12) with the common goal being ‘the ultimate restoration of unity in true faith and love.'"

  The two co-chairmen of the Joint Commission for the Theological dialogue between the Orthodox Church and the Oriental Orthodox Churches, HE Elder Metropolitan Emmanuel of Chalcedon (Ecumenical Patriarchate) and HE Metropolitan Thomas of Quosia and Mir (Coptic Orthodox Church) made introductions regarding the previous stages and achievements of the dialogue, and recommendations for future steps.  HE Metropolitan Emmanuel also recalled the blessed memory of Metropolitan Bishoy of Damietta, former co-chairman, who played a predominant and decisive role together with his late predecessors Metropolitan Damaskinos of Switzerland and Metropolitan Chrysostomos of Myra, the first co-chairman, for their tireless efforts for having advanced rapidly the theological dialogue.  Moreover, HE Metropolitan Thomas pointed out the need for an immediate action towards the implementation of the agreements of the Dialogue and noted that in our days the voice of the Orthodox faith can bring hope to the people and restore Christianity in the fragile society of today’s world. 

  The representatives of the two Orthodox families met in an atmosphere of Christian fraternal love in the round table.  They recognized the successful steps of the dialogue while elaborating the concrete measures needed for the restoration of full communion by considering a ‘Road Map’ previously prepared by the working group of official delegates in Athens, 24^th-25^th November 2014.  An intense and fruitful discussion took place.  Separate meetings of the families discussed the issues from the perspective of each family followed by a series of plenary sessions, addressing: the stance of each Church on the Agreed Statements; how to implement them, how to proceed, and how to deal together with contemporary challenges, including social and ethical issues, facing the Orthodox.

  Furthermore, with one voice and in faithfulness to our shared theological, biblical and patristic tradition, all members raised the issue of the crisis surrounding family matters and anthropological challenges present in today’s secular society. They expressed the wish that all Christians may become ambassadors (cf. II Cor 5:20) of Christ’s message to the modern society, in order to transfigure the world with the light of truth and wisdom.

  ….

  The participants unanimously agreed that:
  i) the two Joint Sub-Committees on liturgical and pastoral issues continue their work;
  ii) the two co-chairmen of the Commission visit the Primates of the Orthodox Churches and Oriental Orthodox Churches in order to communicate the positive outcome of the dialogue and to receive their feedback regarding the signed Agreed Statements and Proposals;
  iii) a joint website to be created, containing all the necessary documents of the previous bilateral dialogue at the disposal of the new members of the Joint Commission to be appointed by their Churches, to facilitate the decision making process;
  iv) the two Orthodox families involve all levels of the clergy, monastics and lay people in the implementation of the dialogue. 

  The Coptic website noted that the last such meeting was 34 years ago in 1990.  According to the website of the Romanian Patriarchate, it was the resumption of the dialogue of the Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox Churches “after a 31-year hiatus.”   According the website of the Moscow Patriarchate, the meeting “was devoted to issues of strengthening unity between the Local Orthodox Churches and the Ancient Eastern Churches, primarily in terms of implementing the results of the official theological dialogue that took place in 1989-1993 – during the active work of the Joint Commission for Theological Dialogue between the Orthodox Church and the Ancient Eastern Churches.”

  One of the most interesting aspects of this meeting is that the Moscow Patriarchate participated in it even though the co-chairman of the Joint Commission is Metropolitan Emmanuel of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.  As you recall, the Holy Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate on September 14, 2018, decided to “to interrupt the participation of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Episcopal Assemblies, in theological dialogues, multilateral commissions and all other structures in which the representatives of the Patriarchate of Constantinople are co-chairs.”  https://mospat.ru/ru/news/47198/  It can be argued that the meeting hosted by Pope Tawadros II was a “preparatory meeting” and thus not within the foregoing limitation imposed by the Holy Synod.  However, there will presumably be future meetings of the Joint Commission as well as of the two subcommittees that are established.  The Moscow Patriarchate will need to decide whether to participate in these or not.  In the last year, the Moscow Patriarchate has placed great emphasis on contacts with the Oriental Orthodox Churches.  It also seeks to maintain very good relations with the Coptic Church and Pope Tawadros – perhaps due to the present existence of the Moscow Patriarchate in Africa.  My guess is that the Moscow Patriarchate will establish an exception for this dialogue and will continue to participate.  Another interesting aspect is that the Moscow Patriarchate’s website stated that the Orthodox Church in America (OCA) had delegates at the meeting.  However, the website of the Coptic Church listed no delegation from the U.S.  In the past the Ecumenical Patriarchate had not agreed to the presence of the OCA on international dialogue commissions as the Ecumenical Patriarchate has not recognized the autocephaly of the OCA.  Maybe the Ecumenical Patriarchate will make an exception with respect to the Orthodox – Oriental Orthodox Commission.  

  It is interesting that the resumption of the dialogue of the Oriental Orthodox Churches with the Orthodox Church occurs a few months after the suspension of the dialogue of the Oriental Orthodox Churches with the Catholic Church.  With respect to both the resumption and the suspension, the leader has been Pope Tawadros.  Perhaps Pope Tawadros, who is a strong believer in Christian unity, decided to change his focus to the Orthodox after the dialogue with the Catholics was suspended. The suspension of the Catholic dialogue was covered in my previous newsletters.  On March 7, 2024, the Holy Synod of the Coptic Church suspended the dialogue between the Coptic Church and the Catholic Church “after consulting with the sister churches of the Eastern Orthodox family.”  At the same time, the Holy Synod adopted a statement on “The Belief of the Coptic Orthodox Church on the Issue of Homosexuality.”   https://copticorthodox.church/en/holy-synod/holy-synod-session-march-2024/  It is clear that the suspension was triggered by the issuance by the Vatican of Fiducia Supplicans relating to same sex blessings.  https://www.ewtnvatican.com/articles/coptic-orthodox-church-confirms-dialogue-with-catholic-church-suspended-over-same-sex-blessings-2273   On May 22, Cardinal Victor Fernández, head of the Vatican’s Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith who signed Fiducia Supplicans, made a special trip to Cairo to explain to Pope Tawadros the Vatican's position on same-sex blessings.   https://copticorthodox.church/en/2024/05/22/h-h-pope-tawadros-ii-receives-cardinal-victor-fernandez-envoy-of-the-pope-of-the-vatican-and-head-of-the-vaticans-department-of-doctrine-and-faith/ .   However, it appears that Pope Tawadros was not persuaded.

  The communique issued after the September 16-17 meeting addressed only one substantive issue.  It stated that matrimony was  “the indissoluble and loving union between a man and a woman.”  It affirmed: “Our Churches categorically reject the justification of same-sex relations within what is called ‘absolute human freedom’ which causes harm to humanity.”   As was true of the statement of the Holy Synod of the Coptic Church issued on March 7, the statement of September 17 does not specifically mention same-sex blessings.  However, it is likely that the reason for raising this topic was the issuance of the Vatican's statement relating to same-sex blessings as was true for the Coptic statement of March 7.  In fact it is likely that Pope Tawadros desired that the statement be made in the communique to show that his concerns with respect to same-sex blessings are shared by all of the Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox Churches.

  The communique also made the following appeal:  “As 2025 marks the 1700^th anniversary of the first ecumenical council of Nicaea, and Christians around the world will celebrate Pascha at the same date, the representatives of the two families expressed their wish that all Christians in the whole world celebrate Pascha following the canonical tradition of Nicaea and the Orthodox Paschalion.”   Some non-Orthodox may not be familiar with the “Orthodox Paschalion.”  The following are two paragraphs that I wrote in an article a few years ago explaining the Paschalion:

  The Julian calendar, decreed by Julius Caesar in 45 BC, made every fourth year a leap year.  With respect to Easter, the first Council of Nicaea decided in 325 that it would be observed on the first Sunday after the first full moon after the spring equinox.   Several centuries later, a table, called the Paschalion, was developed to determine when the paschal full moon would occur in future years.  Using both the Julian calendar and a lunar calendar, it was an excellent effort to predict the actual dates of the equinox and full moons, but it was not exact.  For centuries [until 1582], both the Orthodox and Catholic Churches used the Paschalion to determine the dates of the equinox and the paschal full moon as opposed to using physical observations of the sun and moon.

  By 1582, the errors of the Julian calendar had caused the Paschalion to be wrong by ten days with respect to the date of the equinox and wrong by approximately four days for the phases of the moon.  To correct these errors, Pope Gregory XIII degreed that ten days would be eliminated in October 1582 and that a limited exception would be made to the leap year rule of the Julian calendar.   Under the exception, the leap year would not be observed in centennial years (divisible by 100) but that centennial years divisible by 600 would remain leap years.  It was also discovered that this new “Gregorian calendar” did not work with the Paschalion, and it was necessary for the Catholic Church to develop a new and different Easter table (“computus”).

  There was some hope that both the East and the West could adopt in 2025 a new way of computing Pascha based on astronomical data.  However, the communique shows that there is simply not an Orthodox consensus to change their way (used by all of the Orthodox Churches except Finland) of computing Pascha.  Indeed, the Synaxis of the Hierarchs of the Ecumenical Throne (Ecumenical Patriarchate) stated on September 3, 2024:  “In this spirit, the unanimous wish is expressed that the common celebration of Pascha next year by Eastern and Western Christianity should not be merely a happy coincidence, but the beginning of the establishment of a common date for its annual celebration, according to the Paschalion of our Orthodox Church.”    Now, the Western Christian churches need to respond to this Orthodox suggestion.  In my opinion, the decision involves the question of whether one should accept astronomical error (with respect to the first full moon after the spring equinox) for the sake of Christian unity.  In the 21st Century, the latest Orthodox Pascha will be May 7 (2051).  In the 22nd Century, the latest Orthodox Pascha date will be May 9 (2173). For the 40th Century, the latest Orthodox Pascha date will be May 22 (3932).   http://5ko.free.fr/en/easter.php?y=40  

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 24 September 2024: Ukrainian Law 3894 - English translation of entire text with commentary

  On Monday, September 23, Ukrainian Law 3894 (previously Draft Law 8371) went into effect except for certain amendments to the Judicial Code.  These amendments to the Judicial Code relate to court enforcement of an order to terminate a religious organization and will become effective on May 24, 2025.  The title of Law 3894 is “On the protection of the constitutional order in the sphere of activity of religious organizations.”  In spite of this title, the primary purpose of this Law is to authorize the termination of an Ukrainian religious organization on any one of three grounds.  In general terms, these three grounds are: (1) “affiliation” with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) --  “affiliation” being found if any one of seven “signs” of "affiliation" is present; (2)  repeated facts of the religious organization being used to spread the ideology of "Russian world;" and (3)  conviction of its authorized persons for committing crimes involving national security or for committing other specified crimes such as the incitement of religious enmity.  Although the Law does not name the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), statements by members of the Rada (the Ukrainian parliament) make it very clear that the UOC is the primary target of the Law.

  The termination of a religious organization under the Law has draconian consequences.  “Cult property [such as churches, monasteries, and seminaries] is transferred to other religious organizations.”  Undoubtedly, the primary recipient of the UOC’s “cult property” would be the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU).  The courts are authorized to transfer all non-cult property to the state.  Leases or agreements providing for the use of property by the terminated religious organization are ended early.

  The question now is whether Law 3894 is a good law or a bad law for which Ukraine should be criticized.  Already, the Synods or primates of various Orthodox churches have expressed concerns about the new Law.  This includes the Patriarchates of Antioch, Jerusalem, Moscow, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Moscow  and  the Churches of Albania and Czech Lands and Slovakia.   On September 16 the  Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of the United States of America stated that it was “deeply concerned” about the Law.  https://www.assemblyofbishops.org/news/2024/uk-law-3894-peace   Others expressing concern include Pope Francis and the WCC.  On the other hand, Ukrainian supporters of Law 3894 contend that those expressing concerns have succumbed to Russian propaganda.  They maintain that the purpose of the Law is not to prevent the exercise of religious freedoms, but rather to prevent religion being used as a weapon in Ukraine.

  Who does one believe?  For over one week, I have been studying the full text of Law 3894 as signed by President Zelensky.  With the Google translation tool, with some corrections made by me, I have prepared an English translation of the entire text.  I have then studied every paragraph and made comments on many of them.  I have prepared a document in which the full text of the Law is in black font, while my comments are in red font.  The comments are placed next to the text paragraphs to which they relate.  In that way, the reader can make his or her own judgement as to whether my comments are in fact correct.  Some of the comments are aids to assist the reader in navigating the long statute.  Others summarize various provisions.  And some reflect my opinions with respect to various provisions.

  THE DOCUMENT IS ENTITLED:  “ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF LAW 3894 WITH COMMENTS.”  THE DOCUMENT CAN BE READ AT   https://www.unifr.ch/orthodoxia/de/assets/public/files/Dokumentation/Anderson/LAW 3894 OF UKRAINE.pdf

  The document is 28 pages in length, a majority of which is the actual text of the law.  Some of the more important parts of the document are:

  National security as a justification for the Law  p. 1-2

  Termination of a religious organization for promoting “Russian world”  pp. 6, 17, 26-27

  Termination of a religious organization which is “affiliated” with ROC  pp. 10-13

  Termination a religious organization for conviction of authorized persons for committing certain crimes including inciting religious enmity  p. 17

  Disposal of property of a religious organization after termination  pp. 23-24

  Having completed my study, my conclusion is that 3894 is a bad law.  However, I am not alone in my judgement.  Professor Dmytro Vovk and Professor Elizabeth A. Clark have written a detailed analysis of 3894.  Their excellent article in English can be read at https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2932   Although I am an attorney, Professor Vovk is a Ukrainian lawyer specializing in law and religion.  He is thus far more qualified to analyze 3894 than I.  He is presently “a visiting professor of law and a legal scholar specializing in the rule of law, church state relations, and comparative constitutional law” at  Cardozo School of Law (part of Yeshiva University) in New York City.   https://cardozo.yu.edu/directory/dmytro-vovk   He is also the Director of the Center for the Study of the Rule of Law and Religion of Yaroslav the Wise National University of Law, the largest law school in Ukraine.   He is presently a member of the OSCE/ODIHR Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief.  Professor Vovk and Professor Clark believe that 3894 “does not comply with legally-binding international standards of freedom of religion or belief, and significantly increases State powers to arbitrarily monitor and restrict religious communities and the expression of religious ideas.”

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 4 September 2024: Synaxis of Ecumenical Patriarchate & other news

  The meeting of the Synaxis of Hierarchs of the Ecumenical Throne was held at the Grand Hyatt Hotel in Istanbul, September 1-3.  This meeting, which is held every three years, included more than one hundred bishops of the Ecumenical Patriarchate from throughout the world.  At the beginning of the Synaxis, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew gave an address.   https://ec-patr.org/%e1%bc%90%ce%bd%ce%b1%cf%81%ce%ba%cf%84%ce%ae%cf%81%ce%b9%ce%bf%cf%82-%e1%bd%81%ce%bc%ce%b9%ce%bb%ce%af%ce%b1-%cf%84%e1%bf%86%cf%82-%ce%b1-%ce%b8-%cf%80%ce%b1%ce%bd%ce%b1%ce%b3%ce%b9%cf%8c-3/  The following are some of his observations:

  A major problem in this connection is the anthropological and moral confusion about the essentials of life, even among Christians.  It is self-evident that we are concerned with the division of Christianity and how it will be transcended.  It is our duty to compete in the arena of ecumenical dialogue. 

  It is considered certain that the peace of religions is of decisive importance for the peace of peoples and cultures and that the way to this is the sincere inter-religious dialogue.  Today there are two enemies of this dialogue: a) fundamentalism, i.e. the absolutization of my own truth and the demonization of the other, which fuels intolerance and violence "in the name of God", and b) the acceptance of everything and the denial that there is "truth", i.e. the so-called "postmodern nihilism" of "anything goes". 

  It is noteworthy that the positions which present the Orthodox Church as essentially negative towards the ecumenical dialogue and indifferent to the meeting of contemporary culture and new ideas, as introverted and ethnocentric, are expressed under the walls as praise and as a testimony of authenticity of orthodox opinion, while from outside with a critical attitude and stigmatization of the "closed" Orthodoxy, according to them.  The characterization of the Holy and Great Synod of the Orthodox Church by fundamentalists as "ecumenical", while some outsiders believe that the Synod did not dare to take the necessary decisions in the face of contemporary great challenges, is a clear proof of this. This criticism fails completely when its object is the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the one vigorously fighting for the stability of Orthodoxy and its common witness in the world.

  The Holy Great Church of Christ is well aware of its pan-Orthodox responsibility and, also, the manner of its application and exercise.  The recent developments in Orthodox relations have made it clear that the unity of Orthodoxy is threatened when the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate is questioned….

  At the end of the Synaxis, a concluding statement was issued. https://orthodoxtimes.com/the-holy-synaxis-of-the-hierarchy-of-the-ecumenical-throne-has-concluded/ (English translation of text)  The Synaxis “explicitly condemned this ideology [Russian World] and the transformation of the Church into a secular institution, as well as its use to promote state interests and the ongoing war in Ukraine following the unprovoked invasion of a sovereign state by the Russian Federation.”  A letter was read from Patriarch Theodoros of Alexandria concerning “the canonical encroachment of the Moscow Patriarchate on the canonical territory of the Church of Alexandria and the resulting schism and scandal among the People of God in Africa.”  The Synaxis “condemned these non-canonical actions of the Russian Church” and “expressed its unwavering support for the Patriarchate of Alexandria and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.”  The Ecumenical Patriarch stated that the official celebration of the 1700th anniversary of the convocation of the First Ecumenical Council in Nicaea, Bithynia, will take place at the end of May 2025 with the participation of Pope Francis.

  The special delegation, appointed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate to investigate ways to improve religious relations in Ukraine, has completed its visit to Ukraine.  As described in my last report, the delegation met with the heads of the OCU, UOC, UOC-KP, and the UGCC.   https://www.unifr.ch/orthodoxia/de/dokumentation/anderson/ (25 Aug. 2024)  They subsequently met with Roman Catholic Bishop Vitalii of Kyiv and Zhytomyr on August 26 for three hours.   https://www.facebook.com/vitalii.kryvytskyi/posts/pfbid02SNupvGk46JgFxx2S7w1WC4dPhx5WT4G1p6qymYLo9UYhjDYrgv39YRsjcLMsUeA8l?rdid=7LNpg3MNT7xG0k9C    There was a separate meeting with the Apostolic Nuncio, Archbishop Visvaldas Kulbokas.  https://www.uocc.ca/meetings-of-the-delegation-of-the-ecumenical-patriarchate/  Metropolitan Ilarion had a private meeting with Metropolitan Oleksandr (Drabinko), a hierarch of the OCU who had previously been a metropolitan of the UOC and as a priest, had been personal secretary to Metropolitan Volodymyr, the previous primate of the UOC.   https://www.facebook.com/oleksandr.drabinko  The special delegation met on August 28 with the St. Sophia Brotherhood, an organization of priests and laity from both the OCU and the UOC who seek better relations between the two churches.  https://sofiyske-bratstvo.org/vidbulas-zustrich-sofijskogo-bratstva-z-chlenamy-delegacziyi-vselenskogo-patriarhatu/   Undoubtedly, the delegation or one of its members met with a number of other organizations and persons as well.  The delegation had a meeting with President Zelensky and Viktor Yelensky on August 28.  https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/volodimir-zelenskij-zustrivsya-z-predstavnikami-vselenskogo-92885

  At the Synaxis, Elder Metropolitan Emmanuel of Chalcedon gave a report on “The Ukrainian question and Orthodoxy in the Baltic countries.”  It is extremely likely that he included in his report the visit of the special delegation to Kyiv.  However, I have seen no information as to what he said on that subject.

  I have also seen no official report or response from the UOC with respect to the meeting of Metropolitan Onufry and other UOC bishops with the special delegation from the Ecumenical Patriarchate.  The UOC is not a monolithic organization and has a broad spectrum of views, including a very conservative wing and a more liberal wing.  On August 23 Metropolitan Luke of Zaporozhye, one of the most conservative and outspoken hierarchs of the UOC, told his diocesan assembly that a relationship with the Ecumenical Patriarchate will “dramatically aggravate the situation.”  He stated that “our transition to the omophorion of Constantinople means only one thing – we will move further and further away from the Orthodox faith, following the Phanar's course towards unity with the Vatican.”  https://hramzp.ua/newsitem/sostoyalos-obshhee-sobranie-dukhovenst).  On the other hand, Prof. Sergii Bortnyk, who teaches at the UOC’s Kyiv Theological Academy and Seminary and who is an employee of the DECR of the UOC, has written an extremely interesting article entitled, “Legislative ban on UOC as a chance for reconciliation of Orthodox Churches in Ukraine.”  The article has been posted in English at https://publicorthodoxy.org/2024/08/28/legislative-ban-on-the-uoc-and-reconciliation-in-ukraine/   Dr. Bortnyk believes that the present time, with the impending ban of the UOC, may be an opportunity for churches to make changes that in normal circumstances would seem to be impossible.  Prof. Bortnyk's article is certainly worth reading.

  There does seem to be a somewhat different atmosphere prevailing now in Kyiv.  On August 23 there was a televised discussion lasting for 80 minutes between Metropolitan Kliment, head of the Information and Education Department of the UOC, and Metropolitan Oleksandr (Drabinko) of the OCU.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=776k8CcFVXU  The subject was: “’We are not Moscow priests’ - priests of UOC-MP and OCU on the law banning the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine.”  It is really amazing that metropolitans of the two churches were even talking with each other.  It is even more amazing that they were very polite to each other.

  Draft Law 8371, which passed by the Rada on the second reading and signed by President Zelensky, has now become “Law 3894.”  The complete text of Law 3894 is posted at https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3894-20#Text .  This is a very important link.  The Google translation tool works well with the full Ukrainian text found at this link, and one can use the tool to translate the full text into any language.  One can also use the search engine at this link to find any word or phrase in Law 3894.  Law 3894 was officially published on August 24, 2024.  The clock on the effective dates begins to run from this publication date.  Accordingly, all of the provisions, except for those relating to enforcement in the courts, will be effective September 23, 2024.  The provisions relating to court enforcement become effective nine months after the publication date or May 24, 2025. 

  There continues to be  concerns expressed about Law 3894.  On August 24, the World Council of Churches (WCC) issued a statement that “the WCC is deeply alarmed by the potential for unjustified collective punishment of an entire religious community and violation of the principles of freedom of religion or belief under a new law approved by the Ukrainian Rada on 20 August 2024.”  https://oikoumene.org/resources/documents/wcc-statement-on-the-new-law-passed-by-the-ukraine-rada-on-20-august-2024   On September 3, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem published a strong condemnation of the new law.  https://en.jerusalem-patriarchate.info/blog/2024/09/03/statement-by-the-patriarchate-of-jerusalem-on-recent-legislation-in-ukraine-affecting-freedom-of-religion/  The condemnation included the following:  It is in this spirit that the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, along with many of our fellow Patriarchs as well as other Heads of Church, condemn the passing of a new law by the Parliament of Ukraine on 20 August to ban the worship UOC churches.  Such a blanket punishment of countless faithful men and women does not promote unity, nor does it promote peace.   A representative of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has stated that the Office has now received a copy of the new law and is in the process of analyzing it.  The results of the analysis will be published. https://ria.ru/20240903/ukraina-1970281307.html 

  Stephen Schneck, chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), sent a message to Voice of America shortly after the passage of Law 3894. https://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-s-zelensky-considers-ban-on-russia-linked-religious-groups/7752255.html https://www.voanews.com/a/ukraine-s-zelensky-considers-ban-on-russia-linked-religious-groups/7752255.html  The message stated: “The most recent version of the law does not fully address prior concerns about the law's potential to impose collective punishments on entire religious communities.  It also introduced new problematic aspects that could compromise the protection of freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression.”   Immediately after the meeting with the special delegation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Dr. Viktor Yelensky, the head of DESS, travelled to Washington, DC to meet with various organizations including USCIFR.   https://dess.gov.ua/relihiyna-dyplomatiia-u-dii-vizyt-ukrainskoi-delehatsii-do-ssha/  However, Law 3894 will stand or fall based on the actual wording of the new law.  No amount of explanation by Dr. Yelensky or anyone else can change the actual wording.

  From August 10 to 29, Metropolitan Konstantin, the Moscow Patriarch’s Exarch of Africa, made a long visit to Kenya.  The program for the visit is described at http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6155838.html.  Metropolitan Konstanin also gave an interview to TASS.   https://tass.ru/obschestvo/21716789  He stated that the “number of priests who identify themselves as members of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Africa has already reached 236, with more than 100 of them in Kenya.”  During the visit, he ordained three priests.  Only five of the 236 priests are Russian-speakers.  On the last day of the visit, Metropolitan Konstantin celebrated Liturgy for the feast of the Dormition at the Russian Embassy in Nairobi.  The very close bond between the Moscow Patriarchate in Africa and the Russian Foreign Ministry continues.

  On September 3, the Estonian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate and the Pühtitsa Monastery filed separate lawsuits with the Tallinn Administrative Court.  The statement issued by the law firm can be read at https://sirel.com/mpeok-ja-puhtitsa-naisklooster-poordusid-kaebustega-halduskohtusse/.  According to the statement, the purpose of the lawsuits is “to eliminate the illegal consequences caused by the statement of the Riigikogu [the Estonian parliament] on 06.05.2024 ‘Declaring the Moscow Patriarchate as an institution supporting the military aggression of the Russian Federation’ and to exclude them [the Church and the Monastery] from the list of supporters of military aggression.”

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 25 August 2024 (2): Statement of WCC on Ukrainian Law 8371

  TO NEWSLETTER RECIPIENTS WHO MAY BE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN LAW 8371:

  On August 24, the World Council of Churches (WCC) issue a statement with respect to the law (Law 8371) passed by the Rada on August 20.   https://oikoumene.org/resources/documents/wcc-statement-on-the-new-law-passed-by-the-ukraine-rada-on-20-august-2024   This law has now been signed by President Zelensky.  The complete text of the WCC statement is pasted below.

  The six-step process, referenced in the statement, is as follows:  (1) On the initiative of the Ukrainian State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) or on the initiative of “other persons,” an investigation is begun by DESS; (2) The investigation is performed by DESS with the possible use of experts to determine whether there are "signs" that the religious organization is “affiliated” with the Moscow Patriarchate; (3) If any of the signs is found, DESS issues an order to eliminate the signs of affiliation; (4) Within a period of 30 days (which can be extended to 60 days), the religious organization is required to eliminate the signs of affiliation and to send a report to DESS.  The religious organization may also object to the findings of affiliation; (5) DESS then makes a decision as to whether affiliation still exists.  This five-step administrative procedure goes into effect and is activated 30 days after the publication of 8371.  There is then a sixth step which is the filing of a lawsuit by DESS with a court to terminate the religious organization which has failed to eliminate all of the signs of affiliation.  Under the terms of 8371, DESS cannot take this final sixth step and file a lawsuit with the court until nine months after the publication of 8371. However, all of the five administrative steps can be done before the ninth month.

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

   

  WCC Statement on the new law passed by the Ukraine Rada on 20 August 2024

  The government of Ukraine has the sovereign right and responsibility to defend the nation’s territorial integrity and to protect its citizens, even more so in the face of Russia’s illegal invasion and armed aggression. The World Council of Churches (WCC) has consistently condemned Russia’s war against Ukraine, and we remain steadfast in that position. Ukrainian authorities have a right to protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence, and to prosecute individuals guilty of crimes against the interests of Ukraine. 

  At the same time, the WCC is deeply alarmed by the potential for unjustified collective punishment of an entire religious community and violation of the principles of freedom of religion or belief under a new law approved by the Ukrainian Rada on 20 August 2024. The new law now awaits the signature of President Zelensky. We call again on the Ukrainian government to exercise caution in relation to measures that risk violating the fundamental right to freedom of religion or belief and undermining social cohesion at this time of national emergency. 

  We note the six-step process prescribed by the new law before a religious organisation can be banned, and plead that there be a fair and unbiased approach to any such investigation, and that due consideration be given to the principles of international law, natural justice and due process in undertaking any actions under this new law. Neither the crimes of some individuals, nor the historical affiliations of a particular religious entity, can be a sufficient basis for measures tantamount to collective punishment of a living worshipping religious community in Ukraine. The government of Ukraine is responsible for protecting the rights of all its citizens.

  Rev. Prof. Dr Jerry Pillay
  General secretary
  World Council of Churches

  Bishop Dr Heinrich Bedford-Strohm
  Moderator
  World Council of Churches

• 25 August 2024: Pope's statement on 8371 & Fanar delegation

  Pope Francis, in his Angelus address on Sunday, August 25, made a strong appeal relating to the religious situation in Ukraine.  The official English translation of his remarks can be read at https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/angelus/2024/documents/20240825-angelus.html.  With respect to Ukraine, he stated:

  I continue to follow with sorrow the fighting in Ukraine and the Russian Federation.  And in thinking about the laws recently adopted in Ukraine, I fear for the freedom of those who pray, because those who truly pray always pray for all.  A person does not commit evil because of praying.  If someone commits evil against his people, he will be guilty for it, but he cannot have committed evil because he prayed.  So let those who want to pray be allowed to pray in what they consider their Church.  Please, let no Christian Church be abolished directly or indirectly.  Churches are not to be touched!

  On August 23, Draft Law 8371 was signed by Ruslan Stefanchuk, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.  On August 24 (which is the Independence Day of Ukraine), President Zelensky signed the Draft Law.  These two events are noted on the webpage of the Rada relating to Draft Law 8371.  https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/41219  The signings by the two were apparently done privately without any ceremony.

  Using the above link, the official text of the 8371 in Ukrainian, as signed by Stefanchuk, can be read in its entirety by clicking on the entry “Текст, підписаний Головою Верховної Ради України”.

  Within a few hours after the Pope’s remarks, the remarks were posted in Ukrainian on the website of the UOC.  https://uoc-news.church/2024/08/25/nexaj-zhodna-xristiyanska-cerkva-ne-bude-skasovana-pryamo-chi-oposeredkovano-papa-francisk-prokomentuvav-prijnyattya-v-ukrajini-zakonoproektu-8371/   On August 24, Patriarch Kirill had sent a letter to world church leaders, including the Pope, and international organizations urging them to “to raise their voices in defense of the persecuted believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.”  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6153461.html  However, the Vatican has been concerned about 8371 for many weeks prior to this.

  The three-person delegation sent by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to Kyiv continues to meet with church leaders concerning the religious situation in Ukraine.  On August 23, they met with Major Archbishop Sviatoslav, the primate of the UGCC.  https://risu.ua/delegaciya-vselenskoyi-patriarhiyi-vidvidala-glavu-ugkc_n150457   On the same day, they met with Filaret, the head of the Kyiv Patriarchate. https://www.cerkva.info/news/sviatijshyj-patriarkh-filaret-zustrivsia-z-delehatsiieiu-konstantynopolskoho-patriarkhatu/

  The delegation met with the Metropolitan Onufry and others of the UOC on August 22, the same day that it met with the OCU.  There have been no statements either by the UOC or by the Fanar delegation about the UOC meeting.  Personally, I found the following article about the UOC meeting particularly interesting.  https://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/51261-gotovnist-na-dialog-ye-vvs-pro-zustrich-delegaciyi-vselenskogo-patriarxa-z-mitropolitom-onufriyem.html  This report is cautiously optimistic.  In my opinion, the very fact that there was a formal meeting between Metropolitan Onufry and a delegation from the Fanar is progress. 

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA 

• 24 August 2024: Official text of signed 8371

  TO NEWSLETTER RECIPIENTS WHO MAY BE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN LAW 8371:

  On August 23, Draft Law 8371 was signed by Ruslan Stefanchuk, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.  On August 24 (which is the Independence Day of Ukraine), President Zelensky signed the Draft Law.  These two events are noted on the webpage of the Rada relating to Draft Law 8371.  https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/41219  The signing by the two was apparently done privately without any ceremony.

  Using the above link, the official text of the 8371 in Ukrainian, as signed by Stefanchuk, can be read by clicking on the entry “Текст, підписаний Головою Верховної Ради України”  I have also copied and attached this official signed text.

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

   Official text of Signed Law 8371

• 23 August 2024: Critical time for UOC and Ecumenical Patriarchate & other news

  On August 20, the Ukrainian Rada approved on the second reading Draft Law 8371 without discussion and by a large majority vote.  https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-parliament-legislative-ban-ukrainian-orthodox-church-539e0f3a6d657277aa4fa93b8ec53505  The Draft Law is now being prepared for the signature of President Zelensky.  https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/41219  It appears absolutely certain that the President will sign 8371 as he repeatedly urged its passage in his nightly addresses last week.  In the event of an alleged violation of the new law, there are a series of administrative steps that will occur.  A very brief summary of these administrative steps is as follows:  (1) On the initiative of the Ukrainian State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) or on the initiative of “other persons,” an investigation is begun by DESS; (2) The investigation is performed by DESS with the possible use of experts to determine whether there are "signs" that the religious organization is “affiliated” with the Moscow Patriarchate; (3) If any of the signs is found, DESS issues an order to eliminate the signs of affiliation; (4) Within a period of 30 days (which can be extended to 60 days), the religious organization is required to eliminate the signs of affiliation and to send a report to DESS.  The religious organization may also object to the findings of affiliation; (5) DESS then makes a decision as to whether affiliation still exists.  This five-step administrative procedure goes into effect and is activated 30 days after the publication of 8371.  There is then a sixth step which is the filing of a lawsuit by DESS with a court to terminate the religious organization which has failed to eliminate all of the signs of affiliation.  Under the terms of 8371, DESS cannot take this final sixth step and file a lawsuit with the court until nine months after the publication of 8371. However, all of the five administrative steps can be done before the ninth month.

  There remains the very important question as to whether 8371 complies with the freedom of religion requirements of the Ukrainian Constitution and of the various international conventions to which Ukraine is a party, such as the Council of Europe’s Convention of Human Rights (involving the European Court of Human Rights and the Venice Commission) and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (involving the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights).   Liz Throssel, press secretary of the Office of the High Commissioner, has informed RIA Novosti: “We are aware of the adoption of this law by the Ukrainian parliament and are in the process of obtaining the law and analyzing its provisions."  https://ria.ru/20240821/ukraina-1967501859.html  It is my opinion, as frequently stated in my prior newsletters, a reading of the actual language of 8371 discloses many serious legal problems with respect to freedom of religion.  If you are interested in an English translation of 8371, as approved by the Rada, I will email it to you upon request.

  As is not surprising, the Holy Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate issued on August 22 a long and harsh condemnation of the passage of Draft Law 8371.   http://www.patriarchia.ru/en/db/text/6152926.html (official English translation of the full text)  

  The passage of 8371 may provide a critical opportunity to reassess the relationship between the UOC, the OCU, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate.  At the present time, a delegation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate is in Kyiv to explore the opportunities that may now exist for improving the religious situation in Ukraine.  As a first stop, the delegation visited the historic St. Andrew Church (owned by the State but used by the Ecumenical Patriarchate as its stauropegion) in Kyiv.  https://fosfanariou.gr/index.php/2024/08/21/antiprosopeia-tou-ecum-thronou-sto-kiev/  On August 22 the delegation met with Metropolitan Epifany and other representatives of the OCU.  The OCU’s summary of the meeting is found at https://www.pomisna.info/uk/vsi-novyny/zustrich-z-delegatsiyeyu-vselenskogo-patriarhatu/.  It is my understanding that the mission of the delegation is to talk to all parties and to seek to establish a dialogue to help resolve the religious situation in Ukraine.  All of the three members of the delegation are ethnic Ukrainians.  Metropolitan Ilarion is the Archbishop of Winnipeg and Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada.  In September 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarchate appointed Ilarion, then Bishop of Edmonton, Canada, to be one of two exarchs to Ukraine with the responsibility of preparing for the unification Council held in Kyiv at the end of the year.  Metropolitan Job (Getcha) of Pisidia was born in Canada and has held various important positions with the Ecumenical Patriarchate.  In 2014, Job and Ilarion represented the Ecumenical Patriarchate at the funeral of Metropolitan Volodymyr, the primate of the UOC prior to Onufry.  The third member of the delegation is Epiphanios Kamianovych, a Ukrainian patriarchal deacon at the Fanar.

  It is significant that Elder Metropolitan Emmanuel of Chalcedon, who has been the Ecumenical Patriarch’s principal representative to Ukraine, is not a member of the delegation.  Emmanuel presided at the Council which created the OCU in 2018.  He has since traveled to Ukraine on numerous occasions.  There are unverified reports that there were tensions between Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and Metropolitan Emmanuel in connection with the meetings with the delegations of the OCU and the Office of the Ukrainian President at the Fanar on August 13, 2024.  It appears that Metropolitan Emmanuel is very supportive of the OCU and defends its actions.  On the other hand, it is reported that the Ecumenical Patriarch has concerns about some of the actions taken by the OCU.  See  https://spzh.live/ru/news/81722-hlava-fanara-potreboval-ot-dumenko-objasnit-silovye-zakhvaty-khramov-upts (a very pro-UOC website)  It is likely that the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s delegation will take a fresh look at the religious situation now existing in Ukraine and will not view the situation simply through the eyes of the OCU.

  One option to be considered is the establishment of a temporary structure of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to receive parishes, and even eparchies, of the UOC seeking to escape the effect of 8371.  It appears that both the OCU and Metropolitan Emmanuel are strongly opposed to this option.  The argument is that the tomos gives the OCU exclusive jurisdiction over Ukraine.  However, the Ecumenical Patriarchate is the creator of the tomos and should have the power to create a structure which is limited in duration and which seeks to provide relief in an unusual and urgent situation.  Of course, the OCU will argue that the solution is for the UOC parishes and eparchies to join the OCU, as many UOC parishes have already done.  However, the number of transferred parishes is still a fairly small percentage of the total number of UOC parishes.  Often these UOC parishes have transferred to the OCU without their priests, and the OCU does not have sufficient priests to staff all of these parishes.  No eparchies of the UOC have transferred to the OCU after the 2018 Council.

  The animosity between the UOC and the OCU has become so great that many UOC parishes would prefer to be terminated and to continue their existence without their buildings and governmental recognition rather than join the OCU.  The reasons for this animosity include, but are not limited to the following: (1) the belief that the OCU does not have apostolic succession and that the orders of the OCU are not valid; (2) the belief that the OCU is responsible for the violence and “seizure” of UOC churches; (3) the fact that the OCU has vigorous campaigned for the elimination of the UOC through Draft Law 8371 and though other means.  Although the UOC has severed eucharistic communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Patriarchate does have apostolic succession, has not been involved in the war over churches, and has not vigorously campaigned for 8371.  There are now some indications that parts of the UOC, which would find joining the OCU completely unacceptable, would seriously consider joining a temporary structure under the Ecumenical Patriarchate.   Hopefully, the delegation will consider all possible options including this one.  The delegation should have serious discussions with representatives of UOC, which would probably be done on a very confidential basis.   Archimandrite Cyril Hovorun has given a very interesting interview concerning the situation of the UOC following the passage of 8371.  https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/08/21/not-about-banning-theologian-unpacks-ukraines-new-anti-russian-church-law/  He comments on the diversity of views within the UOC.  Because the UOC is not united in its views, an option may involve the entire UOC or only a part of it.  In my opinion, the delegation should be prepared to “think outside of the box.”  Now may be a unique opportunity for improving the religious situation in Ukraine.

  In Estonia, a Council of the Estonian Orthodox Church (EOC) of the Moscow Patriarchate was held in Tallinn on August 20, and an important decision was made with respect to the relationship of the EOC to the Moscow Patriarchate.  The EOC’s report on the results of the Council can be read at https://ru.orthodox.ee/news/v-talline-sostoyalas-vtoraya-sessiya-sobora-epcz-mp/   From a photograph of the Council posted on this link, one can see that Metropolitan Evgeny of Tallinn and All Estonia presided at the Council via videoconferencing from Russia.  The Council was held pursuant to the agreement reached on July 30 between the EOC and the Estonian Ministry of the Interior that the EOC would “submit to the Ministry of the Interior by the end of August” its proposal for amending its charter to delete references to the statutory documents of the Moscow Patriarchate, except for the reference to the tomos of the Moscow Patriarchate giving the EOC “self-governing” status.  From the EOC’s report, it appears that these deletions were approved at the August 20 meeting.  The July 30 agreement with the Ministry of Interior also involved a commitment by the EOC to begin consultations with the EAOC (Ecumenical Patriarchate) to find ways to unite all of Orthodoxy in Estonia into a single church.  In this regard, the report on the Council of August 20 stated: “The Council approved the activities of the Synod in the negotiation process with the state and expressed confidence that the Orthodox in Estonia will be able to find ways and means of healing the schism on the basis of canonicity, mutual respect and equality.” 

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 19 August 2024: Ecumenical Patriarchate's special commission to arrive in Kyiv prior to vote on 8371?

  Although Poroshenko had predicted that the Rada would meet today, August 19, and approved Draft Law 8371 on the second reading, there was no meeting with the Rada today.  However, the vice-chairman of the Rada confirmed that Draft Law 8371 was on the agenda for the next session of the Rada.   https://espreso.tv/suspilstvo-pershiy-vitsespiker-kornienko-rozpoviv-yaki-zakonoproekti-stoyat-na-poryadku-dennomu-u-radi   There is also a fascinating media report that a special commission of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, consisting of Metropolitan Ilarion (Rudnyk) of Winnipeg, Metropolitan Job (Getcha) of Pisidia, and Patriarchal Deacon Epifaniy Kamyanovich, will be in Kyiv on August 20-21.  https://telegra.ph/Poroshenko-trebuet-nemedlennogo-golosovaniya-po-zakonoproektu-o-UPC-MP-na-fone-novogo-vnimaniya-Konstantinopolya-k-religioznoj-s-08-18  According to the article, the commission was originally established by the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate on April 26, 2023, to work on the restoration of the unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.  The article then discusses in detail various steps by the OCU and the Ukrainian government to imped the operation of the commission.  However, through the personal diplomacy of Metropolitan Tikhon, primate of the Orthodox Church of America, who visited the UOC and the Fanar last June, the commission was reactivated.  Metropolitan Ilarion met with Metropolitan Onufry this summer and found him “quite open to dialogue.”  The part of the article, beginning with the involvement of Metropolitan Tikhon, is pasted below.  It would be a great irony if the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s commission, seeking to create Orthodox unity in Ukraine, is present in Kyiv at the same time that the Rada approves Draft Law 8371, which will very likely cause the termination of the UOC.  If the commission arrives before the passage of Draft Law 8371, will it slow down the passage of the Draft Law?  Of course, it is possible that this article is not accurate.  However, I am personally inclined to give it some credence.

  One correction before the excerpt from the article.  In my last newsletter, I quoted a statement on the official website of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations.  The title of this statement, not included in my quote, is as follows:  “Statement of members of Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations.”   https://vrciro.org.ua/en/news/statement-by-members-of-the-ukrainian-council-of-churches-and-religious-organizations  Thus, it is not a statement from the Council as a whole but rather from “members” of the Council.  Presumably, the reason for the use of the term “members” is that the UOC, which is a member of the Council, did not join the statement.  The general media, including myself, initially missed this important distinction.

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

  Excerpt from article relating to special commission (Google translation):

  A breakthrough occurred on June 1-5 of this year, when Metropolitan Tikhon of America, who maintains warm relations with both Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and Metropolitan Onufriy, visited Ukraine.  Metropolitan Tikhon does not support aggression against Ukraine and has repeatedly condemned it.  The OCA has raised millions of dollars in humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and is helping Ukrainian refugees establish communities in the United States.

  Tikhon arrived at the invitation of the UOC MP, but the Office of the President, let's say, knew about this visit.  And then, unexpectedly, Metropolitan Tikhon tells Onufriy about the importance of the unity of Orthodoxy.  And then he went through Romania straight to Phanar, where he arrived on June 8 - as they say, with a gift from Onufriy, in which Patriarch Bartholomew was captured in official photographs from the festive liturgy on Pentecost.

  Metropolitan Tikhon's visit led to the resumption of dialogue, the culmination of which was the Patriarch's order to resume the activities of the commission.  On June 28, the head of the commission for the further unification of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, Metropolitan Ilarion of Winnipeg, finally arrived in Kyiv with the blessing of the Ecumenical Patriarch and at the invitation of the Office of the President.

  During their 10 days in Kyiv, Metropolitan Ilarion and Bishop Michael of Koman who accompanied him attended the Presidential Prayer Breakfast and had many important meetings.  Including with Metropolitan Onufriy, who, as it turned out, behaves positively and is quite open to dialogue.  Both hierarchs also met with the new Deputy Head of the Presidential Office, EA Kovalska.  And she found the right words to explain to them for the first time that the President had still been… let's say, not entirely correctly informed about the processes taking place in Ukrainian Orthodoxy, and that Patriarch Bartholomew was allegedly not interested in participating in its further unification.  That the President regretted the misunderstandings and asked for the opportunity to speak with the Patriarch personally on the phone, and was also waiting for the arrival of the commission and inviting His All-Holiness to Ukraine.  And that Ukraine would be grateful if the Patriarch accepted the UOC MP into the jurisdiction of Constantinople under the canonical guarantees of the Ecumenical Patriarchate - no matter whether in the form of an exarchate or in the form of some other temporary jurisdiction.  Because to register a good half of the country's population as "FSB agents" is somehow not very constructive for the European future of Ukraine.

  On July 15, immediately after Metropolitan Ilarion reported on his visit to Phanar, Metropolitan Emmanuel rushed to Kyiv (and the possible explosion of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant did not frighten him).  And the first thing Emmanuel said at a meeting with the Prime Minister of Ukraine was that there would be no parallel jurisdiction for the UOC MP, period.  But the process has already moved forward.

  One way or another, on August 12, Metropolitans Epiphanius and Eustratiy were unexpectedly summoned to the Ecumenical Patriarch for a stern talk.  And the Ukrainian delegation headed by Kovalskaya was also invited, and was accorded all the due honors.  The moth-eaten atheist Yelensky was there too: he blushed, groaned, but did not object to the commission's arrival.  Even Eustratiy Zorya did not object, and smiled so sweetly at Elena Alexandrovna.

  In short, the commission is going to Ukraine – and will be in Kyiv on August 20-21, consisting of: Metropolitan of Winnipeg Ilarion, Metropolitan of Pisidia Job and Patriarchal Deacon Epiphanius Kamyanovich.  That is why Petro Poroshenko and Rostislav Pavlenko, who are afraid of losing their positions and benefits, demand an immediate ban on the UOC MP and shout that the second tomos will not happen – in order to influence the situation before the arrival of the commission.

• 18 August 2024: Final version of 8371 & the statement by the Ukrainian Church Council

  On the morning of Friday, August 16, the Rada’s Committee for Humanitarian and Information Policy approved the latest version of Draft Law 8371.  The Committee issued a statement immediately after its approval. https://kompkd.rada.gov.ua/news/main_news/76332.html   This version is almost certainly the final version of Draft Law 8371 on which a plenary session of the Rada will vote (second reading) during the week of August 19.  Later on August 16, the required Comparative Table relating to this final version was posted on the official website of the Rada.  https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/41219 (click on the last item on this web page).  In the far right column of this Comparative Table is found, in separate segments, the complete text of the final version of Draft Law 8371 approved by the Committee earlier in the day.  Using the Google translation tool, I have prepared an English translation of this final version of the full text of the Draft Law.  My English translation is attached to this newsletter.  In discussing this final version, I will make references to the pages of this attachment.  If you would like to receive the text of the final version in the Ukrainian language (as it is found in the latest Comparative Table), please send a reply email, and I will send the Ukrainian version to you by return email.

  Although the attached version has some changes from prior versions, there have been no substantive changes with respect to the very problematic provisions discussed in my previous newsletters.  The attached final version still subjects a Ukrainian religious organization to termination if even one of seven signs of “affiliation” with the ROC is present, without any need to prove that the ROC is now in fact controlling the Ukrainian religious organization.  See pages 8-9 of the attached.  As discussed in prior newsletters, I am aware of no evidence that the ROC has in fact exercised control over the UOC since the UOC's Council held in May 2022.  Indeed, since the 2022 Council, the UOC has in fact made decisions which are in direct violation of the ROC Charter.  Under Article 9, Section 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights (enforced by the European Court of Human Rights), actions, such as termination of the UOC, are not lawful unless “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”   Termination of the UOC for a mere affiliation, with proof of actual control, is not “necessary” in “the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order….”

  The latest version continues to make it absolutely certain that the UOC will be subject to termination.  For example, under the third sign of affiliation (see pages 8-9), affiliation exists if the Charter of the ROC has “provisions regarding the right to make decisions by the statutory governing bodies of the specified foreign religious organization on canonical and organizational issues that are binding for the operating religious organization in Ukraine.”  This third sign is clearly present with respect to the UOC.  Chapter X, Section 10 of the ROC Charter provides:  “The decisions of the Local and Bishops’ Councils are binding on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.”  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5082273.html   To terminate the UOC, one needs only to point to Chapter X, Section 10 of the ROC Charter and to the statutory language describing the third sign.  Furthermore, it is beyond the control of the UOC to cause the ROC to eliminate Section 10 from the ROC Charter.  Thus, the enactment of Draft Law 8371 will doom the UOC to termination, and there are no changes that the UOC can now or later make that will eliminate this drastic result.

  The European Convention of Human Rights, as interpreted by the Venice Commission, prohibits punishing an entire religious organization for the offenses of its members.  Thus, the Venice Commission has stated that “any wrongdoings of individual leaders and members of religious organizations should be addressed to the person in question through criminal, administrative or civil proceedings, rather than to the community and other members.”  See Case CDL-AD(2010)005.  In spite of this, the latest version continues to subject an entire religious organization to termination based on the commission of certain crimes by religious leaders or based on their spreading of the ideology of “Russian world.”  See page 13, paragraphs 5 and 7.  The latest version also goes to the extreme of subjecting to termination a religious organization that is “affiliated with a religious organization that is affiliated with” the ROC.  See page 8.  Clearly, termination for such a remote connection is not “necessary” within the meaning of Article 9, Section 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights.

  There is one positive change in the final version of Draft Law 8371 --  a new provision that the amendments of the Judicial Code specified in 8371 “shall enter into force nine months from the day following the date of publication of this Law.”  See page 5.   This means that court proceedings to terminate the UOC will not begin until May 2025.  

  On August 16, President Zelensky held a videoconference with representatives of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations.  Based on the timing of this conference, it is extremely likely that the President was seeking the support of the Council for Draft Law 8371.  As a result of the meeting, the Council issued a statement which can be read at https://vrciro.org.ua/en/news/statement-by-members-of-the-ukrainian-council-of-churches-and-religious-organizations (official English translation).  The following are two key paragraphs from the statement:

  We categorically condemn activities of the Russian Orthodox Church, which has become an accomplice to the Russian invaders’ bloody crimes against humanity, which sanctifies weapons of mass destruction and openly declares the need to destroy Ukrainian statehood, culture, identity, and, more recently, Ukrainians themselves. 

  We reiterate our statement of 11 April 2023 that partnerships and freedom of religion and their protection by the state are the basis of church-state relations in Ukraine, and no organisation – whether religious or secular – that has its centre in a country that has committed military aggression against our people and is governed by the aggressor state can operate in Ukraine.  We support the legislative initiative of the President of Ukraine to make it impossible for such organisations to operate in our country, which also has broad political and public support.

  The above statement is carefully worded.  It condemns a Ukrainian religious organization which has its “centre” in Russia and “is governed” by Russia.

  In the above quotation, the Council confirms its statement made on April 11, 2023.  The 2023 statement can be read in its entirety at https://vrciro.org.ua/ua/events/rada-tserkov-zasudzhue-zlovzhivannya-rosiyskoyu-federatsieyu-religiynimi-pochuttyami-v-agresivniy-i-nespravedliviy-viyni-proti-ukraini  In the 2023 statement, the Council “unanimously declared: the inadmissibility of activities in Ukraine of any organizations, including religious ones, the centers and management of which are located in the Russian Federation.”  At that time, there was only the one-and -one-half page original version of Draft Law 8371.  The key sentence in the original version was directed at “a religious organization (association), the governing center (control) of which is located outside of Ukraine in a state that carries out armed aggression against Ukraine.”

  Thus, the Council’s statement of April 11, 2023, and its statement of August 16, 2024, relate to prohibiting a Ukrainian religious organization that has a management center (control) in the Russian Federation.  Since the 2023 statement of the Council, the approach taken by Draft Law 8371 has radically changed.  In all of the 2024 versions of Draft Law 8371, it is now unnecessary to show that the Ukrainian religious organization is actually being governed from a Russian center.  Rather, a mere “affiliation” is sufficient for termination.  By reconfirming the need to prohibit a religious organization with a governing center in Russia, the Council cannot be considered to have endorsed the termination of a religious organization based on a mere "affiliation" without any actual control from a Russian center.

  Obviously, many are waiting to see what will happen in the Rada after this weekend.

  Draft Law 8371 (16 August 2024)

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 16 August 2024: OCU's appeal to UOC and latest news on 8371

  On August 15, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) sent an “appeal", signed by its primate Metropolitan Epifany, to Metropolitan Onufry and to all of the hierarchs, clergy, and faithful of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC).  The text of the appeal can be read at https://www.pomisna.info/uk/vsi-novyny/zvernennya-do-mytropolyta-onufriya-iz-zaklykom-do-dialogu-pro-yednannya/.  The first part of the appeal was a recitation describing the formation of the OCU.  The second part included the following:

  Therefore, firmly and unwaveringly adhering to these principles, we turn again and again to you, Vladyka, and to all our Orthodox brothers and sisters, but first of all - to the bishops and priests, because they are entrusted with a greater responsibility, as Scripture testifies - with a call to start a dialogue on unity without any preconditions.

  We know that you have previously announced three demands regarding such a dialogue, namely, that we reject the decisions of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and that we do not hear requests from those who accept these decisions and wish to be united as the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.  But for objective reasons independent of us, we cannot agree to such demands, because they contradict the truth and would mean for us a renunciation of God, who gave our hierarchs and clergy the grace of the priesthood, and of the Church of Christ, which by the hands and work of the Ecumenical Patriarch benefited Ukraine.

  Therefore, we lovingly ask you and the hierarchs who are with you to agree to start our dialogue without preconditions.  That is how, without preconditions, a dialogue began, which was blessed and supported by Metropolitan Volodymyr of blessed memory of Kyiv and All Ukraine and which the Moscow Patriarchate destroyed.  Let all those who truly cherish the memory of Metropolitan Volodymyr take him as an example in this.

  Therefore, never abandoning hope in God, in the intercession of the Mother of God and all the saints, in the matter of overcoming church divisions, despite the fact that all of our numerous earlier appeals to you and to those who are with you regarding dialogue remained unanswered - I again appeal to you, Vladyka, and to all who are with you now, not to leave this appeal, this hand extended to you, without a constructive response.

  Metropolitan Epifany had previously raised the subject of dialogue in his address at the OCU’s annual bishops’ conference held on May 11, 2024.  https://www.pomisna.info/uk/document-post/dopovid-predstoyatelya-na-arhiyerejskomu-sobori-11-travnya-2024-r/   He stated that “we do not put forward any preconditions for the start of the dialogue.”  However, later in the address, Metropolitan Epifany seems to impose the following condition on the dialogue:  “We are ready to conduct a dialogue only while preserving the prescriptions of the Tomos on autocephaly, in which it is determined that all dioceses, monasteries, parishes and other Orthodox church institutions should be under the jurisdiction of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine.“   This seems to say that there will be no dialogue except one in which all Orthodox dioceses will be under the OCU.  In these remarks, Metropolitan Epifany never mentioned the “Ukrainian Orthodox Church,” but always called it the “Moscow Patriarchate.”   In contrast, the appeal of August 15 is, in my opinion, a new and positive step by the OCU.

  As indicated in the quotation above, the UOC imposed three conditions for a dialogue to begin.  These conditions are set forth in the resolutions of the Council of the UOC held on May 27, 2022.  https://news.church.ua/2022/05/28/resolutions-council-ukrainian-orthodox-church-may-27-2022/?lang=en#2024-08-15  These conditions are: (1) “stop the illegal seizure of churches and forced transfers of parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC);” (2) “realise that their canonical status, as enshrined in their “Statute of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine,” is in fact non-autocephalous and significantly inferior to the freedoms and opportunities for the implementation of Church activities as compared to those that are provided for in the Statute of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC);” (3) “resolve the issue of canonicity of the hierarchy of the OCU, because for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, as for most Local Orthodox Churches, it is quite obvious that to recognise the canonicity of the hierarchy of the OCU, it is first necessary to restore the apostolic succession of its bishops.”   Thus, even to begin a dialogue, the OCU must first admit that the tomos granting it autocephaly is invalid and that the ordinations of its hierarchs are invalid.  It is absolutely inconceivable that the OCU would agree to these preconditions.  The preconditions seem to have been adopted by the Council to prevent any dialogue aside from a complete capitulation by the OCU.  After the UOC has painted itself in a corner by adopting the three preconditions in 2022, it may be difficult for the UOC to accept the OCU’s invitation without calling a new UOC Council -- something that is unlikely to happen.

  It is very likely that the appeal of August 15 is the result of a meeting held at the Fanar on August 13.  The press office of the Ecumenical Patriarchate immediately announced this meeting but said nothing about the subjects discussed.   https://ec-patr.org/%ce%bf-%cf%80%cf%81%ce%bf%ce%ba%ce%b1%ce%b8%ce%ae%ce%bc%ce%b5%ce%bd%ce%bf%cf%82-%cf%84%ce%b7%cf%82-%ce%b5%ce%ba%ce%ba%ce%bb%ce%b7%cf%83%ce%af%ce%b1%cf%82-%cf%84%ce%b7%cf%82-%ce%bf%cf%85%ce%ba%cf%81-3/   The key participants were: Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and Metropolitan Emmanuel of Chalcedon; Olena Kovalska, Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, and Viktor Yelensky, head of DESS; and Metropolitan Epifany and Metropolitan Yevstraty of the OCU.  Very late on August 13, the Office of the President of Ukraine issued a short statement describing the meeting.  https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vselenskij-patriarh-varfolomij-pidtrimuye-iniciativu-prezide-92609  According to the statement, the “parties discussed in detail the state of religious freedom in Ukraine.”  The OCU has posted a somewhat longer statement relating to the meeting.  https://www.pomisna.info/uk/vsi-novyny/vizyt-do-vselenskogo-patriarhatu/  For example, it stated:  “During a long, constructive conversation, opinions were exchanged regarding the challenges currently facing Orthodoxy in general and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in particular in connection with Russian aggression and attempts to justify it using the pseudo-religious ideological rhetoric of the "Russian world."  Another part of the statement provides: “The Primate of the OCU also emphasized the openness of the Local Church to dialogue with those who have not yet followed the Tomos.”

  The August 13 press release of the Office of the President describing the Fanar visit has the headline: “Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew Supports President's Initiative Aimed at Spiritual Independence.”  As reported in my last newsletter, President Zelensky concluded his nightly address on August 10 saying:  “I have just held a preparatory meeting on a decision that will strengthen our Ukrainian spiritual independence.  We must deprive Moscow of the last opportunities to limit the freedom of Ukrainians.  And the decisions to achieve this must be one hundred percent effective – they must really work.  We will ensure them.”  Zelensky in his nightly address on August 15 made another statement relating to “spiritual independence.”   https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/nastav-chas-uhvaliti-vazhlivi-zakonodavchi-rechi-oboronnij-z-92633  He stated:  “Of course, in addition to these decisions I have mentioned, there are some other no less important legislative initiatives to strengthen our independence, including spiritual independence, and the necessary governmental work to implement them.  All this should be done really quickly.”  It is clear that President Zelensky is referring to Draft Law 8371 in his remarks about “spiritual independence.”  However, it is not totally clear that Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew was focusing particularly on the Draft Law in his alleged remarks.

  In a briefing on August 14, Petro Poroshenko, the most vocal supporter of Draft Law 8371, made an announcement that the Rada’s Conciliation Council of Parliamentary Factions and Groups (the body that sets the agenda for the Rada) had decided that day to make Draft Law 8371 the first item to be considered in the next plenary session of the Rada.  https://www.5.ua/ru/polytyka/zapret-moskovskoi-tserkvy-poroshenko-anonsyroval-rassmotrenye-zakonoproekta-8371-na-blyzhaishem-zasedanyy-vr-332578.html  He stated:  “Today an agreement was reached that on August 19, the work of the Verkhovna Rada will begin immediately on this issue, and a decision will be made.  Moreover, the decision will be made on the version, in which a compromise was reached in June-July.”  The June-July version can be read at 35037.pdf (rada.gov.ua).  If Poroshenko is correct, the version considered by the Rada will not include any changes that might be recommended by the “working group” established a few weeks ago. 

  The Rada’s Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy, which is responsible for the Draft Law, has scheduled a meeting for tomorrow, August 16.  The first item on the agenda is “ Revision of the Committee's conclusion to the draft Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Activity of Religious Organizations in Ukraine (Register No. 8371, Second Reading).”  https://www.rada.gov.ua/preview/anonsy_podij/252443.html  If the Rada will be considering the June-July version, one wonders why the Committee needs to revise its conclusions.  

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 14 August 2024: Statement by the Ukrainian Presidential Office on Fanar meeting

  https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vselenskij-patriarh-varfolomij-pidtrimuye-iniciativu-prezide-92609 (in English)

  Deputy Head of the Office of the President Olena Kovalska and Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience Viktor Yelensky met with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew.

  The parties discussed in detail the state of religious freedom in Ukraine, which, despite the war, is being deepened by Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian side is proud that there are no closed churches or major and minor religions in our country, and the voice of the few religious communities in the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations sounds as loud as the voice of the churches to which the majority of Ukrainians belong.

  The Ukrainian side also thanked His All-Holiness for his continuous and unwavering support of Ukraine, which is highly appreciated by the Ukrainian people. The Patriarch was informed about the crimes committed by the Russian occupiers against religious freedom in Ukraine, about the dozens of priests, pastors, and theologians killed by the Russian invaders, and about more than 630 destroyed religious buildings.

  His All-Holiness emphasized that the world knows very little about these crimes and urged to spread the truth about religious freedom in Ukraine and those who are trying to destroy it.

  The Ecumenical Patriarch confirmed his constant readiness to make the necessary efforts for the prosperity of Orthodoxy in Ukraine and noted that he cares for the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

  His All-Holiness noted that he supports everything that is aimed at the good of Ukraine. In particular, this includes the initiative of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on spiritual independence, which is a prerequisite for the development of our country.

  The Ukrainian side delivered to the Ecumenical Patriarch an invitation from the President of Ukraine to visit our country.

• 13 August 2024: Epifany and Yelensky at the Fanar today

  TO NEWSLETTER RECIPIENTS WHO MAY BE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN DRAFT LAW 8371

  Today, August 13, the Ecumenical Patriarchate issued the following press release, found at https://ec-patr.org/%ce%bf-%cf%80%cf%81%ce%bf%ce%ba%ce%b1%ce%b8%ce%ae%ce%bc%ce%b5%ce%bd%ce%bf%cf%82-%cf%84%ce%b7%cf%82-%ce%b5%ce%ba%ce%ba%ce%bb%ce%b7%cf%83%ce%af%ce%b1%cf%82-%cf%84%ce%b7%cf%82-%ce%bf%cf%85%ce%ba%cf%81-3/:

  His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew welcomed with brotherly love, today, August 13, 2024, at the Fanar, His Beatitude Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine Epiphany, accompanied by Rev. Metropolitan of Bila Tserkva, Mr. Evstratiy, and other associates.

  His Holiness received with cordiality the official Delegation of the State of Ukraine under her Excellency Mrs. Olena Kovalska, Deputy Head of the Office of the President of the country, and Ex. Mr. Viktor Yelensky, head of the State Agency for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience, and Mr. Vasyl Bodnar, Ambassador of Ukraine in Ankara, as well as the Hon. Mr. Roman Nedilskyi, Consul General of Ukraine in the City, with his deputy Edim. Mr. Andriy Boyko.

  The meetings themselves were attended by the Elder Metropolitan of Chalkidon, Mr. Emmanuel, the Grand Ecclesiastic, Mr. Aetios, Director of the Special Patriarchal Office, and the Patriarchal Deacon, Mr. Epifanios Kamyanovich, who acted as a translator.

  At noon, His Holiness hosted a lunch in honor of the high-ranking visitors of the Mother Church in the building of the Patriarchal Urban School of Maraslis.

  The above is a Google translation which is obviously not perfect.  The press release also included a number of photos.   

  In view of the fact that now is the crucial time when the Rada’s “working group” is attempting to prepare the final form of Draft Law 8371 (which will probably be presented to the full Rada next week for a vote on the second reading), it is very possible that the Draft Law was one of the subjects discussed at the Fanar today.  Prior to today, there was some speculation about 8371 that would involve the Ecumenical Patriarch.  For example, the following article,  https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/get-vid-moskvi-k-radi-zbirayutsya-zaboroniti-1723413259.html , was posted yesterday, August 12:

  In the political corridors where the twists and turns of the church bill are being discussed, the concept of "temporary tomos" has appeared.  The term itself is absolutely incorrect, but the publication's interlocutors used it for convenience, since the word "tomos" itself has already firmly entered not only the church, but also the political Ukrainian vocabulary.

  The point is that the part of the UOC, which in principle would not truly mind finally breaking all church-canonical ties with the ROC, would like to receive some official place in the Orthodox world, and not remain in the "gray zone".  After all, joining the OCU is completely unacceptable for many representatives of the UOC for a number of reasons, including personal ones.   And this place could be formalized in the form of that very "temporary tomos".   To be more correct, the Ecumenical Patriarchate could create its own exarchate in Ukraine, which would include that part of the UOC that can break with the ROC, but does not want to go to the OCU.

  During closed discussions in parliament, the idea was put forward that in this way it would be possible to avoid unnecessary escalation around Draft Law 8371, to expand the number of its supporters in the Rada and obtain additional votes, and to offer an “escape route” to those representatives of the UOC who agree to sever ties with Moscow.

  Robert Amsterdam, an attorney representing the UOC, has written an “emergency communication” to President Zelensky on August 6.  The entire letter may be read at  https://robertamsterdam.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Letter-to-President-of-Ukraine-06AUG2024.pdf .  The letter includes the following:

  My firm has come into possession of internal documents, which detail plans to establish a new exarchate (diocese) in Ukraine to subsume the UOC under the administration of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (EP).  These documents suggest this is a first step towards an eventual forced unification of the UOC and Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU).  I have reason to believe that the plans, as laid out in these documents and described in detail in Annex One of this letter, have been developed by members of your administration.

  Amsterdam sharply attacks these plans.  I believe that an exarchate might possibly have been the subject of today’s meeting at the Fanar, but it may have been something completely different.

  Amsterdam’s communication to Zelensky includes an “Annex Two” (pages 13-15) which describes the international standards relating to freedom of religion.  I found this description to be helpful.  As you know, I continue to believe that Draft Law 8371 is a flagrant violation of these standards.  To sum up succinctly my major objections to 8371, they are as follows:

  • Mere “affiliation” of the UOC with the ROC, without proof of current actual control of the UOC by the ROC, is not a lawful basis for outlawing the UOC and for giving all of the UOC’s churches and monasteries to other religious organizations.  Under Article 9, Section 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights (enforced by the European Court of Human Rights), such draconian measures are not “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”   
  • Under the European Convention, an entire religious organization cannot be banned based on the actions of certain of its leaders or members.  Draft Law 8371 violates this principle by outlawing an entire organization simply because leaders or members may be promulgating the ideology of “Russian World” or may have been convicted of certain crimes.
  • The provisions of 8371 requiring the outlawing of religious organizations which are affiliated with religious organizations which are affiliated with the ROC is not “necessary …in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order….”
  • The provisions of 8371 relating to judicial review of cases arising under 8371 impose impossible time limitations and eliminate an entire level of review.  Denying these judicial rights is highly prejudicial and is a form of unlawful discrimination against the UOC.

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 12 August 2024: Zelensky on "Ukrainian spiritual independence" & the Estonian puzzle

  Ukrainian President Zelensky, in his evening television address to the Ukrainian people on August 10, made an apparent reference to Draft Law 8371, now pending before the Ukrainian Rada (parliament).  https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-dovodit-sho-dijsno-vmiye-povertati-spravedlivist-zv-92565   At the very end of his address, he stated:

  And one more thing.  I have just held a preparatory meeting on a decision that will strengthen our Ukrainian spiritual independence.  We must deprive Moscow of the last opportunities to limit the freedom of Ukrainians.  And the decisions to achieve this must be one hundred percent effective – they must really work.  We will ensure them.

  As you may recall, a group of Rada deputies on July 23 occupied the rostrum of the Rada after they had heard that Draft Law 8371 was not on the latest agenda to be considered and voted on by the full Rada.  The agenda is determined by the Rada’s Conciliation Council of Parliamentary Factions and Groups.   After the interruption caused by the occupation of the rostrum, the Conciliation Council met and decided to establish a “working group” to resolve disputes relating to the Draft Law.   It was also decided that the next plenary session of the Rada would be postponed until the week of August 19 so as to give the "working group" time to resolve the disputes. 

  Earlier, on May 21, the Conciliation Council had unanimously decided that Draft Law 8371 would be placed on the agenda if the proponents of 8371 obtained the signatures of 240 deputies affirming that they would vote for 8371.  The effort to obtain signatures was led by Petro Poroshenko and his “European Solidarity” party.   The proponents of the Draft Law had obtained slightly more than 220 signatures but had not been able to reach the 240 signatures required.  Frustrated, the proponents occupied the rostrum on July 23 to force a vote on the Draft Law in spite of the failure to reach the 240 mark.   Although many deputies of the majority Servant of the People party had signed their support for the Draft Law, the leadership of the party still had reservations concerning the Draft Law and had delayed its consideration by the full Rada.  It appears that a major function of the "working group" is to resolve those reservations by the party leadership. 

  It is very likely that the meeting referenced by Zelensky on August 10 related to the "working group."  The optimistic tone of Zelensky’s remarks indicate that the reservations (which are probably not major) will be resolved and that Draft Law 8371 will become law in some form.  For those people, like myself, who believe that Draft Law 8371 is fundamentally flawed to its core and is a clear violation of the European Convention on Human Rights and other international agreements, this is not good news.

  The Rada’s Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy has now finally posted the full text of Draft Law 8371 as it now exists.  https://kompkd.rada.gov.ua/uploads/documents/35037.pdf.   This text will presumably be modified to some extent at the current meetings of the “working group.”

  In my last newsletter, I reported on a meeting held in Tallinn on July 30 between Raivo Küüt (representative of the Estonian Ministry of Interior), Bishop Daniel Lepisk of Tartu, who is the vicar of the Tallinn diocese (the representative of the Estonian Orthodox Church (EOC) of the Moscow Patriarchate), and Steven-Hristo Evestus (the attorney representing the EOC and the Assumption Stavropegial Monastery of Pühtitsa).  See https://www.unifr.ch/orthodoxia/de/dokumentation/anderson/ (Report of Aug. 2, 2024)  A statement describing the results of the meeting was posted on the website of the Ministry of Interior on July 31.  https://www.siseministeerium.ee/uudised/siseministeerium-ja-mpeok-leppisid-kokku-edasistes-sammudes-moskva-patriarhaadi-moju  The title of the statement read: “The Ministry of Interior and the EOC agreed [my emphasis] on further steps to reduce and eliminate the impact of the Moscow Patriarchate on the EOC.”  The full text of the statement was also posted on the official website of the EOC.  https://orthodox.ee

  The posted statement included the following sentence:  “At the meeting, the EOC presented its vision of the process of disassociation from the Moscow Patriarchate in two stages, where, firstly, today's statutes will be changed, and in the second stage, consultations will be started with the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church to find ways to unite all Estonian Orthodox under a single church in the future.”  The first part of this sentence is not a complete surprise.  The EOC would change its charter to delete references to the Moscow Patriarchate, but would leave in its charter a reference to the 1993 Tomos in which the EOC was granted autonomy by the Moscow Patriarchate.  These changes are very similar to what was done by the UOC at its Local Council in May 2022.  However, the second part of the sentence is a big surprise and a dramatic change in the previous position of the EOC with respect to the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (EAOC) which is part of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.  These planned consultations with the EAOC are even more surprising in that they are now part of the EOC’s “vision.”

  It is very unlikely that Bishop Daniel, as a vicar bishop, would publicly state such a “vision” without the prior blessing of his superior and primate, Metropolitan Evgeny of Tallinn and All Estonia.  Although Evgeny was exiled from Estonia by the Estonian government in February, he is still the primate of the EOC.  Daniel was also the personal secretary for Metropolitan Evgeny for a number of years. 

  In an interview by Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR) conducted apparently on July 31 and released by ERR on August 1 at 9:35 a.m., Bishop Daniel stated that discussions with the EAOC could begin as early as this fall.   https://www.err.ee/1609413280/eestis-tegutsevad-oigeusukirikud-voivad-koostoo-arutelusid-alustada-sugisel  With respect to the EAOC, he stated:  “If we look at each other as equal partners - we are still Orthodox here, they are Orthodox in a different structure, but Orthodoxy is what we have in common."  This article also stated that Metropolitan Stefanos, head of the EAOC, had informed ERR that the EAOC is open to finding a good solution that satisfies all parties.

  On August 1 at 10:44 a.m., approximately one hour after the release of this last interview, ERR released another interview of Bishop Daniel on its Russian-language channel.  https://rus.err.ee/1609413274/episkop-daniil-obedinenie-jepc-mp-s-jestonskoj-apostolskoj-pravoslavnoj-cerkovju-nepriemlemo  While the first interview was filmed in the Bishop’s office probably the night before, the second interview was conducted in the studio of ERR probably on the morning of August 1.  In the second interview, Bishop Daniel takes a very different approach toward the EAOC.  Nothing is said about a future meeting with the EAOC.  Now Bishop Daniel states: 

  "This option [of unification with the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church] was offered to us [by the Ministry of Interior] somewhat unexpectedly back in May.  But we said that we do not see the constructiveness of such a proposal.  Neither the leadership nor the parishioners agree with such a transition.”

  In the second interview, Bishop Daniel was asked about the role that Metropolitan Evgeny currently plays in the activities of the EOC.  He replied: “Metropolitan Evgeny, elected by our Church Council as primate in 2018, remains in his place.  The church people have chosen a primate for themselves, who is still in long-distance contact with us."

  On August 2, this second interview of Daniel was posted by the EOC on its Facebook page.  The copy of the July 30 agreement between the Ministry of Interior and the EOC has now been removed from the official website of the EOC.  https://orthochristian.com/162725.html  Something must have happened between the latter part of July 31 and the early morning of August 1 to cause Bishop Daniel to change his approach.

  On the morning of August 1 there was an event involving Metropolitan Evgeny which may or may not be relevant.  On that morning Patriarch Kirill celebrated the Divine Liturgy in Christ the Savior Cathedral in Moscow and ordained Archimandrite Vyacheslav (Sorokin) as a bishop.   http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6148888.html   Archimandite Vyacheslav has been at the Moscow Theological Academy since 2012.  Metropolitan Evgeny was the rector of the Academy from 1995 to 2018.  Although many metropolitans and bishops were present at the ordination of Vyacheslav, Metropolitan Evgeny was not one of them.  It is known that Metropolitan Evgeny was present at services in the Moscow area in July.  See, for example  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6144052.html   Andrey Kuraev has commented in his blog on the absence of Metropolitan Evgeny at the ordination.  https://diak-kuraev.livejournal.com/4593060.html   Kuraev states: “Yesterday there was a bishop's ordination of a student and teacher of the MDA, whose entire career is connected with Evgeny.”  Kuraev concludes that the absence of Evgeny is a sign that Evgeny is now in “disgrace” and is “persona non grata” in the eyes of the leadership of the Patriarchate. 

  However, maybe Evgeny was not at the ordination because he was ill on August 1.  Still, it is possible that the Church in Moscow heard about the July 30 agreement on July 31 and that Evgeny was personally subject to great criticism by the Moscow Church leadership later that day or early on August 1.  This may have resulted in his not being allowed to attend the ordination. This may also have resulted in the sudden change of course by the EOC in Estonia on the morning of August 1.  However, who knows???

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 2 August 2024: Agreement in Estonia & Draft Law 8371

  On July 31, the Estonian Orthodox Church (EOC) of the Moscow Patriarchate reached an agreement with the Ministry of Interior of Estonia.  It essentially provides a plan for amending the charter of the EOC to delete references to the Moscow Patriarchate and for the commencement of discussions between the EOC and the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church - Ecumenical Patriarchate (EAOC) to form a single Orthodox Church in Estonia.  In reaching the agreement, the EOC was represented by Bishop Daniel (Lepisk) of Tartu, vicar of the Tallinn diocese.  Bishop Daniel is the only bishop of the EOC who was born and raised in Estonia.  He is not an ethnic Russian, but converted to Orthodoxy at the age of 20.  He was ordained a bishop on February 4, 2024, by Metropolitan Evgeniy of Tallinn and All Estonia, the primate of the EOC, who was required to leave Estonia two days later due to the expiration of his temporary residence permit.  Aside from Bishop Daniel, there are two other bishops (Sergei and Lazarus) presently in Estonia.  The famous Pühtitsa Monastery, a stavropegic women’s monastery under the direct jurisdiction of the Patriarch, was represented at the meeting by an Estonian attorney, Steven-Hristo Evestus.  The complete text of the agreement has been posted on the official website of the EOC. https://et.orthodox.ee/news/siseministeerium-ja-mpeok-leppisid-kokku-edasistes-sammudes-moskva-patriarhaadi-moju-vahendamiseks-ja-kaotamiseks-mpeokile/   The full text of the agreement reads as follows:

  The Ministry of the Interior and EOC agreed on further steps to reduce and eliminate the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate on EOC

  On July 30, Raivo Küüt, the representative of the Ministry of the Interior, Vicar Daniel Lepisk, the representative of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (EOC), and Steven-Hristo Evestus, attorney-at-law of the law firm Sirel & Partners, representing the EOC and the Assumption Stavropegial Monastery of Pühtitsa, met to review the activities so far and discuss possible future scenarios.  Next steps and schedule of activities were agreed upon.

  The representative of the Ministry of the Interior, Raivo Küüt, reviewed the state's expectations, which is the complete separation of the EOC from the Moscow Patriarchate, both canonically and legally, because the state has an obligation to protect the Estonian population from the effects of a hostile regime.  At the same time, Küüt emphasized that the solution is being moved in cooperation, and during the process the state does not intend to close the churches under the EOC or the Pühtitsa monastery or hinder the work of the congregations.   "Religious freedom is guaranteed and services will continue," Küüt confirmed.

  At the meeting, the EOC presented its vision of the process of disassociation from the Moscow Patriarchate in two stages, where, firstly, today's statutes will be changed, and in the second stage, consultations will be started with the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church to find ways to unite all Estonian Orthodox under a single church in the future.

  In the first stage, EOC’s proposal would be to amend the statutes, which would unilaterally end the statutory references to the operating statutes of the Russian Orthodox Church, leaving a reference to the 1993 Tomos [the tomos of Patriarch Alexy II granting autonomy to the Church in Estonia].

  The EOC described the possibilities for changing its statutes, the necessary steps and the structure of the decision-making process, and informed about the Synod's appeal to the Patriarch for the abolition of the stavropegic status of the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral [in Tallinn].

  The law firm Sirel & Partners also discussed the specifics regarding the possibilities of untying the Pühtitsa monastery.  The Ministry of the Interior expressed its willingness to review the issues related to the monastery separately in the same period, taking into account the status and special features of the monastery.  "Representing EOC and the Monastery is of decisive importance to help the Church and the Monastery negotiate with the state and find a solution based on the basic principles of the rule of law as well as canonical rules," explained attorney-at-law Steven-Hristo Evestus. "It must be aimed at observing freedom of religion and its exercise, the freedoms and peace of mind of EOC  congregation members, and not at creating a feeling of pressure and exclusion in a situation that cannot be blamed on the Church and Monastery operating in Estonia at the moment.  Meetings with the Ministry of the Interior are motivated by the desire to find peaceful solutions with the state to continue coexistence and ensure freedom of religion.  We consider it necessary to continue a constructive dialogue that does not divide communities and respects the laws of both church and civil life."

  As for the next activities, it was agreed that the EOC will submit to the Ministry of the Interior by the end of August specific proposals for amendments to the statute and the necessary steps and schedule for implementing the amendment.  Based on this, the Ministry of the Interior will formulate its position by the end of September at the latest.  The EOC also agrees and informs the Ministry of the Interior of the date when EOC will meet with representatives of the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church and start preparing a road map for the activities of the second stage of EOC.  Further activities will be agreed separately with the monastery as a separate religious organization.

  To date, I have seen no comments by the Moscow Patriarchate concerning this development.  However, TASS has posted an article.  https://tass.ru/obschestvo/21499433  In the article, TASS portrayed the meeting as a statement by the Estonian government of its expectations rather than any change of position on the part of the EOC.  Personally, I believe that the agreement by the EOC to meet with the EAOC to prepare a road map for the formation of a single Orthodox church in Estonia is very significant.  The formation of a single church in Estonia would be far easier than in Ukraine.  Unlike the OCU, there does not appear to be a dispute as to the validity of the ordinations of the EAOC.  Also, there is not in Estonia the great animosity which is present in Ukraine between the UOC and the OCU.

  As stated in my last newsletter, Draft Law 8371 will not be considered for the second reading by the plenary session of the Rada until at least August 20.  Consideration was delayed last week primarily because the leadership of the Servant of the People party refused to place the Draft Law on the agenda of the Rada.  There is now a report that David Arakhamia, the head of the Servant of the People party, has described the plan where the Draft Law will be subject to a vote by the Rada on August 21-22.  https://lb.ua/news/2024/07/24/625837_kadri_tserkva_podatki_pauzi.html  He stated:  “With a high probability, the law will be slightly revised, but by consensus.”  The work between now and August 15 will be “behind-the-scenes work on the international front.”  From August 15-20, the draft law will be “finalized in the committee [presumably the Rada's Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy].”

  In my opinion, it is very naïve to believe that Draft Law 8371, "slightly revised," will be acceptable to foreign countries and international human rights organizations.  The problems with Draft Law 8371 go to the very core of the proposed legislation.  The core is that a Ukrainian religious organization is subject to termination if it is “affiliated” with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) -- without any proof that the Ukrainian religious organization is now being controlled in any way by the ROC.  According to the Draft Law, “affiliation” is found simply if one of seven “signs” is present.  The Draft Law even goes further and provides that a Ukrainian religious organization which is affiliated with another Ukrainian religious organization which in turn is affiliated with the ROC is subject to termination.  The present Draft Law 8371 is drafted in such a way that it is 100% certain that the UOC will be subject to termination.  For example, the fact that the charter of the ROC provides that the UOC is bound by the decisions of ROC bishops’ councils (the last council was held 2017) mandates under sign 3 that the UOC be subject to termination.  This is so even though the UOC is powerless to change the ROC charter and even though there is absolutely no evidence that the UOC has been actually controlled by the ROC since the council of the UOC held in May 2022.  Furthermore, since May 2022, the UOC has grossly violated the ROC charter in at least three important respects (not commemorating Kirill in every parish, not obtaining chrism from Moscow, and not obtaining approval from the ROC with respect to changes in the UOC charter).  Under sign 3 the Ukrainian government only needs to point to a sentence which is indisputably present in the ROC charter to prove its case.   There is no need to prove any actual control by the ROC or to consider any actions taken by the UOC in defiance of the ROC .

  Ukraine is bound by its own Constitution and by international conventions guaranteeing freedom of religion.  For example, Article 9, Section 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights (enforced by the European Court of Human Rights) provides as follows:  “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”   Is the termination of the UOC, based on affiliation alone, “necessary…in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order…”?  If it were proven that the UOC is a mere puppet with strings being pulled for Moscow to advance its war agenda, a law providing for termination might well be justified under the Convention.  However, a law which subjects the UOC to termination simply based on “affiliation,” without proof of any actual control from Moscow, is clearly not “necessary” to protect the public safety or order of Ukraine. 

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA  

• 29 July 2024: Status of 8371 according to Rada head

  TO NEWSLETTER RECIPIENTS WHO ARE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN DRAFT LAW 8371

  Today, July 29, Ruslan Stefanchuk, the chairman of the Rada, gave an important interview to Ukrainian News.  https://ukranews.com/ua/interview/3122-ruslan-stefanchuk-ukrayina-ne-mozhe-odnoznachno-provodyty-peremovyny-odyn-na-odyn-z-rosiyeyu  The last part of the interview related to Draft Law 8371.  I have pasted below a Google translation of that part of the interview.  Some of the key points are the following: (1) Stefanchuk is a lawyer and has now spent one and one-half days studying Draft Law 8371; (2) Stefanchuk has reservations concerning the current version of 8371 – “because there are a lot of legal inaccuracies, which will later affect court processes, some nuances, some repetitions, duplications in the terms of this text”;  (3) in addition to legal work, we must do certain things (not disclosed in the interview) that relate to canonical matters; (4) “When all these processes are completed, and we arrive at some final vision of this draft law, with which everyone will already be familiar, and everyone will say ‘okay’, then we will immediately introduce it to the hall;” (5) “We will start the next session with consideration of this draft law;” (6) “it is very important here to come up with, firstly, a legally perfect draft law, and secondly, to implement it in accordance with all applied procedures.”

  It is clear that a group, including Stefanchuk, will be working on the Draft Law during the next few weeks.  It is not clear to me whether the Rada will consider the Draft Law in the second half of August even if the working group is unable to agree on the necessary changes to the Draft Law.  In my opinion, very major changes are required to make the Draft Law comply with international law relating to freedom of religion. 

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

   

  Do we remember what was the meeting on Tuesday?  Why did it end?  I wanted to know some details.  Why did you decide to finalize the draft law on banning the Russian church?  After all, as far as I know, the committee recommended that it be adopted already.  That is, you could simply take it to the hall of the Verkhovna Rada and vote.

  Let me immediately start again from the beginning. The agenda of the Verkhovna Rada is formed in the Ukrainian Parliament by the Conciliation Council. We are not an American parliament where it is shaped by the speaker. Only the Conciliation Council, where representatives of factions and groups vote. Even I, Oleksandr Kornienko, Olena Kondratyuk, we do not vote at the conciliation council, we do not have the right to vote. Only factions and groups. A unanimous decision was made at one of the meetings of the Conciliation Council. Moreover, this decision was made by the "European Solidarity" faction. They made such a proposal that the draft law will enter the hall only after they collect 240 signatures of people's deputies. It was voted unanimously by all factions and groups. That is, the decision on this draft law was adopted. What happened next? They collected for about a month and saw that they could not complete this task. But on the other hand, this decision, in my opinion, was the right one. We cannot bring such a bill to the floor without being sure of the number of votes. The worst we can do is carry out and get 225 votes. You understand that, right? How will it end in society. Therefore, for me, as the head of the parliament, it is fundamental that we must be convinced that this draft law will be voted on. But I will say once again, it was an initiative of the "EU" faction, which was unanimously supported. After they realized that they could not get 240 votes, political manipulation began. Screams, all these, and so on. This is, in principle, a normal situation. You couldn't, let's negotiate in a new way. That is why they and I have decided that we will take a break and see what we do next with this law.

  What is the point? Just to understand. With all due respect to the existing committee, what is going to the second reading is not the draft law that was voted on in the first reading. Because the draft law in the first reading was one and a half pages long. On the second reading, there are already 25 pages of text. A completely new concept. A completely new vision. That's why some deputies say absolutely correctly: "we voted for one thing in the first reading, and for the second reading something incomprehensible was prepared for us." For two days, my colleagues will confirm, I personally, as a lawyer, went through the entire text of this law. Today I will have a meeting with my colleagues, and I will tell them all my reservations, because there are a lot of legal inaccuracies, which will later affect court processes, some nuances, some repetitions, duplications in the terms of this text. Therefore, our task is to clear all these things, taking into account everything that is necessary to reach the second reading. And that's why it's absolutely normal, balanced work.

  In addition to legal work, we must also clearly conduct, and we have agreed on this, certain things that are not related to legal, but canonical matters. I will not divulge what, but we have such plans, which we have also agreed among ourselves. When all these processes are completed, and we arrive at some final vision of this draft law, with which everyone will already be familiar, and everyone will say "okay", then we will immediately introduce it to the hall. No one will delay, because we are aware of and respect the right of our colleagues. They said that until this bill is ready, we will block the Verkhovna Rada. But I emphasize once again that session meetings are not one type of activity of the Verkhovna Rada. We have now switched more to work with committees, temporary investigators and special commissions. I am personally working on this draft law from a legal point of view, as are my colleagues. So that we receive a legally stable and competent text in the near future.

  That is the situation, that it will not be carried out, can no longer be?  The next meeting – this is an immediate consideration.

  We will start the next session with consideration of this draft law. And this would be the position of the vast majority of factions and groups. I think that it is fair that we should put an end to this matter.

  It took me one and a half days to scrupulously work through this draft law. I know every dot, every comma, I know the legal risks, I know the legal risks that may arise, I know the law enforcement risks. And that's why I want to share with my colleagues so that they, holding the next committee, where they will already take this into account, should definitely pay attention to certain things. We don't just need to adopt some law and tell the society: "that's all, we've adopted it." We must pass a law that will work. Because the worst thing is if we adopt a law and it doesn't work, then there will be a claim against us. What kind of junk did you take? Why can't we exercise our rights? Do you understand? And that is why it seems to me that it is very important here to come up with, firstly, a legally perfect draft law, and secondly, to implement it in accordance with all applied procedures. Because any violation in point "A" or in point "B" will certainly entail a challenge to this draft law through the Constitutional Court. And we know that if this draft law is contested and recognized as unconstitutional due to our shortcomings, due to violation of the requirements of the Constitution, or due to violation of the adoption procedure, then it will be our responsibility.  As the Speaker of the Parliament, I cannot allow such complex laws, important for the country, to leave the Ukrainian Parliament with violations.

• 26 July 2024: Synod's action temporarily removing Metropolitan Hilarion & other news

  The Holy Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate held its summer meeting on July 25, 2024.   Journey Entry 78 of the minutes of the meeting announced an important decision relating to Metropolitan Hilarion of Budapest and Hungary.  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6146121.html  A Google translation of the complete text of the entry is as follows:

  HAD A JUDGMENT on the state of affairs in the Budapest-Hungarian Diocese.

  RESOLVED:

  1. To form a Commission to study the situation in the Budapest-Hungarian Diocese.

  2. For the duration of the work of said Commission, temporarily remove Metropolitan Hilarion of Budapest and Hungary from the administration of the Budapest-Hungarian Diocese.

  3. The temporary administration of the Budapest-Hungarian Diocese shall be entrusted to the Patriarchal Exarch of Western Europe, Metropolitan Nestor of Korsun and Western Europe.

  4. To relieve Metropolitan Hilarion of his posts as Chairman of the Synodal Biblical-Theological Commission and as Chairman of the Inter-Council Presence Commission on Theology and Theological Education and to appoint His Grace Bishop Methodius of Yegoryevsk as acting chairman of both commissions, including him in the Inter-Council Presence.

  As can be seen, Metropolitan Hilarion is “temporarily” removed from the administration of the Budapest diocese pending completion of the work of a commission that will study the situation in the diocese.   Paragraph 4 provides that Metropolitan Hilarion is relieved of his posts as Chairman of the Synodal Biblical-Theological Commission and as Chairman of the Inter-Council Presence Commission on Theology and Theological Education.   The first position is a very important one.  However, in paragraph 4, the word "temporarily" is not used.  The “acting chairman” of both commissions will be Bishop Methodius of Yegoryevsk.  In my opinion, the latter is a surprising choice.  His biography is found at http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6108984.html.  He has only been a bishop for nine days.

  Although the decision gives no information on the “situation in the Budapest-Hungarian Diocese,” it is assumed by most that it relates to allegations made against Metropolitan Hilarion by Georgy Suzuki, a 21-year-old subdeacon who is from Japan and who lived with Metropolitan Hilarion as a “cell-mate.”  On July 4, Novaya Gazeta Europe posted a long investigative article based on certain allegations made by Suzuki.  As you may recall, Novaya Gazeta was a Moscow newspaper known for its independence.  Its editor-in-chief Dmitry Muratov received the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize.  After the invasion of Ukraine, the newspaper received several warnings from the Russian government concerning its coverage of Ukraine.  As a result, the newspaper suspended its Moscow operations and began a publication Novaya Gazeta Europe, headquartered in Riga.  The publication has since been blocked in Russia and designated an “undesirable organization.”  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Novaya_Gazeta 

  The newspaper’s full report on Metropolitan Hilarion can be read at https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/07/05/trudy-i-dni-mitropolita-ilariona.  The claims made by Suzuki include Suzuki being required to sleep in the same bed as Hilarion and skin-to-skin contacts (but not sex acts) between the two.  Suzuki also attacked the Metropolitan’s alleged high style of living.  Suzuki provided the newspaper with voice recordings and photos that Suzuki had secretly taken. The newspaper acknowledged that Suzuki “took an expensive watch and money totaling 30 thousand euros from Hilarion's house” when Suzuki returned to Japan.  Metropolitan Hilarion filed criminal charges for theft against Suzuki after this occurred.  Following the decision today by the Holy Synod, Novaya Gazeta Europe has posted another article.   https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/07/25/russian-orthodox-turmoil-en   The latest article is entitled “Russian Orthodox turmoil -- Allegations of sexual harassment against a once high-flying bishop have rocked Russia’s religious establishment to the core.”   Today’s article retells the allegations against Metropolitan Hilarion.  It also stresses Metropolitan Hilarion’s strict views concerning sexual morality and homosexuality.  The article ends with a statement by Inga Leonova, the editor-in-chief of The Wheel (an Orthodox journal in the USA) that sexual misconduct within the Russian Orthodox Church is widespread and that “the situation is probably even more dire than it was in the Catholic Church before the Spotlight investigation, because everybody talks, nobody investigates, nobody ever goes on record, and no one ever comes forward with accusations because there is nowhere to go.”  It appears that the newspaper is attempting to make the story much bigger than the Hilarion matter.

  Metropolitan Hilarion has launched his own counterattack against the story posted on July 4.  This is reflected in his statement made to RIA Novosti on July 9.  https://ria.ru/20240709/mitropolit-1958444464.html   Archpriest Nikolai Kim, press secretary of the Budapest diocese, supported Metropolitan Hilarion in an interview by TASS.   https://tass.ru/obschestvo/21316241   The clergy of the Budapest diocese has posted a statement supportive of Metropolitan Hilarion.  https://magyarortodox.com/2024/07/10/a-magyar-egyhazmegye-papsaganak-nyilt-levele-hilarion-budapesti-es-magyarorszagi-metropolia-vedelmeben/  One of the Metropolitan’s contentions is that he is being blackmailed.  Archpriest Nikolai Kim stated in his interview that Suzuki's mother tried to sell the Metropolitan these (secret) recordings for €384,000 and demanded that the money be transferred to her account.  Metropolitan Hilarion has denied many of the allegations made by Suzuki.

  The decision made by the Holy Synod to suspend Metropolitan Hilarion pending investigation is similar to the practice of the Catholic Church when a bishop or a priest is accused.  During my years as a practicing attorney, I handled a considerable number of sexual harassment cases.  These can be difficult cases with two persons giving very conflicting testimony as to what happened when the two of them were alone.  When I followed the news concerning the trial of Cardinal Pell in Australia, my prayer was – may the truth prevail.  I have the same prayer in this case. 

  In Ukraine, consideration by the Rada of controversial Draft Law 8371 has been delayed at least until August 20.  On July 23, the proponents of Draft Law 8371 occupied the rostrum of the Rada after they had heard that Draft Law 8371 was not on the latest agenda to be considered and voted on by the full Rada.  The agenda is determined by the Rada’s Conciliation Council of Parliamentary Factions and Groups.   After the interruption caused by the occupation of the rostrum, the Conciliation Council met and decided to establish a “working group” to resolve disputes relating to the Draft Law.   Another plenary session of the Rada will not be held (except for military matters) until the latter part of August.  This is described in an interview of Ruslan Stefanchuk, chairperson of the Rada.  https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2024/07/23/7467064/   Also with respect to Draft Law 8371, “Renovabis” (the Eastern European Aid Organization of the Catholic Church in Germany) has issued a strong statement against Draft Law 8371.  https://www.renovabis.de/pressemeldungen/ukraine-verbot-der-ukrainisch-orthodoxen-kirche-zeichnet-sich-ab 

  The following announcement has been made by the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s Exarchate in Lithuania:  “On 23 July 2024, in accordance with his request, protodeacon Andrei Kuraev was admitted to the clergy of the Exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Lithuania….Protodeacon Andrei Kuraev will continue his ministry in the Church as a missionary—not bound by ministry in one parish, but will continue to preach the gospel in different cities and countries in accordance with the rules of the Church.”  https://www.ortodoksas.lt/2024/07/naujas-dvasininkas-egzarchate.html?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR13xROlPI6Gu9dhEeY3JTgN0bGJDYo8FEVTKt_WfTfz1m8i4pNH04CLjYs_aem_QjzJ3J_8G6Kk990ambokPA   As you recall, Kuraev was defrocked by the Moscow Patriarchate, but then reinstated by the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

  Lastly, the U.S. Helsinki Commission has posted on July 24 a video of a hearing on "Russia's Persecution of Ukrainian Christians."  It can be watched at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHWvita1mrw. 

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 25 July 2024: Rada's consideration of Draft Law 8371 postponed until late August

  TO NEWSLETTER RECIPIENTS WHO MAY BE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN DRAFT LAW 8371

  Yesterday, Tuesday, July 23, was a very eventful day at the Rada with respect to Draft Law 8371.  In the month of July, the Rada had held plenary meetings on July 16, 17, and 18.  The meeting of the Rada on July 23 was the fourth plenary meeting of the month.  The agenda that was prepared for July 23 is set forth at  https://www.rada.gov.ua/meeting/awt/show/8341.html.  The first two items on the agenda involved extending the term of marital law and extending the term of the general mobilization.  These two extremely important items were approved.  However, there was nothing on the agenda for July 23 with respect to voting on Draft Law 8371 (second reading).  The absence of a vote on 8371 greatly upset the proponents of 8371, particularly Petro Poroshenko and his “European Solidarity” party.   In response to this concern, a meeting of the Conciliation Council of Parliamentary Factions and Groups (the body that determines the agenda for the Rada) was immediately held.

  It was reportedly a heated meeting.  Because of objections by the leadership of the Servant of the People party and perhaps others, the Conciliation Council did not reach agreement to place 8371 on the agenda.  When this news was announced, Poroshenko, his European Solidarity party, and others occupied the rostrum so as to prevent further proceedings by the Rada.  This resulted in a second meeting of the Conciliation Council.  At this meeting, it was determined that there would be no further plenary meetings of the Rada until the week of August 19-25.   It was also decided that a “working group” appointed by the Speaker would seek to resolve differences with respect to the language of 8371.

  The foregoing description of events is based on various statements and interviews reported on the Ukrainian media.  In my opinion, the most reliable sources are statements made by Ruslan Stefanchuk, the chairman of the Rada.  See  https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2024/07/23/7467064/ .  The statements include the following:

  "Therefore, today we gathered and decided to give time to the internal working group to finalize this bill.  The fact is that it [the draft law] has changed significantly by the second reading compared to the first.  And some colleagues do not agree with all the changes.  In addition, this bill should be such that no one can appeal it to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine after its adoption.  As soon as the working group completes work on the document, we will immediately bring it to the hall."

  "As soon as the working group completes the draft law banning religious organizations associated with Russia and submits it to the Conciliation Council, we will immediately determine the date of the next meeting."

  Although not in quotation marks, the foregoing link from Ukrainska Pravda also states:  Stefanchuk noted that at a meeting of one of the conciliation councils, it was unanimously decided that the relevant draft law would be put to a vote by parliament after 240 votes were collected in its support.  According to him, after they began to collect votes, it turned out that approximately 225-226 deputies are ready to vote "for", but there are no final lists yet.   This statement by Stefanchuk refers to a decision by the Conciliation Council on May 21 that 8371 would be placed on the agenda if the proponents of 8371 obtain the signatures of 240 deputies affirming that they would vote for 8371.  It takes 226 affirmative votes to pass Draft Law 8371 on the second reading.  The requirement of 240 was to provide additional assurance that the 8371 would actually be approved when it came to a vote.  It now appears that the proponents of 8371 have approximately 226 signatures, but not 240.  Frustrated by those deputies who have refused to sign, the proponents of 8371 are now using physical means (blocking the rostrum) to prevent the Rada from holding any plenary sessions (except for military matters) until 8371 is placed on the agenda.

  Poroshenko has made a statement on his Facebook page.  https://www.facebook.com/petroporoshenko/posts/pfbid0rNSx553tBuqRkvttdFRoVkShUod1YGqMNH4DcdjUCe2myscQJWkVXxdExnFPDjfbl   It reads as follows:

  Friends, I announce good news: we have the first tactical victory in the fight for the ban of the Russian church in Ukraine, agents of the FSB.

  • First of all, if in the coming days they do not provide a law on the ban of the Moscow church, there will be no meetings of the Verkhovna Rada.
  • Secondly, the next meeting of the Rada will begin with the law of prohibition of the Russian church.
  • Thirdly, before the meeting of the Rada, the working group will work on a few important issues: about the deadline, that this issue must be resolved by August 20, that not only the Government, but also the VRU [the Rada] can go to court on the elimination of the UPC MP, etc.

  It became possible because all factions of the Parliament would unite, except for OPZZh [the pro-Russian Opposition Platform for Life party].  Even a huge part of the Servant [of the People party] also came out and took part in blocking the rostrum.

  The fifth column of the Russian Federation in Ukraine must be eliminated.  Those who want to work for the enemy should be forbidden.  Those who love God and Ukraine can join the only autocephalous council Orthodox Church of Ukraine.  Keeping it simple.

  In contrast to Poroshenko, Stefanchuk did not state that the working group will only work on a “few” issues.  Rather, the working group will prepare a “draft law” which in turn will be presented to the Rada for the vote on the second reading.  Apparently the working group is charged with preparing a draft law which complies with the Constitution of Ukraine so that “no one can appeal it.”  Presumably, Stefanchuk assumes that the present proponents and opponents of the latest version of 8371, particularly the leadership of the Servant of the People party, will be able to agree on a new version.  There remains the open question of what will happen if the members of the working group are unable to reach agreement among themselves. 

  There is also an interesting interview of Deputy Mykyta Poturaev, head of the Rada’s Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy (the committee that has primary responsibility for 8371).  https://glavcom.ua/interviews/privid-novinskoho-i-rozkol-monobilshosti-shcho-vitvorjajut-lobisti-moskovskoji-tserkvi-u-radi--1011528.html#google_vignette   Poturaev, who is a member of the Servant of the People party, complained about the leadership of the party who have opposed consideration of 8371 contrary to the views of many of the party’s deputies.  This difference has resulted in major tensions within the party.  When asked about the reasons given by the party leaders for delaying a vote on 8371, Poturaev stated:  “Different things are said.  America is nodded at, which will not approve of this, although it is certainly not a problem.”

  Also on July 23, DESS issued a statement expressing concerns about the current version of 8371.  https://dess.gov.ua/zaiava-dess-shchodo-zakonoproiektu-8371-vazhlyvist-i-neobkhidnist-usunennia-relihiynoho-vplyvu-krainy-ahresora/  Some of the concerns expressed by DESS are the following:

  Unwaveringly advocating the unconditional need for the adoption of draft law No. 8371, DESS points to the need to eliminate unfortunate miscalculations in its wording, which is submitted for the second reading.  First of all, DESS is convinced that the law should make it impossible to operate in Ukraine religious organizations associated with any center in the aggressor country, not only with the Russian church.  This is a perfectly logical point that, for reasons that are completely inexplicable, is currently being ignored.

  International law in the field of freedom of conscience does not provide for the regulation of religious freedom for reasons of national security.  Not because this or that religious organization cannot threaten such security, but because a number of states have abused and are abusing the very concept of national security.  Mountains of legal literature have been written about it.  This is emphasized within the framework of the European Union in international acts on the protection of religious freedom, it is stated in the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.  DESS consistently draws the attention of the law makers to this, while emphasizing that the very repetition of the phrase "national security" does not make the draft law either stronger or more effective, but makes it more vulnerable to possible criticism.

  Until now, it has not been possible to clean the draft law of overt Sovietism and shortcomings - we hope, not because of an evil intention.  Some of them threaten to turn the law into a laughingstock.  For example, the draft law still contains the following prescription: those who want to establish ties with a banned religious organization, i.e. the Russian church, must obtain a special permit for this from the DESS.  It is difficult to imagine exactly what situation this prescription regulates, who in their right mind would establish ties with an organization that has become a continuation of the criminal regime of the Russian Federation.  Who will give permission for this, how and why?

  We strongly ask the legislators not to be ashamed of such prescriptions!

  DESS also offers a number of purely technical and legal provisions, but really important for the implementation of the future law. 

  Lastly, Cardinal Pietro Parolin, the Vatican’s Secretary of State, who is visiting Kyiv, met on July 22 with Dr. Viktor Yelensky, the head of DESS.  https://dess.gov.ua/holova-dess-ta-derzhavnyy-sekretar-sviatoho-prestolu-obhovoryly-pytannia-relihii-humanitarnoi-dopomohy-ta-myru-v-ukraini/  One of the subjects discussed was “ legislative initiatives in the field of freedom of conscience.”  See also https://www.vaticannews.va/es/vaticano/news/2024-07/ucrania-visita-parolin-cronaca-viaje-paz-papa-francisco.html  On the same day, the Cardinal met with the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches.  From the photo, I can see that Archpriest Mykola Danylevych, deputy head of the Department of External Church Relations of the UOC, was one of the attendees at the meeting.

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 22 July 2024: Concealment continues - Draft Law 8371

  On July 18, 2024, the Rada’s Committee for Humanitarian and Information Policy met and made certain amendments to the text of Draft Law 8371 (for the second reading).  This is the third time that the Committee has made amendments to 8371.  The prior two occasions were in March and May.  As was true in these prior two occasions, the Committee has not released the latest text of 8371.  This appears to be part of a continuing policy of concealing the full text, apparently to prevent criticism of the text of the Draft Law and to allow statements by the proponents of Draft Law 8371 to go unchallenged.  Also as far as I can determine, the full text (including the March, May, or July versions) has not been posted as a single document on any website in Ukraine.  I have tried to change this.  Recently, I requested Dr. Yelensky to post the full text on the website of DESS, and in his reply email, he declined to do so.  A few weeks ago, I provided a major religious website in Ukraine the full text of the May version of 8371, and I requested that the full text be posted on its website.  I stated that in a democracy, citizens should be able to obtain the text of legislation being considered by a parliament so that they can provide comments to their legislators.  I was informed by the website that it was its policy not to post proposed legislation which may be subject to further amendment.

  The Committee is required to prepare before the vote on the second reading a “Comparative Table” which describes all of the amendments proposed by deputies with respect to the draft law.  After the Committee finalized its May amendments, it prepared a comparative table for Draft Law 8371.  Because of the number of proposed amendments, the table was 916 pages in length.  There is a column on the far right of the form relating to the version of the draft law proposed by the Committee.  On the first page of the table, this column only contains the name of the draft law.  On the second page, this column is blank.  However, if one goes through the entire 916 pages, one finds the full text, broken into fragments at pages 3-4, 95-107, 110-118, 120-139, 176-179, 326-327, and 346-347.  There appears to be no reason to divide the draft law into eight separate fragments scattered in a 916-page document, aside from hiding it and making it unlikely for one to know that the full text is there. 

  This weekend, I discovered that a second “Comparative Table” was posted on the Rada’s website.  https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/41219  I then assembled the various fragments and merged them into a single document.  Following this, I compared the full text of the draft law in the second comparative table with the full text in the first table.  From this I determined the exact changes made by the Committee at its meeting on July 18.   Attached to this report is an English translation of the full text of Draft Law 8371 as it now exists.  Changes made by the Committee on July 18 are noted in red.

  On July 18, the Rada posted a report relating to amendments which were made by the Committee to Draft Law 8371 on that day.  https://kompkd.rada.gov.ua/news/main_news/76304.html  The full report is as follows:

  On July 18, the Committee on Humanitarian Affairs and Information Policy revised the conclusion to the draft law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Concerning the Activities of Religious Organizations in Ukraine (Reg. No. 8371), which makes it impossible for religious organizations to operate in Ukraine that have ties with the Russian Federation.

  For the second reading, the wording of some provisions of the document was expanded, in particular Article 3 now reads: "In view of the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church is an ideological continuation of the regime of the aggressor state, an accomplice to war crimes and crimes against humanity committed on behalf of the Russian Federations and the ideologies of the "Russian world", the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church is banned in Ukraine."

  "It's, in fact, a quote from the PACE Resolution. That is, we are also strengthening our law with international documents," said the deputy Chairman of the Committee Yevheniia Kravchuk.

  The Committee recommends that the Parliament support the draft law as a whole as a law.  According to the Chairman of the Committee, Nikita Poturayev, the adoption of this will be one of the fateful decisions for the development of Independent Ukraine.

  It is true that the Committee amended Article 3 as stated.  See attachment at page 3.  However, the amendment made to Article 3 is of minor significance. 

  In contrast, the Rada’s July 18 report is completely silent on an amendment of great significance.  As can be seen at pages 10 and 21 of the attached, THE LATEST AMENDMENTS DELETE THE REQUIREMENT FOR A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY VOTE FOR A RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION TO CHANGE ITS SUBORDINATION AND TO MAKE APPROPRIATE CHANGES IN ITS CHARTER.  Thus, it appears that a simple majority will now be sufficient.  This change will make it much easier for the OCU to cause the transfer of parishes from the UOC.  Yet, this extremely important change is concealed and not mentioned in the Rada’s report.  To the best of my knowledge this amendment has not been mentioned by any media, and the media is probably unaware of it.  In my opinion, this concealment of pending legislation is inconsistent with a democracy.

  The proponents of Draft Law 8371 are using fairly extreme measures to cause Draft Law 8371 to be placed on the agenda of the full Rada for a vote on the second reading.  The website Left Bank has reported:  Instead, about 70 MPs (including members of the European Solidarity, Voice, and Servant of the People parties), according to LB.ua sources, have issued an ultimatum to the leadership of the Servant of the People and the Verkhovna Rada: if the bill on the UOC-MP is not on the agenda next week, they will not vote for anything other than the extension of martial law.   According to LB.ua, the bill managed to collect the required 226 votes for the second reading, but more votes are needed "for a safety net".  https://en.lb.ua/news/2024/07/21/30746_servants_still_hesitate_support.html   On May 21, the European Solidarity Party occupied the rostrum at the Rada in an attempt to force a vote on Draft Law 8371.

  If 8371 is passed, the OCU will be the chief beneficiary.   Contacts by OCU bishops with the deputies of the Rada have been reported.  An anonymous deputy supposedly stated:  “They called and tried to persuade me to sign a letter to the Verkhovna Rada about supporting bill 8371. They promised that they would mobilize the flock for political support in my region if I signed it.”  https://spzh.live/ru/news/81254-arkhierei-ptsu-zvonjat-nardepam-ubezhdaja-podderzhat-zakon-o-zaprete-upts-smi 

  For Draft Law 8371, next week will be an important one, and I hope that the Draft Law does not pass.  In a number of my past reports, I have analyzed various provisions of Draft Law 8371 and have explained why I believe those provisions are outrageous.  None of those outrageous provisions have been modified in the latest amendments by the Committee.

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

   

  Latest Draft Law 8371 (19 July 2024)

  For newsletter recipients who may be interested in the latest version of Draft Law 8371 in the original Ukrainian language, as last amended by the Rada’s Committee for Humanitarian and Information Policy on July 18, I have attached the full text obtained from the “Comparative Table” posted on the Rada’s website last weekend.  I have highlighted in red font the changes made by the Committee on July 18.  The  blue font provides the pages of the Comparative Table from which the text was obtained.  In my opinion, the biggest change made on July 18 was to delete the requirement for a two-thirds majority vote for a change of subordination and a change in the charter of the religious organization.  At its meeting on July 18, the Committee failed to modify any of the many provision of the prior text which raise great concerns.

  Latest Draft Law 8371 (Ukr.)

• 17 July 2024: Effect of U.S. politics on Draft Law 8371 & other news

  On July 15, 2024, former president Donald Trump announced that he had selected Senator J.D. Vance to be his choice as nominee for vice president.  Vance, who converted to Catholicism in 2019, is a strong opponent of Draft Law 8371, which is now pending before the Rada (the Ukrainian parliament).  The following is a very short video of Vance speaking about Draft Law 8371 in the U.S. Senate on April 23, 2024.  https://spzh.live/ru/news/81181-amsterdam-v-ssha-pokazyvajut-film-pro-honenija-na-upts-s-uchastiem-vensa   In the video, he states that some of the churches in Ukraine may be too close to Russia, “but you don’t deprive a whole religious community of their religious freedom because some of its adherents do not agree with you about the relevant conflict of the day.”  Based on the polls, there is a very real possibility that Vance will be the next vice president of the United States.

  This week could be very important for Draft Law 8371.  On July 16, Petro Poroshenko, leader of the "European Solidarity" party, spoke in the Rada about Draft Law 8371.  https://www.5.ua/polityka/yakoho-bisa-vzhe-bilshe-nizh-piv-roku-blokuiut-zakon-pro-zaboronu-rpts-v-ukraini-poroshenko-v-radi-330979.html;  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rJM8qwS-5ME  Poroshenko and his party are probably the most zealous supporters of 8371.  He stated: 

  Here we are being congratulated on the anniversary of the baptism of Rus'. The best gift to the people of Ukraine from the Verkhovna Rada would be to vote for this law.  I'm sorry, what the hell, why has the law on the church not been put to the vote for half a year, even more?  Yesterday, I was in the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra for the Divine Liturgy.  Ukrainians are amazing, because the army, the language, and the faith are important to them.  I emphasize that the law on the church should be voted on this week.  And those who have not yet signed  -- sign immediately!

  The Rada’s session on July 16 was its first plenary session since June 20.  It is reported that Draft Law 8371 will be placed on the agenda of the Rada for the second reading if 240 deputies sign a document stating that they will vote to approve 8371.  It appears that by June 26 approximately 221 signatures had been obtained.  https://lb.ua/news/2024/06/26/620954_ponad_140_nardepiv_postavili.html   Now that the Rada is back in session, there may be an opportunity to obtain more signatures.  However, approval by the Rada of  Draft Law 8371 on the second reading would definitely provide an additional argument to political forces in the United States, such as Vance and possibly Trump as well, who may use this argument as one the reasons for limiting further funding for Ukraine.   Will the Rada deputies be concerned about this?  They should be.

  There have been several interesting events relating to Bulgaria and the election of Patriarch Daniil.  On the morning of June 30, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew went to the Bulgarian National Assembly (parliament) and awarded the Cross of Pammakaristos to Boyko Borisov, the leader of Bulgaria's GERB party.  https://orthodoxtimes.com/the-ecumenical-patriarch-honored-the-former-pm-of-bulgaria-boyko-borissov/  Borisov was honored for his support of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.  GERB is the largest (24%) political party in Bulgaria, and Borisov has played a very important role in Bulgarian politics since 2010.   In recent years, there has been a rivalry between Borisov and President Rumen Radev.  At the present time, Radev is more hesitant with respect to providing aid to Ukraine than a majority of the members of the National Assembly including Borisov.  Earlier this month, Radev refused to lead the Bulgarian delegation to the NATO summit in Washington DC.  https://apnews.com/article/bulgaria-president-nato-summit-refusal-53bb058b1754b438fe252be5ea5cdb02   According to a very recent poll, only 55% of Bulgarians are in favor of continued aid to Ukraine.  https://kosovapress.com/en/bullgaret-shprehen-me-pak-te-prire-per-te-mbajtur-ndihmen-per-ukrainen  This division in Bulgarian society now seems to be reflected in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC) as well.  A majority of the Holy Synod of the BOC seems to be more oriented to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, while the primate of the BOC, Patriarch Daniil, seems more oriented towards the Moscow Patriarchate.

  On July 10 the Holy Synod held its first meeting since the enthronement of Patriarch Daniil.  https://bg-patriarshia.bg/news/reshenia-na-sv-sinod-ot-zasedanieto-mu-na-9-07-2024-g  The only significant decision was the appointment of Bishop Pachomius of Branitsa, former rector of the Sofia Theological Seminary," as the first Vicar Bishop of the Sofia Metropolia.  The report of the Synod meeting said nothing about the very important election of a new metropolitan for the Vidin eparchy, the position previously held by Daniil.  Under the BOC charter, the Holy Synod will submit a list of bishops to the Vidin Diocesan Electoral Council, which will elect a “shortlist” of two bishops, one of whom will be elected by the Holy Synod as the new metropolitan of Vidin.  Presumably, the Vidin Electoral Council will be greatly influenced by the views of Daniil.   It therefore appears that the only way that the pro-Constantinople majority of the Synod can ensure the election of one of its supporters is to prepare an initial list which does not include two or more supporters of the views of Daniil.  If there are two supporters of Daniil's views on the initial list, the Vidin Electoral Council could elect a “shortlist” consisting of the names of these two from which the Holy Synod would have no choice but to elect one of them.  The preparation of the initial list by the Holy Synod will probably involve a major confrontation within the Holy Synod.  This preparation may even have been a subject of discussion at this first meeting of the Synod but was not reported because of a lack of resolution of this issue..

  On July 4, Patriarch Daniil visited the United States Embassy in Sofia to join in the celebration of American Independence Day.  https://bg-patriarshia.bg/news/balgarskiat-patriarh-daniil-prisastva-na-priem-v-posolstvoto   In the Patriarch’s address at his enthronement, he stressed the need for unity.   https://orthochristian.com/161050.html   His addresses included the following:

  Following the example of my recent predecessors, the ever-memorable Bulgarian Patriarchs Neophyte, Maxim, and Cyril, I will strive to ensure unity in Christ and brotherly service with the fellow archbishops of the Holy Synod, in a spirit of mutual respect and support in the joint care for our spiritual flock as the leader of our Orthodox Church and the Holy Synod, so that “God through the Lord in the Holy Spirit—Father and Son and Holy Spirit” may be glorified (34 Apostolic Canon).

  He has also made a number of other appeals for unity.  However, with the divisions existing in Bulgarian society generally, this unity may be difficult to obtain.

  On July 15, Elder Metropolitan Emmanuel of Chalcedon (Ecumenical Patriarchate) was in Kyiv for the feast of St. Vladimir.  https://orthodoxtimes.com/metropolitans-of-kyiv-and-emmanuel-of-chalcedon-celebrated-divine-liturgy-in-ukraine/  On July 11, Metropolitan Anthony of Volokolamsk, head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s DECR, visited Pope Francis at the Vatican.  “During the meeting, issues of inter-church relations and joint efforts in the humanitarian sphere were discussed.”  https://mospat.ru/ru/news/91975/  

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA 

• 30 June 2024: Pro-Moscow Daniil new Bulgarian Patriarch & other news

  What a surprise!!!  Something few expected.  Today, June 30, Metropolitan Daniil of Vidin was elected the new patriarch of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC).  It was an extremely close election.  According to the charter of the BOC, Daniil was elected by the Patriarchal Electoral Church Council.  Aside from the Bulgarian bishops, this council consists of three clergy, two laypersons, one monk, and one nun from each of the dioceses of the BOC, except for Sofia.  The Sofia diocese has six clerics, four laypersons, one monk, and one nun.  In addition there is one representative from each of the theological schools and seminaries.  The members of the Council vote for the new patriarch by secret ballot.  With the vacancy caused by the death of Patriarch Neofit, the Holy Synod consisted of 14 metropolitans.  If each of these metropolitans exercised “control” over the delegates from his diocese, the choice for patriarch by a majority of the members of the Synod would also very likely be the choice of the Council as well.  However, the use of the secret ballot allows a delegate not to follow the choice of his or her bishop -- without detection by the bishop.  One can say that this is very democratic and gives non-bishops a real voice in the selection of the new patriarch.

  Pursuant to the charter of the BOC, the Holy Synod had elected on June 20 a shortlist of three metropolitans from which the Electoral Council selected the new patriarch.  Under the charter, one needs the support of two-thirds of the members of the Holy Synod to be placed on the shortlist.  On June 20, the results of the voting was a follows:  Metropolitan Grigoriy of Vratsa received 11 votes in the first round of voting, Metropolitan Daniil of Vidin received 9 votes after the 32nd round of voting, and Metropolitan Gavriil of Lovech received 9 votes after the 42nd round.  Two-thirds of the 14 participating metropolitans is actually ten.  However, to obtain the required shortlist of three, the Holy Synod lowered the threshold to nine.  From this, it is very apparent that Grigoriy was clearly the first choice of the Holy Synod.  In addition, Grigoriy was unanimously elected by the Holy Synod to head the BOC and the Sofia Metropolia until the election of a new patriarch.  In my opinion, the Holy Synod's preference for Grigoriy reflected a desire of the Holy Synod to have a leader who is not clearly identified with either the part of the Holy Synod oriented towards the Moscow Patriarchate or the part of the Holy Synod oriented towards the West and Constantinople.  In researching past news concerning Metropolitan Grigoriy of Vratsa, it appears that he has maintained an extremely low profile.  There is almost nothing on the Internet with respect to his views on different issues.

  On the other hand, Daniil and Gavriil are the two members of the Holy Synod who are the most outspoken in favor of Moscow.  In fact, on June 24, Metropolitan Daniil gave an interview on Bulgarian state radio in which he strongly attacked Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew for the creation of the OCU.   https://bnr.bg/ru/post/102010741/blagodaty-svatogo-duha-v-edinenii-chistote-veri-i-blagochestii  According to him, the “uncanonical action of Patriarch Bartholomew led to even greater division in Ukraine.”  He states that the “so-called tomos” established a “non-canonical structure.”  He also states:  “Patriarch Bartholomew was sure that in this way millions of Orthodox Christians, deprived of communion with the Church, will join it.  And instead of peace reigning, as he expected, he kindled an even more bitter division, in which literally these people, whom he proclaimed canonical, began to persecute the canonical Church.  They take away churches, beat priests, kill, are these Christians? This is absurd, but the division is a fact.”  Daniil maintains that the only head of the universal church is Jesus Christ himself and that Orthodox teachings “categorically prohibit the head of one church from interfering in the affairs of another autocephalous Orthodox church.”

  With respect to the election of a new patriarch, the charter of the BOC provides that if one of the three on the shortlist receive two-thirds of the vote in the first round of voting, that metropolitan will be the next patriarch.  Today, the first round of voting resulted in the following vote:  Metropolitan Grigoriy of Vratsa --  64 votes; Metropolitan Daniil of Vidin -- 51 votes; Metropolitan Gavriil of Lovech -- 19 votes.  A total of 138 ballots were issued.  Four ballots were invalid. https://dveri.bg/component/com_content/Itemid,100723/catid,14/id,73432/view,article/  As none of the three received a two-thirds majority, there was a second round of voting involving the two who received the most votes.  Under the charter, the metropolitan who receives the most votes in the second round becomes the new patriarch.

  The results of the second and final round were as follows:  Daniil – 69: Grigoriy – 63.  There were 138 voters with three of the ballots declared invalid.  Daniil received exactly half of the total number of voters and more votes than Grigoriy.  https://dveri.bg/component/com_content/Itemid,100723/catid,14/id,73433/view,article/  Thus, Daniil becomes the new patriarch of the BOC.  In accordance with the announced schedule, Daniil was immediately enthroned this afternoon after the election.   A video of the entire enthronement can be watched at  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JvQvC-n84SQ .

  The election result must be a shock to many members of the Holy Synod.  The Holy Synod had expressly invited Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to attend the enthronement.  He was the only primate of a Local Orthodox Church present at the enthronement.  The Ecumenical Patriarchate came to the enthronement with a delegation of eleven.  With respect to the other Local Orthodox Churches, none had a delegation larger than two.  https://dveri.bg/component/com_content/Itemid,100723/catid,14/id,73424/view,article/  The Moscow Patriarchate came with a relatively low-level delegation consisting of Metropolitan Nestor of Korsun and Western Europe and Archpriest Vladimir Tishchuk.  It is very unlikely that Bartholomew would have been invited if it was expected that his strongest critic in the Holy Synod would be the one enthroned.  In spite of this surprising situation, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew had some gracious words to say about Metropolitan Daniil at the enthronement.  https://www.bta.bg/bg/news/bulgaria/700206-sledva-parvenstvuvashtiyat-da-bade-ukrasen-s-dobrodetelite-na-vyarata-kaza-vsel 

  It is possible that Daniil will now take a less polar position on the Moscow-Constantinople issue as patriarch.  He would do this for the unity of the BOC.  It should also be noted that the Bulgarian patriarch does not have the great power possessed by the Russian patriarch.  Key decisions will be made by the Holy Synod of the BOC.  In the Synod the patriarch has only one vote, and he may be in the minority. There are now six Synod members who are definitely in the pro-West group.  They are: (1­-3) Nikolai (age 54), Cyprian (age 48), and Yakov (age 53), all of whom concelebrated with hierarchs of the OCU on May 19; (4) Naum (age 55) who published Bartholomew’s book Encountering the Mystery in Bulgarian and who personally presented the translated book to Bartholomew at the Phanar on April 4; (5) Anthony (age 46) who spoke highly of Nikolai in a May 8 interview; (6) Arseniy (age 37) who is a spiritual son of Nikolai.   As can be seen, all of the six are young.  There are two members who are definitely in the pro-Russia group: Gavriil (age 73) and Daniil(age 52).  Although it is less clear, three metropolitans -- Joseph of America (age 81), Grigoriy of Veliko Turnovo (age 73), and Ignatii of Pleven (age 86) --- are probably more inclined to the pro-West view.  Because of the age of these metropolitans, there may be vacancies in these eparchies in the not too distant future.  Although again unclear, Ioan of Varna (age 55), who attended the Moscow Theological Academy, and Seraphim of Nevrokop (age 49) may be more inclined to the pro-Russia view.  Grigoriy of Vratsa is a question mark.  With the election of Daniil, there will now be a need to elect a new metropolitan for Vidin.  Who that person will be may be very important.  It takes eight votes to command a majority in the 15-member Holy Synod.      

  As reported in my last newsletter, Metropolitan Jonathan of Tulchin and Bratslav was released by Ukrainian authorities on Saturday, June 22.  It appears that he was met at the Ukraine – Belarus border by Father Nikolai Balashov, the key personal advisor to Patriarch Kirill with respect to international matters.  https://lb.ua/society/2024/06/25/620777_mitropolita_upts_mp_ionafana_yakiy.html  On the evening of Sunday, June 23, Metropolitan Jonathan made an appearance at the Holy Spirit Cathedral in Minsk for the All-Night Vigil on the eve of the feast of the Holy Spirit.  See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JYGKxzioTCY&t=5447s  (beginning at 1:28:10.)  On Tuesday, June 25, he was warmly received by Patriarch Kirill at the patriarchal residence in Moscow.  The Patriarch awarded him the Order of St. Sergius of Radonezh, 1st degree.  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6140136.html  This is an important award whose previous recipients included such people as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.  A six-minute video of the meeting of Patriarch Kirill and Metropolitan Jonathan can be watched at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FsOX--DpCbU.  During the meeting, the Metropolitan stated: “The Patriarch is a symbol of the entire Russian Church.  Not to disgrace your name was my task, and this gave me strength in resisting evil.” 

  There has been no explanation by the Ukrainian authorities as to the events leading up to the release.  Leonid Sevastianov, who has fairly frequent contacts with Pope Francis, told TASS that the Pope facilitated the release at the request of Patriarch Kirill.  https://t.me/tass_agency/256287  Shortly after the release of Jonathan, there was an exchange of 90 Ukrainian prisoners of war for 90 Russians prisoners of war.   https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6790878  This exchange occurred at Belgorod, Russia and was mediated by the UAE.  Perhaps Russia desired that Jonathan cross the border into Belarus, rather than into Russia, so that it did not appear that his release was part of the release of captured Russian soldiers.   Sergei Chapnin has stated on Facebook that the Ukrainian court records approving Jonathan’s release refers to him as a prisoner of war.  https://www.facebook.com/chapnin  Metropolitan Theodosius of Cherkassy (UOC), who is under investigation by the SBU, contends that the SBU “constantly tried to persuade me to exchange with prisoners of war.”  https://spzh.live/ua/news/80794-ne-pohodivsja-na-obmin-sbu-provela-cherhovij-obshuk-u-mitropolita-feodosija  From this it appears that the SBU may actually desire that UOC bishops who are under investigate leave Ukraine as part of a war prisoner exchange.

  Major Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk, head of the UGCC, has given a lengthy interview to the Ukrainian state news agency Ukrinform.  https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3878034-blazennijsij-svatoslav-predstoatel-ugkc.html  In the interview, he states:  “Our Church was liquidated in the occupied territories.  In particular, the so-called ‘state acts.’  For example, it happened in the occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region.  Institutions of social service of our church are also prohibited there.  For example, ‘Caritas Ukraine’ or such a community of Catholic men as the ‘Knights of Columbus.’  In fact, there is not a single Catholic priest, either Greek Catholic or Roman Catholic, in the occupied territories today.”   Although I am highly critical of the actions of the Ukrainian government in promoting Draft Law 8371, the actions by the Russian authorities against certain religious groups in the occupied territories such as the UGCC and OCU have been far worse than the actions of Ukraine against the UOC.

  On June 28 two UGCC Redemptorists priests were released from a Russian prison.  They had been seized by the Russian occupying forces in Berdyansk (a port west of Mariupol) on November 16, 2022.  In connection with their release, Major Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk thanked Pope Francis , Cardinals Parolin and Zuppi, and the apostolic nuncio in Kyiv, Archbishop Visvaldas Kulbokas.  https://risu.ua/yeromonahiv-ugkc-ivana-levickogo-ta-bogdana-geletu-zvilnili-z-rosijskogo-polonu_n149271  One wonders whether the release of these two priests could be related in any way to the release of Metropolitan Jonathan.

  In accordance with a tradition begun in 1977, a delegation from the Ecumenical Patriarchate was at the Vatican for the feast of Saints Peter and Paul.  The delegation was led by Elder Metropolitan Emmanuel.  The address of Pope Francis to the delegation on June 28 can be read at https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2024/june/documents/20240628-patriarcato-costantinopoli.html.  The address included the following:  “2025 will also mark the 1700th anniversary of the First Ecumenical Council of Nicaea.  It is my hope that the commemoration of this highly significant event will inspire all believers in Christ the Lord to testify together to their faith and their desire for greater communion.  In particular, I am pleased that the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Dicastery for Promoting Christian Unity have begun to reflect on how to join in commemorating this anniversary, and I thank His Holiness Bartholomew for inviting me to celebrate it near the place where the Council met.  It is a trip that I truly wish to make.” 

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 23 June 2024: Metropolitan Jonathan (UOC) released & other news

  On June 22 at 9:45 p.m., the Department of External Church Relations (DECR) of the Moscow Patriarchate posted an article entitled, “Metropolitan Jonathan of Tulchin and Bratslav received freedom.”  https://mospat.ru/ru/news/91905/  Simultaneously, the story was also posted by RIA Novosti and TASS.  https://ria.ru/20240622/mitropolit-1954794382.html; https://tass.ru/obschestvo/21172977  The DECR report states:  “On June 22, 2024, at the request of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus', as a result of negotiations, Metropolitan Jonathan of Tulchin and Bratslav was released.”  The article also states: "In the near future, the hierarch, in dire need of treatment and medical rehabilitation, will arrive in Moscow.”  The release of Metropolitan Jonathan has not yet been reported by either the Ukrainian government or by the Ukrainian media.

  This announcement comes four days after the Vinnitsa Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Vinnitsa City Court sentencing the 75-year-old metropolitan to five years imprisonment and confiscation of his property.  https://risu.ua/apelyacijnij-sud-zalishiv-u-sili-virok-mitropolitu-upc-mp-ionafanu-pyat-rokiv-z-konfiskaciyeyu_n149027  The conviction of Metropolitan Jonathan by the Vinnitsa City Court on August 7, 2023, had given rise to sharp protests.  https://mospat.ru/ru/news/90602/   On the day of the conviction, Patriarch Kirill issued a statement praising the metropolitan and condemning the conviction.  On August 9, 2023, Patriarch Kirill sent an appeal to the primates of the Local Orthodox Churches, to other religious leaders, and to international organizations protesting the conviction and asking them to “pay attention to the purposeful policy of the Ukrainian authorities aimed at destroying the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.”  https://mospat.ru/ru/news/90608/  However, concerns were also raised by people outside of the Moscow Patriarchate.  On August 11, 2023, Archbishop Anastasios of Tirana and All Albania, primate of the Albanian Orthodox Church, wrote a letter to Metropolitan Jonathan.  https://mospat.ru/en/news/90621/  The letter included the following statement:  “We participate in your suffering, and, to the extent of our capabilities, we share, where appropriate, our testimony about the atrocities against the pious Orthodox holy clergy, the devout people, as well as the renowned sacred places in Ukraine.”

  Prior to the decision of the Court of Appeals on June 18, the subject of including Metropolitan Jonathan on a prisoner exchange had been raised.  See https://glavcom.ua/country/society/mytropolyt-moskovskoi-tserkvy-ne-dochekavsia-dopomohy-rosii-i-prysiahnuv-ukraini-1005772.html .  On April 10, 2024, while hospitalized (reportedly he suffered a stroke in March), Metropolitan Jonathan gave his written consent to his exchange as a prisoner of war and to a transfer to representatives of Russia.  At a court session on June 12, Metropolitan Jonathan stated that he had changed his mind and that he was now opposed to being transferred to Russia as a prisoner of war.   The Union of Orthodox Journalists on its website praised the Metropolitan for not seeking a transfer and considered his remaining in Ukraine to be an “act of confession.”  https://spzh.live/ua/zashhita-very/80806-ukrajina-sohodni-pershi-arkhijereji-spovidniki 

  Presumably, more information will be available shortly on the circumstances relating to the June 22 release.  Questions remain.  Is Metropolitan Jonathan now being released without being classified as a prisoner of war?  I believe that most people will agree that it is a good development that a 75-year-old man with serious health problems will not have to spend five years in prison.  The Ukrainian authorities, after prevailing in the legal proceedings, may now be anxious to avoid the possible international reaction that might arise in the event of an actual imprisonment.  With respect to whether Patriarch Kirill should receive credit for the release, I do not know to what extent, if any, his statement and letters played a role.  Certainly, the Ukrainian authorities are not inclined to do any favors for the Patriarch.   The Ukrainian authorities may argue that the Metropolitan's relocating to Russia shows that his sympathies are really with Russia in the present war.   Undoubtedly, Russia and Ukraine will give different versions of what occurred in connection with the release.

  On a different subject, the close connection between the Putin government and the Moscow Patriarchate was again illustrated by President Putin’s recent visits to North Korea and China.  On June 19 he made a 20-hour (2 a.m. to 10 p.m.) visit to North Korea.  In Pyongyang President Putin was hosted with great fanfare by North Korea’s head Kim Jong Un, and an important treaty was signed.  President Putin and Kim Jong Un spent approximately ten hours together.  In spite of an extremely tight schedule, President Putin found time on his way to the airport to visit the Russian Orthodox Church of the Holy Life-Giving Trinity in Pyongyang.  http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/74338   The Church had been constructed, with most of the cost paid by North Korean government, on the personal order of Kim Jong Il after his visit to the Church of St. Innocent of Irkutsk in Khabarovsk in 2002.  It was consecrated in 2006 by Metropolitan (now Patriarch) Kirill of Smolensk.  It is the only Orthodox church in North Korea.  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6138217.html  In an interview, Metropolitan Feofan, who heads the Moscow Patriarchate’s diocese covering South and North Korea, spoke about the excellent relations between the church in Pyongyang and the North Korean authorities.  https://tass.ru/obschestvo/21139149  He stated:  “The temple is maintained in very good condition.  I think this is also thanks to the attention that the [DPRK] authorities provide.  The attitude is attentive, one might say, even caring.  Everything is going well for our temple.”  The foregoing treatment stands in contrast to the treatment of Christianity in general in North Korea.  The “World Watch List,” an annual report published by the NGO Open Doors, found in its 2024 report that North Korea, of all of the nations of the world, ranks first in the list of the worst persecutors of Christianity. https://www.opendoorsuk.org/persecution/world-watch-list/ 

  President Putin also visited a Russian Orthodox Church during a two-day visit to China, May 16-17.  On the first day he met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing, and he then traveled to Harbin the next day.   During his time in Harbin, he visited the Church of the Intercession of the Most Holy Mother of God.  http://www.patriarchia.ru/en/db/text/6131714.html   On the one hand, one can say that Putin’s visits to these churches help to portray Christianity in a positive light to the public in these two atheistic countries.  On the other hand, the two visits demonstrate again that the Moscow Patriarchate is an important player in Russia’s foreign policy.

  In Sofia, the program for Sunday, June 30, the day of the election and enthronement of a new Bulgarian patriarch, has been released.  https://dveri.bg/component/com_content/Itemid,100723/catid,14/id,73411/view,article/  The election of a new patriarch will occur during the morning at the building of the Holy Synod.  At the same time, the Ecumenical Patriarch and other representatives of Local Orthodox Churches will be greeted in the Metropolitan Cathedral of Saint Nedelya.  The enthronement will occur at 3 p.m. at the Patriarchal Cathedral of St. Alexander Nevsky.  The voting procedure is described at  https://orthodoxtimes.com/the-election-of-the-next-patriarch-of-bulgaria-an-insight-into-the-process/.  There will be a maximum of two rounds of voting.  In the first round, the members of the Patriarchal Electoral Church Council (approximately 145 members) will vote by secret ballot for one of the three metropolitans elected by the Holy Synod.  The three are Metropolitans Gavrill, Danill, and Grigorii of Vratsa.  If one of these three receive two-thirds of the vote in the first round, that metropolitan will be the next patriarch.  If none of them receive a two-thirds vote, there will be a second round of voting with the two metropolitans, who received the most votes in the first round, on the ballot.  The metropolitan who receives a simple majority in the second round will be the new patriarch.

  On June 13, the Vatican’s Dicastery for Promoting Christian Unity published its 146-page “study document” entitled The Bishop of Rome. Primacy and synodality in ecumenical dialogues and responses to the encyclical Ut unum sint.  The full text of the document can be read in English, French, and Italian at http://www.christianunity.va/content/unitacristiani/en/news/2024/2024-06-13-il-vescovo-di-roma-nuovo-documento-dpuc.html.  There is a summary beginning at page 107 in the English version.  On the same day, a press conference was held at the Vatican on the publication of the document.  The entire press conference can be watched at  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a6dTzDaqJ9s   At the press conference, questions are answered by Cardinals Koch and Grech.  Later the same day, a theological and ecumenical presentation of the document was held at the Angelicum Institute for Ecumenical Studies in Rome.  This presentation was in English.  The speakers were Rev. Anthony Currer, Prof. Hyacinthe Destivelle OP, and Prof. Juan Usma Gómez with comments from Prof. James Hawkey (Anglican Communion) and Prof. Dimitrios Keramidas (Orthodox Church).  The entire presentation at the Angelicum can be watched at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-aktNx_n_4 .  A great deal of work went into the preparation of this “study document,” and one can learn much by reading it.

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 20 June 2024: Future Bulgarian Patriarch - 3 finalists selected

  Late today, June 20, the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC) elected three metropolitans as finalists whose names will be submitted to the Patriarchal Electoral Church Council as the candidates for the election of a new patriarch.  BTA, the state news agency, has reported today’s events at https://www.bta.bg/bg/news/lik/694343-vrachanskiyat-mitropolit-grigoriy-vidinskiyat-mitropolit-daniil-i-lovchanskiyat .  The report is as follows:

  The Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church - Bulgarian Patriarchate (BOC-BP), today in a full body with election by secret ballot, chose three diocesan metropolitans as worthy candidates to occupy the patriarchal throne.  After checking the submitted ballots, it was found that with the votes of two-thirds or nine of the bishops, members of the Holy Synod, the following were elected: Metropolitan Grigoriy of Vratsa with 11 votes in the first round, Metropolitan Danill of Vidin. with nine votes after the 32nd round and Metropolitan Gavriil of Lovech with nine votes in the 42nd round.  This was announced to journalists by the spokesman of the Holy Synod, Metropolitan Cyprian of Stara Zagora.

  The Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church - Bulgarian Patriarchate began this morning at 9:00 a.m.  its meeting to determine the three metropolitans from whom the new Bulgarian Patriarch, who is also metropolitan of Sofia, will be elected on June 30 at the Patriarchal Electoral Church Council in Sofia.

  Metropolitan Cyprian specified that in this election the Most Eminent diocesan metropolitans: Metropolitan Anthony of Western and Central European, Metropolitan Seraphim of Nevrokop, Metropolitan Cyprian of Stara Zagora were not eligible to be elected, because they do not have the required age [50] specified in Article 40 paragraph 2 of the Statute of the BOC-BP.  Metropolitan Yakov of Dorostol also did not have the right to be elected, due to the five-year service as diocesan metropolitan stipulated in article 40 paragraph 3 of the Statute of the BOC-BP, as well as Metropolitan Arseniy of Sliven, Metropolitan Cyprian explained.

  The names of those elected, according to Article 45 and Article 47 of the Statute of the BOC-BP, who received the required two-thirds of the votes of the synodal bishops, three diocesan metropolitans, as worthy of the patriarchal electoral throne, will be presented to the Patriarchal Electoral Church Council, explained the spokesperson of the Holy Synod.  

  When asked if there were major debates in today's election of the three metropolitans, Metropolitan Cyprian replied that there was no way to discuss these things, but added that 42 rounds spoke volumes.

  This morning it became known that Metropolitan Joseph of the USA, Canada and Australia has announced that he will withdraw and will not participate in the election for patriarch because he is 83 years old.

  In the Holy Synod, the metropolitans are now in full composition and are 14.  Voting today was secret.  For a metropolitan to be elected among the three candidates, he had to receive two-thirds of the votes.

  The person to be elected as the Bulgarian Patriarch and Metropolitan of Sofia must possess the following qualities: be a serving diocesan metropolitan of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, be no younger than 50 years old, have ruled a diocese as a metropolitan for at least five years, be distinguished by correct thoughts on the Orthodox faith and with exact observance of church order.

  The Patriarchal Electoral Church Council will take place on June 30.  The enthronement of the new Bulgarian patriarch, who is the Metropolitan of Sofia, will be on the same day, in the patriarchal cathedral "St. Alexander Nevsky."

  An important Bulgarian website has posted an article entitled:  “The Synod named three unexpected candidates for the new patriarch.”   https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2024/06/20/4641053_sinodut_opredeli_trimata_kandidati_za_nov_patriarh/ 

  The results of today’s election are very interesting.  Most significant is that Metropolitan Grigoriy of Vratsa received 11 of the 14 votes in the first round.  In view of this very strong showing, it is extremely likely that he will be the next patriarch of the BOC.  With respect to the three metropolitans who did not vote for Grigoriy of Vratsa on the first round, two of the three may well have been Gavrill and Danill who voted for themselves.  At the meeting on March 19, the Holy Synod had elected Metropolitan Grigorii of Vratsa, by a unanimous vote, to head the Holy Synod and the Sofia metropolis during the time period prior to the election of a new patriarch.  https://orthodoxtimes.com/holy-synod-of-bulgarian-church-elects-metropolitan-of-vratsa-as-vice-president/  Metropolitan Grigorii, age 53, is a graduate of the Theological Faculty of the University of Athens.   https://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%93%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D0%92%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%87%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8  Presumably he knows Greek.  Perhaps for that reason, he represented the Bulgarian Patriarchate at such events as the enthronement of Archbishop George of Cyprus and the celebration in Athens of 100^th anniversary of the journal Theologia.

  With respect to Gavrill and Danill, they became finalists after they received nine votes.  However, the statute requires a two-thirds vote, and two-thirds of 14 is 10, not 9.  In the last election of a patriarch of the BOC in 2013, the Holy Synod also could not complete a list of three names with the two-thirds requirement.  The Synod therefore decided to let a metropolitan be on the list with one vote less than two-thirds.  See https://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2024/06/19/4639399_izborut_na_nov_patriarh_zapochva_koi_sa_vuzmojnite/ (a very informative article).  With the many rounds of voting that occurred today, the requirement of two-thirds was probably also reduced by one vote.

  It is significant that of the 14 metropolitans, Gavrill and Danill are the two who are the most supportive of the Moscow Patriarchate.  A biography of Gavrill is found at   https://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%93%D0%B0%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B8%D0%BB_%D0%9B%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%87%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8.  A biography of Danill is found at   https://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%94%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B8%D0%BB_%D0%92%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8.  It is possible that some of the supporters of Metropolitan Grigoriy of Vratsa may have finally voted for Gavrill and Danill because of the belief that it is very unlikely that the Electoral Council would elect them.  It should also be remembered that the Holy Synod, in a letter from Metropolitan Grigorii of Vratsa, invited Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to be present at both the election and the enthronement.  The members of the Electoral Council presumably will realize that the election of such strong Moscow supporters as Gavrill or Danill would be a great embarrassment to the Ecumenical Patriarch.  This may influence the Electoral Council.

  The good news is that it is very likely that the new patriarch of the BOC may well enjoy broad support within the Holy Synod.  This resulting unity would be very beneficial for the BOC, which has not always had unity.  Because Grigoriy of Vratsa is now only 53 years old, he may be the patriarch of the BOC for a long time if elected.

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 13 June 2024: New Vatican "study document" on primacy and synodality published today

  Today, June 13, the Vatican’s Dicastery for Promoting Christian Unity published its 146-page “study document” entitled The Bishop of Rome. Primacy and synodality in ecumenical dialogues and responses to the encyclical Ut unum sint.  The full text of the document can be read in English, French, and Italian at http://www.christianunity.va/content/unitacristiani/en/news/2024/2024-06-13-il-vescovo-di-roma-nuovo-documento-dpuc.html.  There is a summary beginning at page 107 in the English version.  Today’s press conference on the publication of the document can be watched in its entirety at  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a6dTzDaqJ9s   At the press conference, questions are answered by Cardinals Koch and Grech. 

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 11 June 2024: The future Orthodox-Catholic dialogue & other news

  From 3 -7 June, the Coordinating Committee of the Joint International Commission for Theological Dialogue between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches met in Bari, Italy.  This Committee performs much of the hard work of the Commission.  It determines the subjects to be discussed by the Commission and is responsible for drafting the documents to be considered by the Commission at its plenary sessions.  The Coordinating Committee is headed by the co-presidents of the Commission, Cardinal Kurt Koch and Metropolitan Job of Pisidia (Ecumenical Patriarchate).  The Committee includes representatives from most of the Local Orthodox Churches.  Since 2018 the Moscow Patriarchate has not participated in either the meetings of the Coordinating Committee or the plenary sessions of the Commission because the Moscow Patriarchate decided on September 14, 2018, to  “suspend the participation of the Russian Orthodox Church in … theological dialogues … co-chaired by representatives of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.” 

  The Coordinating Committee released a communique at the end of its Bari meeting.  The full text of the communique can be read in English at http://www.christianunity.va/content/unitacristiani/en/dialoghi/sezione-orientale/chiese-ortodosse-di-tradizione-bizantina/commissione-mista-internazionale-per-il-dialogo-teologico-tra-la/comitato-misto-di-coordinamento/2024-Joint-Coordinating-Committee.html.  The portion of the communique relating to the work performed by the Committee at this meeting is as follows:

  The Coordinating Committee considered a draft text entitled “Towards Unity in Faith: Theological and Canonical Issues,” which summarized the achievements of the Dialogue thus far and identified several issues remaining to be resolved between Roman Catholics and Orthodox. The Committee began to discuss in particular the historical and theological issues related to the Filioque and Infallibility, respectively. To this end, two subcommittees were formed, and each was tasked with producing a draft text on one of these themes.  It was decided that once these draft documents have been completed, the Coordinating Committee will convene, hopefully next year at a time and place to be determined, in order to discuss them in detail.

  From the foregoing, it appears that the Committee will be working in the near future on three different documents.  The first is an already-prepared draft of the document, “Towards Unity in Faith.”  It is my understanding that the scope of this document includes an enumeration of those differences between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches which prevent the reestablishment of eucharistic communion between the two churches.  At the Bari meeting, the Committee established two subcommittees to draft documents on “the historical and theological issues related to the Filioque and Infallibility.”  Presumably, these two issues are among the list of issues preventing the reestablishment of eucharistic communion.  Interesting photos of the Bari meeting can seen at http://www.christianunity.va/content/unitacristiani/en/news/2024/2024-06-07-comitato-di-coordinamento-dialogo-cattolico-ortodosso.html .

  On June 10, it was announced that a press conference will be held at the Holy See Press Office on June 13 “to present the document of the Dicastery for Promoting Christian Unity, ‘The bishop of Rome.  Primacy and synodality in the ecumenical dialogues and in the responses to the Encyclical Ut unum sint’”.   https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2024/06/10/240610d.html  The announcement also states:  “The Bishop of Rome” is a study document, published with the approval of Pope Francis, summarizing for the first time the responses to the Encyclical Ut unum sint and the ecumenical dialogues on the question of primacy and synodality.  The document concludes with a proposal from the Dicastery, identifying the most significant suggestions made for a renewed exercise of the ministry of unity of the Bishop of Rome, “recognized by one and all”.  Cardinal Kurt Koch will lead the presentation.  Perhaps because of the reference in the document to synodality, Cardinal Mario Grech, secretary general of the General Secretariat of the Synod, will also participate in the presentation.

  Metropolitan Tikhon, primate of the Orthodox Church in America (OCA), has now completed his visit to Ukraine, Romania, and the Phanar.  His visit to Ukraine was covered in my last newsletter.  In this newsletter, I referred to the differing reactions by the Ukrainian media to the visit.  One was a very negative article which describes Metropolitan Tikhon as “Gundyaev's subordinate from the USA” and “a  classic Trojan horse.”   https://glavcom.ua/columns/andriykovalov/hastroli-amerikanskikh-pravoslavnikh-v-ukrajini-chomu-ne-reahuje-sbu-1003657.html#google_vignette  An OCA priest, Father Nicholas Breckenridge from Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, has now written a strong and excellent rebuttal.  One can read his entire letter at https://spzh.live/ru/zashhita-very/80616-svjashchennik-ptsa-spiker-henshtaba-raskaetsja-v-svoej-klevete. 

  In comparison to the great attention given by the UOC to the visit of Metropolitan Tikhon to Ukraine, the Metropolitan’s visits to Romania and the Phanar were far more subdued.  His visit to Romania, June 4-7, is described at https://www.oca.org/news/headline-news/his-beatitude-metropolitan-tikhon-leads-delegation-of-the-orthodox-church-in-america-in-romania.  It consisted of a visit to the Putna Monastery, just south of the Ukraine border, and a visit on June 7 with Bishop Varlaam of Ploiești, Patriarchal Vicar Bishop, at the Palace of the Romanian Patriarchate in Bucharest.  The Romanian visit was also described by the news service of the Romanian Patriarchate.  https://basilica.ro/en/oca-metropolitan-tikhon-visits-putna-monastery-an-occasion-for-spiritual-strengthening-and-reflection-on-monastic-life/ (Putna);  https://basilica.ro/mitropolitul-tihon-al-americii-in-vizita-la-patriarhia-romana/ (Bucharest)   The Facebook page of the Putna Monastery has many photos and a video of the visit to the monastery.  https://www.facebook.com/SfantaManastirePutna/?locale=ro_RO  Of interest, the head of the Putna Monastery stated that there “are more than 125 Romanian villages with Romanian priests” on the other side of the Ukrainian border.

  The visit of Metropolitan Tikhon to the Phanar occurred June 7-10 and is described at https://www.oca.org/news/headline-news/his-beatitude-metropolitan-tikhon-leads-delegation-of-the-orthodox-church-in-america-to-constantinople.  The regular meeting of the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate occurred during the latter part of the delegation’s visit, June 9-10.  The OCA delegation attended the Divine Liturgy with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and members of the Holy Synod on Sunday, June 9.  On June 8 the delegation attended a luncheon with Metropolitan Emmanuel of Chalcedon and other hierarchs, and on June 9 they attended a luncheon with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and other hierarchs.  While at the Phanar, the delegation discussed their visit to Ukraine and Romania with various hierarchs of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

  With the election of a new patriarch for the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC) occurring later this month, persons close to the Moscow Patriarchate are sounding an alarm.  The Bulgarian Revival Party (37 out of 240 delegates in the Bulgarian National Assembly) has called upon President Rumen Radev to immediately convene a National Security Advisory Council on the issue of U.S. interference in the election of the Bulgarian Patriarch, which poses a threat to Bulgaria's national security.  https://glasove.com/novini/kostadinov-vodyat-tsarkvata-ni-kam-razkol-kato-ukrainskata-namesata-na-sasht-v-izbora-na-patriarh-e-opasna#google_vignette  The Party states that it is unacceptable for the BOC to be controlled by foreign agents of influence posing as clergy.  It contends that the mastery of BOC by the United States is carried out with the kind assistance of the Ecumenical Patriarch and some Bulgarian metropolitans and bishops who violated the canons and served with schismatics in Turkey.

  On Sunday, June 9, Metropolitan Cyprian of Stara Zagora represented the BOC in the Divine Liturgy in Ohrid in connection with the canonization of two new saints of the Orthodox Church of North Macedonia.  The Serbian Patriarchate was represented by Bishop Arseniy of Niš.  Both the representatives of Bulgaria and Serbia served together with Archbishop Stefan, primate of the Orthodox Church of North Macedonia, and with the hierarchs of the Orthodox Church of North Macedonia.  https://dveri.bg/component/com_content/Itemid,100724/catid,19/id,73383/view,article/  It is significant that these hierarchs concelebrated with Metropolitan Cyprian even though the Moscow Patriarchate on May 30 had severed communion with Cyprian because he celebrated the Divine Liturgy with a hierarch of the OCU on May 19.  Two bishops of the Orthodox Church of North Macedonia did not participate in Sunday’s Liturgy.  It is not totally clear whether they failed to participate due to the presence of Cyprian or for other reasons.  https://religija.mk/sinodot-na-mpts-oa-se-podeli-petar-i-grigorij-odbija-da-sosluzhuvaat-vo-ohrid/

  Lastly, a recent report shows how Orthodox bishops vary among themselves as to how to view the Catholic Church.  One of the most articulate bishops of the anti-Catholic wing is Metropolitan Seraphim of Piraeus (Church of Greece).  He actually is very popular and the important religious news website in Greece, Romfea.gr, gives him great coverage.  Here is the Metropolitan’s latest historical observation as published by Romfea:  “Without exaggeration we can say that 80% of the terrible crimes in history were and, unfortunately, are being committed (secretly) by the papacy.”  https://spzh.live/ru/news/80646-ierarkh-ellady-80-prestuplenij-protiv-chelovechestva-sovershajutsja-papstvom  Based on this remark, I would say that the Catholic – Orthodox dialogue still has a long way to go!!

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA  

• 6 June 2024: Primate of Orthodox Church in America visited UOC & other news

  Metropolitan Tikhon (Mollard), primate of the Orthodox Church in America (OCA), has just completed a visit to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) in Ukraine.  The visit began on June 1 and ended on June 4.  It was truly a visit to support the UOC.  The visit did not include Kyiv, and there were no meetings by Metropolitan Tikhon with Ukrainian authorities (such as Viktor Yelensky), with other churches, or with the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations.   Rather, the visit was limited to two UOC dioceses in southwestern Ukraine (the Chernivtsi-Bukovyna diocese and the Ternopil diocese) and the Pochaiv Lavra.   Metropolitan Tikhon and his party (including  OCA Chancellor Father Alexander Rentel) were exclusively hosted by the UOC during the entire time of the visit.  Metropolitan Tikhon is now visiting Romania and will end his trip with a visit to the Phanar.  https://www.oca.org/news/headline-news/his-beatitude-metropolitan-tikhon-arrives-in-ukraine 

  The OCA is one of the largest Orthodox churches in the United States and Canada.  It presently has approximately 600 parishes.  It was granted autocephaly by the Moscow Patriarchate in 1970.  Its autocephaly has also been recognized by a number of the Slavic Orthodox Churches (such as Bulgaria, Poland, and Czech Lands) and the Georgian Patriarchate, but it has not been recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which maintains that only the Ecumenical Patriarch can grant a tomos of autocephaly.  However, the OCA has friendly relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and other Local Orthodox Churches which have not recognized its autocephaly.   For example, in 2016 Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew invited Metropolitan Tikhon to come to the Phanar and to concelebrate the Divine Liturgy with him.  https://www.oca.org/holy-synod/statements/his-beatitude-metropolitan-tikhon/statement-of-his-beatitude-metropolitan-tikhon-on-his-trip-to-constantinopl   In 2019 the Ecumenical Patriarch invited Metropolitan Tikhon to join him on a three-day pilgrimage to Cappadocia.  https://www.oca.org/News/headline-news/metropolitan-tikhon-guest-of-ecumenical-patriarchate-at-annual-pilgrimage-to-cappadocia 

  Although the OCA was granted autocephaly by the Moscow Patriarchate, the OCA cannot be considered a “Russian” church.  Many of the bishops, priests, and members of the OCA are converts to Orthodoxy.  For example, Metropolitan Tikhon grew up as an Episcopalian.  In the OCA parishes, the Divine Liturgy is almost always in English.  In contrast to the OCA, there are Orthodox churches in the United States which are in fact now part of the Moscow Patriarchate, namely the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) and the “patriarchal parishes” which declined to join the OCA in 1970.  On March 22, 2022, the Holy Synod of the OCA issued a strong statement against the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation and also in support of Ukraine and the UOC.  https://www.oca.org/holy-synod/statements/holy-synod/statement-on-ukraine 

  Metropolitan Tikhon arrived in Chernivtsi, Ukraine on June 1 and was greeted by Metropolitan Onufry, primate of the UOC, at the Chernivtsi Cathedral of the Descent of the Holy Spirit.  The two metropolitans and other clergy then celebrated a vigil service at the Cathedral at which Metropolitan Tikhon delivered a short address which incorporated the main themes of his visit.  https://www.oca.org/reflections/metropolitan-tikhon/greetings-to-his-beatitude-metropolitan-onuphry-at-the-conclusion-of-vigil-at-chernivtsi-cathedral  The themes are as follows:

  I would like to reiterate my unyielding fraternal love and support for Your Beatitude, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and the entire Ukrainian people.  In this regard, while we of course affirm the right and obligation of your beloved country of Ukraine to defend itself against unjustified aggression, we also implore the civil authorities of this land to respect religious freedom, due process, and the norms of international law.  We express this out of love for Your Beatitude and your God-protected Church, but also out of love for the whole Ukrainian people, who are presently engaged in a struggle to preserve both their land and their freedom.

  The visit of Metropolitan Tikhon has been largely ignored by the secular media in Ukraine.  Some of the comments in the secular media have been very negative.  See, for example, https://glavcom.ua/columns/andriykovalov/hastroli-amerikanskikh-pravoslavnikh-v-ukrajini-chomu-ne-reahuje-sbu-1003657.html#google_vignette  The website RISU (operated by Greek Catholics) has covered the visit in a more neutral fashion.  See https://risu.ua/vidbuvsya-vizit-predstoyatelya-pravoslavnoyi-cerkvi-v-americi-u-pochayivsku-lavru_n148760  As expected, the UOC has given the visit maximum coverage on its website.  https://news.church.ua  In following the visit, I have also found the Facebook page of the OCA helpful.  https://www.facebook.com/orthodoxchurchinamerica  The following is a brief summary of the visit.

  After the vigil service in Chernivtsi, Metropolitan Tikhon and Metropolitan Onufry travelled to the Ascension Men's Monastery in Bancheny.  On Sunday June 2 the two metropolitans celebrated the Divine Liturgy at the Monastery together with many of the leading hierarchs of the UOC.  This Sunday marked the 30^th anniversary of the Monastery.  https://news.church.ua/2024/06/02/predstoyateli-pca-ta-upc-zvershili-bozhestvennu-liturgiyu-u-banchenax/#2024-06-04; https://news.church.ua/2024/06/02/spodivajemosya-shho-vlada-ukrajini-dotrimuvatimetsya-usix-norm-mizhnarodnogo-prava-predstoyatel-pravoslavnoji-cerkvi-ameriki/#2024-06-04   After the Liturgy, Metropolitan Tikhon stressed the same themes as stated above:

  "We once again confirm the right, and not only the right, but also the duty of your country, Ukraine, to defend itself from unjustified aggression, and at this time from the aggression that the people are suffering from the war.  We also want to draw attention to the fact that we hope that the civil authorities of Ukraine will observe all human rights, all freedoms and norms of international law."

  One of the concelebrating hierarchs was Metropolitan Longin, who was rector of the Monastery until September 2023 and who is the vicar bishop of the Chernivtsi-Bukovina diocese.  Metropolitan Longin has become famous because he founded, and the Ascension monastery now operates, a wonderful orphanage.  In 2008 the President of Ukraine had awarded Longin the title of “Hero of Ukraine” because of his work with the orphanage.  However, he has also been known for his extremely vocal anti-ecumenism including sharp attacks on Patriarch Kirill and Metropolitan Hilarion following the Havana meeting.  After the Crete Council, Longin wrote a letter asking the attending bishops to repent and to return to the Church of Christ.  This was described in detail in my newsletter of April 26, 2017, entitled “Bartholomew & Longin.”  See   https://www.unifr.ch/orthodoxia/de/dokumentation/anderson/news-2017.html  In May 2023, the SBU placed Longin under investigation for inciting religious hatred.  In June 2023 it was reported that he suffered a stroke.  In December 2023 it was reported that he underwent heart surgery.  After the Liturgy on June 2, Metropolitan Longin took Onufry and Tikhon on a tour of the orphanage.  A charming video of the visit can be watched at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FnjAKAufwjY.  Later in the day, Metropolitan Tikhon met with some members of the UOC Holy Synod.

  The high point on June 3 was a pilgrimage to the Holy Dormition Pochaiv Lavra.  https://news.church.ua/2024/06/03/vidbuvsya-vizit-predstoyatelya-pravoslavnoji-cerkvi-v-americi-u-pochajivsku-lavru/#2024-06-04  At the Lavra Metropolitan Tikhon again repeated the themes that had been stated by him (quoted above) on the two prior days.  https://news.church.ua/2024/06/03/odin-iz-najyaskravishix-mayakiv-pravoslavya-u-sviti-predstoyatel-pravoslavnoji-cerkvi-v-americi-pro-pochajivsku-lavru/#2024-06-04  This indicates that Metropolitan Tikhon was being very cautious and guarded as to what he was saying.  On the evening of June 3, Metropolitan Tikhon visited the UOC cathedral in Ternopil.  On his last day in Ukraine, he visited a women’s monastery and the residence of the metropolitan of Chernivtsi-Bukovyna.  That night, Metropolitan Tikhon arrived at the Romanian Patriarchate’s Putna Monastery, located just south of the Ukraine border.  He celebrated the Divine Liturgy there with the brethren of the Monastery on the morning of June 5.  https://t.me/s/orthodoxchurchamerica 

  It is possible, but not probable, that Metropolitan Tikhon is carrying messages from the UOC to Patriarch Daniel and to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew.  The UOC is concerned that the Romanian Patriarchate in February asserted direct jurisdiction over the ethnic Romanian parishes in Ukraine, of which there are many in the UOC’s Chernivtsi-Bukovyna diocese.  Also there are the well-known tensions between the UOC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate with respect to the tomos issued to the OCU.

  With respect to Draft Law 8371, it appears that the Draft Law will not be considered for the second reading by the full Rada in the next few weeks.  On May 21, the European Solidarity Party occupied the rostrum at the Rada in an attempt to force a vote on Draft Law 8371.  Later in the day, there was a meeting of the Conciliation Council of Parliamentary Factions and Groups, the body that determines the agenda for the Rada.  The Conciliation Council decided that 8371 would be placed on the agenda for the second reading provided that its proponents obtain the signatures of at least 226 deputies on a statement affirming that they would vote for the Draft Law.  It was reported that on May 22 the deputies of the Servant of the People party met and decided that consideration of the matter should be delayed because the Global Peace Summit will be held in Switzerland, June 15-16, and because an important official of the US Republican Party will be attending a prayer breakfast in Kyiv at the end of June.  https://english.nv.ua/nation/russin-linked-religious-groups-servant-of-the-people-party-postponed-the-ban-50421060.html   Currently in the Rada, the Servant of the People party has 235 deputies, while there are 166 deputies who are members of other parties or of no party.   Without the help of the Servant of the People party, the proponents of 8371 will not be able to gather the needed 226 signatures, and it appears that this help will not be provided until after the prayer breakfast at the end of June.

  With respect to events regarding Bulgaria, the Holy Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate on May 30 severed communion with the five hierarchs of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC) who had celebrated the Divine Liturgy with a hierarch of the OCU. http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6132831.html (Journal entry 60)  This was a much-expected action and is similar to previous actions by the Synod in regard to hierarchs who concelebrate with OCU hierarchs.  On Sunday, June 2, the various dioceses of the BOC met to select their respective representatives on the Patriarchal Electoral Church Council.  The latter body will choose the new patriarch from a list of three candidates submitted by the Holy Synod of the BOC.  These events on June 2 are described in an article at https://dveri.bg/component/com_content/Itemid,100723/catid,14/id,73366/view,article/.  According to the latter article, past practice shows that the “word of the metropolitan is always decisive” with respect to those chosen to the represent the metropolitan’s diocese on the Patriarchal Electoral Church Council.  Also on June 2, Metropolitan Nikolay of Plovdiv told journalists:  “I will not be the patriarch.”  https://www.bta.bg/bg/news/bulgaria/682027-az-nyama-da-sam-patriarh-zayavi-v-burgas-plovdivskiyat-mitropolit-nikolay  It is also reported that in March he made a somewhat similar comment.  However, he has not gone so far as to state that if a majority of the Synod insisted that he be one of the three finalists, he would still refuse.  Lastly, Metropolitan Gavriil of Lovech, who is one of the members of the BOC Holy Synod closest to the Moscow Patriarchate, has given an interesting interview at  https://glasove.com/na-fokus/mitropolit-gavriil-sinodat-ne-e-izprashtal-nikolay-plovdivski-da-sluzhi-s-hora-ot-nekanonichnata-tsarkva-na-ukrayna-tova-e-negovo-lichno-patuvane .

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA 

• 27 May 2024: Results of important election in Sofia & other news

  On Sunday, May 26, the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC) elected Bishop Arseniy of Znepol (vicar bishop under Metropolitan Nikolai of Plovdiv) as the new metropolitan of Sliven.  https://bg-patriarshia.bg/news/sv-sinod-izbra-znepolskia-episkop-arseniy-za-nov-slivenski-m (includes videos and photos)  He will be enthroned on Monday, May 27.  It was a very important election.  Sliven is a very significant eparchy, and the new metropolitan is eligible to vote in the election next month for a new patriarch of the BOC.  On May 19, the Sliven Diocesan Electoral Council had elected a “shortlist” of two bishops.  The Holy Synod had used this shortlist to select the new metropolitan.  The two bishops on the shortlist were Bishop Arseniy and Bishop Gerasim of Melnik, who has been the general secretary of the Holy Synod since 2016. 

  The winner, Bishop Arseniy, is very much the spiritual son of Metropolitan Nikolai of Plovdiv.  Immediately after his election on Sunday, Bishop Arseniy stated to Metropolitan Nikolai:  “I don't have enough words to express all that you have done for me.  I rely on you, on your support, on your wise counsel and prayers.”  https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/sveti-sinod-izbor-sliven-mitropolit/32964274.html  Presumably because of the influence of Metropolitan Nikolai, the Holy Synod made Arseniy a bishop at the age of 28, even though the BOC charter requires one to be 35 years old to be a bishop.  https://www.mediapool.bg/episkop-arseniy-e-izbran-za-nov-slivenski-mitropolit-news359498.html  Arseniy has now been made a metropolitan at the age of 37.  In the entire BOC, there is no younger bishop than he.

  Unlike many Local Orthodox Churches, the BOC gives the exact numbers of the voting results on the various decisions made by its Holy Synod.  With respect to today’s election, there were seven votes for Arseniy and five votes for Gerasim.  *Metropolitan Yosif of the USA, Canada and Australia was not physically present at the election, and members of the Synod did not agree to allow him to cast his vote remotely in real time from New York City.  https://dveri.bg/component/com_content/Itemid,100723/catid,14/id,73348/view,article/   The following is a listing showing how the various metropolitans voted:

  ARSENIY:  (1) *Grigoriy of Veliko Turnovo;  (2) *Ignatii of Pleven; (3) *Nikolai of Plovdiv; (4) Antony of Western and Central Europe; (5) *Naum of Rousse; (6) Cyprian of Stara Zagora; and (7) Yakov of Dorostol.

  GERASIM:  (1) *Grigoriy of Vratsa;  (2) *Gavriil of Lovech;  (3) *Ioan of Varna;  (4) Seraphim of Nevrokop; and (5) *Danill of Vidin. 

  With respect to eligibility to be elected patriarch of the BOC, the charter requires that one must have been a diocesan metropolitan for at least five years and must be at least 50 years of age.  (Article 40)  Above, I have placed an asterisk in front of the names of the metropolitans who are eligible.

  I consider the metropolitans who voted for Arseniy to be the “pro-Nikolai” group.  All three metropolitans (Nikolai, Cyprian, and Yakov) who visited the Phanar recently and who concelebrated with the hierarch of the OCU are members of this group.  Metropolitan Naum is definitely a friend of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew.  Naum recently had a work by Bartholomew translated into Bulgarian and personally brought a copy of the book to Bartholomew.  With respect to the non-Nikolai group, Gavriil and Danill are the two most outspoken members of the Synod in favor of the Moscow Patriarchate.  With respect to Grigoriy, he was unanimously elected to head the Synod until the new patriarch assumes office.  This indicates that he is a “middle-of-the-road” candidate.

  Who will be the next patriarch remains very much of an open question.  The new patriarch is not elected by the Holy Synod.  Under Article 45 of the BOC charter, the Holy Synod elects, by secret ballot and by a two-thirds majority, three diocesan metropolitans to be the final candidates.  (Article 45)  A Patriarchal Electoral Church Council then chooses one of three to be the next patriarch.  (Article 47)  The composition of the Patriarchal Electoral Church Council is specified by Articles 41 and 43.  It is a large group consisting of representatives from the dioceses, the monasteries, and the secondary theological schools. With respect to the Holy Synod voting to establish the shortlist of three, there will be 14 metropolitans voting.  To make the two-thirds majority required for placement on the shortlist, a metropolitan will need to receive at least 10 votes.  The pro-Nikolai group will consist of 8 or 9 metropolitans.  Thus the pro-Nikolai group will not be able to dictate the shortlist, but some type of compromise will be necessary.  The Holy Synod will meet on June 20 to prepare its shortlist, and the Electoral Council will meet on June 30.

  In March Metropolitan Nikolai had stated:  “I announce and declare that I do not wish and will not accept to be included as a candidate for the Patriarchal Throne….”  https://orthodoxtimes.com/metropolitan-of-plovdiv-declines-candidacy-for-bulgarian-patriarchal-throne/   However, in an interesting interview posted on May 8, Metropolitan Antony of Western and Central Europe commented on Nikolai’s statement.  https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/32936562.html  The posted article states:  Regarding Nikolai's letter saying that he did not want to be nominated as patriarch, Antony said that "every single metropolitan, when he becomes a bishop, he makes his vows that he will serve God, the Church, he will have obedience to the Bulgarian Patriarch, to the Holy Synod.  From then on, when we take up this cross, we give our whole life to the Church, and whether someone wants it or not, it depends entirely on the Holy Synod of the BOC."  Antony said that at the synod meeting where candidates for patriarch would be nominated, he would nominate Nicholas. "If it were my turn, I would offer it—yes," said Antony.

  On May 22, Cardinal Victor Fernandez met with Pope Tawadros II in Cairo.  The purpose of the visit was to explain the Catholic position on same-sex blessings as stated in the papal declaration Fiducia supplicans.   https://www.vaticannews.va/en/vatican-city/news/2024-05/fiducia-supplicans-fernandez-tawadros-same-sex-blessings.html (report from the Vatican);  https://copticorthodox.church/en/2024/05/22/h-h-pope-tawadros-ii-receives-cardinal-victor-fernandez-envoy-of-the-pope-of-the-vatican-and-head-of-the-vaticans-department-of-doctrine-and-faith/ (report from the Coptic Church)   Earlier it had been reported that the Coptic Church had suspended its theological dialogue because of the papal declaration.  Pope Francis has enjoyed excellent relations with Pope Tawadros, and the trip by Cardinal Fernandez to Cairo was apparently intended to reaffirm these excellent relations and to explain the narrow scope of the declaration. 

  The suspension of the dialogue had occurred on March 7, 2024, at a meeting of the Holy Synod of the Coptic Orthodox Church .  The official English translation of the decrees and recommendations at this meeting are found at https://copticorthodox.church/en/holy-synod/holy-synod-session-march-2024/  One of the decrees reads as follows:  “After consulting with the sister churches of the Eastern Orthodox family, it was decided to suspend the theological dialogue with the Catholic Church, reevaluate the results achieved by the dialogue from its beginning twenty years ago, and establish new standards and mechanisms for the dialogue to proceed in the future.”  In the decrees and recommendations, there is also a statement entitled: “The Belief of the Coptic Orthodox Church on the Issue of Homosexuality.”  There is no specific statement in the decrees and recommendations that relates to same-sex blessings, but following the March 7 meeting, Father Moussa Ibrahim, spokesperson for the Coptic Church, stated that the suspension was caused by the changed Catholic position on the issue of homosexuality.  https://www.ewtnvatican.com/articles/coptic-orthodox-church-confirms-dialogue-with-catholic-church-suspended-over-same-sex-blessings-2273 

  The report issued by the Coptic Church on May 22 concerning the meeting with Cardinal Fernandez states in part: “Cardinal Victor Fernandez stressed that the Catholic Church fully supports this statement ["The Belief of the Coptic Orthodox Church on the Issue of Homosexuality"] and is committed to everything [my emphasis] contained in it, considering that these are the teachings of the Holy Bible.”  If one reads this statement adopted by the Holy Synod in March, one can see that it is a very strong statement.  For example, it states:   “As for those who choose to reconcile with their homosexual tendencies, letting go of themselves to homosexual acts, rejecting spiritual and psychological treatment, and choosing of their own free will to break God’s commandment, their condition becomes worse than the one who lives in [struggle against] adultery/fornication.  Therefore, they must be warned and cut off from communion until they repent.”   I have seen nothing said by the Vatican recently about warning such individuals and cutting them off from communion.  If Cardinal Fernandez actually stated that the Catholic Church is committed to "everything" contained in the statement, it would be big news.

  In my opinion it is very questionable whether the visit by Cardinal Ferandez will cause the Coptic Church to reverse its March 7 decision relating to the temporary suspension of the theological dialogue.  According to the May 22 report of the Coptic Church, Pope Tawadros stressed in the meeting with Cardinal Ferandez the importance of dialogue “after evaluating the accomplishments of the past twenty years and the necessity of developing more effective methods and mechanisms for it.”  This is the same language used in the decree on March 7 to suspend the dialogue.  Thus it appears that the position of the Coptic Church has not changed on this issue.

  Pope Francis has given a very recent interview to the US television network CBS.  In the interview the subject of deaconesses was raised.  The Holy Father's comments on this subject are found at 22:30 in the following video of the interview:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D1rRj2ecNew.   The questions and answers on this subject are as follows:  Question: “You will have many young boys and girls that will come here at the end of next month for World Children’s Day and I am curious.  For a little girl growing up Catholic today, will she ever have the opportunity to be a deacon and participate as a clergy member in the church?"   Pope Francis: “No.”  Question: "I understand you have said no women as priests, but you are studying the idea of women as deacons.  Is that something you're open to?”    Pope Francis:  “If it is deacons with Holy Orders, no.  But women have always had, I would say, the function of deaconesses without being deacons, right?  Women are of great service as women, not as ministers, as ministers in this regard within the Holy Orders.”

  At the end of the first session of the XVI Ordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops last October, a "Synthesis Report" was issued on the results of the first session.  The Report shows that during the first session different positions were expressed regarding women's access to the diaconal ministry.  The Report also states:  “Theological and pastoral research on the access of women to the diaconate should be continued, benefiting from consideration of the results of the commissions specially established by the Holy Father, and from the theological, historical and exegetical research already undertaken.  If possible, the results of this research should be presented to the next Session of the Assembly.”  https://www.synod.va/en/news/a-synodal-church-in-mission.html  (page 41)  Has the Holy Father’s answer in the CBS interview now resolved the key issue that would have otherwise been debated in the second session this fall?  Would it have been more consistent with the principle of synodality to have waited until one saw the results of the second session?   

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 20 May 2024: Bulgarian Patriarchate favors Constantinople

  On May 18, 2024, a large delegation from Bulgaria met with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew at the Phanar.  The meeting occurred immediately after the session of the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.  The Bulgarian delegation included three members of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church:  Metropolitan Nikolay of Plovdiv, Metropolitan Cyprian of Stara Zagora, and Metropolitan Yakov of Dorostol.  Metropolitan Nikolay is perhaps the most influential member of the Holy Synod.  Metropolitan Cyprian acts as the spokesman of the Holy Synod.  Metropolitan Yakov has been very close to Metropolitan Nikolay and could be considered his spiritual son.  The official website of the Ecumenical Patriarchate covers the meeting in detail.  https://ec-patr.org/%cf%80%cf%81%cf%8c%cf%83%ce%ba%ce%bb%ce%b7%cf%83%ce%b7-%cf%84%ce%b7%cf%82-%ce%b9%ce%b5%cf%81%ce%b1%cf%81%cf%87%ce%af%ce%b1%cf%82-%cf%84%ce%b7%cf%82-%ce%b5%ce%ba%ce%ba%ce%bb%ce%b7%cf%83%ce%af%ce%b1/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR3PCmHdr-mLVzSHah5S1tDh9_CeveemhyTo7NTWnsxBtKN3HTV46s2u8Ik_aem_AWV5Rmvs8pYWSTCjaxBhTvR7fWZwJyCfp5bOxT9DYcncyz-Bgjnmu-SvQXP9Ye9NJ_tPhQzlciXprrLWT7lIfXMm  The following is an excerpt of the remarks by the Ecumenical Patriarch:

  We pray for the repose of the soul of the blessed Patriarch Neophytos," said the Ecumenical Patriarch, who had presided, last March, at the funeral service of the Primate of the Church of Bulgaria, and continued: "Just yesterday I received a kind letter from brother Metropolitan Gregory of Vratsa, who on behalf of the entire Holy Church of Bulgaria, invites me to be present at the election and enthronement of the new Primate of the sister Church of Bulgaria.  [Metropolitan Gregory is heading the Holy Synod until the election of a new primate.]  Very kind of you to personally invite the Ecumenical Patriarch to a historic moment in the life of your Church."

  As His Holiness said, on June 30, when the election is scheduled to take place, he has planned to visit the Holy Diocese of Artis. “I will try to change the program, because I consider this invitation very great and blessed and my desire to respond is corresponding.  I hope brother Metropolitan of Arta, where I was to officiate that day, will show understanding and we can modify the program.”

  Concluding his speech, the Patriarch pointed out that, "we live in a difficult time in which the testimony of the Orthodox Church is more than necessary and for this testimony we need unity and love, in order to be reliable.  From this point of view, I repeat, that your visit, the meeting of all of us, in the Mother Church is historic, it is very important."

  After the death of Patriarch Neophyte, there was speculation as to whether the new patriarch would lean toward Moscow or Constantinople.  The invitation from the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Patriarchate for the Ecumenical Patriarch to attend the election is certainly an indication that the Holy Synod believes that a supporter of the Ecumenical Patriarch will be elected as the new Bulgarian primate .  It is difficult to believe that the Holy Synod would place the Ecumenical Patriarch in the very embarrassing situation of being invited to an election where a supporter of Moscow was elected.  The steps for the election for a new patriarch will be as follows:  On June 2 all of the dioceses will hold elections to select their representatives on the Patriarchal Electoral Church Council.  On June 20, the Holy Synod will meet and will select, by secret ballot and a two-thirds majority vote,  a “shortlist” of three metropolitans from the list of metropolitans who meet the eligibility requirements for patriarch.  On June 30 the Patriarchal Electoral Church Council will meet and will select the new patriarch from the “shortlist” of three metropolitans.

  Today, May 19, there was perhaps even bigger news from Constantinople.  Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew presided at the Divine Liturgy for the Sunday of the Holy Myrrhbearing Women in the Church of the Patriarchal Monastery, located in the Balıklı neighborhood of Istanbul.  The church is dedicated to the Mother of God of the Spring.  A holy spring was located nearby.  Not only was the delegation from Bulgaria there, but also a delegation of the OCU.  Those who served with the Ecumenical Patriarch included the three metropolitans from Bulgaria and Metropolitan Yevstratiy of the OCU.  https://ec-patr.org/%CE%B7-%CE%BA%CF%85%CF%81%CE%B9%CE%B1%CE%BA%CE%AE-%CF%84%CF%89%CE%BD-%CE%BC%CF%85%CF%81%CE%BF%CF%86%CF%8C%CF%81%CF%89%CE%BD-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B7%CE%BD-%CE%B9-%CE%BC%CE%BF%CE%BD%CE%AE-%CE%B2%CE%B1-4/  At the end of the Liturgy, the address of the Ecumenical Patriarch included the following:

  A sign of the eternal presence of the Lord in our midst is the congregation with brother High Priests from two dear daughters of the Church of Constantinople, namely from the Autocephalous Churches of Bulgaria and Ukraine.  Your presence, Venerable brothers, in the Courts of the common Mother Church is a reason for encouragement for us, because the labors of her, eternally emptying and spent for the stability of her children, have not been fruitless.   At the same time, we are certain that for you too the pilgrimage to the Reigning and Great Church is a spiritual return to the pool, which reborn and enlightened your people and was a decisive and beneficial turning point in their history and culture." 

  Metropolitan Yevstratiy has a short video of the service on his Facebook page.  https://www.facebook.com/100001148806070/videos/pcb.7565805516801000/2101529803551404 

  The fact that the hierarchs of the Bulgarian Patriarchate served with a hierarch of the OCU is, of course, extremely significant.  It is a form of de facto recognition of the UOC by the Bulgarian Patriarchate.  Several years ago, the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Patriarchate established a committee to study the question of the recognition of the OCU.  The head of that committee is Metropolitan Cyprian of Stara Zagora, who has now served with the OCU metropolitan.  I do not believe that the presence of the Ukrainian delegation at the Phanar was a surprise for the metropolitans from Bulgaria, but rather all of this was pre-planned.  Today's events are very good news for the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the OCU, but bad news for Moscow.  If it is confirmed that the Bulgarian Patriarchate has recognized the OCU, it will be the first Slavic Orthodox Church to do so. 

  Also today, the Sliven Diocesan Electoral Council met to elect a “short list” of two bishops, from which the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Patriarchate will select the new metropolitan of Sliven.  This new metropolitan will be a member of the Holy Synod.  In the first round of voting, Bishop Arseniy of Znepol received a majority of the votes.  Bishop Arseniy is a vicar bishop for Metropolitan Nikolay of Plovdiv.  In the second round of voting, Bishop Gerasim of Melnik became the second candidate on the short list.  Bishop Gerasim has been the general secretary of the Holy Synod since 2016.  On May 25 the Holy Synod will meet to determine whether there are any valid challenges to today’s election.  If there are not, the Holy Synod will select the new metropolitan of Sliven on May 26.  https://sofiaglobe.com/2024/05/19/bulgarian-orthodox-churchs-sliven-diocese-shortlists-two-candidates-in-election-of-metropolitan/

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

   
• 19 May 2024: Bartholomew and Francis to celebrate Nicaea anniversary together & other news

  On May 18 at the conclusion of a visit to Lisbon, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew celebrated the Divine Liturgy at the Catholic church of Nossa Senhora da Vitória in downtown Lisbon.  The Catholic Patriarch of Lisbon Dom Rui Valério was present for the Liturgy.  The two patriarchs processed into the church together.  The Ecumenical Patriarch recited the Our Father in Greek, while the Catholic Patriarch recited it in Portuguese.  After the Liturgy the two patriarchs walked together to the Church of São Nicolau.  There, the Ecumenical Patriarch recited a prayer before an icon of St. Nicholas, and then went to the library of the church for a 20-minute press conference.  These events are described, with photos, on the website of the Patriarchate of Lisbon.  https://www.patriarcado-lisboa.pt/site/index.php?id=12192  With respect to the press conference, the article states:

  Bartholomew I is then accompanied to the Library, for the press conference, announcing that Pope Francis plans to visit Turkey next year, as part of the celebrations of the anniversary of the Council of Nicaea. “His Holiness Pope Francis wishes to celebrate this important anniversary together and plans to come to our country to visit the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and then we will continue together to Nicaea, to Iznik, for an important historical celebration of this anniversary,” revealed the Orthodox Patriarch, further adding that an organizing committee for the meeting is being formed, made up of Catholics and Orthodox. “It will meet soon,” he said, adding that the Vatican will soon contact the Turkish government regarding this visit.

  According to another website, the Ecumenical Patriarch also stated that a “mixed commission with four Catholics and four Orthodox” will “meet a few days from now in Istanbul, to arrange all the details of this important meeting to take place next year.”  https://www.thetablet.co.uk/news/18770/patriarch-bartholomew-pope-hopes-to-visit-turkey-in-2025  The Ecumenical Patriarch also commented on the situation in Ukraine.  https://agencia.ecclesia.pt/portal/igreja-patriarca-de-constantinopla-pede-cessar-fogo-imediato-na-ucrania-e-no-medio-oriente/  He stated:  “We cannot agree in any way with the ideology of the Russian world and with the prayers that the patriarch prays, not for peace, but for the victory of Russian weapons.  I said this morning that this ideology is pure nationalism and is a heresy.”

  As previously reported, Metropolitan Seraphim of Zimbabwe (Patriarchate of Alexandria) ordained a deaconess on Holy Thursday, May 2.  Carrie Frost, Chair of St. Phoebe Center for the Deaconess, has written a detailed eyewitness account of the event.  https://publicorthodoxy.org/good-reads/ordination-of-deaconess-angelic/  She states that “Deaconess Angelic read petitions, read the Gospel, and distributed communion to the faithful.”  Also, “Deaconess Angelic wore the same vestments as a deacon, modified to fit her smaller frame.”   On May 11, the Patriarchate of Alexandria issued a clarifying statement.  https://www.patriarchateofalexandria.com/anakoinosi-4/  The clarification states in part: 

  The Holy Synod of the Venerable Patriarchate of Alexandria and all Africa made the decision in principle to revive and activate the institution of Deaconesses within its pastoral jurisdiction.  [The decision was made in 2016.]  However, this Decision was referred for further study to establish the details concerning the attire, method of ministry delivery, and liturgical role of deaconesses in the contemporary life of the Church.   However, Metropolitan Seraphim of Zimbabwe, being an experienced missionary to Africa, proceeded with the implementation of the initial decision of the Holy Synod.  However, this decision has yet to be activated as the examination of the matter by the Synod has not been completed for a final decision.

  It therefore appears that the decision to ordain Deaconess Angelic was made at the initiative of Metropolitan Seraphim and that this decision was not directed by the Patriarchate.  One must still wait to see what the Patriarchate will determine will be the liturgical function and vestments of a deaconess.

  On the night of May 17, the National Museum of the History of Ukraine caused the demolition of the UOC’s Church of the Tithe Monastery of the Nativity of the Holy Theotokos, which was location on the Museum’s property in Kyiv.  Metropolitan Onufry called the demolition “a grave sin.”  https://news.church.ua/2024/05/18/blazhennishij-mitropolit-onufrij-visloviv-slova-pidtrimki-bratiji-desyatinnogo-monastirya/#2024-05-18  The destruction has been portrayed as further evidence of the persecution of the UOC by the Ukrainian authorities.  However, in the religious information war in Ukraine, a full and objective presentation of the facts is often absent.  As best as I can determine, the following are the relevant facts.

  On September 14, 2023, the Northern Commercial Court of Appeals issued a decision requiring the UOC to remove the small Church of the Tithe Church of the Nativity of the Most Holy Theotokos, from the grounds of the National Museum of the History of Ukraine.  The small church was located approximately 30 meters from the building of the National Museum, 40 meters from the open area believed to be the location of the historic Tithe Church, and 85 meters from the reconstructed St. Andrew’s Church.  It is inside the UNESCO buffer zone surrounding St. Andrew's.  The reconstruction of the St. Andrew’s Church was completed in 1987 using the drawings of Rastrelli, the original architect.  In August 2001, the Cabinet of Ministers granted permission to the UAOC (now part of the OCU) to use the St. Andrew’s Church on a daily basis for religious services.  https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/371-2009-%D0%BF#Text   The presence of the UAOC at St. Andrew’s may have been one of the motivating factors in the decision of the UOC to establish its own church nearby.  The small UOC church is named after the Tithe Church, the first stone church in Rus’.  The Tithe Church was built by St. Volodymyr, who allocated a tenth of his income for its construction and maintenance.  The church was destroyed by the Mongols in 1240.  During the period 1828 to 1840, a new Tithe Church was built at the approximate location of the original Tithe Church.  This building was destroyed by the Soviet authorities in 1935.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church_of_the_Tithes

  In 2004 the head of the National Museum gave permission to the UOC to build three small kiosks (each covering 20 sq. m.) on the property of the National Museum with ownership of the land remaining with the State.   In 2012 a court upheld the ownership of these three structures by the UOC.  https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-kyiv/3761313-apelacijnij-sud-zobovazav-demontuvati-hrammaf-bila-desatinnoi-cerkvi.html  Subsequent to 2012, the UOC, without any authorization by the government, built the present structure which occupied twice the area of the three kiosks.  After the building of the three kiosks, the entire UOC project became the subject of a great public controversy, and dozens of newspaper articles were written about the subject.  The Court of Appeals in its decision of September 14, 2023, concluded that the plot of land on which the present structure was built was not given to the UOC for its ownership or use.  In addition the present structure was built without government approval of the project and was built without obtaining construction permits.  Accordingly, the Court ordered the UOC to remove the structure from the land of the National Museum.   After more than one year of non-compliance by the UOC with the Court’s order, the structure was demolished.  Movable objects from the church were transferred to the Kyiv Lavra National Reserve. 

  On May 11, 2024, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) held its annual Bishops’ Council at the Tabernacle Church of the Kyiv Upper Lavra.  https://www.pomisna.info/uk/vsi-novyny/vidbuvsya-arhiyerejskyj-sobor-pravoslavnoyi-tserkvy-ukrayiny-3/  At the Council, Metropolitan Epifany, primate of the OCU, gave his report on the activities of the OCU since last year's Council.  https://www.pomisna.info/uk/document-post/dopovid-predstoyatelya-na-arhiyerejskomu-sobori-11-travnya-2024-r/  (full text)  The report included statistics on the size of the OCU.  The following are the latest numbers for 2024 followed by the corresponding numbers for 2023 and 2019 in parentheses:  communities – 9,000 (8,500, 7,000);    clerics – 5,700 (5,300, 4,500);    dioceses – 45 (45, 44);    bishops – 63 (61, 62);    students – 1,200 (1,200, 1,101);    monasteries – 96+ (80+, 77)

  Metropolitan Epifany in his address gave considerable attention to the “unification process” with respect to Orthodoxy in Ukraine.  He repeats what the OCU has previous said: “we do not put forward any preconditions for the start of the dialogue.”  However, later in the address, Metropolitan Epifany seems to impose the following condition on the dialogue:  “We are ready to conduct a dialogue only while preserving the prescriptions of the Tomos on autocephaly, in which it is determined that all dioceses, monasteries, parishes and other Orthodox church institutions should be under the jurisdiction of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine.“  In his remarks, he never mentioned the “Ukrainian Orthodox Church,” but always called it the “Moscow Patriarchate.”   The address does not invite a dialogue, but actually sets up major roadblocks to a dialogue.  Metropolitan Epifany correctly pointed out in his address that the UOC has imposed “clearly unacceptable conditions” for the commencement of a dialogue.  For example, at its Local Council in May 2022, the UOC resolved that for a dialogue to begin, the OCU must acknowledge that it is not an autocephalous church and that it has less independence than the UOC.  Thus, both sides have taken steps which greatly impede the commencement of a dialogue.

  On April 10, Metropolitan Epifany and Metropolitan Yevstratiy met in Geneva with Rev. Prof Dr Jerry Pillay, general secretary of the WCC, and with other WCC officials.  https://www.oikoumene.org/news/his-beatitude-metropolitan-epiphany-of-kyiv-and-all-ukraine-visits-wcc  According to the posting on the website of the WCC, the general secretary stated: “The meeting was a very informative, engaging and enlightening discussion on the issues in Ukraine.  I was deeply impressed with their positive aspirations to end the war, support dialogue and find solutions to encourage good relationships at all levels in spite of the current challenges, including among churches.  We have discussed possible steps forward and plan to act on them as soon as possible.”  For months, the WCC has attempted to sponsor a meeting between the UOC and the OCU.  As I understand it, this would not be a meeting to negotiate unification between the two churches, but rather to improve relations between the two churches.  Personally, I believe that this is a wonderful idea.  However, Metropolitan Epifany’s address on May 11 does not help to improve the climate between the OCU and the UOC so as to encourage the holding of such a meeting.  The UOC must be further alienated by Metropolitan Epifany using a significant portion of his address to call upon the Rada “to speed up" the process of enacting Draft Law 8371.  As far as I can determine, the OCU is the only religious organization in Ukraine which is now actively and vocally promoting the passage of 8371.

  On May 1, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom issued its 2024 Annual Report.  It can be read at  https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/2024%20Annual%20Report.pdf   At page 78 of the Report, the Commission expressed concern about the original version of Ukrainian Draft Law 8371.  It states that 8371 is clearly intended “to target the UOC.”  The Report expressed concerns about Ukraine seeking to impose "collective punishment on the entire religious group, including peaceful, law-abiding citizens.”  If the Commission was concerned about the original version of 8371, it is very likely that the Commission will be even more concerned about the latest version of 8371.  The original version of 8371 (one and one-half pages long) is far milder that the current May 2024 version (24 pages long).  The full text of the May 2024 version can be read in Ukrainian and English at https://www.unifr.ch/orthodoxia/de/dokumentation/anderson/ (click on “16 May 2024: Latest Version of the Complete Text of Draft Law 8371"). 

  In other news, it has been confirmed by Ukrainian President Zelensky that Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew will attend the Ukrainian Peace Summit to be held in Lucerne, Switzerland, June 15-16.  https://kyivindependent.com/zelensky-ecumenical-patriarch-bartholomew-to-attend-switzerland-peace-summit/  Pope Francis has also been invited to attend.  Cardinal Parolin has indicated that a Vatican delegation will attend, but he did not specifically mention the Pope. https://www.vaticannews.va/uk/world/news/2024-05/parolin-pro-samit-myru-v-shvejtsariji-ta-obmin-polonenymy.html   The Finnish Orthodox Church (Ecumenical Patriarchate) has objected to the establishment of UOC parishes in Finland.  https://ort.fi/news/suomen-ortodoksisen-kirkon-autonomista-aluetta-haastetaan/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR38VVpWR9NWyvnuvsxzmbu0vhlnhEN8wNjWlSunaIKuldg0bxD_awb0BpU_aem_Abr0O9lcIlC-Dznz11vPKrd96o7ofO51cIEU8NoqaNOKAWQwOyg9Rk0PKu7GRiMfoEuE8F4-UcCk5y2zXicJSgVk  The Finnish Church has stated that establishing “representative offices of other Orthodox churches that are canonically separated from our own local church in our autonomous region is unsustainable and against canon law.”  The UOC and the Finnish Church are “canonically separated” because the UOC has severed communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA 

   
• 16 May 2024: Latest Version of the Complete Text of Draft Law 8371

   Draft Law 8371 (English Translation)

   Draft Law 8371 (Ukrainian Version)

• 13 May 2024: English translation of full text of latest version of 8371 & commentary

  On May 6, 2024 the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament) posted on its website a “comparative table” for Draft Law 8371 on the second reading.  https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/41219  This comparative table, which is 916 pages long, contains a brief summary of each of the 1,260 amendments that were offered by Rada deputies following the first reading of 8371, which occurred on October 19, 2023.  In addition to the proposed amendments, the table also includes a column on the far-right entitled “Draft Law proposed by the Committee head in the final version.”  In this case, the Committee that has the primary responsibility for 8371 is the Rada’s Committee for Humanitarian and Information Policy (“Committee”).  The far-right column sets forth the full text of the latest version of 8371.  The full text is divided into six segments which are found at pages 1, 3-4, 95-107, 110-118, 120-139, 326-327, and 346-347 of the table.

  I have copied the six segments and placed them in the proper order in a single document.  I have then used the Google translation tool to translate the Ukrainian text into English.  After reading the Google translations, I have made some corrections.  The result is the document that is attached to this newsletter.  In the attached document, I have added some notes and comments which are in red font.  The full text of the latest version of 8371 is in black font.

  The latest version is the third version of 8371.  It was adopted by the Committee at its meeting on April 4, 2024.  It is 22 pages in length.  The first and original version of 8371, which is only one and one-half pages in length, was submitted to the Rada by the Prime Minister of Ukraine on January 20, 2023.  It was then approved by the full Rada for the first reading.  The full text of this first version can be read at blob:https://itd.rada.gov.ua/5fd4caac-835a-4a7b-9795-dad420413f04.  The second version of Draft Law 8371, which is 20 pages in length, was adopted by the Committee on March 5, 2024, after considering the many amendments submitted by deputies to 8371.  The full text of the second version was never posted on the Internet by anyone, although a copy was leaked to certain individuals.

  Although none of the three versions referred to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) by name, both deputies in the Rada and the Ukrainian media have repeatedly referred to 8371 as a law to ban the UOC.  In accomplishing this goal, the second and third versions take a different approach than the original version in establishing the criteria for banning a religious organization.  In the original version, the key provision was as follows:  “Activities of religious organizations that are affiliated with the centers of influence of a religious organization (association), the governing center (control) of which is located outside of Ukraine in a state that carries out armed aggression against Ukraine, are not allowed.”   This ambiguous provision was construed by the UOC and many others to mean that the activities of the UOC could only be prohibited if its “governing center (control)” is located in Russia.  In fact on April 12, 2023, Ruslan Stefanchuk, the speaker of the Rada, met with members of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations (without the UOC).  At the meeting, the Council declared “the inadmissibility of the activities of any organizations in Ukraine, including religious ones, whose centers and leadership are located in the Russian Federation.”   Thus, the declaration relates to a situation where the Ukrainian church is being controlled from Russia.  This interpretation, involving control coming from Russia, provided some optimism to the UOC that it would escape the sanctions imposed by 8371, because there is no evidence that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is in fact controlling the decisions of the UOC after the UOC's Local Council of May 2022.  In fact, the UOC had taken certain actions which constitute gross violations of Chapter X of the ROC’s Charter – the chapter that relates specifically to Ukraine.

  Faced with the possibility that the UOC might escape the sanctions of 8371, the Draft Law was changed to make it certain that the UOC could not escape.  Thus, in the second and third versions, language was added that a religious organization is not allowed to operate if it is simply “affiliated” with a Russian religious organization, even though no actual control exists.  (Attachment, pp. 7-8)   According to these two versions, “affiliation” is found if just one of seven specified “signs” is present.  (p. 8)  The seven signs are described at pages 8-9 of the attached Draft Law.  There is an interesting background with respect to the selection of these seven signs by the Committee in drafting 8371.  On December 22, 2022, the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) issued an order to establish an “Expert Group” to determine whether a church-canonical connection exists between the UOC and the ROC.   On February 1, 2023, the “Expert Group” issued its conclusions and found that a church-canonical connection did exist and that the UOC was part of the ROC.  https://dess.gov.ua/vysnovok-relihiieznavchoi-ekspertyzy-statutu-pro-upravlinnia-ukrainskoi-pravoslavnoi-tserkvy/  All of the seven signs adopted by the lawmakers in the second and third versions are apparently taken from the findings and conclusions reached by this “Expert Group.”  In other words, the lawmakers used as signs the same elements that the “Expert Group” relied on in reaching its conclusion that a canonical connection exists between the UOC and the ROC.  It therefore appears that the seven “signs” were specifically tailored by the lawmakers to match the situation of the UOC and to ensure that all of the seven signs would be present with respect to the UOC.  Although various other signs could have been adopted by the lawmakers, only signs that would be applicable to the UOC and answered in the affirmative were adopted.

  The use of each of the seven signs is problematic, but it is especially problematic with respect to the third sign.  (p. 8)  In regard to the third sign, “affiliation” is established if the Charter of the ROC has “provisions regarding the right to adopt by the statutory management bodies” of the ROC “decisions on canonical and organizational issues that are binding for a religious organization (association) operating on the territory of Ukraine.”  One only has to look at Chapter X of the Charter of the ROC to see that this element is satisfied.  Chapter X provides that the “decisions of the Local and Bishops' Councils are binding on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.”  Thus, the existence of this single provision in Chapter X of the ROC Charter alone mandates that all activities of the UOC be prohibited.  The UOC is without power to require the ROC to remove Chapter X from the Charter of the ROC, so this element cannot be cured by the UOC.  Thus, it is 100% certain that the activities of the UOC will be prohibited under the third sign of the latest version and that the UOC must be terminated. 

  If 8371 becomes law, it will be the responsibility of DESS to investigate whether a religious organization is violating the law.  (pp. 17-18)  Thus, it will be DESS that will determine whether any of the seven signs apply to the UOC.  However, it will hardly be an impartial investigation as DESS’s “Expert Group” has already determined that all seven signs are present with respect to the UOC.  If the religious organization does not eliminate the presence of the signs, DESS applies to a court to enforce a termination order.  The court proceedings are described at pp. 5-7 of the attached Draft Law.  The proceedings are shortened and are extremely expedited.  Instead of the normal two levels of appeal above the court of the first instance, there is only one level.  The court of the first instance must render its decision within one month after the start of the court proceedings.  The appeal court must also render its decision within one month after the beginning of the appellate proceedings.  (p. 7)  As a retired attorney who has litigated court cases, I find these short time limits almost unbelievable when one considers the time necessary for possible preliminary motions, hearings, trials, preparation of written arguments by the attorneys, and deliberations and writing of decisions by the judge or appellate judges.  The consequences following a termination order can be draconian.  The religious organization loses all property rights.  With respect to its existing property, there is a provision: “In the event of termination of the activities of a religious organization due to violation of this Law and other legislative acts of Ukraine, property owned by it, with the exception of cult property, may be transferred to the state free of charge.  Cult property is transferred to other religious organizations.” (pp. 21-22)

  Comments can also be made with respect to many other aspects of the latest version of 8371.  For example, there are lengthy provisions making it easier for religious organizations to transfer to other jurisdictions and harder to challenge the transfer in court.  (pp. 9-15)  A religious organization may be terminated in the event of “detection of repeated facts of the use of a religious organization for the purposes of spreading propaganda of the ideology of the ‘Russian world.’”  (p. 16)  This ideology includes “expansion of the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church beyond the territory of the Russian Federation.”  (p. 24)  A religious organization may also be terminated in the event of “conviction of its authorized persons for committing a crime against the foundations of national security of Ukraine or for committing a criminal offense provided for in Articles 111-1, 161, 190, 209, 258–258-6, 436–438, 442, 447 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.”  (p. 16)  If you read the attachment, I am sure that you will find other concerns as well.

  The latest version of 8371 has been reviewed by the Main Legal Department of the Rada.  The Department has written a 25-page opinion which concludes that “the draft law can be adopted in the second reading, taking into account the comments of the Main Legal Department.”  It is possible that the Committee may make some changes in the latest version based on those comments.  However, I do not expect that any of the changes will be major.  I have prepared an English translation of the entire 25-page opinion.  If you are interested in receiving a digital copy of this translation, please send me a request by a reply email.

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

   
• 8 May 2024: Full text of latest (May 2024) version of 8371 in Ukrainian

  Attached is the latest version of Draft Law 8371 in Ukrainian.  This is the version that was approved by the Rada’s Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy at its meeting on 4 April 2024.  This version was then included by the Committee in its “Comparative Table” which was posted on the website of the Rada on 6 May 2024.  See https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/41219. 

  The “Comparative Table” briefly describes in numerical order all of 1260 proposed amendments that were submitted by the Rada’s deputies to the version of 8371 that was approved by the full Rada on the first reading on 19 October 2023.  Because of the many amendments, the length of the Table is 916 pages.  The column on the far right of the Table has the title “The draft law proposed by the committee head in the final version.”  The final version is not placed in this column in one consecutive document, but is divided into six segments which are found at various places in the 916 page Table.  One must scroll through all of the 916 pages to find all of the segments.  I have personally done so and have copied and pasted the six segments into one complete document which is attached.  In the attached document, I have listed in red font the page numbers of the Table in which each segment is found.   

  The Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy approved an earlier version of 8371 on 5 March 2024.  This version was never published but was leaked to certain persons.  It was with respect this version that I did my earlier analysis.  Although I have not yet studied the latest version, it appears to differ in certain major respects from the earlier version of 5 March 2024.

  It is possible that based on the comments of Main Legal Department of the Rada, posted by the Rada last weekend, there may still be more changes.  However, I so not expect them to be major.  If you wish my English translation of these comments, please contact me.

  I now plan to do an English translation of the attached document with the Google translation tool.

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 5 May 2024: Orthodox Deaconess ordained by Metropolitan Seraphim of Zimbabwe

  On Thursday, May 2, the day observed this year by the Orthodox as Holy Thursday, Mother Angelic Molen was ordained a deaconess by Metropolitan Seraphim (Kykkotis) of Zimbabwe in St. Nektarios Mission in Waterfalls (a suburb of Harare) with the approval and support of Patriarch Theodoros and the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate of Alexandria.  The Facebook page of Metropolitan Seraphim has links to some of the articles covering this historic event.  https://www.facebook.com/giorgos.iakovou/?locale=tl_PH&paipv=0&eav=AfY0GWe45YoXsPebdJZNYA6brxs3xiefJX235VujvlcAX4FmmGoU2SUH5mFwxeHqG0I&_rdr   Dr. Carrie Frost, who is now the chairperson of the Board of the St. Phoebe Center for the Deaconess (a non-profits organization founded in the US and dedicated to educating about and advocating for the revival of deaconesses in the Orthodox Church) witnessed the ordination along with her daughter Annie.  I have pasted below a photograph by Annie Frost showing Deaconess Angelic distributing communion to the faithful.   It should be noted that some Local Orthodox Churches, such as the Moscow Patriarchate, do not even allow male deacons to distribute communion.

  The following is an article about the event posted on the website of the St. Phoebe Center.  https://orthodoxdeaconess.org/the-deaconess/contemporary-orthodox-deaconesses/bishop-ordains-orthodox-christian-woman-as-deaconess/   I found the most interesting report on the website of the Religion News Service (RNS):   https://religionnews.com/2024/05/03/eastern-orthodox-church-ordains-zimbabwan-woman-as-its-first-deaconess/    This article states: “After unanimously voting to revive the female diaconate at its synod in Alexandria in 2016, the Patriarchate ordained six sub-deaconesses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2017.  Molen’s ordination as a full deaconess goes further.  Her responsibilities, and those of future deaconesses, will include assisting priests in the liturgy and sacraments and addressing the specific needs of parishes in her country, explained Seraphim.”  

  This Orthodox event may have some effect on the Catholic Church.  On October 28, 2023, the members of the XVI Ordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops adopted a Synthesis Report.   https://www.synod.va/en/news/a-synodal-church-in-mission.html  The section of the Synthesis Report on “Women in the Life and Mission of the Church” provides in part as follows:

  j)   Different positions have been expressed regarding women's access to the diaconal ministry.  For some, this step would be unacceptable because they consider it a discontinuity with Tradition.  For others, however, opening access for women to the diaconate would restore the practice of the Early Church.  Others still, discern it as an appropriate and necessary response to the signs of the times, faithful to the Tradition, and one that would find an echo in the hearts of many who seek new energy and vitality in the Church.  Some express concern that the request speaks of a worrying anthropological confusion, which, if granted, would marry the Church to the spirit of the age.

  ….

  Proposals

  ….

  n)   Theological and pastoral research on the access of women to the diaconate should be continued, benefiting from consideration of the results of the commissions specially established by the Holy Father, and from the theological, historical and exegetical research already undertaken.  If possible, the results of this research should be presented to the next Session of the Assembly.

  At the second session of the Assembly to be held October 2-27, 2024, the proponents for the ordination of women to the diaconate will certainly stress this week’s event in Zimbabwe.

  The RNS article quoted certain Orthodox experts that one should not expect this week’s ordination to significantly influence the other Local Orthodox Churches.  I expect that the ordination will spark a strong reaction especially from more conservative Orthodox.  I also believe that the ordination will be used by the Moscow Patriarchate’s Exarchate of Africa in its competition with the Patriarchate of Alexandria for priests and faithful in Africa.  Moscow will argue that the ordination is just further evidence that the Patriarchate of Alexandria has separated itself from the Orthodox faith.  In fact, Father Georgy Maximov, the chief missionary of the Exarchate, has already commented extensively on the ordination on his Telegram channel.  https://t.me/s/OtecGeorgy  Among his statements are the following:  “I don’t know how the priests of the AOC [Alexandrian Orthodox Church] feel about this, but among our African priests (who converted to the Russian Orthodox Church) this causes indignation and rejection.  Actually, they drew my attention to this ‘ordination,’ expressing the hope that we do not have such a thing.  I assured them: no and never will be. This is modernism and a perversion of the Orthodox tradition. The fathers replied: another confirmation that we made the right choice by moving to the Russian Orthodox Church.” 

  Many of you will be celebrating the great feast of Pacha when you read this email.  To all of you, I say:  Christ has Risen!

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

   

  

• 29 April 2024 (2): Latest on Draft Law 8371

  The news agency "Ukrainian National News" ("UNN") reported today that Draft Law 8371 is now pending before the Main Scientific-Expert Department of the Rada.   https://unn.ua/en/news/more-than-1000-amendments-have-been-submitted-to-the-draft-law-banning-religious-organizations-affiliated-with-russia  This information was provided by Sergii Yevtushok, the first deputy chairman of the Rada’s Regulatory [Rules] Committee, in a telethon.  According to him, the Department will prepare a table that will “analyze all the amendments that were approved by the Committee [on Humanitarian and Information Policy].”  According to my calculations, this Committee approved, at least in part, 11 proposed amendments at its meeting on April 4, 2024, and 70 proposed amendments at its meeting on March 5, 2024.  Preparing an analysis on this number of adopted amendments will presumably be a time-consuming project.  However, the Department may have begun work on this project as early as the day following the April 4 Committee meeting.  The Department previously analyzed the first version of Draft Law and issued its opinion in February 2023.  blob:https://itd.rada.gov.ua/9127c440-edd2-452a-ad78-e19931f89102  The Department strongly criticized certain aspects of the first version.  This indicates that the Department is not a “rubber-stamp” body.  Below is the UNN’s English translation of the article. 

  Peter Anderson

  More than 1,000 amendments have been submitted to the draft law banning religious organizations affiliated with Russia

  Kyiv   •   UNN

  April 29 2024, 03:48 AM  •  13804 views

  More than 1,000 amendments have been submitted to the draft law banning religious organizations affiliated with Russia, which are awaiting expert review before being put to a vote in parliament.

  More than 1,000 amendments have been submitted to the bill No. 8371 on the ban on religious organizations associated with Russia. This was announced by MP, first deputy chairman of the Regulatory Committee of the Verkhovna Rada Serhiy Yevtushok during a telethon, a correspondent of UNN reports.

  Only one draft law has been voted on, and it has already been developed in the committee. About a thousand amendments have been submitted as of today. The draft law has already passed the committee and is awaiting an expert opinion. That is, our Main Scientific and Expert Department should provide a table that will allow us to find out and analyze all the amendments that were approved in the committee. Then the draft law will be put on the agenda and then we will go through the amendments. I assume that this draft law will not be passed by amendments, but, for example, as the law on mobilization was passed, in blocks

  - Yevtushok said.

  Asked when the draft law might be put to a vote as a whole, Yevtushok said it would happen after the Main Scientific and Expert Department provides a table. "We will look at their comments and then this draft law can be considered on the agenda," he said. 

• 29 April 2024: Bizarre events in Moldova and Bulgaria & other news

  As previously reported, Metropolitan Vladimir of Chisinau and All Moldova wrote a surpisingly strong letter to Patriarch Kirill on September 5, 2023.  https://cubreacovblog.wordpress.com/2023/10/20/mitropolitul-vladimir-cantarean-ne-aflam-intr-o-situatie-de-faliment-institutional-mitropolia-basarabei-a-demonstrat-ca-este-o-forta-care-nu-mai-poate-fi-oprita/  The letter contained many grievances including the failure of the Holy Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate to elect Archimandrite Filaret (Kuzmin) as a bishop as requested by the Synod of the Orthodox Church of Moldova (OCM).  Some people speculated that such a strong letter might be the first step in the OCM leaving the Moscow Patriarchate.  The Moscow Patriarchate acted quickly.  At its Synod meeting on October 11, 2023, Archimandrite Filaret was elected a bishop with the location of the episcopal ordination to be determined at the discretion of Patriarch Kirill.  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6066199.html (Journal entry 97).  The ordination was subsequently held in Chisinau -- the first time in over 200 years that an episcopal ordination of the OCM occurred in Moldova.   Recently, two more Moldovan bishops have been approved at the request of Metropolitan Vladimir.  On March 12, 2024, the Moscow Synod elected Archimandrite Nicolae (Rosca) as the vicar of the Cahul diocese (Journal entry 17) and Archimandrite Patrocl (Porombac) as vicar of the Edinet diocese (Journal entry 18).  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6109912.html  In both cases, the locations of the episcopal ordinations were left at the discretion of Patriarch Kirill.  On April 7, 2024, Archimandrite Nicolae was ordained in Chisinau by Metropolitan Vladimir with the participation of Metropolitan Vikenty of Tashkent and Uzbekistan.   https://en.mitropolia.md/his-eminence-metropolitan-vladimir-primate-of-the-orthodox-church-of-moldova-officiated-the-ordination-of-archimandrite-nicolae-rosca-as-bishop/   On April 21, 2024, Archimandrite Patrocl was ordained by Metropolitan Vladimir, but with the participation of no bishops from outside Moldova.  https://en.mitropolia.md/his-eminence-metropolitan-vladimir-primate-of-the-orthodox-church-of-moldova-led-the-ordination-as-bishop-of-archim-patrocl-porombac

  On April 23, 2024, the Holy Synod of the OCM met and took a very important step in regard to establishing a new diocese in Moldova.  The official minutes, which are in the Romanian language (the official state language of Moldova), can be read at https://mitropolia.md/hotararile-sinodului-bisericii-ortodoxe-din-moldova-din-23-aprilie-2024/.  Journal entry 15 reads in part:  “It was decided:  1. To establish the Diocese of Soroca and Drochia of the Orthodox Church of Moldova…. 2.  To elect as titular bishop of the Diocese of Soroca and Drochia His Grace Ioan, Bishop of Soroca and Vicar of the Metropolis of Chisinau and all Moldova.”  This was surprising as the Charter of the Russian Orthodox Churches provides as follows for “self-governing churches” such as the OCM:  “Decisions on the formation or abolition of dioceses included in the Self-Governing Church and on the determination of their territorial boundaries are made by the Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus' and the Holy Synod on the proposal of the Synod of the Self-Governing Church with subsequent approval by the Council of Bishops.”  See Chapter XII, Section 8 of the Charter.  Nevertheless, the official minutes in Romanian clearly provided that the Holy Synod of the OCU made the decision to form the new diocese.  However, the Synod did not go so far as to make the bishop of the new diocese a “ruling” bishop, but only a “titular” bishop.  The Press Service of the OCM’s Synodal Department for Church Relations with Society and the Media issued a press release about the decision in both Romanian and English.  The title of the release in English reads as follows:  “Diocese of Soroca and Drochia of the Orthodox Church of Moldova was founded.”  https://en.mitropolia.md/diocese-of-soroca-and-drochia-of-the-orthodox-church-of-moldova-was-founded/  The release in Romanian has essentially the same language.  This particular release was not issued in Russian.

  And now comes the big surprise!  In the Russian translation of the minutes, posted on the website of the OCM, the language for Journal entry 15 is completely different from the official Romanian entry.  Instead of having only two numbered paragraphs, the Russian translation has five paragraphs.  https://ru.mitropolia.md/%d0%b6%d1%83%d1%80%d0%bd%d0%b0%d0%bb%d1%8b-%d0%b7%d0%b0%d1%81%d0%b5%d0%b4%d0%b0%d0%bd%d0%b8%d1%8f-%d1%81%d0%b8%d0%bd%d0%be%d0%b4%d0%b0-%d0%bf%d1%80%d0%b0%d0%b2%d0%be%d1%81%d0%bb%d0%b0%d0%b2%d0%bd-3/   The first and fifth paragraphs read in part as follows: “DECIDED:  1.  To support the initiative of His Eminence Metropolitan Vladimir of Chisinau and All Moldova to form the Soroca diocese ….5.  His Eminence Metropolitan Vladimir of Chisinau and All Moldova will send a report to His Holiness Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus' and the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church for approval of Journal No. 14 [actually it is No. 15] of the Synod of the Orthodox Church of Moldova on the formation of the Soroca diocese.”   Is this a form of “double bookkeeping” – one version to be read in Moscow and another version to be read in Moldova, where 78% of the population use Romanian as their primary language?

  I have also previously reported on certain events leading up to the June election of a new patriarch for the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC).  One step that must be taken before the June election is to fill the vacant metropolitan see of Sliven.  This is an important step as the new metropolitan will be a member of the Holy Synod, which will prepare a “short list” of three metropolitans from which the Patriarchal Electoral Church Council will select the new patriarch.  With respect to the selection of a new metropolitan, the BOC Charter provides that the Holy Synod will prepare a list of bishops to be considered by a Diocesan Electoral Council.  The Council will then elect a “short list” of two bishops from which the Holy Synod will select the new metropolitan.  At the meeting of the Sliven Diocesan Electoral Council, held on February 18, 2024, the Council elected a short list from a list of 12 bishops provided by the Holy Synod.  In the first round of voting, the following three bishops received the most votes:  Bishop Herotei (vicar of Sliven) received 26 votes, Bishop Arseniy (vicar of Plovdiv) 17, and Bishop Michael (vicar of Lovech) 11.  As the recipient of the most votes, Bishop Herotei, the vicar bishop of Sliven and apparently the local favorite, became one of the two bishops on the short list.  In the second round of voting to determine the second member on the short list, Michael received 22 votes while Arseniy kept his original 17 votes.   The results of this February 18 election were challenged.  It appears that one contention was that the voters were improperly influenced between the first and second rounds of voting.  Supposedly, those who voted for Herotei in the first round were influenced to vote for Michael in the second round – not because he was the best candidate in the second-round race between Michael and Arseniy, but rather because it was clear that the Synod would never select Michael.  With the final two candidates being Herotei and Michael, it would be certain that Herotei would be the next metropolitan of Sliven.  This scheme in effect denied the Synod a meaningful choice and allowed the Electoral Council to determine who the successful candidate will be.

  On February 24, the Holy Synod met and decided to void the election held on February 18.  The Synod also adopted a “regulation” by a vote of 9 to 3.  The nature of the regulation was not specified on the BOC’s website.  https://dveri.bg/component/com_content/Itemid,100723/catid,14/id,73051/view,article/   It appears that the regulation provides that only the metropolitans would select a new metropolitan and that this would be done without the involvement of a diocesan electoral council.  https://dveri.bg/component/com_content/Itemid,100723/catid,14/id,73052/view,article/  This regulation was a clear violation of the Charter of the BOC, and it caused a great public outcry.  On  March 12, the Synod met again and retreated.  It was decided that the first election would be void, but that the new election would be held in accordance with the terms of the Charter with the participation of the Sliven Diocesan Electoral Council.

  And now comes the second surprise!   On April 22 the Holy Synod prepared a new list of candidates to be considered by the Sliven Diocesan Electoral Council in the rerun election.  Unlike the February list which had twelve names, the new list has only six names, and neither Herotei nor Michael, the winners in the first election, are on the new list!!  Anseniy is on the new list.  This surprising event is reported at https://dveri.bg/component/com_content/Itemid,100723/catid,14/id,73253/view,article/.  Perhaps the omission of the two winners of the February election is the Synod’s way of ensuring that what happened in the February election will not reoccur in the rerun election.  However, it is bizarre that Heroei, the local favorite, is now ineligible.  This latest action by the Synod has prompted protests in Sliven.  In response, Bishop Herotei has addressed to the faithful of the Sliven Diocese an appeal urging peace and forgiveness.  https://www.bta.bg/bg/news/bulgaria/661510-agatopolskiyat-episkop-yerotey-otpravi-obrashtenie-kam-miryanite-ot-slivenskata-  The voting by the Sliven Diocesan Electoral Council for the rerun election is now scheduled for May 19 with the Holy Synod choosing the new metropolitan of Sliven on May 26.

  In Ukraine, there is speculation that the voting of the full Rada with respect to the second reading of Draft Law 8371 is imminent.  However, no date has yet been set.  When and if the Draft Law will be considered by the full Rada is determined by the Rada's Conciliation Council of Parliamentary Factions.  As I previously reported, the Rada’s Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy approved a very major revision of Draft Law 8371 on March 5, 2024.  Now, almost two months later, the text of this March revision has not yet been made public and is not available on the Internet.  On April 4, 2024, the Committee met and adopted more amendments to Draft Law 8371.  The Committee’s minutes for that day can be read at  https://kompkd.rada.gov.ua/uploads/documents/34905.pdf .  The minutes show that a decision was made “[T]o take into account editorially the following amendments: number 314, 1175, 1180, 1183, 1188, 1193, 1216, 1217, 1220, 1234, 1236.”   However, there is no way of knowing what these proposed amendments say or knowing what parts of these proposed amendments were adopted.  With the minutes providing no help, one might expect that the transcript of the Committee's meeting would provide a clue as to the substance of the amendments.  It is logical that there would be some discussion of the substance of the amendments before the vote by the Committee members on the amendments.  The verbatim transcript of the April 4 meeting can be read at  https://kompkd.rada.gov.ua/uploads/documents/34870.pdf.  The transcript shows that there was no discussion, but simply a motion, a roll call vote, and a unanimous adoption.  Thus, the official documents give no information from which one can determine the language or substance of the amendments adopted on April 4.  In my opinion this lack of information was probably intentional.  The effect of withholding from the public the text of the amendments adopted on March 5 and on April 4 means that public criticism of the Draft Law is greatly inhibited.  That result may well be the Committee's hope and purpose in withholding the text.  (The text of the March amendments was leaked to a few people, but the text is apparently nowhere available on the Internet.  To the best of my knowledge, there have been no leaks of the April amendments.)

  In other news, Patriarch Kirill has sent a letter to world religious leaders and international organizations concerning the actions now being taken against the UOC by the Ukrainian government.  Although the entire letter has not been posted, an article was posted on April 27 on the Patriarch’s website concerning the letter.  The article was in both Russian and Ukrainian.   http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6124407.html  It is possible that the Ukrainian translation was made available immediately as part of an attempt to convince the faithful of the UOC that the Patriarch is their defender.  Two highly regarded German theologians specializing in Eastern Europe have written an excellent statement defending Father Mykola Danylevych.  The statement can be read in English at  https://news.church.ua/2024/04/25/the-uoc-department-for-external-church-relations-has-published-a-statement-by-roman-catholic-theologians-from-germany-in-support-of-archpriest-mykolai-danylevych/?lang=en#2024-04-28 .   

  A blessed Holy Week to all who are observing Pascha on May 5!

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

   
• 25 April 2024: Statement from Münster theology professors in support of Danylevych

  The statement below was posted today by the official website of the UOC.  https://news.church.ua/2024/04/25/the-uoc-department-for-external-church-relations-has-published-a-statement-by-roman-catholic-theologians-from-germany-in-support-of-archpriest-mykolai-danylevych/?lang=en#2024-04-25 

  Peter Anderson

   

  The UOC Department for External Church Relations has published a statement in support of Archpriest Mykolai Danylevych 

  by Emeritus Professor Dr. Thomas Bremer and Professor Dr. Regina Elsner from the Faculty of Theology of the University of Münster

   

  Statement in support of Fr. Mykolai Danylevych on his criminal persecution

  On April 12, 2024, the private house of Fr. Mykolai Danylevych, a well-known priest and vice chairman of the office for external affairs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, was searched by the SBU.  In a press statement, the SBU accused him of discrimination on a religious basis (Art 161 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) and of justification of the Russian aggression (Art 436-2).

  As academic researchers in the field of Christianity in Eastern Europe, we have both always stood and stand in firm solidarity with Ukraine in this Russian war against the country.  We condemned and theologically exposed the Russian ideology behind and the religious legitimation of this war by the Russian Orthodox Church in many academic and popular publications.  We use every possible opportunity to raise awareness for Ukraine’s resistance and bravery in this war.  We have known Fr. Mykolai for many years in the context of our academic and ecumenical work, including joint working groups with European partner organizations on the questions of peaceful religious coexistence in Ukraine and fieldwork on the religious landscape in Ukraine.  We know his public statements in social media, including his personal Telegram account, and we have researched the statements he made on Telegram which—among others—have attracted the attention of the SBU. From our academic perspective, none of his texts justifies accusations of discrimination, of legitimation of the Russian aggression, or of faith-based hate speech. Especially in the two “incriminating” passages, Fr. Mykolai stresses the need for united efforts to defend the country against the Russian aggressor and to avoid any inner-Ukrainian split.  He criticizes takeovers of UOC parishes, which have indeed happened multiple times since the beginning of the full-scale invasion by Russia, and which endanger the needed consolidation of Ukrainian society.  His texts do not contain any inciting of violence or hatred, any degradation of the dignity of others, or any violation of personal rights.  In fact, Fr. Mykolai’s wording is milder than the usual accusations which representatives of both Orthodox Churches in Ukraine regrettably make against each other.  In particular, there is no dismissal of the canonicity of the OCU and no misspelling or intentional misnaming of the OCU, which could be classified as disrespect or denial of the integrity of this religious community.

  We are aware of the official visit of a delegation of the Conference of European Churches (CEC) to Ukraine, which met with several religious communities including the UOC with Fr. Mykolai as its official representative, to learn about the situation of religious communities in the context of Russia’s aggression.  In those meetings, Fr. Mykolai also drew attention to the problematic draft law No. 8371, which plans a ban of the UOC and which has been criticized by international organizations and experts.  Fr. Mykolai participated in the preparation of the joint statement of the CEC and the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations, issued on April 14, 2024.  It calls for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, unambiguously condemns the Russian military and ideological aggression, and calls for unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine.

  Fr. Mykolai is also responsible for the pastoral care of Ukrainian Orthodox refugees in Western Europe, and he participates in establishing of parish structures of the UOC in European countries.  From our work as consultants to the Catholic Bishops’ Conference in Germany and our engagement in other ecumenical networks, we have learned that these parishes are an important spiritual and humanitarian anchor for many refugees.  They are to a large degree publicly open and in contact with humanitarian and ecclesial institutions in Germany and they do not pose any security risk to Ukrainian refugees and European societies.  On the contrary, these parishes enrich the religious landscape in Europe and provide a safe space for Ukrainian Orthodox believers who do not want to attend other Orthodox parishes, above all not those belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate.  It seems that the real reason for the recent accusations against Fr. Mykolai are his statements on draft law 8371 in conversation with foreign church representatives and his vital engagement in the new Ukrainian ecclesial presence in Europe.  This seems to be confirmed by the fact that the two Telegram statements now under suspicion were made in March and August 2022 and it is hard to believe that the SBU needed two years to understand the allegedly pernicious character of these statements.

  Thus, there is neither basis nor evidence for the allegation of the SBU that the parishes in Western countries “distribute the propagandistic narratives of the Russian Federation”, or for the statement that Fr. Mykolai “tried … to discredit our country on the international level”.  Quite the opposite: in fact, from our knowledge of the ecumenical and humanitarian situation in Germany, where the largest community of UOC parishes exists at present, Fr. Mykolai and these parishes have solicited support for Ukraine in Germany and many Western countries.  The parishes of the UOC in Germany are important actors in mobilizing the German society to support Ukraine in spiritual, humanitarian, economic, and military ways.  They inform the public about the reality of the Russian aggression and the severe consequences for the people of Ukraine.  In contrast, unfortunately the public stigmatization of the UOC as a “Russian agent” by Ukrainian political actors—illustrated by such actions as those of the SBU—discredits Ukrainian interests abroad and harms efforts to strengthen international solidarity.

   

• 19 April 2024: Danylevych in the Kyiv court & other news

  On April 17, 2024, Father Mikola Danylevych, deputy head of the Department of External Church Relations of the UOC, appeared in the Solomyansky District Court of Kyiv.  https://t.me/graty_me/6275  Before the judge of the Court, the prosecutor requested an order placing Danylevych under house arrest as “a preventive measure.”  As you may recall, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) had searched the residence of Danlevych on April 12.  On the same day, the SBU posted on its Telegram channel its allegations against Danylevych.  https://t.me/SBUkr/11701   It was alleged that he “justified the Russian war against Ukraine and incited religious hatred.”   After hearing from the prosecutor and from Danylevych and his attorneys, the judge denied the request for a house arrest and simply imposed on Danylevych a personal obligation to appear before the investigator.  This constituted a significant victory for Danylevych.  In recent months, Danylevych has been spending the vast majority of his time in Western Europe establishing UOC parishes for the many Ukrainians now living there.  If the request for house arrest had been granted, Danylevych’s work outside Ukraine would have been seriously impeded. 

  In contrast to the sweeping condemnations made by the SBU against Danylevych on April 12, the main evidence presented by the prosecutor in the Solomyansky Court proceedings was limited to one sentence found in Danylevych's Telegram entry for March 26, 2022, and a part of a sentence found in his Telegram entry for August 12, 2022.  Yesterday, I sent my comments on these two entries to certain people who are particularly interested in Ukraine.  To the extent that you also have an interest, I have pasted these comments at the end of this newsletter.  In the comments, I highlighted in yellow the sentence and the half-sentence upon which the prosecutor relied.  In my opinion, the criminal proceedings against Danylevych raise certain questions.  The Telegram entries by Danylevych have been public knowledge and available for anyone to read for approximately two years.  Why has the SBU waited for such a long period of time before taking action on them?  In recent years, the tensions between the OCU and the UOC have been extremely high.  This has resulted in many harsh words by the OCU against the UOC and by the UOC against the OCU.  In view of this very harsh language, why has the SBU chosen to attack the relatively mild comments made by Danylevych?  It appears that the SBU is straining to find something for which Danylevych can be charged.  In my opinion, this lends credence to the theory that the SBU and perhaps other government officials are unhappy with the statements made by Danylevych to a delegation of the Conference of European Churches (CEC) two days before the search, and the criminal proceedings are a way of showing this to Danylevych.

  There have already been statements of concern with respect to these proceedings against Danylevych.   It is my understanding that in the court proceedings, an attorney representing Danylevych read parts of a letter from the World Council of Churches (WCC) expressing concern.  In a YouTube video, over a dozen young people, presumably in Western Europe, have individually given testimonies relating to their high respect for Danylevych.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfmogBgY_Wo  There has also been a statement from the UOC’s Vicariate of Western Europe. https://vzcz.church.ua/2024/04/17/zayava-zaxidnojevropejskogo-vikariatstva-upc-na-pidtrimku-protoijereya-mikolaya-danilevicha/?lang=en  This statement includes the following:  For example UOC has more than eighty newly formed parishes which largely worship in the buildings of local national churches [such as Catholic parishes in Italy] and promote Ukrainian culture and the image of our country as taking pastoral responsibility for its suffering refugees.  Neither Father Mykolay personally nor any of the foreign parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has spread any pro-Russian narratives and it is absurd to suggest that this might happen in the future.  On the contrary, precisely because of their strong patriotic stance, foreign parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church are constantly harassed by aggressive representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church abroad.  Danylevych himself has posted a statement denying the charges against him.  https://vzcz.church.ua/2024/04/15/commentary-by-deputy-head-of-the-uoc-decr-archpriest-mykolay-danylevych-on-his-criminal-prosecution/?lang=en  In the statement, Danylevych gives, in my opinion, a very plausible explanation for the documents found by the SBU in the search of his residence.

  Following the visit of the CEC delegation to Ukraine, April 8-10, the CEC and the All-Ukraine Council of Churches and Religious Organizations issued a joint statement.  https://ceceurope.org/storage/app/media/CEC-UCCRO%20Ukraine%20statement.pdf  The joint statement condemns (1) the Russian aggression, (2) “the complicity of the Russian Orthodox Church in legitimising this unjust conflict,” and (3) the “documents recently issued by the World Russian People’s Council, justifying Russian aggression against Ukraine.”  Rev. Prof. Dr Jerry Pillay, General Secretary of the WCC, has also issued a statement with respect to the decree of the World Russian People’s Congress.  https://www.oikoumene.org/resources/documents/wcc-statement-on-decree-of-xxv-world-russian-peoples-council?fbclid=IwAR0TiJtKz0H-lR8eplErujj_JIiy_dpMdPtScjvalUBz2_eFYICELMm2tAA  The statement by Dr. Pillay includes the following sentence:  Among other concerns arising from the recent Decree, the World Council of Churches cannot reconcile the statement that “the special military operation [in Ukraine] is a Holy War” with what we have heard directly from Patriarch Kirill himself, nor with relevant WCC governing body policy pronouncements, nor indeed with the biblical calling for Christians to be peacemakers in the midst of conflict.  In the statement, Dr. Pillay requests “an urgent meeting” with Patriarch Kirill and also directs three written questions to the Patriarch.  Dr. Pillay maintains that in a meeting which he had in Moscow in May 2023, Patriarch Kirill agreed “that no war of armed violence can be ‘holy’.”

  The Atlantic magazine in the United States has published a long article in its May 2024 issue, entitled “Clash of the Patriarchs.”   https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2024/05/russia-ukraine-orthodox-christian-church-bartholomew-kirill/677837/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=the-atlantic-am&utm_term=The+Atlantic+AM  The article was written by Robert F. Worth, a former bureau chief for the New York Times in Beirut.  In researching his article, he traveled to such places as the Phanar and Mt. Athos.  He interviewed such persons as Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, Archbishop Elpidophoros of America, and Metropolitan Gregorios of Cameroon.  His request for interviews with Patriarch Kirill and the Moscow Patriarchate went unanswered.  The author related certain information that was new to me.  For example, he stated:  In late 2021, weary of the conflict and worried that it was damaging all of Orthodoxy, Bartholomew reached out to the Russians—and was rebuffed.  The Moscow Patriarchate “sent us a message saying that there is no way we will engage in any dialogue,” Archbishop Elpidophoros recalled.  The Russians, he went on, declared that “the wound is so deep that we will need at least two generations to overcome.” 

  Protodeacon Andrei Kuraev has posted on his blog a photocopy of the decree which he received from Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew.  https://diak-kuraev.livejournal.com/  At the end of the decree, there are three footnotes citing canonical authorities in support of the decree. The decree, which is dated April 3, 2024, provides in part as follows:

  We accepted your appeal and, having carefully considered the case and the issues concerning you, have determined that the canonical punishments imposed on you by your spiritual authority do not in any way flow from ecclesiastical criteria.  Therefore, we have come to the decision that with this Patriarchal charter of ours, in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, we absolve and release you from the punishment of defrocking and restore you to the status of a clergyman and to the rank that you previously had, so that you can fully enjoy everything that befits your sacred status (ιερατικής ίδιότητος) as before.   Moreover, since only We, the Shepherd of Constantinople, bear the responsibility and authority, according to the Divine and Holy Canons and the established practice of the Church, “to receive clergy from other churches, even if they have not received a letter of release from the bishop who ordained them” (cf. interpretation Theodore Balsamon [a famous canonist of the 12^th century] to canons 17 and 18 of the Trullo Council and canon 10 of the Seventh Ecumenical Council of Nicaea [3]), having favorably accepted your request, We include you among our holy clerics under our omophorion.

  In the 2024 edition of the Annuario Pontificio, just released by the Vatican, the title “Patriarch of the West” suddenly and unexpectedly reappears among the titles of the pope.  https://www.pillarcatholic.com/p/why-is-pope-francis-embracing-the  This title, used in editions prior to 2006, had disappeared in the 2006 edition during the pontificate of Pope Benedict XVI and has not been listed in the successive editions until now.  The deletion of the title in 2006 caused an uproar in the Orthodox world.  In an apparent attempt of “damage control,” the Vatican’s Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity issued a communique in March 2006 seeking to allay the Orthodox fears.  http://www.christianunity.va/content/unitacristiani/en/documenti/altri-testi/comunicato-circa-la-soppressione-del-titolo--patriarca-doccident/comunicato-circa-la-soppressione-del-titolo--patriarca-doccident.html  According to this communique, the omission “changes nothing to the recognition, so solemnly declared by the Second Vatican Council, of the ancient patriarchal Churches.”  Thereafter, the uproar gradually abated.  Why after eighteen years has this title reappeared without any comment by the Vatican?  Personally, I wonder whether Pope Francis desired a positive movement toward the Orthodox after the negative reaction of many Orthodox to his decision on the blessing of same-sex couples. 

  On April 7, I reported on the trend of the Patriarchate of Alexandria to ordain as bishops more native African priests.  On March 31, Patriarch Theodoros of Alexandria ordained a native African as the bishop of Benin and Togo.  Now, on April 7, Patriarch Theodoros ordained another native African,  Archimandrite Constantine Mbonabingi from Uganda, as the bishop of Juba and South Sudan.   https://orthodoxtimes.com/ordination-of-the-bishop-of-juba-and-south-sudan-by-the-patriarch-of-alexandria/   The following is an interesting YouTube video of Bishop Constantine’s jubilant return to Kampala on the day after his ordination.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZQp6_lsuusg   The Moscow Patriarchate has also been active in Africa in the last few days.  The Exarch for Africa, Metropolitan Konstantin, has been in Malawi this past week.  There he gave a video interview, with English subtitles, to RT.  https://www.rt.com/africa/595979-russian-orthodox-church-baptized-malawians/?utm_source=ground.news&utm_medium=referral  It is claimed that thousands have been baptized during his visit.  On April 14, he met with the priests of Malawi.  https://mospat.ru/ru/news/91665/  There are 15 native priests in the group photo.  On April 17, Metropolitan Konstantin was in Zambia.  https://mospat.ru/ru/news/91663/  The best site for following the visit is https://t.me/s/exarchate_mp. 

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

  MY COMMENTS ON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT APRIL 17 HEARING AGAINST DANYLEVYCH

  The hearing was covered by Kyiv’s Channel 5.  Channel 5 has posted an article with details of the hearing.  https://www.5.ua/suspilstvo/nazyvaie-perekhid-hromad-do-ptsu-tserkovnym-maroderstvom-iak-sud-obyrav-zapobizhnyi-zakhid-zastupnyku-holovy-viddilu-zovnishnikh-zviazkiv-upts-mp-siuzhet-326245.html  It also posted a YouTube video.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7JIpmanqneE&t=33s   During the hearing, the only specific evidence presented by the prosecutor were two entries from the Telegram channel of Danylevych.  https://t.me/s/MykolayDanylevych   The first was a sentence from his Telegram posting of March 26, 2022, and the second was part of a sentence from his posting on August 12, 2022.  I have pasted below an English Google translation (not perfect) of the complete entry of March 26 and the complete entry of August 12.  I have highlighted in yellow the sentence and the part of a sentence on which the prosecutor relied.

  With respect to the March entry, the comment that the actions of the OCU created an “excuse for Putin’s aggression” is in my opinion a fair comment which should not be punishable by imprisonment for up to five years and by confiscation of all of Danylevych’s property (the penalty specified in the SBU Telegram channel).   In my newsletter of February 27, 2022, five days after the invasion, I stated:  “President Putin in his long address on February 21 devoted a paragraph to the subject: ‘Kiev continues to prepare the destruction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.’  Rescuing the UOC-MP is one of the purposes of the invasion by the Russian Federation.”   Danylevych's statement that Putin was using the actions against the UOC as an excuse for invading Ukraine is absolutely true.  Danylevych’s statement is not pro-Russia as he said that the actions against the UOC were an “excuse” by Putin and did not say a “justification.”  He also refers to “Putin’s aggression,” a phrase which is not pro-Russia.

  With respect to the allegation of inciting “religious hatred,” Danylevych denied this at the hearing.  In my newsletter of February 27, 2022, I quoted an appeal made by Danylevych on his Telegram channel specifically directed to the OCU:  “I very much hope that this trouble [the war] will motivate us to appreciate peace in general and interfaith peace in particular.  That we will all rethink a lot.  We are all citizens of Ukraine, let us unite in defense of the state and put aside mutual claims.”  As far as I can determine, there was no response by the OCU to this appeal.  The entry by Danylevych on March 26, 2022, appears to reflect his frustration that the OCU did not respond favorably to his appeal but had continued to attack the UOC and to take its churches.

  Danylevych’s entry of August 12, 2022, relates to an incident filmed by TV Rivne.  It shows a woman, who is a supporter of the OCU, pushing away an UOC priest while he was saying a funeral prayer.  As stated by Danylevych, it did involve a quarrel and pushing (Ukrainian against Ukrainian).  According to Danylevych, this animosity is destroying the unity that should exist in Ukraine during the war.  Compared to the very harsh rhetoric coming from both the OCU and the UOC, in recent years, the entry of August 22 is relatively mild. 

  March 26, 2022

  While everyone, regardless of faith and language, united in the fight against the aggressor and defends their country, the OCU, meanwhile, is simply trying to take advantage of this, dragging and capturing our parishes, creating enmity and division on religious grounds, which under the time of war weakens our society in unity in the fight against the enemy.  Banal fishing in the murky waters of war.  Church looting - that's what our people have already called it.
  It is significant that all this is happening in the rear. You go to Mariupol and tell there about the transfer to OCU.  Or in Zaporizhzhia at least, or even here in Kyiv.  Under fire. For some reason, no one here talks about it.  People are busy defending the country and their cities, and they are looting in the rear.
   I also see that their recorded propagandists have already appeared on the airwaves again, and have again begun to shake up the situation in the religious sphere, once again inciting the information space against the UOC.  Have they still not understood that it was they who created an excuse for Putin's aggression during the previous years with such actions?
  It is interesting that in the first days of the war, they all sat quietly and remained silent, and some even heroically escaped from Kyiv.   And now they have emboldened, again slanders, stamps, fakes.
  And this despite the fact that on the very first day of the war, our Primate, His Beatitude Metropolitan Onufriy, clearly called the invasion a war, called the aggression a Cain's sin, and the believers of our Church stood up for the defense of the country, parishes and believers began to help the army, the Teroboron [the Territorial Defense Forces of Ukraine], the displaced and the refugees.  Instead of uniting in the common defense of our country and helping the needy and those affected by the war, those grief experts began to tell how to ban and liquidate the UOC and seize more parishes.  And with this, they try again and again to divide Ukrainian society.

  August 12, 2022 

  What a telling photo (see next post)!  Similar to the paintings of Italian Renaissance artists.   All the figures are in expressive movements and poses, with clear emotions on their faces.  The grandmother (a supporter of the OCU) pushes out the priest of the UOC; behind, people are crying and covering their faces with their hands; in the left part of the image, people are standing with faces on which grief and incomprehension are written.  This all happens during the funeral prayer….
  How much trouble has this OCU already caused - and it continues to stir up quarrels, push people (Ukrainians against Ukrainians) in the villages and cities of Ukraine with its destructive ideology, under the influence of which the mentioned grandmother from the photo is also under the influence.  At a time when there is a war in the country, they continue to do their dirty work.  There are no words to talk about it all again, to comment.  Isn't it obvious that they are destroying Ukraine with such actions?
  When there are no laws in the country, then looking at all this, one can only see in all this some kind of art, tragic and sad art....
  Perhaps this kind of approach will help to psychologically survive this lawlessness against the communities of our Church, which continues....

  [The entry also included a photo of the incident]

• 13 avril 2024: Ukraine's Security Service accuses Father Mykola Danylevych (UOC)

  A delegation of the Conference of European Churches (CEC) visited Ukraine, April 8-10, 2024.  https://ceceurope.org/cec-visit-ukraine-strengthens-relations-affirming-hope-just-peace   The delegation was led by CEC President Archbishop Nikitas of Thyateira and Great Britain (Ecumenical Patriarchate).  In Kyiv on April 10, the delegation met with representatives of the OCU, the UOC, the UGCC, the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations, and the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience (DESS).  Each of these organizations posted an article about the visit on its website:  https://www.pomisna.info/uk/vsi-novyny/zustrich-z-delegatsiyeyu-konferentsiyi-yevropejskyh-tserkov/ (OCU);  https://news.church.ua/2024/04/11/mitropolit-avgustin-povidomiv-delegativ-konferenciji-jevropejskix-cerkov-pro-poziciyu-upc-shhodo-zakonu-8371/#2024-04-12 (UOC);   https://ugcc.ua/data/religiynyy-myr-e-narizhnym-kamenem-bezpeky-ukrayny-glava-ugkts-na-zustrichi-z-ekumenichnoyu-delegatsieyu-cec-4686/ (UGCC);  https://vrciro.org.ua/ua/news/uccro-meeting-with-the-ctc-delegation (Council of Churches); https://dess.gov.ua/dess-ta-konferentsiia-ievropeyskykh-tserkov-obhovoryly-sytuatsiiu-z-relihiynoiu-svobodoiu-v-ukraini/ (DESS). 

  For me, it was interesting to read that Archpriest Mykola Danylevych, deputy head of the Department of External Church Relations of the UOC, was in Kyiv for the meetings with the CEC on April 10.  For most of the last few months, Danylevych has been in Western Europe, primarily Italy, establishing UOC churches for Ukrainians located there.  In this regard, he has been extremely successful.  In fact, in my last newsletter, I reported an interview of a Ukrainian priest of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Italy who stated:  “The UOC parishes in Italy are the result of the efforts of almost one person - Father Mykola Danylevich.”  The interviewed priest also stated that the Catholic Church in Italy was at first reluctant to allow the UOC to use Catholic churches for services but that Danylevych was able to persuade the Italian Catholic Bishops’ Conference to allow it.  On April 10, three representatives of the UOC met with the CEC delegation:  Metropolitan Augustine of Bila Tserkva, Archpriest Mykola Danylevich, and Prof. Sergii Bortnyk.  Draft Law 8371 was a major topic of discussion.  The UOC was one of the founding members of the All-Ukrainian Council, and Danylevych was also present at the meeting of the CEC delegation with the All-Ukrainian Council.  The article on the website of the CEC states that freedom of religion was discussed at this meeting.  From previous remarks by Danylevych about the lack of religious freedom in Ukraine with respect to the UOC, one can certainly assume that he expressed similar concerns on this topic at the Council's meeting with the CEC.  These comments may well have sounded a discordant note at the meeting, which may not have pleased the Ukrainian authorities.  As you may recall, a delegation of the All-Ukrainian Council visited the United States in October of last year.  On October 30, the delegation participated in a discussion at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, DC.  As reported in my newsletter of November 7, 2023, the delegation strongly maintained that religious rights are not being violated in Ukraine.  There were no discordant notes from the Ukrainian delegation at the Washington meeting as the UOC had not been included in the delegation that came to the United States.

  Today, April 12, two days after the meetings by Danylevych with the CEC delegation, the Security Service of Ukrainian (SBU) made a startling announcement on its Telegram channel.   https://t.me/SBUkr/11701  The full text of the statement is as follows:

  The SBU informed about the suspicion of one of the leaders of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (MP), who called to pray for the Russian fascists in the war against Ukraine.  The cleric justified the Russian war against Ukraine and incited religious hatred.  After the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation, the archpriest publicly called for cooperation with the Russian fascists in order to jointly "pray for the health and well-being" of the Russian occupiers.  He wrote about this in his own Telegram channel, which he repeatedly used to spread pro-Kremlin narratives.  According to operational data, the priest oversaw an extensive network of dioceses of the UOC (MP) abroad.  These institutions, under the guise of supposedly spiritual guardianship of Ukrainian immigrants, spread propaganda narratives of the Russian Federation.  In this way, the person involved tried to influence the consciousness of Ukrainians abroad and discredit our country in the international arena.
  Examinations initiated by the Security Service confirmed the facts of his informational and subversive activities against our state.  In addition, during searches of his place of residence, an insurance certificate of mandatory pension insurance of the Russian Federation was found, which indicates that he may have citizenship of the aggressor state. Documents confirming his studies at the diplomatic academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation were also found.  Based on the collected evidence, the cleric was notified of suspicion under two articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine:
       ▪️Part 2 of Art. 161 (violation of the equality of citizens depending on their racial, national, regional belonging, religious beliefs and on other grounds);
       ▪️Part 2 of Art. 436-2 (justification, recognition as legitimate, denial of armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, glorification of its participants).
  Currently, the issue of selecting a preventive measure for him is being resolved. An investigation is ongoing to establish all the circumstances of the crime.  The perpetrator faces up to 5 years in prison with confiscation of property.

  The actions by the SBU included a search of Danylevych’s residence.  The quotation above states that “a preventative measure” is being resolved.  Undoubtedly, the preventative measure would mean, at the very least, no more trips outside of Ukraine to work with foreign parishes.  Most likely, it will involve remaining in Kyiv with a security bracelet.   The above quotation establishes that the SBU is relying on entries found on Danylevych’s Telegram channel.  I can very honestly say that I have personally read every entry by Danylevych on his Telegram channel since the Russian invasion.  I have frequently quoted from those entries in my newsletters.  Below are a few examples from my past newsletters:

  Newsletter of Feb. 24, 2022 – the day Ukraine invaded:  This morning, Father Mykola Danilevich, deputy head of the DECR of the UOC-MP, who often speaks on behalf of the UOC-MP, made on his Telegram channel a very strong statement which shows that the previous restraint is now gone.  https://t.me/s/MykolayDanylevych  He stated: “Putin treacherously attacked our country!  We bless everyone for the defense of Ukraine!  We pray and defend ourselves!   Church with the people!  God save Ukraine!  Later, he wrote: "Tell your parishioners that there are people in Italy who pray for you," said friends from the Community of Sant'Egidio of Rome.  Priests from Cyprus, Greece, Georgia, and other countries are also calling.  Coptic priest from Egypt.  Pleasant, even joyful, tears well up in my eyes.  Thank you!

  Newsletter of Feb. 27, 2022:  Quoting Napoleon, he [Mykola Danylevych] said:  “’Military forces are not enough to defend the country, while a country defended by the people is invincible.’  Today’s Ukraine.”   He also made a personal appeal: “Personal appeal to the sympathizers and believers of the OCU.  We are all in the same boat. [Here he refers to some negative comments with respect to the UOC-MP on the social media of the OCU, especially in the province of Volyn.]  Brothers and sisters!  Don't do that.  Now is the time to unite, not quarrel.  Trouble in our common home.  We are all in the same boat.  Do not shake it, because we will all drown.  I very much hope that this trouble will motivate us to appreciate peace in general and interfaith peace in particular.  That we will all rethink a lot.  We are all citizens of Ukraine, let us unite in defense of the state and put aside mutual claims.  True patriotism today is in unity and in helping the state.  Remember the words of Christ in the Gospel that "a house divided against itself cannot stand" (Matt. 12:25).   Please do not divide our common Ukrainian home.  Restrain emotions.  Just please.”   For anyone closely following the hostile stance of the UOC-MP toward the OCU over the past few years, the fact that one of the leading spokespersons of the UOC-MP would make a statement advocating uniting with the OCU in defense of the state and putting aside mutual claims is truly amazing.  Also amazing is his remark that “we will all rethink a lot.”

  Newsletter of Mar. 1, 2022:  “The perfidious open invasion of Ukraine is a huge mistake of Russia.  Perfidious, because we have heard earlier assurances from high-ranking Russian officials that ‘there is no invasion and it is not planned.’  In Ukraine, all the people stood up for the defense of the country, namely the country, and not personally for President V. Zelensky or his policies.  In fact, this is a Patriotic War.   War to defend the Fatherland.  And the Church did too.   Like in 1941.  It's a matter of principle.  After all, there is a fact of an open invasion of the territory of a sovereign country.  The defense of the country is the sacred duty of every citizen.  And our Beatitude clearly stated this in his statement on the first day of the war.  Today Russia is at war not with our government, but with the people.   That is how we perceive it.  This means that it is impossible for the aggressor to win such a war.   In addition, people did not hear from the Patriarch a clear assessment of this war and his call to stop this madness.  But people heard these words from His Beatitude Metropolitan Onufry.”

  Newsletter of Jan. 19, 2023:  In my last report, I provided a quotation from Archimandrite Cyril Hovorun, a well-known supporter of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), who essentially stated that individual “villains” should be punished by the state, but not those who participate in a specific church.  https://www.facebook.com/hovorun  Father Mykolay Danylevich, deputy head of the DECR of the UOC, has also stated:  “Obviously, if there are individual traitors or collaborators [in the UOC], then let them answer according to the law, but how can the whole Church?”  https://t.me/s/MykolayDanylevych (entry of Dec. 3, 2022)

  Newsletter of Jan. 29, 2023:  Father Mykolay has also given a video interview which covered his Vatican visit.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QTTu6WyEASg   

  On January 29, the UOC posted an article describing another aspect of Father Mykolay Danylevych's trip to Italy.   https://news.church.ua/2023/01/29/nedilna-shkola-kijivskogo-xramu-v-imya-svt-spiridona-zdijsnila-palomnictvo-u-milan/  In addition to being the deputy head of the DECR, Father Mykolay is also the rector of the UOC parish of St. Spyridon of Trimythous located in the Sviatoshyn district of Kyiv.  https://spiridon.in.ua/    According to the article, Father Mykolay took his teenage Sunday school students on a pilgrimage to Milan during the period January 21-25.  The article stated: “The main purpose of the trip, in addition to visiting shrines and places of interest, was to practice the Italian language, which most of the students had studied in Sunday school for two years.”  This included a visit to a private Catholic school where they practiced their Italian with students and teachers.   

  For the past few months, I have been following Father Mykolay on his Telegram channel and his Facebook page because I believe that he is a reasonable voice in the highly emotional church conflict in Ukraine.  I have just found an excellent interview that Father Mykolay gave to the major Russian religious website Pravmir in 2017.  https://www.pravmir.ru/protoierey-nikolay-danilevich-samoe-strashnoe-nenavist-mezhdu-hristianami/  In the interview, Father Mykolay describes some of his past life and his love of the priesthood.   He also describes his approach to dialogue – “during discussions I try never to get personal, I criticize ideas, but not the people who articulate these ideas.”   With respect to inter-Christian meetings, he states:  “No need to be afraid, you just need to learn more.  And when you travel, communicate with other Christians, you see many forms of preaching the Gospel that you can borrow, learn at some moments to be more open to the world, when it is possible and necessary.”   As to conflicts between Christians, he stated:  “In fact, the basis of all conflicts is, first of all, the lack of love, respect, and then hatred.  And the worst thing is when hatred arises between Christians.  As a rule, nationalists of all stripes are predisposed to it: Ukrainian, Russian, Greek, Turkish - any radical attitude deprives a person of peace of mind.   And a Christian must maintain moderation in everything.   In my opinion, a Christian can and should be a patriot, but not a nationalist - otherwise he is no longer a Christian.”  Father Mykolay has been very much of a Ukrainian patriot.   His brother Vitaly is a lieutenant colonel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and was one of the defenders of Azovstal in Mariupol. 

  Newsletter of July 24, 2023:  One of the vicar bishops of Metropolitan Agafangel, Archbishop Viktor (Bykov) of Artsyz, has written what can only be described as a scathing attack on Patriarch Kirill and his Holy Synod.  I believe that it is significant that the deputy head of the DECR of the UOC, Father Mykola Danylevych, who often serves as a spokesperson for the entire UOC, has posted the full text of Archbishop Viktor’s letter on his Telegraph channel.  https://t.me/s/MykolayDanylevych  It is an indication that the strong feelings prompted by the missile attack are not limited to Odesa. 

  In my reading of every entry in Danylevych’s Telegram’s channel since the invasion, I have seen nothing which raises any question in my mind about his loyalty to Ukraine.  Danylevych has spoken out in defense of the UOC with respect to the transfer of UOC churches to the OCU and with respect to Draft Law 8371.  However, this is totally consistent with being loyal to Ukraine.

  Frankly, I read the statement by the SBU with amazement and disbelief.  I am left with certain questions in my mind.  The action by the SBU was taken just two days after the Danylevych, in a meeting with an important foreign delegation, expressed views that are inconsistent with the government’s position that there is complete freedom of religion in Ukraine.  The entries of Danylevych in his Telegram channel have been public knowledge for years.  Why did the SBU wait until two days after the meeting with the CEC to take action against Danylevych?  Were the actions by the SBU motivated in part by a desire to confine in Kyiv a priest who has been so successful in establishing UOC parishes abroad?  In my opinion, people should be concerned.

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA 

• 8 April 2024: Kuraev reinstated & other news

  Although there is not yet an official announcement from the Phanar, it appears that Andrei Kuraev has been reinstated as a protodeacon by Ecumenical Patriarch Batholomew.  https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/04/06/protodiakon-andrei-kuraev-soobshchil-chto-ego-vosstanovili-v-sane-vo-vselenskom-patriarkhate-news;   https://dveri.bg/component/com_content/Itemid,100724/catid,19/id,73212/view,article/   On his blog, Kuraev notes that the decree relating to him was dated April 3, 2024, and it was received by him via email on April 5, 2024.  https://diak-kuraev.livejournal.com/  He remarks about the coincidences of the dates.  Exactly 15 years earlier, on April 5, 2009, he was elevated to protodeacon by Patriarch Kirill in St. Isaac’s Cathedral in St. Petersburg.  Three years ago, on April 3, 2021, Patriarch Kirill signed a decree defrocking Kuraev (subject to a moratorium).  Kuraev writes in his blog, “Lord, do You really still need me, that you give such ‘coincidences’?”  The blog shows photos of Kuraev at the Basilica of St. Nicholas in Bari, Italy on April 6, 2024.  He immediately went there from Prague after receiving the email.  The caption for the photos reads:  “I went to thank St. Nicholas.”  On April 7, 2024, he visited the shrine of Saints Cosmas and Damian at Alberobello (55 km southeast of Bari).

  As you recall, the Ecumenical Patriarchate had previously reinstated two Moscow priests, Father Ioan Koval and Father Alexy Uminsky, who had been defrocked by the Moscow Patriarchate for modifying or omitting the Patriarch’s Pray for Holy Rus’.  Although Kuraev has been critical of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the decision from the Moscow Diocesan Church Court relating to his defrocking did not mention Ukraine.  http://moseparh.ru/reshenie-eparxialnogo-suda-g-moskvy-po-delu-50-54-2020.html (Dec. 29, 2020)  Rather, the decree was based on his alleged “slanderous” statements.  Anyone who reads Kuraev’s blog knows that he is not hesitant to make accusations.  In some of these accusations, he uses very harsh words.  At one time, Patriarch Kirill had a good relationship with Kuraev, a brilliant person who taught for many years at the Moscow Theological Academy.  Perhaps, because of the regard by Patriarch Kirill for Kuraev’s intellect, the Patriarch added a moratorium to his decree of April 3, 2021.  It provided:  “A moratorium is imposed upon the issuance of the decree for the time being, for Protodeacon Andrei to rethink his position and return to the path of the Church that he chose at one time.”  https://orthochristian.com/138452.html   After the lapse of more than two years, the Patriarch terminated the moratorium, and the defrocking decree went into effect.  https://orthochristian.com/153372.html 

  On his blog, Kuraev has expressed a few thoughts concerning the canonicity of the decree from Constantinople.  He remarked that while he was a member of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Synodal Biblical-Theological Commission from 2007 to 2013, he worked on the document, “The position of the Moscow Patriarchate on the problem of primacy in the Universal Church.”  (The document, approved by the Holy Synod in 2013, can be read at https://mospat.ru/en/news/51892/)  Kuraev states: “[T]his document poses too poor and harsh an alternative: either the full powers of government (jurisdiction), or a purely protocol ‘primacy of honor.’  The issue that has turned out to be so significant since 2018 - the question of the right to receive judicial appeals by Constantinople from other local churches – was not noticed.”

  On March 31, 2024, the day on which most non-Orthodox Christians celebrated Easter this year, the Ecumenical Patriarch delivered a homily at the Church of St. Theodore in the Vlanga community of Istanbul.  https://orthodoxtimes.com/ecumenical-patriarch-its-a-scandal-to-celebrate-separately-the-one-resurrection-of-the-one-lord/  The homily included the following statement:

  But also from this position we extend a heartfelt greeting of love to all Christians around the world who celebrate Holy Easter today.  We beseech the Lord of Glory that the forthcoming Easter celebration next year will not merely be a fortuitous occurrence, but rather the beginning of a unified date for its observance by both Eastern and Western Christianity.

  This aspiration is particularly significant in light of the upcoming 1700th anniversary in 2025, marking the convening of the First Ecumenical Council in Nicaea.  Among its pivotal discussions was the matter of establishing a common timeframe for the Easter festivities.  We are optimistic, as there is goodwill and willingness on both sides.  Because, indeed, it is a scandal to celebrate separately the unique event of the one Resurrection of the One Lord!

  Thus, the Ecumenical Patriarch asks Our Lord that the celebration of the Resurrection in 2025 will be the beginning of “a unified date for its observance by both Eastern and Western Christianity.”  He later adds: “We are optimistic, as there is goodwill and willingness on both sides.”   It is not surprising that the Ecumenical Patriarch is praying for a common date for Pascha.  However, the words in this homily could be interpreted to mean that the Ecumenical Patriarch is optimistic that there will be a common date for Pascha beginning next year.  Under the existing calendars, a common date for Easter/Pascha will in fact occur in 2025 (April 20).  However, to say that there will be a unified date for all years after 2025 is startling.  With the existing tensions in the Orthodox world, it is extremely unlikely that there could be a pan-Orthodox agreement in the next few years on moving the Pascha date.  The only way of having a common Easter date in the near future is for the non-Orthodox churches to accept the Orthodox date.  Before the adoption of the Gregorian calendar in 1582, both the East and the West celebrated Easter/Pascha on the same day, because both used the Julian calendar and the Paschalion to calculate the feast of the Resurrection.   Thus, if Catholics used the Orthodox date, it would not be something new, but rather a reversion to the practice that the Catholic Church had for approximately one thousand years.  Of course accepting the Orthodox method would mean living with a calculation which is now not astronomically correct.

  In Kinshasa DRC on March 31, Patriarch Theodoros of Alexandria ordained as a bishop another native African.    The new native bishop is Archimandrite Athanasios Kayebe, who becomes Bishop Athanasios of Benin and Togo.  https://www.orthodoxianewsagency.gr/patriarxeia/patriarxio_aleksandrias/h-xeirotonia-tou-episkopou-mpeni-athanasiou-stin-kinsasa-tis-kentrikis-afrikis/  This ordination is the latest in what appears to be a trend in the Patriarchate of Alexandria to increase the number of native African bishops.  As far as I can determine, aside from this new bishop, the following are the existing native African bishops in the Patriarchate:  Metropolitan Jeronymos of Kampala (Uganda);  Metropolitan Chariton of Kananga (DRC);  Bishop Neophytos of Eldoret and Northen Kenya  (Kenya); Bishop Sylvester of Jinja and Eastern Uganda (Uganda); Bishop Nektarios of Gulu and Northern Uganda (Uganda); Bishop Panaretos of Nieri and Mount Kenya (Kenya).   Metropolitan Innokentius of Burundi and Rwanda retired last February for health reasons. 

  In contrast, the Moscow Patriarchate’s Exarchate of Africa does not yet have any native African bishops.  This is not surprising as it takes time for a native African priest to learn Russian, to obtain experience in monastic life, and to receive further theological training.  The Moscow Patriarchate is taking steps to accomplish this.  However, the present situation is that the two dioceses formed by the Moscow Patriarchate in Africa still do not have bishops.   The Moscow Patriarchate’s only bishop for Africa is the Patriarchal Exarch of Africa, Metropolitan Konstantin of Zaraisk (he became a metropolitan on March 24), who is a native Russian.  Metropolitan Konstantin has now made trips to Tanzania, Cairo, and South Africa.  However, for a majority of the time, he seems to be in Moscow.  His trip to South Africa in January was the first time that he had ever been to Africa.   The fact that Alexandria is now ahead of Moscow with respect to native African bishops may be helpful for Alexandria in the competition for priests in Africa.

  There is a very interesting interview of Archpriest Volodymyr Melnychuk, a Ukrainian who is the rector of an Orthodox parish, now under the Ecumenical Patriarchate, in Udine, Italy.  https://glavcom.ua/interviews/poljuvannja-za-virjanami-abo-nejmovirni-prihodi-moskovskikh-svjashchennikiv-v-italiji-994307.html  He describes the dynamics of Orthodox churches in Italy that are composed of different national groups.  He also discusses the parishes of the UOC in Italy.  According to Father Volodymyr, the “UOC parishes in Italy are the result of the efforts of almost one person - Father Mykola Danylevich.”  At first, after the invasion of Ukraine, there was a reluctance of the Catholic Church in Italy to allow the UOC to use its churches.  However, through the work of Father Mykola, the Italian Catholic Bishops’ Conference gave permission.  The interview also contains many other interesting observations.

  In other news, the Holy Synod of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate on April 2 issued a message including the statement:  “We do not accept the final document of this [Russian People’s] Council, as it does not correspond, in our opinion, to the spirit of the Gospel teaching.”  Among the signatories are the four bishops of the Estonian Orthodox Church (MP), including Metropolitan Eugene.  As you recall, Metropolitan Eugene was required to leave Estonia on February 6 when his temporary residence permit expired.  The official English translation of the message is found at https://ru.orthodox.ee/messages/mpeok-sinodi-lakitus-poslanie-sinoda-epcz-mp/.  On April 3, the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court in Ukraine issued an important decision relating to the rights of the courts to be involved in the transition of churches from the UOC to the OCU.  https://www.facebook.com/supremecourt.ua/posts/834806852020540/  It appears that the full text of the decision has not yet been made public.  However Metropolitan Yevstratiy (Zoria), the spokesperson of the OCU, has stated on his Facebook page that the decision is “important good news.”  https://www.facebook.com/yevstr?eid=ARAYsOzu1tE3zMtyOrmwuPZ951FrKLNM_N1G4hvjz_yFe20WpAIFoISI-Mk8IA48zdwr5DsM5Bmc9DAW  According to him, the decision decides such issues as: “whether the rights of the former incumbent are violated by the transition decision; how membership in a religious community is defined; how a quorum is determined at general meetings of members of the religious community.”  With respect to Draft Law 8371, a date has not yet been set by the Ukrainian Rada for a vote on the "second reading."

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 6 April 2024: Orthodox Church life in wartime Ukraine - a required reading

  Professor Volodymyr Burega has given an excellent interview to the Bulgarian website "Christianity and Culture,"  published by the Communitas Foundation in Sofia.  The Foundation is described at  https://www.communitas-bg.org/en/.  The title of the interview is "Difficult Dialogue in Wartime:  An Inside Look at Church Life in Ukraine."   https://www.hkultura.com/article/3050-trudniyat-dialog-po-vreme-na-voina-pogled-otvytre-kym-cyrkovniya-zhivot-v-ukraina?fbclid=IwAR0svdzVJHzqDrXjK6hg71r35GpGwjpzU_1SJ6fhaJjWJiP6QMjH4tpQH08_aem_Abm2_WzwBGDwwLMSbikHuUwjh60nKHarlyHaNws12e0WmzJwbMWpI-CSCe-QA2YFHQEXmgQD9cvdidwDCvah3xty   Burega is the vice-rector of the Kyiv Theological Academy and Seminary of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC).  

  I first read an article by Burega in 2019, and I was very impressed by it.  However, in reading his latest interview, I am even more impressed.  I can honestly say that this latest interview is the best description of the present state of the UOC that I have read.  Of course, it is written by an insider.  I am particularly impressed by Burega's objectivity and candor.  In the present "information war" now being conducted in Russia and Ukraine, articles tend to be very one-sided and to paint a picture in black and white.  Although Burega holds a responsible position with the UOC, he is not reluctant to point out the problems that the UOC has created for itself, while at the same time describing the complexity of the situation involving the UOC and the inappropriateness of referring to it as the Moscow church.  He also discusses the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and describes how the OCU has disappointed expectations.  On the other hand, he describes the "cruel repression" against the OCU in the occupied territories.  He also mentions his bitterness that respected and educated Orthodox priests in Russian "become full apologists for every decision handed down from above."

  Because I believe that a reading of this interview is so important for a good understanding of the current religious situation in Ukraine, I have pasted below a Google translation of the full text which is in Bulgarian.

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

   

  The tomos for autocephaly of the OCU was perceived by many as an opportunity to build a new church structure that would embody in action the principles of collegiality and Christocentricity.  A few months later, lay people and priests from the newly created Local Church raised 10 theses, among which there were calls for openness and dialogue, rejection of the "symphony" between Church and State and building relations with civil society, internal mission and evangelization, etc. .  To what extent have these expectations and hopes been fulfilled?

  The 2019 issuance of the Tomos for autocephaly was greeted in Ukraine with great enthusiasm, and the expectation was that the new Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), as a young church unconnected to a previous tradition, would have the opportunity to build itself differently.  To build the way it wants to be.  Therefore, at the beginning, the Tomos was perceived in Ukraine as a great chance for OCU.  Many laymen and priests who joined the OCU had expectations for a large-scale church reform that would reflect on church governance, church life and worship, the dialogue between the Church and society, and theological education.  These expectations were reflected in the so-called "10 theses" for the OCU announced in January 2019 and made public by the OCU.  [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1IMGiOtHRk68Qv9lOruhwq78PXsDvzVvzE4QDquTVfsg/viewform?edit_requested=true&pli=1]   I myself do not belong to the OCU, so my point of view is that of an observer, but it seems to me that today it can be safely said that these hopes were not justified.  If one looks at the "10 theses" of the OCU published at the time, it will be seen that none of them were fulfilled in full.  In addition, I think that some of these theses contradict the current situation of the OCU, one of them, for example, condemns the "symphony" and talks about the need to create a new model of church-state relations.  But we see that this is not happening, and although the Church is officially separated from the state, today the OCU actively relies on state support. Therefore, I think that the expected positive internal development in the OCU after receiving autocephaly almost did not happen.  Unfortunately, in my opinion, the OCU suffers from too many of the traditional diseases of Orthodoxy that it has never been able to overcome.  I'm not just talking about the symphony, but other things as well.  At least that's my feeling.

  And does the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) manage to discover its identity after the local council of May 2022, at which it announced its separation from the Moscow Patriarchate, but without using the uncomfortable term "autocephaly"?  Does it manage to win the support of the Ukrainian society and what kind of trust does she enjoy?

  After the start of the war, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which was previously part of the Moscow Patriarchate, made serious changes to its statutes. This happened at a Council on May 27, 2022.  After that date, the UOC is no longer considered part of the Moscow Patriarchate, without, however, then declaring autocephaly.  I will say right away that, in my opinion, the UOC deliberately refused to proclaim autocephaly in order not to come into conflict with other Local Churches, because if it had declared autocephaly, it can be confidently predicted that it would not have been recognized by any Local Church, and this would lead to a rupture in the relations between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the other Local Churches. Therefore, the leadership of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church limited itself to saying that it is "completely self-governing and independent", without using the word "autocephaly".  Indeed, this gave rise to a serious problem with its identity, because today its status is neither autocephaly nor autonomy, and the term used is not traditional in canon law, because no such term exists there.  I will immediately add that the term "autocephaly" also does not exist in the decrees of the ecumenical councils, i.e. the term "autocephaly" is also not clearly defined in the canons of the Church.  We take it the way it was defined in the 19th and 20th centuries, i.e. and this term as a principle is a new phenomenon. But this is another, big problem, which we will not discuss now.

  Inside the UOC, in my opinion, one cannot speak of a single identity.   More precisely, in the UOC there are different groups that interpret the decisions of the Council of May 27, 2022 in different ways. There is a group of those who believe that the connection with the Moscow Patriarchate was not completely severed, and even in Kyiv there are monasteries and temples, which continue to mention Patriarch Kirill in the Liturgy.  There is also the group that believes that these decisions have led to a complete severance of ties and that the UOC is de facto autocephalous, although it does not use that term.

  There are also a large number of priests and laymen who are simply confused, who do not understand what the status of our Church is, whether we are with Moscow or no longer with Moscow.  The main problem, in my opinion, is that after the adoption by the Council of the new Statute, the leadership of the UOC did not publish any clarifications on this matter.  The leadership of the Church did not even officially publish the new statute, it was published only on the website of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience. The statute is published by the state because by law it is filed for information in the relevant state office.  So the Church itself did not even publish the statutes, did not make the relevant clarifications, that is why even today different people interpret these decisions in different ways. This is the problem, that is why it is difficult to talk about a single identity.  Such decisions allow people with a pro-Moscow identity, people with a Ukrainian identity, those who support the idea of autocephaly, but also those who are against, to coexist within the UOC.  Both groups find confirmation of their views in the Council's decisions. I believe that this represents a weakness of the conciliar decision, because today the UOC is to some extent divided. On the other hand, with these decisions, management has determined the direction in which we are moving. The direction is towards complete independence. But today the priests do not see a clear plan and do not understand how we should behave now, how to position ourselves in the dialogue with the state.

  Understandably, this also creates a problem in relations with society.  Because it was not clearly said that we were on the path to autocephaly - the term used in the document was "disengagement" ("otmeživanie") from the MP, not even "rupture", but the mildest possible term.  Ukrainian society, which today is radically opposed to Russia and Moscow, generally reacted negatively to these decisions.  The UOC failed to give the public a clear sign of a break with Moscow, the softest possible expressions were used, which are not sufficient in a time of war.  This conflict with society exists, and if we follow the Ukrainian media, a generally negative attitude towards the UOC prevails in them.  Usually, the Council's decisions are interpreted in the sense that the leadership of the UOC is afraid of a conflict with Moscow and therefore adopts the softest possible decisions, and hopes that way it will be able to preserve its obedience or its ties with Patriarch Kirill; that there is some secret connection with Moscow, even if it is not declared.  Although today it has no relations with Moscow, and the UOC does not implement any decrees of the Moscow Synod, the public remains suspicious of the UOC.  So the relationship between the UOC and public opinion remains strained.

  Is there an alternative or a way out of this situation where society is much more radical than the church leadership?

  That part of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which advocates complete independence from Moscow, for autocephaly, outlines an alternative plan.  It consists of the UOC first restoring relations with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which are now severed, and restoring Eucharistic communion with Constantinople.  Second, to send a delegation to Constantinople and start negotiations for the regulation of the status of the UOC, and at the same time, inside Ukraine, the UOC should also start negotiations with the OCU.  These steps would be comprehensible to society, and thus the rift with Constantinople could be overcome.  Of course, it is clear that these steps will provoke a sharp response from Moscow in the form of an ecclesiastical court, bans or even excommunication.  It seems to me that the bishops do not want to take this path because they fear severe sanctions from the Moscow Patriarchate.  More radical priests insist that these measures should not be heeded because the Moscow Patriarchate is increasingly losing its legitimacy.

  As far as I understand, the leadership of the UOC adheres to the opinion that the maximum of what can be done has already been done.  This is the maximum in the situation of war, and the decision should be postponed until peacetime.  This is the position of the leadership, but underneath there is a radical party of the clergy, which exerts pressure, but for now cannot change the situation.

  How active is the process of transition of Orthodox parishes from the jurisdiction of the UOC to the OCU?  Is it a movement "from below" among believers, or rather a movement "from above"?  Is this process voluntary and free, or are there cases of violent acts?  What is the state of religious freedom in Ukrainian society after two years of hostilities?

  I think that after the issuance of the Tomos for autocephaly of the OCU, a part of the UOC priests quite sincerely switched to the OCU.  I know such priests who, together with their parishes, quite sincerely and freely made a decision to join the newly created autocephalous church.  Their expectations at the time were that it would be a younger, open and dynamic church, so they switched to OCU quite sincerely.  In addition, after 2019 there were conflicts in some places, in many parishes there were internal schisms, some of the laity supported the transition to the new church, others were against it. These conflicts mostly concern parishes in villages, not cities.  Because there is usually one temple in the villages, the whole village goes there, and when opinions are divided in the village, it means a fight for the temple.  There is no such problem in the cities, because there are many temples in the cities, and if a person does not want to go to church in one jurisdiction, he can go to another.  In the villages, however, this leads to division, it has led to conflicts, in some cases to violent actions, illegal decisions to change jurisdiction.  Before the war, there were more than 250 lawsuits over the status of individual temples, and the situation in many places was uncertain.  According to the statistics of the OCU before the war, there were about 600–700 temples that passed from the UOC to the OCU.  The UOC does not accept this statistic and cites the number of trials.

  After the start of the war, the sentiments in society became much more radical, then there were cases of forceful seizure of temples, and videos appeared on the Internet. There were such serious cases in Ivano-Frankivsk, then in Cherkasy, in Khmelnytskyi, in this way the cathedral was taken over.  And this led to a change of mood in the UOC.  If in 2022 the priests of our Church spoke about the need for dialogue with the OCU, then in 2023 the idea of dialogue became less popular, more and more people began to say that dialogue with the OCU is impossible, because they tend to use violence. Therefore, in 2023, the situation in the relations between the UOC and the OCU deteriorated. Today, the leaders of both churches do not see dialogue as a priority task.  I think that anyone who has wanted to voluntarily transfer by this point has already done so. That is why it seems to me that today there are no longer any prerequisites for a mass transfer of parishes.  Especially since in some regions of Ukraine, there are cases of violence on a religious basis.  That is why today there is no constructive dialogue between the UOC and the OCU.

  Let me clarify something that seems important to me. In the media, the UOC is usually presented as the pro-Russian church in Ukraine, while I understand from your words that this is not entirely correct.  Apparently, there is also some tolerance on the part of the state towards the UOC.  The situation appears to be much more complicated than is usually presented.

  It is true that today the opinion has been established in Ukrainian society that the UOC is a pro-Moscow force that should not be present in Ukraine. The cliché pro-Moscow church has very visibly stuck to the UOC, although in fact, if you look at the facts, this statement is problematic, because Metropolitan Onufry condemned the Russian aggression on the very first day of the war and has repeatedly made such statements. But as I said, the UOC has never been uniform because, on the one hand, we are witnessing the condemnation of aggression by Metropolitan Onufry, but on the other hand, we also see trials against UOC priests who directly declared support for the aggression.  Just a few days ago, it was reported that a priest from the Dnipropetrovsk diocese was sentenced to 5 years in prison for supporting aggression.

  In individual dioceses, the sentiments among priests are very different, and they can hardly be brought under a common denominator. That is why the society accepts with indignation any news about a priest who has been arrested, and the court has condemned him for cooperation with the Russian authorities.  We know that several UOC bishops who found themselves in the temporarily occupied territories collaborated directly with the occupation authorities.  Such was the case of Metropolitan Eliseus from Izyum, who fled to Russia with the Russian troops after the liberation of Izyum.

  The problem lies in the fact that the leadership of the UOC never condemned the collaborationists outright. There is no decision that not only expresses support for the integrity of Ukraine, but also clearly condemns cooperation with the Russian occupation authorities. The UOC Synod nowhere directly condemned the cases of collaboration, and the radicalized Ukrainian society immediately interpreted it to mean that this was hardly supported.  That is why the struggle against the UOC is perceived as a legitimate struggle with those who may turn out to be potential collaborators.  And the UOC, for its part, gets confused in its internal heterogeneity and refrains from condemning the obvious cases of collaboration...

  What is the situation in the occupied territories?  At first glance, the old principle from the time of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation prevailed in the Orthodox Church - who is in power, his is the faith.  The episcopate and clergy from almost all territories occupied by Russia are now part of the ROC-MP, including the three dioceses of the Crimean Peninsula, which even after 2014 formally remained part of the UOC.

  After the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which declared that it was severing relations with the Moscow Patriarchate, probably already in June 2022, the principle decision was made in Moscow that all dioceses in the occupied territories should pass under direct subordination to the Patriarch. On May 27, 2022, the Council was held in Kyiv, and already on June 7, 10 days later, the first decision was made, with which the three dioceses in Crimea passed to the direct subordination of Patriarch Kirill, and the Crimean Metropolis was immediately established as part of the Moscow Patriarchate. Thus a sign was given of what Moscow's response to the Kyiv Council would be.

  This was most easily accomplished in the Crimea.  As far as we can judge from the media reports, it was assumed that this would also happen to the dioceses of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.  But at least as far as I know, the Donetsk bishop, Hilarion, has refused such a step.  He attended the Council of the UOC on May 27 remotely, and there he stated that the Donetsk Diocese will not leave the UOC and wants to remain part of the Church, although he cannot agree with the decisions made.  As far as I know, he has refused to go under the direct subordination of the patriarch, arguing that part of the territories of his diocese are controlled by Ukraine. There is another diocese there, the Horliv Diocese, which also follows the example of the Donetsk Metropolitan.  That's why I don't think that a transition to the Moscow Patriarchate is being prepared there.

  The Diocese of Luhansk behaves in the same way. The only diocese in the region that has said it wants to switch to Moscow is the Rovenkiv Diocese in the Luhansk Region, which, like Crimea, passed to the patriarch directly in 2022.  All other dioceses in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions have not turned to the patriarch with such a request.  But they were forced to re-register under Russian legislation.  Thus, they remain part of the UOC, but they are legally registered under Russian legislation, because without this registration they cannot have any activity, bank account, etc.   Even on the website of the Moscow Patriarchate they are listed as part of the UOC.  There are reports in the Ukrainian media that these bishops are resisting pressure and refusing to go over to the Moscow Patriarchate, so my impression is that the situation on the ground is tense, they are under pressure.

  There are also priests who served in the occupied territories and managed to escape, who talk about the very heavy pressure exerted on the people and on the diocese.  We also have the case in the Berdyansk Diocese, where the bishop went abroad, and when he left, a new ruler was immediately appointed from Moscow.  It can be assumed that there was pressure on him and that is why he left the diocese, publicly he himself did not talk about it, officially he left for health reasons.  But it is obvious that there is pressure, and it is strong.

  It should be added here that the priests of the OCU, who found themselves in the occupied territories, were subjected to cruel repression. There are known cases of priests who were arrested and sent to prison.  Not long ago, the even more terrible news was received that on February 13, 2024, in the occupied Kherson Region, Archpriest Stephan Podolchak, who was a cleric of the OCU, was shot. Therefore, there is no question of any freedom of religion in the territories occupied by Russia.

  Recently, OCU switched to the New Julian calendar. How is this change received in church circles and in Ukrainian society?  Is there a danger of a new dividing line, already because of the calendar issue, such examples as we have seen in other Local Churches, including the Bulgarian one.

  This transition was an expected event, it had been talked about for several years, and even before the start of the war, Christmas both old and new style were holidays.  Thus, not only the Roman Catholics, but also the state accepted that both dates should be holidays.  So society got used to having two Christmases in our country. There were also attempts in some Orthodox municipalities to celebrate Christmas on December 25.  Last year, the Greek Catholics and the Orthodox Church in Ukraine made an almost simultaneous decision to switch to the new calendar.  As far as I understand, the situation with the Greek Catholics is specific, because in Ukraine there is the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), but there is also the Mukachevo Diocese, which is Greek Catholic and is located in Transcarpathia, but which is not part of the UGCC, but is directly subordinated to Rome. This year, the Mukachevo Diocese announced its transition to the Western Easter, i.e. they fully adopted the Gregorian calendar.  This caused some tension among the rest of the Greek Catholics, because it turned out that this year the Greek Catholics will not celebrate Easter together, but on different days, which caused some misunderstanding on the part of the Greek Catholics in Lviv, for example.

  But the important thing is that this process started even before the war, and society accepts it as another marker of separation from Moscow.  This is not just a ecclesiastical matter, but a matter of civil choice.  The public mood in Ukraine is that with the adoption of the new calendar, we are returning to the family of European nations and abandoning the tradition imposed by Russia.

  I don't see any reasons for internal problems in OCU, nor do I see any dissatisfaction with the transition to the new calendar.  There are specific parishes that would probably like to continue serving in the old style, I don't know how many there are, but according to the leadership of the OCU, they are very few.  According to my observations, the parishes from the UOC that switched to the OCU have a more conservative attitude, but I don't know what the sentiments are among them.

  The danger I see is that the old style will become a new marker of the UOC's identity and thus this issue will become a new dividing line.  This will further limit the possibilities for dialogue.

  And on a household level, I can say, at least in the eastern part of Ukraine, there are many people who preserve the tradition of celebrating in the old style, because Christmas, among other things, is also tradition, folk customs and rites.

  I am sure that you follow the developments in the Russian Orthodox Church as well, we see what happened to Fr. Alexey Uminsky, the transformation of the Moscow Patriarchate into a bearer of the regime's ideology.  How do you explain and evaluate the events in the Russian Church?

  It seems to me that very serious changes are taking place in the Russian Orthodox Church now, which I don't even know how to describe.  It is commonly said that Patriarch Kirill has adopted an authoritarian approach, does not allow any dissent, and any statement, even the most careful, that does not coincide with the general line, is punished. The case of Fr. Alexey Uminsky, Fr. Ioan Koval, formerly of Fr. Joan Burdin - they are the tip of the iceberg.  In some dioceses in Russia, there are cases of other priests who have been removed from ministry, but these cases are not so much talked about in the public space.

  What amazes me, my deep inner bitterness, is due to how priests who are part of the Moscow Church Court, among whom there are respected priests who know canon law, how they become full apologists for every decision handed down from above.  It gives the impression that every task assigned by the patriarchate is immediately carried out by the ecclesiastical court.  There are many literate and educated priests in the ROC.  I am therefore now struck that I do not see below any disagreement with this course, on the contrary, I see a complete agreement which leads to the automaticity of the decisions of the ecclesiastical court on perfectly fictitious charges.  For me, the problem is not that there is one person at the top who has become authoritarian, but that there is an infrastructure below that is ready to condemn priests.  There is an apparatus at the top that feels completely confident, has the ability to adopt and impose repressive measures without fear of a reaction from below.  For me, this is the scariest symptom, because it means that the disease is deeper.  I am surprised by this.  Because I remember another Russian church that was much more adequate for the intellectual elite. Unfortunately, today inside the Russian Church we do not see a force to oppose what is happening.

• 29 March 2024: Russian World and the UOC & other news

  On March 27, 2024, the World Russian People’s Council (“Council”) held an extraordinary congress in the Hall of Church Councils of the Cathedral  of Christ the Savior in Moscow.  The congress was held under the chairmanship of Patriarch Kirill, who is also the head of the Council.   https://vrns.ru/news/pod-predsedatelstvom-svyateyshego-patriarkha-kirilla-sostoyalsya-vneocherednoy-sobornyy-sezd-vsemirn/    The Council was created in May 1993 and was the idea of the then Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk, the chairman of the Department of External Church Relations (DECR) of the Moscow Patriarchate.  On the day that Kirill was installed as patriarch in 2009, he also became the head of the Council.   https://vrns.ru/o-vrns.php  At the extraordinary congress on March 27, the Patriarch gave the keynote address.  The full text of the Patriarch’s address can be read at http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6116021.html.  Patriarch said almost nothing about Ukraine, but did refer to the document which the Council has now produced.  He also said that it is impossible to consider the crime [the Crocus City Hall tragedy] that occurred in isolation, outside the general context of current military events…..”

  The extraordinary congress produced a document entitled, “The Present and Future of the Russian World.”  The complete text of the document can be read at http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6116189.html .  The document is divided into eight sections.  The first section is devoted to the “special military operation” and states:

  The special military operation is a new stage in the national liberation struggle of the Russian people against the criminal Kyiv regime and the collective West behind it, waged on the lands of Southwestern Rus' since 2014.  During the SVO [special military operation], the Russian people, with arms in hand, defend their lives, freedom, statehood, civilizational, religious, national and cultural identity, as well as the right to live on their own land within the borders of a single Russian state.  From a spiritual and moral point of view, a special military operation is a Holy War, in which Russia and its people, defending the single spiritual space of Holy Rus', fulfill the mission of “Holding”, protecting the world from the onslaught of globalism and the victory of the West, which has fallen into Satanism.

  After the completion of the Northeast Military District, the entire territory of modern Ukraine should enter the zone of exclusive influence of Russia.  The possibility of the existence in this territory of a Russophobic political regime hostile to Russia and its people, as well as a political regime controlled from an external center hostile to Russia, must be completely excluded.

  The second section relates to the “Russian world.”  It includes the following paragraph:  The highest meaning of the existence of Russia and the Russian world it created - their spiritual mission - is to be the global “Holder”, protecting the world from evil.  The historical mission is to over and over again destroy attempts to establish universal hegemony in the world - attempts to subjugate humanity to a single evil principle.  The third section relates to foreign policy.  A part of this section provides: The reunification of the Russian people should become one of the priorities of Russian foreign policy.  Russia should return to the doctrine of the trinity of the Russian people, which has existed for more than three centuries, according to which the Russian people consist of Great Russians, Little Russians and Belarusians, who are branches (sub-ethnicities) of one people, and the concept “Russian” covers all the Eastern Slavs - the descendants of historical Rus'.  The other sections of the document cover family and demographic policy, migration policy, education and upbringing, spatial and urban developments, and economic development.

  The next day, March 28, the website of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) issued a statement that had been prepared by its DECR.  The full text is at https://news.church.ua/2024/03/28/zakliki-znishhennya-ukrajini-ta-vipravdannya-vijskovoji-agresiji-nespivstavni-z-jevangelskim-vchennyam-zayava-vzcz-upc/#2024-03-28  The statement in ten numbered paragraphs strongly attacks the Council’s document.  The UOC statement concludes:  Summing up, we state that the mentioned text contains an apology for violence, a justification of violations of spiritual and moral and evangelical principles, which threatens the Ukrainian identity and sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.  We believe that the ideas discussed from the above mentioned document cannot be supported by a religious organization that claims to be called Christian.  

  The Wall Street Journal, one the leading US newspapers, has run a long opinion article relating to the situation of the UOC in Ukraine.   https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-religious-liberty-under-attack-in-ukraine-russia-war-82b1f198?st=e4r9l2rixsc3f1s&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink  The article describes the UOC as a church “controlled by Russia” and concludes that the actions of the Ukrainian government, including Draft Law 8371, do not violate freedom of religion.   However, the article failed to provide any evidence that the UOC has in fact been controlled by Russia or the Moscow Patriarchate since the Local Council of the UOC held in May 2022.  I even wrote an email to the author asking for the factual basis for her “controlled” statement and have not received an answer.  I personally believe that the UOC, like the OCU, can be criticized for many things.  However, if one looks at the actual proof, there is nothing that merits the penalty of “capital punishment” (banning and the confiscation of all property) mandated by Draft Law 8371.  Aside from the lack of evidence of any control from Russia since May 2022, there are a number of statements from the UOC, such as the one above, which are inconsistent with any attempt to portray the UOC as a Russian puppet following May 2022.

  In Bulgaria, the Holy Synod on March 19 set the dates for the election of a new patriarch.  On June 2 all of the dioceses will hold elections to select their representatives on the Patriarchal Electoral Church Council.  On June 20, the Holy Synod will meet and will select, by secret ballot and a two-thirds majority vote,  a “shortlist” of three metropolitans from the list of metropolitans who meet the eligibility requirements for patriarch.  On June 30 the Patriarchal Electoral Church Council will meet and will select the new patriarch from the “shortlist” of three metropolitans.  https://sofiaglobe.com/2024/03/19/bulgarian-orthodox-church-to-elect-new-patriarch-on-june-30/  There were nine metropolitans who met the eligibility requirement for patriarch.  However, in an unexpected development, Metropolitan Nikolai of Plovdiv, who was considered one of the top contenders, announced that he “will not accept to be included as a candidate for the Patriarchal Throne.”  https://orthodoxtimes.com/metropolitan-of-plovdiv-declines-candidacy-for-bulgarian-patriarchal-throne/  Accordingly, there are now eight contenders.

  At the meeting on March 19, the Holy Synod also elected Metropolitan Grigorii of Vratsa, by a unanimous vote, to head the Holy Synod and the Sofia metropolis during the time period prior to the election of a new patriarch.  https://orthodoxtimes.com/holy-synod-of-bulgarian-church-elects-metropolitan-of-vratsa-as-vice-president/  Metropolitan Grigorii, age 53, is a graduate of the Theological Faculty of the University of Athens.   https://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%93%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D0%92%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%87%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8  Presumably he knows Greek.  Perhaps for that reason, he represented the Bulgarian Patriarchate at such events as the enthronement of Archbishop George of Cyprus and the celebration in Athens of 100^th anniversary of the journal Theologia.  The fact that Grigorii was elected unanimously indicates, in my opinion, that this temporary position is not considered by the members of the Synod as an important stepping stone in becoming patriarch in June.

  On March 19 the Holy Synod also determined the dates for the selection of a new metropolitan for the diocese of Sliven.  On May 19 the Sliven Diocesan Electoral Council (42 voters from seven districts – six voters per district) will elect a “shortlist” of two candidates, and on May 26, the Holy Synod will select one of the two to be the new Metropolitan of Sliven.  Sliven is an important diocese and borders on the Black Sea.  The Sliven diocese has been very much in the news recently because this will be the second time that the Sliven Diocesan Electoral Council  has met to elect a “shortlist” of two candidates.  The first election by the Diocesan Electoral Council, consisting of both clergy and laypersons, was held on February 18, 2024.  In order to be one of the bishops on the shortlist, a candidate must receive a majority of the votes from the Electoral Council.  In the first round of the February vote, Bishop Herotei (vicar of Sliven) received 26 votes, Bishop Arseniy (vicar of Plovdiv) 17, and Bishop Michael (vicar of Lovech) 11.  Having received a majority vote, Herotei became one of the two members on the shortlist, and then a second round of voting was held in order to select the second member of the shortlist.  In the second round of voting, Michael received 22 while Arseniy kept his original 17 votes.  Thus, it appeared that the Synod would choose between Herotei and Michael.  

  After the election of the two finalists by the Diocesan Electoral Council, two complaints were filed with the Holy Synod by a Sliven priest, Father Evgeniy Yanakiev.   https://boulevardbulgaria.bg/articles/kasiraniyat-izbor-za-slivenski-mitropolit-koy-koy-e-v-bitkata-na-lobitata-v-bpts  On February 24, the Holy Synod met and decided to void the election held on February 18.  The Synod also adopted a “regulation” by a vote of 9 to 3.  The nature of the regulation was not specified on the Patriarchate’s website.  https://dveri.bg/component/com_content/Itemid,100723/catid,14/id,73051/view,article/   It appears that the regulation provides that only metropolitans would select a new metropolitan and that this would be done without the involvement of a diocesan electoral council.  https://dveri.bg/component/com_content/Itemid,100723/catid,14/id,73052/view,article/;  https://dveri.bg/images/Kosio/Predlozhenie_za_priemane_na_Sinodalna_naredba_otnosno_izbiraneto_na_eparhiyski_mitropoliti.pdf (photocopy of the actual 3-page regulation).  This was contrary to the charter of the Bulgarian Patriarchate, and it caused a great public outcry.    On  March 12, the Synod met again.  It was decided that the first election would be void, but that the new election would be held in accordance with the terms of the charter.   However, before the election there will be a complete financial audit including the property of the Sliven diocese and a verification of the list of delegates.

  What was behind this bizarre behavior by the Holy Synod?  To me, it is not entirely clear.  One contention is that the voters were improperly influenced between the first and second rounds of voting.  Supposedly, those who voted for Herotei in the first round were influenced to vote for Michael in the second round – not because he was the best candidate in the second-round race between Michael and Arseniy, but rather because it was clear that the Synod would never select Michael.  With the final two candidates being Herotei and Michael, it would be certain that Herotei would be the next metropolitan of Sliven.  This scheme in effect denied the Synod a meaningful choice and allowed the electoral council to determine who the  successful candidate will be.  In a reaction to this scheme, the Holy Synod adopted the regulation giving it the sole power to determine a new metropolitan.  In addition to this scheme, there were contentions of outside influences who were interested in the valuable property owned by the diocese near the Black Sea.  The election of a new metropolitan of Sliven in May is now especially important because the new metropolitan will be able to vote for the new patriarch in June.

  In other news, the Synodal Biblical-Theological Commission of the Moscow Patriarchate has now posted its full written document criticizing the Vatican’s declaration "Fiducia supplicans."   The entire document written by the Commission can be read at http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6115422.html.  A complete list of all representatives from other churches attending the funeral services of Patriarch Neophyte is found at http://www.plovdivskamitropolia.bg/index.php.  Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew presided at the funeral service following the Liturgy at which only Bulgarian hierarchs served.  The full text of the address by the Ecumenical Patriarch is found at  https://orthodoxtimes.com/address-by-ecumenical-patriarch-at-the-funeral-service-for-patriarch-neophyte/  Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov had been asked about reports by some Internet sites that Pope Francis has been invited to visit Moscow this summer.  Although Peskov could have simply denied these reports, he stated:  “We cannot comment at all yet.”  https://ria.ru/20240320/priglashenie-1934445865.html 

  For those of you celebrating Easter this Sunday, I wish all of you a very blessed and joyful feast of the Resurrection of Our Lord!   

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 27 March 2024: Fiducia supplicans - full text of critique by Moscow Theological Commission

  The full text of the Document of the Synodal Biblical-Theological Commission of the Moscow Patriarchate in response to the Declaration "Fiducia supplicans" has now been posted.   A number of websites have reported the release of this document but have not provided a link to the full text.  The following is the link to the full text in Russian on which the Google translation tool works quite well:  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6115422.html    The following is a French translation of the full text:    https://orthodoxie.com/document-de-leglise-orthodoxe-russe-au-sujet-de-fiducia-supplicans/       

   

  Peter Anderson

   

• 15 March 2024: Death of Patriarch Neophyte & other news

  There is the very sad news that Patriarch Neophyte died on the evening of March 13 at the age of 78 after a long illness.  https://bg-patriarshia.bg/news/saobshtenie-po-povod-konchinata-na-negovo-sveteyshestvo-balg  He had been patriarch for 11 years.  The funeral service will begin at 9:30 a.m. on Saturday, March 16 at the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Sofia.  https://bg-patriarshia.bg/news/sv-sinod-na-bpts-bp-opredeli-datite-za-poklonenieto-opeloto  Patriarch Neophyte seems to have been highly regarded by everyone, and his condolences have poured in.  On the morning of March 14, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew conducted a Trisagion service for the repose of the soul of Patriarch Neophyte.  https://orthodoxtimes.com/patriarchal-trisagion-for-the-late-patriarch-of-bulgaria-and-bishop-of-efkarpia/  The following are the condolences sent from Patriarch Kirill:  https://mospat.ru/ru/news/91526/ 

  The election of a new patriarch is governed by Articles 40 -48 of the Statutes of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC). https://bg-patriarshia.bg/statute (full text of the Statutes); https://orthodoxtimes.com/the-election-of-the-next-patriarch-of-bulgaria-an-insight-into-the-process (English translation).  Among the eligibility requirements for a new patriarch is that the bishop must have been a diocesan metropolitan for at least five years and must be at least 50 years of age.  (Article 40)  There are now 15 dioceses of the BOC, and there are nine diocean metropolitans who satisfy the eligibility requirements.  The nine are:   Yosi, Metropolitan of the United States;  Grigorii of Veliko Turnovo;   Ignatii of Pleven;  Gavriil of Lovech;  Nikolai of Plovdiv;  Yoan of Varna;  Naum of Rousse;  Grigorii of Vratsa; and Daniil of Vidin.  https://sofiaglobe.com/2024/03/14/late-bulgarian-orthodox-church-patriarch-neofits-funeral-to-be-on-march-16/   Under Article 45 the Holy Synod elects, by secret ballot and by a two-thirds majority, three diocesan metropolitans to be the final candidates.  (Article 45)  A Patriarchal Electoral Church Council then chooses one of three to be the next patriarch.  (Article 47)  The composition of the Patriarchal Electoral Church Council is specified by Articles 41 and 43.  It is a large group consisting of representatives from the dioceses, the monasteries, and the secondary theological schools.  A theologian of the BOC describes what to expect in an article at https://www.bta.bg/bg/news/bulgaria/635504-do-yuli-se-ochakva-da-bade-izbran-noviyat-balgarski-patriarh-kaza-za-bta-bogosl.

  With respect to relations with Catholics, Neophyte as a metropolitan represented the BOC at the funeral of Pope John Paul II, and he was one of three bishops to show the Pope the St. Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Sofia in 2002.  He accompanied the President of Bulgaria in a meeting with Pope Benedict on May 22, 2009.  As Patriarch, he warmly greeted Pope Francis on his visit to Sofia in May 2019.  On the return flight from Sofia to Rome, Pope Francis stated: “Then the conversation with Patriarch Neophyte edified me greatly; he is a man of God!”  However, the Patriarch’s warmness was not true for all of the nine metropolitans who are now eligible to be the next patriarch.  After the visit by Pope Francis, Metropolitan Nikolai of Plovdiv stated: “The visit by the Pope of Rome is a political act.  The goal is to unite all the churches around Rome, and when the Antichrist comes, for the Pope to meet him.”  https://sofiaglobe.com/2019/05/06/bulgarian-orthodox-church-plovdiv-metropolitan-nikolai-launches-stinging-attack-on-popes-visit/   On the other hand, another candidate, Metropolitan Naum of Rousse, strongly defended Pope Francis.  There is also the question of where the future patriarch will stand with respect to the current tensions between Moscow and Constantinople.  Metropolitan Gavriil of Lovech and Metropolitan Daniil of Vadim seem to be close to the Moscow Patriarchate. 

  n March 12 the Holy Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate met in Moscow.  The minutes of the meeting are found at https://mospat.ru/ru/news/91510/.  These are some of the important decisions:  (1)  With respect to Romania, the Holy Synod criticized the action of the Romanian Patriarchate on February 29 to bless the formation of a “Romanian Orthodox Church in Ukraine.”  The Moscow Synod also criticized the action by the Romanian Patriarchate to declare invalid the sanctions imposed by the Orthodox Church of Moldova (Moscow Patriarchate) on priests transferring to the Romanian Patriarchate’s Metropolis of Bessarabia.  (Journal entry 29)  The Holy Synod in Moscow stated that these actions “are in direct contradiction with the sacred canons.”  It also stated that if these actions are “further implemented,” it will “inevitably entail grave consequences both for the bilateral relations of the Russian and Romanian Orthodox Churches, and for the unity of the Orthodox Church as a whole.”  Metropolitan Anthony of Volokolamsk, head of the DECR, was instructed to study the matter further and to submit promptly proposals for consideration by the Holy Synod.  (2)  With respect to certain occupied areas of the Zaporozhye Region of Ukraine, the Holy Synod made these areas a part of the Berdyansk diocese on a temporary basis.   (Journal entry 7)  The Berdyansk diocese is also on occupied territory, and the Moscow Holy Synod had assumed direct jurisdiction over it on May 11, 2023.  With respect to the areas now added to it, the Holy Synod directs that both the head of the Berdyansk diocese and the UOC’s Metropolitan Luke of Zaporozhe of and Melitopol are to be commemorated.  (3)  With respect to Moldova, two new vicar bishops were elected.  (Journal entries 17 and 18)  One, at least, is a native of Moldova.  https://mitropolia.md/arhimandritul-nicolae-rosca-duhovnicul-manastirii-sf-m-mc-teodor-tiron-a-fost-ales-episcop-vicar-al-eparhiei-de-cahul-si-comrat/  Patriarch Kirill will determine the places of the two ordinations.  (4)  With respect to Africa,  Bishop Konstantin of Zaraisk was confirmed as the Patriarchal Exarch of Africa and is no longer “acting” in this capacity.  The Holy Synod stated that the action of the Patriarchate of Alexandria in defrocking him was “illegal and invalid.”  (Journal entry 30)

  In Ukraine, the time for the full Rada to vote on the revised version of Draft Law 8371 on the “second reading” has not yet been announced, but it is expected to be soon.  For final approval by the Rada, a “third reading” is also required, but this may occur immediately after the “second reading.”  I have received a machine-translated English text of the full text of the revised Draft Law 8371.  The revised Draft Law is more than ten times longer than the original draft law.  I have now annotated in green font on the English translation my personal observations (available on request) with respect to all of the Draft Law.  Frankly, I am alarmed by what I read.  I could understand a law which prohibits a Ukrainian religious organization which is a mere puppet with Moscow pulling the strings.  However, the revised Draft Law prohibits the activities of religious organizations which are “in any way affiliated” with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).  Later in the revised Draft Law it states that “a religious organization is affiliated” with the ROC “if one or more” of seven enumerated subparagraphs are satisfied.  The provisions of these seven enumerated subparagraphs seem generally to follow the elements used by the DESS “expert” commission in finding that the UOC is part of the ROC.  Under subparagraph 3, “affiliation” is established if the charter of the ROC has “provisions regarding the right to adopt by the statutory management bodies” of the ROC “decisions on canonical and organizational issues that are binding for a religious organization (association) operating on the territory of Ukraine.”  One only has to look at Chapter X of the charter of the ROC to see that this element is satisfied.  Chapter X provides that the “ decisions of the Local and Bishops' Councils are binding on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.”  Thus, the existence of this single provision in Chapter X of the ROC Charter alone mandates that all activities of the UOC are prohibited.  The UOC is without power to require the ROC to remove Chapter X from the Charter of the ROC, so this element cannot be cured by the UOC.  Thus, it is 100% certain that the activities of the UOC will be prohibited under the revised Draft Law and that the UOC will be subject to termination.  Furthermore, there is a provision in the revised Draft Law that activities of religious organizations that are affiliated with the affiliated religious organization are also prohibited.

  The penalties imposed by the revised Draft Law on an affiliated religious organization subject to termination are draconian.  All of the assets and property, except religious property, of the organization become the property of the state.  With respect to religious property, this property “is transferred to other religious organizations."  It can be expected that in almost all situations the other religious organization will be the OCU.  Thus, it seems that all or almost all of the churches of the UOC will be given to the OCU.

  Aside from affiliation, there are other grounds on which a religious organization can be terminated.  There is a provision that an entire religious organization can be terminated if there is a “conviction of its authorized persons for committing on behalf of a religious organization a crime against the foundations of national security of Ukraine” or for committing certain specified criminal offenses.  It reported that this provision was added at the request of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).

  A very new element in the revised Draft Law relates to propagating the ideology of the Russian world.  A provision states: “A religious organization that is found to be spreading propaganda of the Russian world ideology, either in whole or in part, is subject to termination in accordance with the law.”  The revised Draft Law contains a definition of the Russian world which enumerates certain statements but ends with “etc.”  This is unlawfully vague.  One of the enumerated statements is “expansion of the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church beyond the territory of the Russian Federation.”  Because termination of a religious organization under the revised Draft Law can result from propagating only “part” of the Russian world ideology, that part could be simply advocating the quoted statement that the canonical territory of the ROC extends beyond the Russian Federation.

  The foregoing are just some of the highlights of my concerns relating to the revised Draft Law.  So far the revised Draft Law is only the product of a Rada committee.  Hopefully, the full Rada will not approve such an unreasonable law.  If the full Rada approves it, hopefully President Zelensky will not sign the law.  If the revised Draft Law does become law, there is a danger, in my opinion, that some Ukrainians may begin to believe that Russia is their only hope to save their beloved UOC.   Also I believe that many members of the UOC will not watch passively to see their UOC destroyed and their church buildings given to the OCU.  Ukrainians need to focus on saving their country and do not need a chaotic situation behind the front.  Hopefully, reason will prevail.  That at least is my fervent prayer.

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 14 March 2024: Patriarch Neophyte of Bulgaria dies

  https://bg-patriarshia.bg/news/saobshtenie-po-povod-konchinata-na-negovo-sveteyshestvo-balg      https://bntnews.bg/news/pochina-balgarskiyat-patriarh-neofit-1270582news.html   https://sofiaglobe.com/2024/03/13/neofit-patriarch-of-the-bulgarian-orthodox-church-dies-at-78/ 

  https://www.bta.bg/bg/news/bulgaria/634947-pochina-balgarskiyat-patriarh-i-sofiyski-mitropolit-neofit  Includes many article about Patriarch and condolences

  https://www.bta.bg/bg/news/lik/634959-v-utreshniya-den-shte-ima-zasedanie-na-svetiya-sinod-po-povod-konchinata-na-patr   Holy Synod to meet tomorrow

  At the same time, a controversy over the election of a  metropolitan  

  https://dveri.bg/component/com_content/Itemid,100723/catid,14/id,73113/view,article/ 

   
• 6 March 2024: Rada committee approves "stronger" version of 8371 & other news

  On the morning of March 5, 2024, the Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy of the Rada (the Ukrainian parliament) approved a revised version of Draft Law 8371 which will be presented to the full Rada for the second reading.  This was confirmed by the Committee’s official website.  https://www.rada.gov.ua/news/news_kom/247245.html   As far as I can determine, the text of the revised version is not yet available.  I am attempting to obtain a copy.  According to the Committee’s website, the revised version includes the following elements: (1) the Russian Orthodox Church will be banned by law; (2) the activity of all religious organizations that are affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church will be terminated according to a clear procedure, which will include an investigation, an order for the implementation of the Law and a court injunction; (3) the Russian Orthodox Church and its affiliated structures will not be able to use state and communal property; (4) a simplified procedure for the transition of religious communities.

  Following the approval by the Committee, the chair of the Committee, Mykyta Poturayev, spoke to RBC-Ukraine.  https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/russian-orthodox-church-banned-not-ukrainian-1709651357.html  This article, which is in English, should be read in its entirety.  Poturayev states that the revised version “has become more effective and stricter” and that “now it will be impossible to criticize, as before the first reading, that it was toothless and inefficient, that its implementation would take a lot of time, and that it could be challenged indefinitely.”  The new law “includes a declaration that Ukraine prohibits the ROC [Russian Orthodox Church].”  According to Poturayev, [t]he religious organization of Ukraine has no right to be affiliated and to be in hierarchical relationships of subordination with those religious organizations that have governing centers in the aggressor state.”  He maintains that the revised law complies with European standards relating to freedom of conscience and human rights.  Because the Rada is now preoccupied with a law concerning mobilization, he estimates that the revised version will be considered by the full Rada at the end of March or early April.

  Deputy Volodymyr Viatrovych, who is a member of the Committee, has made certain remarks on his Facebook page concerning the revised version.  https://www.facebook.com/1217668243/posts/10224793614487181/  He stated:

  Just now, the Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy of the Verkhovna Rada unanimously recommended to the Parliament to support in the second reading the entire bill 8371, which should put an end to the activities of the Russian Church in Ukraine.  The text of the bill has become much stronger compared to the version supported by the government.  The Russian Orthodox Church should be banned by law, and the activities of all religious organizations affiliated with it will be stopped by a clear procedure that will include research, a law enforcement order and injunction.  The ROC and affiliated structures will not be able to use state and communal property, and the transition of communities to the Ukrainian Local Orthodox Church will be greatly simplified.  Now the decision is up to the Verkhovna Rada.  I hope my colleagues will have enough political will without delay to approve this important law.

  The foregoing quotation implies that the revised version is really the work of the Rada and not the Ukrainian government which sponsored the first version.

  It is best to delay a critique of the revised law until the text of the revised law becomes available.  However, the fact that the revised law is now “stricter” and “stronger” than the first version is very troublesome.  The first version raised concerns from such organizations as the World Council of Churches, the United Nations' Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the Church of England (Mission & Public Affairs Council and Bishop Nicholas Baines of Leeds – head bishop on foreign affairs).  Rather than heeding such concerns, it appears that the Rada committee has made 8371 even stricter.

  As previously reported, the Holy Synod of the Romanian Patriarchate on February 29 approved “the initiatives of the Romanian Orthodox communities in Ukraine” to establish a Romanian Orthodox Church in Ukraine under the jurisdiction of the Romanian Patriarchate.   https://basilica.ro/comunicat-noi-hotarari-ale-sfantului-sinod-al-bisericii-ortodoxe-romane-2024/ (item 11)  Since that time, there has been no official elaboration from the Romanian Patriarchate with respect to this action.   However, Teodor Baconschi, a theologian and past foreign minister of Romania (2009-2012), has given a interview on the subject.  https://www.stiripesurse.ro/decizie-istorica-a-sfantului-sinod-ce-inseamna-infiintarea-bisericii-ortodoxe-romane-din-ucraina-implicatiile_3249851.html  He refers to the millions of Romanians living outside Romania who are served by metropolitans and bishops of the Romanian Patriarchate.  (In fact, Italy and Spain each have over one million Romanians living within their respective borders.)  He mentions the presence of the Romanian Patriarchate in Serbia.  (The Romanian Patriarchate has the diocese of Dacia Felix in Serbia; the Serbian Patriarchate has the diocese of Timișoara in Romania.)  Baconschi expresses optimism that Ukraine will agree with the presence of the Romanian Patriarchate in Ukraine because of the support Romania is giving Ukraine in the war and because of the better relations which now exist between the two countries.  It appears that the Romanian Patriarchate does not agree with the strict concept of “canonical territory,” which is often used by the Moscow Patriarchate to protect its interests.

  To date, there is nothing on the main websites of the Moscow Patriarchate, the OCU, or the UOC with respect to the decision of February 29.  According to the Russian news agency RIA Novosti,  a “source” within the Moscow Patriarchate has stated that the actions of the Romanian Patriarchate violate the canons and indicate an intention to continue expansion into the canonical territory of another Local Church.  https://ria.ru/20240301/rpts-1930575907.html   Bishop Kliment, the head of the Synodal Information and Educational Department of the UOC, has indicated that the Romanian actions reflect an effort of the Romanian communities, now under the UOC,  to avoid the adverse actions being taken against the UOC by the Ukrainian authorities.  https://spzh.media/en/news/79099-uoc-comments-on-the-creation-of-the-romanian-church-of-ukraine  However, he adds that these Romanian actions also carry “a danger not only to the church integrity but also to the state sovereignty on Ukrainian territory, historically associated with the Romanian state.”   Bishop Viktor of Mukachevo and Carpathia (OCU) claims that the actions of the Romanian Patriarchate are dictated by the influence of the structures of the Russian Federal Security Services on the Romanian authorities and the Church.   https://raskolam.net/en/77518-u-pczu-zvynuvatyly-rumunsku-czerkvu-v-roboti-na-fsb-cherez-stvorennya-rumunskoyi-pravoslavnoyi-czerkvy-ukrayiny/   It should be noted that in 2019 the OCU established a special vicarate for the Romanian communities, but this recruiting effort has been unsuccessful.

  In other news: (1) the Supreme Church Court of the Moscow Patriarchate has dropped proceedings against Metropolitan Leonid, former exarch of Africa. https://ria.ru/20240301/rpts-1930573368.html   His retirement location has been determined to be Krasnodar (a Russian city east of Crimea).  (2) At a meeting of the Plenary Assembly of the Conference of Catholic Bishops of Russia, held February 28-29, it was decided: “To avoid temptation and confusion, the KKER [Conference of Catholic Bishops of Russia] draws attention to the fact that blessings of any kind of couples who persist in unresolved relationships from the point of view of Christian morality (cohabiting, second-married, same-sex) are unacceptable.”   https://cathmos.ru/soobshhenie-o-lix-kker/  (3)  The Orthodox Church in North Macedonia has established a committee to examine the issue of the status of the OCU and the issue of the proper name of the Orthodox Church in North Macedonia.  https://orthodoxtimes.com/ohrid-archdiocese-sets-up-committee-to-address-ukrainian-issue-and-its-name-with-greek-speaking-churches/  It appears that these are two issues on which agreement has not been reached in discussions between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the North Macedonia Church with respect to the granting of autocephaly.

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 1 March 2024: Romanian Patriarchate enters Ukraine & other news

  On February 29, the Holy Synod of the Romanian Patriarchate decided to bless, encourage and support “the initiatives of the Romanian Orthodox communities in Ukraine to restore communion with the Mother Church, the Romanian Patriarchate, through their legal organization in the religious structure called the Romanian Orthodox Church of Ukraine https://basilica.ro/comunicat-noi-hotarari-ale-sfantului-sinod-al-bisericii-ortodoxe-romane-2024/ (item 11).  In my opinion, this is big news.  These Romanian communities are presently under the jurisdiction of the UOC.  Now the Romanian Patriarchate assumes direct jurisdiction over these Romanian communities in Ukraine.   The Romanian media referred to this development as an "historic decision."    https://r3media.ro/bor-biserica-ortodoxa-romana-ucraina-romani-episcopia-marii-britanii/   Perhaps the rationale for this action is to remove these Romanian communities from the adverse effect of actions now being taken against the UOC, such as Draft Law 8371.  The largest concentration of Romanians in Ukraine are in the Chernivtsi Oblast.  Metropolitan Onufry, primate of the UOC, was previously the Bishop of Chernivtsi for more than 20 years.  In general, the Romanian Patriarchate has a very strong presence with respect to the Romanians living in other countries.  For statistics relating to this diaspora, see https://basilica.ro/patriarhul-daniel-a-prezentat-activitatea-bisericii-canonizari-si-secifre-relevante-pentru-anul-2023/

  Also on February 29, the Russian news agency RIA Novosti posted an exclusive interview with Metropolitan Hilarion of Budapest.  https://ria.ru/20240229/ilarion-1930145202.html   Most of the interview relates to the Vatican document Fiducia supplicans and elaborates on the unanimous conclusion of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Synodal Biblical-Theological Commission, reached on February 20, that the Vatican document was an “innovation” which reflects “a sharp departure from Christian moral teaching.”  One of the observations made by Metropolitan Hilarion in the interview is that “neither repentance nor correction of lifestyle is offered to those people who come for blessing specifically as a couple.”  I have pasted below a Google translation of the Metropolitan’s entire interview relating to the Vatican declaration.

  On February 27, the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate announced that Patriarch Bartholomew had accepted the appeal of Archpriest Alexei Uminsky.  Uminsky is restored to the priesthood and is assumed under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.  The official announcement in Greek can be read at https://fosfanariou.gr/index.php/2024/02/27/anakoinothen-agias-kai-ieras-synodou-27-2-2024/.  The Orthodox Times has briefly summarized the decision as follows:  The Holy and Sacred Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate also decided to lift the defrocking penalty imposed on the priest Alexey Uminskiy, formerly a clergyman of the Moscow Patriarchate, because the reasons for the penalty “are not at all related to ecclesiastical criteria, but to the just opposition of the said cleric to the war in Ukraine.”  https://orthodoxtimes.com/phanar-decisions-for-the-archdiocese-of-australia-and-former-moscow-patriarchate-clergymans-defrocking-lifted/   As you probably recall, the court of the Moscow diocese on January 13 ruled that Uminsky was subject to defrocking for refusing to recite the Patriarch’s “Prayer for Holy Rus’” (which asks for “victory”) in the Divine Liturgy.  http://moseparh.ru/cerkovnyj-sud-g-moskvy-prinyal-reshenie-po-delu-prot-aleksiya-uminskogo.html  Patriarch Kirill confirmed the defrocking of Uminsky on February 8.  http://moseparh.ru/ukaz-u-0222-ot-8-fevralya-2024.html   Archpriest Vladislav Tsypin, deputy head of the Moscow church court, has stated that the actions of the Ecumenical Patriarchate with respect to Uminsky “are not canonical.”  https://tass.ru/obschestvo/20109113  Metropolitan Hilarion in his Novosti interview states that the action by Constantinople reflects “an attempt to impose on the Orthodox Church on a universal scale a new model of governance, similar to the one that exists in the Catholic Church.”  The Metropolitan’s complete answer is pasted at the very end of this report.

  The Ukrainian Rada (parliament) has announced that the Rada’s Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy will meet on March 5 via teleconferencing to consider Draft Law 8371.  https://www.rada.gov.ua/preview/anonsy_podij/247096.html   The Chairman of the Committee, Deputy Mykyta Poturaev, has stated: There was an initiative from my colleagues from “European Solidarity” [a political party in Ukraine] so that we could finalize certain points together.  We worked for about two weeks, we already have a completely ready text for consideration by the committee, we have full consensus on this document.  It so happened that committee members Mykola Knyazhytskyi and Yevgenia Kravchuk were on business trips abroad, and then I was at the OSCE winter session and returned only on February 26.  I believe that we have a very powerful text, this is the case when we are not ashamed of our joint work.  The lobbyists of Moscow priests will try to discredit the law abroad, but it will be considered by the parliament.  https://holka.org.ua/lobisty-moskovskyh-popiv-sprobuyut-dyskredytuvaty-zakon-za-kordonom-ale-vin-pide-na-rozglyad-parlamentu-poturayev/   The Committee has been considering amendments proposed by Rada deputies to Draft 8371 as approved in the “first reading.”  From the foregoing quotation, it appears that the Committee may approve on March 5 a new amended version of the Draft Law to be submitted to the full Rada for the “second reading.”  If the Committee approves a version of 8371 for the second reading, it is my understanding that the Conciliation Council of Parliamentary Factions will decide if and when 8371 will be placed before the full Rada for approval on the second reading.  On February 27 the Moscow Patriarchate posted an article about a letter sent by Patriarch Porfirije, primate of the Serbian Orthodox Church, expressing his concerns about Draft Law 8371.  https://mospat.ru/ru/news/91438/   The letter from Patriarch Porfirije was in response to a October 19 letter from Patriarch Kirill concerning the Draft Law. 

  The General Synod of the Church of England, which met February 23-27, has approved a four-point resolution relating to Ukraine.   https://www.churchofengland.org/media/press-releases/ukraine-paying-our-security-money-and-blood-archbishop-justin-tells-synod  (scroll to the end).  Several people have pointed out to me that the resolution, which is very pro-Ukraine, never uses the word “Russia.”  The entire discussion relating to the resolution can be watched at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sLujozTlAEI (beginning at 2:13:24).  Archbishop Justin Welby of Canterbury addresses the General Synod concerning Ukraine and his very recent trip to Ukraine beginning at 2:25:30.  In expressing strong support for Ukraine, the Archbishop stated, “I am not neutral.”  Unlike the resolution, he does expressly refer to Russia.

  In other news, John Allen, who is probably the leading American Catholic commentator on the Vatican, has written an interesting article entitled, “On war’s anniversary, is ‘Fiducia’ a new obstacle to Vatican’s peace push on Ukraine?”  https://cruxnow.com/news-analysis/2024/02/on-wars-anniversary-is-fiducia-a-new-obstacle-to-vaticans-peace-push-on-ukraine  Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew has sent a letter to Pope Francis congratulating him on the 10^th anniversary of his pontificate.  The text can be read at https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2023-03/bartholomew-i-patriarch-constantinople-message-pope-anniversary.html#:~:text=%23TENYEARSPOPEFRANCIS-,Patriarch%20Bartholomew%20I%20sends%20anniversary%20wishes%20to%20Pope%20Francis,promote%20the%20care%20of%20Creation.  Metropolitan Onufry, primate of the UOC, has written an address to all Ukrainians on the second anniversary of the invasion.  https://news.church.ua/2024/02/24/zvernennya-blazhennishogo-mitropolita-onufriya-u-zvyazku-z-drugoyu-richniceyu-vid-pochatku-povnomasshtabnogo-rosijskogo-vtorgnennya-v-ukrajinu/#2024-02-29  The address begins:  Today marks two years since the Russian authorities launched a large-scale military invasion of the territory of our Motherland.  The witnesses and victims of the consequences of this sinful act are all our compatriots, to whose homes this terrible war came, bringing great sorrow, full of tears and suffering, horror and despair, but most importantly and the most terrible — taking away the life given to us by God.  He thanked all of the servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and stated that the “feat of each and every one of them is an invaluable contribution to the victory over the enemy.”  At the end he refers to religious policies directed against the UOC.  He concludes:  The [Ukrainian] forces are capable of repulsing the Russian army.  Today, more than ever before, we desperately need the internal solidarity of society and the realization that unity is our strength.  The horror that the war brought us will not break our society if each of us works for unity and looks for ways to be together and not do anything that would destroy this unity.  In this difficult period, I call on all of us to be united in the common desire for a spiritual, free and constructive future for our Ukraine.  And may the Lord help us in this!

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

   

  METROPOLITAN HILARION’S INTERVIEW

  Vladyka Hilarion, how did the commission headed by you begin to consider the declaration “Fiducia supplicans”?

  We studied this document on behalf of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus'.  We held a plenum of the Synodal Biblical Theological Commission, and I had the opportunity to present the results of the plenum personally to His Holiness the Patriarch.

  Why did the Russian Orthodox Church even take up this declaration , since this is an internal document of the Roman Catholic Church?

  Because we have a dialogue with the Catholic Church, interaction.  And we considered it our duty to respond to such a radical innovation.

  There are many different interpretations of the declaration: some say that this is an intermediate step towards the wedding of same-sex couples, others say that the document opens up the opportunity for people to receive help from the Church, including in the fight against their passions, that those who come are blessed in turn, Imitation of a wedding is not allowed. What is your opinion?

  The declaration “Fiducia supplicans” caused an unambiguously very negative reaction from our commission.  We were unanimous that this document reflected a very serious departure from Christian moral standards.  You said that the blessing can be performed one by one, but in fact this is not in the document.  The document specifically talks about blessing couples.  Moreover, two categories of couples are mentioned.  One is couples who are in a so-called unsettled situation.  That is, this is a man and woman who live in an unmarried marriage or in a civil union.  There are a lot of such situations in the Catholic Church, because the divorce process is very complex and it is difficult, almost impossible, to receive a blessing from the Church for divorce.  But another category of persons referred to in the document are same-sex couples.  And so, the same criteria are now applied to both.

  What, according to the commission, is the main contradiction with Christianity here?

   Same-sex couples are spoken of as people who need the blessing of the Church for healing and upliftment. That is, you can bless them in pairs, and not each individually.  Yes, the declaration expresses, repeatedly and in different forms, concern that such blessings should not be ritualized, that they should be spontaneous and not outwardly resemble a wedding.  Because of this concern, various specific recommendations are offered for how to make such blessings different from weddings.  The document postulates that the Church's teaching on marriage as a union of a man and a woman open to procreation remains unchanged.  But at the same time, this practice of blessing same-sex couples, from our point of view, is in radical contradiction with Christian moral teaching.

  Could you explain in more detail?

  The document says nothing, for example, about the sacrament of confession, nothing about repentance or the fight against sin.  That is, the pastoral assistance that is provided to people in an unsettled situation or in same-sex cohabitation, according to this document, does not at all imply that, for example, a priest tells these people about the sinfulness of their lifestyle.  This especially applies, of course, to same-sex couples.  And in general, the word “sin” is mentioned several times in this document, but exclusively in the context of the thought that human sins cannot exceed the love of God, that God’s grace acts despite our sins.  And neither repentance nor correction of lifestyle is offered to those people who come for blessing specifically as a couple.

  Then, in your opinion, why did the Catholic Church adopt such a document - for the further recognition of unregistered cohabitation and the wedding of same-sex couples?

  I don’t think that we can talk about the wedding of same-sex couples, because so far it has been declared that the teaching of the Catholic Church on marriage as a union of a man and a woman remains unchanged.  However, we see what is happening in Protestant communities: it all started with the same thing, with some non-ritualized, spontaneous blessings, and then in some Protestant communities they simply introduced the ritual of blessing same-sex couples.  I don't think the Catholic Church will come to that.  But all this is perceived as a very dangerous signal and as a concession by the leadership of the Catholic Church to those liberal circles who are trying to dictate their agenda.

  You said that this was a “concession from the leadership,” but how did the Catholic world as a whole, priests and parishioners react to this document - what do you know?

  The declaration has already caused a very controversial reaction in the Catholic world.  Of course, she was approved, and various gay activists and representatives of sexual minorities rejoiced at her.  But, for example, local structures of the Catholic Church in some cases openly opposed this declaration.

  In which countries did this happen?

  The Hungarian Bishops' Conference has decided that the blessing of same-sex couples is impossible under any circumstances.  The document will not be implemented in Hungary.  And also, for example, in Nigeria, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.  I think it will definitely not be implemented in African countries.  That is, this document has already created a serious division within the Catholic Church itself.

  What will happen in the future with the “document about the document” - with the results of the discussion of the Synodal Biblical-Theological Commission of the Vatican Declaration?

  The Synodal Biblical Theological Commission always works on behalf of His Holiness the Patriarch or the Patriarch and the Holy Synod.  When we prepare a text, we then give it to the patriarch, and then His Holiness decides its future fate.  Either this document is published, or it is published with amendments, or it forms the basis for some decisions, actions, letters...

  What kind of reaction would you expect from Catholics to the conclusion of the commission of the Russian Church?

  “I wouldn’t want to predict the reaction, but we did our job.”   Our commission is called biblical-theological, and we drew attention to the fact that there is no way to justify this new practice with Holy Scripture.   Because the Holy Scripture expresses a completely unambiguous view of same-sex cohabitation.   We have drawn attention to the fact that, from our point of view, these new decisions of the Catholic Church are contrary to basic Christian moral standards.  We've covered our part of the journey. It is difficult for me to predict what the future fate of the commission’s document will be, and if it is published, what the reaction to it will be in the Catholic Church. But we can already see the reaction in the Catholic Church and in the world to the declaration itself (“Fiducia supplicans” – ed.).

  ….

  You have repeatedly noted that the Patriarch of Constantinople lays claim to the role of “pope” in the Orthodox world.  How would you comment on the reports that this week he reinstated Archpriest Alexy Uminsky, who was deprived of his rank in the Russian Church for violating the priestly oath - refusing to fulfill the patriarchal blessing to read a prayer for Holy Rus', in which there is a petition for the granting of victory?

  The previous project of the Synodal Biblical-Theological Commission was the preparation of a detailed document on the new ecclesiology of Constantinople, that is, on innovations in the doctrine of the Church.  They, in our opinion, very seriously deviate from the Orthodox Holy Tradition; they are essentially an attempt to impose on the Orthodox Church on a universal scale a new model of governance, similar to the one that exists in the Catholic Church.  Our document is called “On the distortion of the Orthodox teaching about the Church in the actions of the hierarchy of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the speeches of its representatives” (approved by the Bishops’ Conference of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2023 – ed.).  We show in this document that for centuries the Orthodox, including the Patriarchs of Constantinople, in polemics with Catholics, defended the point of view that local Orthodox Churches are equal to each other, that there cannot be one earthly head for the entire Ecumenical Church.  But those specific actions that Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople is carrying out, in particular, to legalize the Ukrainian schism, to “restorate in rank” those who have lost this rank for one reason or another, are actions that follow from his new doctrine.  After all, Constantinople now proclaims itself the supreme court of appeal.  That is, any cleric of any local Church, dissatisfied with the decision of his clergy, can now turn to Constantinople, and Constantinople will make a decision at its own discretion.  Moreover, this cleric can remain geographically in the same position, as was the case in Lithuania, when Constantinople “restored the rank” of the clergy who had lost this rank, and they continue to be in Lithuania.  Based on them, a parallel structure of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in Lithuania has now been created, while this country is part of the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church.

• 28 February 2024: Committee to approve 8371 on March 5 ???

  https://holka.org.ua/lobisty-moskovskyh-popiv-sprobuyut-dyskredytuvaty-zakon-za-kordonom-ale-vin-pide-na-rozglyad-parlamentu-poturayev/ 

  Lobbyists of Moscow priests will try to discredit the law abroad, but it will be considered by the parliament – Poturaev

  On March 5, the government draft law (8371) on the release of some religious organizations from subordination to the aggressor state will be considered by the Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy.  The chairman of the committee, Mykyta Poturaev ("Servant of the People"), informed the community initiative "Holka " about this.  It is noteworthy that earlier the people's deputy stated that the draft law could be considered by the Verkhovna Rada in February, but the terms have changed.  "There was an initiative from my colleagues from ‘European Solidarity’ so that we could finalize certain points together.  We worked for about two weeks, we already have a completely ready text for consideration by the committee, we have full consensus on this document.  It so happened that committee members Mykola Knyazhytskyi and Yevgenia Kravchuk were on business trips abroad, and then I was at the OSCE winter session and returned only on February 26.  I believe that we have a very powerful text, this is the case when we are not ashamed of our joint work.  The lobbyists of Moscow priests will try to discredit the law abroad, but it will be considered by the parliament," Poturaev notes.

  See also:  https://spzh.media/ru/news/79055-zakonoproekt-o-zaprete-upts-5-marta-rassmotrit-profilnyj-komitet-nardep;    https://glavcom.ua/country/politics/zaborona-moskovskoji-tserkvi-soratnik-zelenskoho-dav-obitsjanku-988324.html ; https://uanews.net/ru/post/355785  ;  https://zn.ua/ukr/POLITICS/zaborona-moskovskoho-patriarkhatu-koli-komitet-radi-rozpochne-rozhljad-zakonoprojektu.html 

  The Rada’s official website has noted the meeting for 11 a.m. on March 5.  https://www.rada.gov.ua/preview/anonsy_podij/247096.html   The notice states:

  The Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on humanitarian and information policy will hold a regular meeting in videoconference mode.

  Agenda (project):

    I. Bills for which the Committee is in charge:

  1. Draft Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding Activities of Religious Organizations in Ukraine (Reg. No. 8371, Second Reading).

  2. Draft Law on the Use of the English Language in Ukraine (Reg. No. 9432, second reading).

  III. Other questions:

  3. About the announcement of the selection of candidates for the position of a member of the National Council of Ukraine on television and radio broadcasting according to the quota of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

  4. Various.

  If Draft Law 8371 is approved by the Committee, it is almost certain to be an amended version of 8371.  It is also possible that the amended version will be harsher than the original version.  If the Committee approves a version of 8371 for the second reading, it is my understanding that the Conciliation Council of Parliamentary Factions will decide if and when 8371 will be placed before the full Rada for approval on the second reading.

   

  Peter Anderson

• 23 February 2024: Thank you Bishop Brian Farrell LC!!

  Today, February 23, 2024, marks the last day for Bishop Brian Farrell LC as Secretary of the Dicastery for the Promotion of Christian Unity.  The Apostolic Constitution Praedicate Evangelium (2022) now mandates the retirement of all Curia officials at age 80, and Bishop Farrell celebrated his 80^th birthday on February 8.  This morning,  the Vatican Press Office made the following official announcement:  “The Holy Father has appointed the Reverend Flavio Pace, until now under-secretary of the Dicastery for the Eastern Churches, as secretary of the Dicastery for Promoting Christian Unity, assigning him the titular see of Dolia and conferring to him the personal title of archbishop.”   https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2024/02/23/240223a.html   With the naming of a successor, Bishop Farrell is now officially retired.

  Bishop Farrell has served as secretary for the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity and more recently for the Dicastery for Promoting Christian Unity since December 2002 – a span of over 21 years.  His biography can be read at   http://www.christianunity.va/content/unitacristiani/en/dicastero/organico/segretario.html .  Prior to his appointment as secretary, he had been the Department Head of the English-language Section of the Vatican’s Secretariat of State.  In this capacity, he had accompanied Pope John Paul II on many international trips, and he was ordained a bishop by Pope John Paul II in January 2003.  Bishop Farrell’s longevity at the Pontifical Council and later at the Dicastery has provided invaluable continuity.  He has been a member of the Joint International Commission for Theological Dialogue between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches since the time that the dialogue was reconvened in 2006 after a six-year hiatus.  He has been co-chairman of the official Catholic dialogues with certain of the Oriental Orthodox Churches.  He has also been greatly involved in the official Anglican – Catholic dialogue, in the International Catholic–Jewish Liaison Committee, and in contacts with the WCC and Protestant churches.  Aside from these many responsibilities, those who know him can attest that he is a wonderful person and Christian.  Bishop Farrell is a native of Ireland, and I assumed that he will spend much of his retirement in his homeland.  However, he will probably come to Rome to visit his younger brother, Cardinal Kevin Farrell, prefect of the Dicastery for the Laity, the Family and Life.

  On January 29, Bishop Farrell received a very well-deserved honor.  The University of Notre Dame, the most well-known Catholic university in the United States, held a special academic convocation in Rome to confer honorary doctorate degrees on Bishop Farrell, Barbara Jatta (director of the Vatican Museums), and Roberto Benigni (internationally acclaimed actor, director and poet).  The degrees were conferred by the chair of the University’s Board of Trustees, John Brennan, and the University’s president, Father John Jenkins CSC.  https://news.nd.edu/news/notre-dame-confers-honorary-degrees-at-academic-convocation-in-rome/  You can watch the entire convocation at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w6wxtqr6XQc .  The introduction of Bishop Farrell can be seen in the video beginning at 21:15 and the remarks by Bishop Farrell beginning at 23:05.  In the front row of the audience, you can see two proud cardinals – Cardinal Kurt Koch, current prefect of the Dicastery for Promoting Christian Unity, and his predecessor, Cardinal Walter Kasper.  I have pasted below a photo of Bishop Farrell at the convocation.

  The introduction of Bishop Farrell at the convocation included the following:  “This gentle and dedicated successor of the apostles has held fast to the conviction that the message of the Gospel is diminished by divisions among believers, that unity is a fruit of the Spirit, which must be cultivated by all the faithful, and that the imperative of ecumenism, by its very nature, calls us to attentive reverence to the worldwide oneness of Christ’s followers.”  At the Phanar on the Feast of Saint Andrew 2023, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew noted that Bishop Farrell would soon be retiring.  The Ecumenical Patriarch stated: “In this context, we express our particular and distinct appreciation and honor to His Grace Bishop Brian Farrell, Secretary of your Dicastery, who will soon be retiring, and we thank him wholeheartedly for his creative contribution to our bilateral dialogue, as well and for his wisdom, fraternal love and sincere friendship.”  https://fosfanariou.gr/index.php/2023/12/01/omilia-ecum-patr-sti-throniki-eorti-2023/

  A biography of the new Secretary of the Dicastery for Promoting Christian Unity, Father (Don) Flavio Pace, is found at   https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2024/02/23/240223a.html.  He was born in Monzo, Italy (14 km northeast of Milan) in 1977.  In 2011 he began working in the Congregation (now Dicastery) for the Eastern Churches as special assistant to its head, Cardinal Leonardo Sandri.  The prior year Father Pace had received a certificate in Islamic studies.  In February 2020, he was promoted to under-secretary of this Congregation (now Dicastery).   The Dicastery for the Eastern Churches deals with matters that affect the eastern Catholic churches.  Although the jurisdiction of the Dicastery for the Eastern Churches deals with matters relating to eastern church in communion with Rome and not with Orthodox and other non-Catholic eastern churches, it still carries out its work in close coordination with the Dicastery for Promoting Christian Unity.   Father Pace is also a member of the Joint Working Group for Cooperation between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Holy See.  https://mospat.ru/en/news/60980/   Father Pace will receive his episcopal ordination in the Cathedral of Milan on Saturday, May 4 at 3pm. https://www.chiesadimilano.it/news/chiesa-diocesi/don-flavio-pace-segretario-del-dicastero-per-la-promozione-dellunita-dei-cristiani-2795712.html  A five-minute video (2021) of an address by Father Pace in Italian can be watched at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z9bo9OsfnCA.   

  Lastly, I would like to extend my personal thanks to Bishop Farrell.  I first met him when he was in Seattle in February 2004 for the plenary meeting of the Anglican - Roman Catholic International Commission (ARCIC), which finalized a document in Seattle on "Mary: Grace and Hope in Christ."  Since that time, I have followed him closely and have been his “fan.”  In my opinion, his quiet and effective manner plus his knowledge have made him an outstanding bridge builder.  THANK YOU SO MUCH, BISHOP FARRELL, FOR ALL OF YOUR YEARS OF SERVICE IN THE CAUSE OF CHRISTIAN UNITY!!  God bless you in your retirement and grant you many years!

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

   

  

• 22 February 2024: Moscow Patriarchate on "Fiducia supplicans" & other news

  On February 20, the Synodal Biblical-Theological Commission of the Moscow Patriarchate held a plenary meeting through teleconferencing.  The meeting was conducted by the Commission's chairman, Metropolitan Hilarion of Budapest.  A brief report of the plenary meeting has been posted on the official website of the Moscow Patriarchate.  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6104515.html  The most relevant part of the report states as follows:

  The main item on the agenda of the meeting was a discussion of the text of the declaration “Fiducia supplicans,” adopted by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith of the Roman Catholic Church.  The document, signed by the Prefect of the Congregation, Cardinal Manuel Fernandez and the Secretary of the Doctrinal Department, Armando Matteo, approved and signed by Pope Francis, was published on official Vatican resources on December 18, 2023.  The order to analyze the document was given to the Synodal Biblical-Theological Commission by His Holiness Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus'.

  ….

  The meeting participants expressed their positions regarding the theological content of the declaration “Fiducia supplicans,” which for the first time in the history of the Catholic Church proposed forms of blessing “same-sex unions”.  Members of the Synodal Biblical-Theological Commission were unanimous that this innovation reflected a sharp departure from Christian moral teaching.

  The results of the work of the Synodal Biblical-Theological Commission on this issue will be sent for consideration to His Holiness Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus'.

  It is my understanding that the Commission is still working on the text of its final report, and therefore it is not available at the present time.  To the best of my knowledge, the Synodal Commission is the first official Orthodox body to criticize the Vatican document.  Although most Orthodox would disagree with the Vatican document, the other Local Orthodox Churches have not officially stated their disagreement.

  In my opinion, it is particularly significant that Patriarch Kirill was the person who ordered the Synodal Commission to analyze this issue and that the results of the Commission’s work will be sent to the Patriarch for his consideration.  It is highly likely that the results of the Commission’s work will not end there but will be referred by the Patriarch to the Holy Synod for its approval.  The likelihood that the Holy Synod will approve the unanimous opinion of the Synodal Commission is overwhelming.  One can expect that the report of the Commission will be a scholarly work, even if one disagrees with it.  Just three days after the publication of Fiducia supplicans, Metropolitan Hilarion, chairman of the Commission, gave a video interview in English concerning the Vatican document.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UTh9m9DR6WI&t=55s  (96,000 views)   He stated that his reaction after reading the full text of the document was “a kind of a shock.” 

  In Africa, the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate of Alexandria on February 16 extensively discussed the entry of the Russian Church into the jurisdiction of the Alexandrian Patriarchate.  https://www.patriarchateofalexandria.com/apofaseis-tis-ieras-synodoy-toy-patriarcheioy-alexandreias/  The Synod also deposed from the priesthood the present acting Patriarchal Exarch of Africa, Bishop Konstantin of Zaraisk (Moscow Patriarchate).  This comes as no surprise as the Holy Synod in 2022 had deposed the predecessor of Bishop Konstantin, namely Metropolitan Leonid of Klin.  On February 7 the Russian news agency RIA Novosti posted a long interview of Bishop Konstantin.  https://ria.ru/20240207/ekzarkhat_afriki-1925686144.html  It was his first interview since becoming the acting exarch.  He provided some interesting numbers:  We currently have 218 priests from Africa on our list.  This figure will change upward literally in the near future.  They live in 17 countries in Africa and minister to communities from 29 countries: that is, a priest can minister to several countries.  There are also Russian priests: there are five of them, they are sent from Russia.  And there are more than 200 parishes, but these are not parishes in the Russian sense: where such a temple is beautiful with golden domes.  Often the word “parish” can simply mean a settlement, it can literally be a tent or a hut, a room.  Based on the interview, Konstantin appears to me to be far less bombastic than Leonid.  Leonid has now been involuntarily “retired” from the Moscow Patriarchate and is being charged before the Supreme Church Court in Moscow with canonical offences.   Archimandrite Cyril Hovorun has recently stated:  I know both Leonid and Konstantin personally.  If the former is an obsessive supporter of Z-orthodoxy [“Z” – the symbol placed on Russian military equipment in Ukraine], the latter is more calm and prudent.  https://www.religion.in.ua/news/foreign_news/50920-aleksandrijskij-patriarxat-pozbaviv-sanu-vo-ekzarxa-afrikanskogo-ekzarxatu-rpc-komentar-arximandrita-kirila-govoruna.html?fbclid=IwAR3VTb-DASdE-EJjVgiLhX5JE2wExU6vhvN54jppHSYEX7VJs4zRKoHLYHE 

  The Mission & Public Affairs Council of the Church of England has submitted a report on the war in Ukraine to the General Synod of the Church of England.  https://www.churchofengland.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/gs-2348-war-in-ukraine-final-final.pdf  The General Synod will be held February 23-27.  The Mission & Public Affairs Council of the Church is the body responsible for overseeing research and comment on social and political issues on behalf of the Church.  Paragraphs 16-18 of the Report strongly criticize Ukrainian Draft Law 8371.  The Report also discloses that Bishop Nicholas Baines of Leeds, who is the Church of England’s head bishop on foreign policy, wrote a letter to the Ukrainian government and the speaker of the Rada expressing concern about the Draft Law.  The full text of the letter, dated November 13, 2023, can be read at  https://spzh.media/en/news/78889-church-of-england-urges-ukraine-to-withdraw-bill-on-banning-uoc .   As I previously reported, the  Rada’s Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy had a scheduled meeting for January 29 to consider proposed amendments to the Draft Law and to prepare a final version to be submitted to the full Rada for the “second reading.”  However, the meeting was suddenly cancelled, and a new meeting has not yet been scheduled.  https://kompkd.rada.gov.ua/   According to Mikita Poturaev, Chairperson of the Committee, the delay in passing the Draft Law on the second reading is due to the fact that the work on the document requires special care.  He stated that if the future law is peppered with contradictory norms, then as a result, the European Commission can force the already adopted law to be canceled altogether.  https://glavcom.ua/country/society/sjurpriz-vid-jes-zaboronu-moskovskoji-tserkvi-mozhut-skasuvati--986177.html 

  Robert Amsterdam, with some members of his legal team, are now in Kyiv for a week-long visit to Ukraine.  Amsterdam and his law firm (offices in Washington DC and London) are representing the UOC on the international front with respect to the UOC’s problems with the Ukrainian government.  Amsterdam has been particularly critical of Draft Law 8371, and his firm has prepared a detailed legal memorandum comparing the Draft Law with the decisions of the Venice Commission and finding a conflict between the two.   https://savetheuoc.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Legal-Analysis-of-Draft-Law-8371-Final.pdf  On February 21, Amsterdam posted on Twitter (“X”) a photo of his meeting in Kyiv with Metropolitan Onufry, primate of the UOC.  https://twitter.com/robertamsterdam/status/1760332642866655622?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet  It will be interesting to see what activities, if any, Amsterdam will undertake with respect to the Draft Law in the coming week.

  In Lithuania, state funds are allocated each year by the Minister of Finance to the “traditional” religious communities in Lithuania.  Last year, 81,300 euros were allocated to the Lithuanian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).   On February 19, the Minister of Finance ordered that the Lithuanian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and the “Exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Lithuania” would each received 77,000 euros.  https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/2199364/lietuva-skyre-po-vienodai-lesu-konstantinopolio-ir-maskvos-ortodoksams-77-6-tukst-euru  Following approval by the Ministry of Justice, the Exarchate had been entered into the official Register of Legal Entities on February 7.  https://www.bns.lt/topic/1911/news/70535305/  On February 6, Elder Metropolitan Emmanuel of Chalcedon (Ecumenical Patriarchate) was in Lithuania and met with Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė.  https://orthodoxtimes.com/elder-metropolitan-of-chalcedon-met-the-prime-minister-of-lithuania/  After the registration of the Exarchate, Metropolitan Innokenty , head of the Lithuanian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), was asked about his reaction to it.  https://www.orthodoxy.lt/novosti/4525-mitropolit-innokentii-or-budem-vzyvat-k-milosti-gospodnei-i-upovat-na-ego-blagoi-promysl  His reaction was relatively mild.  With respect to the new Exarch (transferred from Estonia), he stated: “I would like to note his friendly tone and sober judgment on very complex issues, such as church property.”  The Metropolitan assessed positively the Exarch’s advocating peaceful coexistence between the two churches.  However, the Metropolitan was adamant that his defrocking of the five clergy members who left his church to form the nucleus of the Exarchate was justified.

  The following are other news developments:  (1)  The text of the official decree by Patriarch Kirill defrocking Archimandrite Alexei Uminsky has now been posted.  http://moseparh.ru/ukaz-u-0222-ot-8-fevralya-2024.html   Sergei Chapnin has written an article discussing and criticizing the actions taken against Uminsky.   https://publicorthodoxy.org/good-reads/patriarch-kirills-ideological-ultimatum/   (2)  On January 22, the Government of Ukraine provided a response to specific questions raised by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.  https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=38094 (full response in English)   Eight pages of the response relate to the actions by the Ukrainian government with respect to the Kyiv Lavra.  The monks of the Lavra have now issued a statement criticizing this response.  https://lavra.ua/uk/zayava-shhodo-vidpovidi-ministerstv-ta-vidomstv-ukrayini-na-mizhnarodnij-zapit-shhodo-diskriminatsiyi-ta-porushen-prav-viryan-upts/  (English translation: https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://news.church.ua/2024/02/16/the-kyiv-caves-lavra-has-published-a-statement-in-connection-with-ukrainian-ministries-untrue-response-to-a-un-inquiry-on-violations-of-the-rights-of-uoc-believers/?lang=en*2024-02-16__;Iw!!Dc8iu7o!yNHrPnxo3TcNS1vjYm9TLsqLuHtOivpPPId09dhFikMQt_jiie9BpM2ddfqpw1Al10DFp0hQvLA--HUAAMF929VMhJc$ (3)  Bishop Timotej, who functions as a spokesperson for the Orthodox Church in North Macedonia, has stated that the failure of the North Macedonian Church to recognize the OCU is an issue separating the Church and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in their negotiations concerning the granting of autocephaly to the North Macedonian Church.  https://religija.mk/vladikata-timotej-otkri-shto-bara-vselenskata-patrijarshija-od-mpc-oa-ukrainskata-crkva-e-prichinata-za-zastoj-na-nashata-celosna-avtokefalnost/  

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 15 Februar 2024: General Synod of the Church of England & Draft Law 8371

  https://www.churchofengland.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/gs-2332-agenda-feb-24_0.pdf  The General Synod of the Church of England will meet February 23 – 27.  On the afternoon of February 27, the General Synod will consider the following motion:

  TUESDAY 27 FEBRUARY 2024 2.00 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. WAR IN UKRAINE AND CHALLENGE TO INTERNATIONAL ORDER (GS 2348) Mr. Mark Sheard (ex officio) to move: 22 ‘That this Synod, recognising the ongoing suffering and terror caused by the war in Ukraine and the repercussions and anxiety felt globally for our common future: (a) affirm with gratitude the churches work with others to support conflict parties and mediators and call for continued efforts to develop pathways to peace, justice and reconciliation in Ukraine; (b) call on all parties to the conflict to ensure that everyone in Ukraine has full freedom to manifest and practice their religion or belief, in line with international human rights law. (c) call on all UK political parties to set out ahead of the General Election their vision for a desirable international order and their strategies for ensuring that existing international rules and principles are attractive both domestically and to a broader global constituency.’

  Mr. Mark Sheard, who will make the motion, is Chair of the Mission & Public Affairs Council of the Church of England.  The Mission & Public Affairs Council of the Church is the body responsible for overseeing research and comment on social and political issues on behalf of the Church.  The Council comprises a representative group of bishops, clergy and lay people with interest and expertise in the relevant areas, and reports to the General Synod through the Archbishops’ Council.  The Mission & Public Affairs Council has submitted to the General Synod a paper entitled, “The War in Ukraine and the Challenge to International Order.”  https://www.churchofengland.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/gs-2348-war-in-ukraine-final-final.pdf  In paragraphs 16-18 of this paper, Ukrainian Draft Law 8371 is strongly criticized as follows:

  16. There are also concerns that recent legislative developments in Ukraine may impact enjoyment of FoRB [Freedom of Religion and Belief].  In October 2023, Ukraine’s Parliament approved in its first reading a set of draft amendments (Draft Law 8371) to the law on religious organisations, which would establish a procedure for the dissolution of “religious organisations affiliated with influence centres, the management of which is located in a country, which carries out armed aggression against Ukraine.”

  17. The Bishop of Leeds, the Church’s Lead Bishop on Foreign Policy, has written to the Ukrainian Government and the Chair of the Ukrainian Parliament to remind them that international law permits restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion only if they are prescribed by law and necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.  While recognising the emergency situation that Ukraine find itself in, many of the amendment’s key terms are vague, lack definition and are open to discriminatory interpretation in ways that violate international norms on FoRB.  At its most basic, this amendment threatens collective punishment.  Arguably, this Draft Law is unnecessary: where individuals have committed treason or other criminal actions against the interests of the state, then they can be held accountable under existing criminal Ukrainian law through due process.

  18. Draft Law 8371 threatens Ukraine’s social cohesion at a time when it needs a unified societal response to Russian aggression.  It encourages an ethno-religious nationalism that will be detrimental to Ukraine’s long term Western trajectory.  It does not recognise the great lengths that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has taken to distance itself from the Russian Orthodox Church or the fact that many of its members serve faithfully as Ukrainian citizens in the country’s armed forces - often with immense cost.  This Draft Law has impeded efforts by the World Council of Churches to foster dialogue between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine as there is now little incentive for the latter to engage in facilitated dialogue when the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is on the cusp of being outlawed and when such a move will reinforce its own role as the defender of the faith in Ukraine.

  The foregoing is a document produced by the an important body of the Church of England.  It does not appear that the motion to be made by Mr. Sheard calls upon the entire General Synod formally to adopt this document.  However, the motion will include the statement that the General Synod calls upon “all parties to the conflict to ensure that everyone in Ukraine has full freedom to manifest and practice their religion or belief, in line with international human rights law.”

  The Archbishop of Canterbury Justin Welby will address the General Synod on the afternoon of February 23.  The Archbishop has just completed a five-day trip to Ukraine.  The trip included meetings with the OCU, the UOC, and with Viktor Yelensky (the head of DESS).  It is possible that the Archbishop will mention in his address Draft Law 8371.

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 8 February 2024: Metropolitan Evgeniy has left Estonia & other news

  On February 6, Metropolitan Evgeniy (Reshetnikov) of Tallinn and All Estonia (Moscow Patriarchate) left Estonia on the date that his temporary residence permit expired.  Metropolitan Evgeniy is a Russian citizen and had been in Estonia since 2018.  The Metropolitan was first informed on approximately January 11 that his application for an extension of his permit would be denied.  On January 18, the Estonian Police and Border Guard Board issued a press release providing the reasons for the denial.  The full text of the press release can be read at   https://www.politsei.ee/et/uudised/eesti-riik-ei-pikenda-valeri-reshetnikovi-elamisluba-11729 .   The press release includes the following statement:  “[T]he representatives of the Ministry of the Interior have repeatedly spoken to Reshetnikov and explained to him that he must give up justifying the Kremlin regime and Russia's military activities in his public activities and speeches.  Despite previous warnings, Reshetnikov continued activities deemed incompatible with Estonia’s values and legal system.  Therefore, Reshetnikov's actions are a security threat to the country.”

  A special Council of the Estonian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) was held on January 30 and adopted a resolution requesting that the Metropolitan’s permit be extended.  https://ru.orthodox.ee/news/mpeok-taiskogu-otsus-postanovlenie-sobora-epczmp-30012024/  The resolution included the following:  “From the very first days of the military conflict in Ukraine, the Church, with the blessing of Metropolitan Evgeniy, began to provide all possible material assistance to refugees, console the suffering and offer prayers for the long-awaited peace to come to Ukraine.  At every Liturgy in the churches of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, they pray for our God-protected country of Estonia, its authorities and army, for a quiet and silent life.  Today, when unfounded claims are made against Metropolitan Evgeniy that he poses a threat to the security of Estonia, we testify that the Primate of the EOC MP has always taken his words responsibly, which has prevented the division of his large flock, which includes people with very different views. The Gospel calls us to unity in Christ, love and patience.  And this, as well as the call for peace and stability in Estonian society, was the main thing in the sermons of Metropolitan Evgeniy.”  As far as I can see, the resolution did not address or deny the accusation by the Estonian authorities that the Metropolitan justified Russia’s military activities in his speeches.

  In spite of appeals by the Metropolitan and by the Council, the Police and Border Guard Board officially notified the Metropolitan on February 5 that his permit would not be renewed.  On February 6, the Metropolitan issued a message to his flock.  https://ru.orthodox.ee/messages/slovo-mitropolita-evgeniya-po-otezde-iz-estonii/   The message included the following statement:  “We hope that, with God’s help, church life will not change and will continue at its own pace.  There remain two vicar bishops in Estonia who, with my blessing, can exercise the full powers of the Primate of our Church.  In turn, I will stay in touch and continue to care for the Church entrusted to me, even remotely.”  In the morning of February 6, Metropolitan Evgeniy first visited the famous Pukhtitsa Dormition Stavropegic Women’s Monastery.   https://ria.ru/20240206/estoniya-1925715648.html  He was then driven to Narva where he walked across the border into the Leningrad Region of the Russian Federation.  https://pravda-en.com/world/2024/02/06/304657.html

  After the departure, there remain in Estonia three bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate – two vicar bishops of Tallinn (Sergei and Daniel) and Bishop Lazarus of Narva.   https://ru.orthodox.ee/clergy/  Bishop Daniel was consecrated a bishop on February 4, 2024, just two days before the departure of Metropolitan Evgeniy from Estonia.  https://ru.orthodox.ee/news/sostoyalas-hirotoniya-arhimandrita-daniila-lepiska-vo-episkopa-tartuskogo/  The Holy Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate had approved the consecration at a specially called remote meeting on February 3 where the only item on the agenda was the consecration.  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6100447.html   Daniel had been elected at a meeting of the Estonian Synod on January 29.  There has been no official explanation as to why the election and consecration occurred at such great speed immediately before the Metropolitan’s departure.  My guess is that Daniel is a native-born Estonian while Sergei and Lazarus are not.  The biography of Daniel can be read at https://ru.orthodox.ee/clergy/episkop-daniil/.  He is apparently not an ethnic Russian and converted to Orthodoxy when he was 20 years old.  Although it may be possible for the Estonian government to deport Sergei and Lazarus, it is likely that Daniel cannot be legally deported because he is a native Estonian. 

  Although the metropolitan and vicar bishop from Lithuania participated in the ordination of Bishop Daniel, there were no bishops or representatives present from Latvia.  It is difficult to determine whether this absence was due to a genuine rejection of the Moscow Patriarchate by the Latvian Church or whether the absence was the result of an effort to appease the Latvian government.  As you recall, the Latvian parliament on September 8, 2022, enacted a law amending the legal statute of the Latvian Orthodox Church to make the Church autocephalous.  The next day, September 9, the Church issued a statement calling on the faithful “to maintain a peaceful dispensation of spirit, to maintain the unity of our Church, strictly observing the laws of our Latvian State.”   https://www.pareizticiba.lv/index.php?newid=9660   On August 13, 2023, Metropolitan Alexander of Riga and All Latvia ordained in Riga a new vicar bishop, Bishop John of Valmiera.  https://www.pareizticiba.lv/index.php?newid=10000&id=6  Bishop John is a native Latvian.  He is the first Orthodox bishop ordained in Riga in the last 80 years.  There is no indication that the Holy Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate ever approved the ordination.   However, on October 6, a delegation of the Latvian church met in Moscow with certain members of the Holy Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate – Metropolitan Pavel (patriarchal vicar of the Moscow Diocese), Metropolitan Dionysius (chancellor of the Moscow Patriarchate), and Metropolitan Anthony (head of the DECR).  Also present was Father Nikolai Balashov, the personal advisor to Patriarch Kirill.  On September 7, 2022, Father Nikolai had issued a commentary attacking the actions of the Latvian government with respect to creating an autocephalous church.  https://mospat.ru/en/news/89610/  After this meeting on October 6, the Latvian Church posted on its website a statement which included the following:  “The Latvian delegation was given a warm welcome.  During a long conversation, which took place in the Small Hall of the Department for External Church Relations, a fruitful exchange of views took place on a wide range of issues of mutual interest.  The conversation took place in a constructive and Christian atmosphere of trust.”  https://www.pareizticiba.lv/index.php?newid=10043  Assuming this statement is correct, it does not appear that Moscow was greatly displeased with the ordination of the Latvian bishop.  One therefore wonders if the Latvian Church has truly embarked on the road to autocephaly and is seeking such status from other Local Orthodox Churches.   Perhaps the Moscow Patriarchate believes that the Latvian Church has taken actions simply to comply with the law, but that the canonical bond between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Latvian Church remains unchanged.  This may also be the belief of the Latvian Church.  All of this remains unclear.

  In other news, there was a long meeting on January 26 at the "Grand Mansion" of the Russian Foreign Ministry involving the Working Group of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Foreign Ministry.  https://mospat.ru/ru/news/91301/  The meeting was chaired by Patriarch Kirill and Foreign Minister Lavrov.  At the end of the meeting, Lavrov presented awards to Metropolitan Anthony (head of the DECR) and Father Nikolai Balashov (advisor to Patriarch Kirill) for “contribution to international cooperation.”  Awards for “cooperation” were presented to certain members of the DECR.  In turn, church awards were given to three members of the Foreign Ministry.   All of this is further evidence of the close ties between the Foreign Ministry and the Church which are especially evident in such areas as Africa.  

  Metropolitan Leonid (Gorbachev) has received a summons to appear before the Supreme Church Court in Moscow for “ecclesiastical offenses revealed during the transfer of affairs when released from the position of the rector of the Church of All Saints at Kulishki.”  https://spzh.media/ua/news/78506-mitropolita-leonida-horbachova-suditime-vishchij-tserkovnij-sud-rpts   As you recall, the Holy Synod removed Leonid from his position as Exarch of Africa on October 11, 2023, and then involuntarily retired him on December 27.  He ceased to be rector of the Kulishki parish on September 8, 2023.  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3010995.html  At the request of Leonid, his hearing before the Court, previously scheduled for January 31, has been postponed.   https://t.me/s/exarchleonid (January 30)

  The Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin Welby, arrived in Kyiv on February 5 for a five-day visit.  https://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/news/news-and-statements/archbishop-canterbury-returns-ukraine  On February 6 he met with Viktor Yelensky, the head of DESS (the government agency relating to matters of religion).  https://dess.gov.ua/zustrich-hlavy-dess-z-arkhyiepyskopom-kenterberiyskym/  On the same day, the Archbishop met with Metropolitan Epifany and others of the OCU.  https://www.pomisna.info/uk/vsi-novyny/mytropolyt-epifanij-zustrivsya-z-arhiyepyskopom-kenterberijskym-dzhastinom-velbi/  It is clear from the statement posted by the OCU that the Archbishop raised the issue of Draft Law 8371.  In what appears to be the response of Epifany, the statement provides: “And what concerns the regulation of administrative relations of religious organizations affiliated with the center in the aggressor country, in particular the Moscow Patriarchate, is exclusively a matter of national security.  Therefore, the state is forced to react in a completely civilized way, through the adoption of the appropriate law, and prevent Russia from using the religious sphere for its aggression.  After all, it is here that Ukraine still remains unprotected from destructive Russian influence.”  The fact that the Archbishop raised a question with respect to 8371 is, in my opinion, a good sign.  Also on February 6, the Archbishop met with representatives of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations.   https://vrciro.org.ua/ua/events/ukrainian-council-of-churches-meets-with-the-spiritual-head-of-the-church-of-england  The UOC was represented at this meeting by Sergii Bortnyk, a member of the UOC’s DECR and a professor at the UOC’s Kyiv Theological Academy.  Bortnyk gave a presentation in which he stressed the importance of avoiding the Russian model which leads to limiting the existence of certain denominations and even to a possible ban on their legal functioning.  He also gave the example of Archbishop Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109), who was twice forced to leave England due to the efforts of the then state authorities to regulate the church.  https://vzcz.church.ua/2024/02/07/spivrobitnik-vzcz-upc-vzyav-uchast-u-zustrichi-vrciro-z-arxijepiskopom-kenterberijskim/   There was also a separate meeting between the Archbishop and some of the leading professors at the UOC’s Kyiv Theological Academy.  http://kdais.kiev.ua/event/zustrich-07-02-2024/?fbclid=IwAR1nU4WE2Y6ufsIIzUH_XSALeJQW1ffmGWWaVw3ru0Z98JNJg4EdJ85Y_CY  On February 7, the Archbishop was awoken by alarms shortly before 6:00 a.m. and had to seek refuge in an air-raid shelter for almost three hours.  https://www.churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2024/9-february/news/world/archbishop-of-canterbury-shelters-as-russians-bombard-kyiv-in-early-morning-attack

  The DECR of the Moscow Patriarchate has posted a study on the relationship between the Constantinople and Moscow Patriarchates during the 1960s and the early 1970s.  https://mospat.ru/ru/authors-analytics/91303/   Lastly, Archimandrite Cyril Hovorun has given a long interview which includes some very candid observations with respect to the OCU and the UOC.  https://www.orthodoxtimes.gr/archim-kyrillos-govoroun-stous-orthodox-times-giati-me-kathairese-o-patriarchis-moschas/    

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA 

• 3 February 2024: Interview of Archimandrite Cyril Hovorun

  Archimandrite Cyril Hovorun has given an interview to the Orthodox Times.  With respect to Ukraine, he has made some very candid comments – which I believe are absolutely true.  The following are two questions and answers that I found especially interesting:

  In the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (of Metropolitan Onufry), they claim to have severed all ties with the Moscow Patriarchate and operate autonomously.  Do you agree with this?  

  They have made a sincere effort to distance themselves from Moscow, but they have not completely succeeded. I believe that, from a purely canonical point of view, this church continues to consist of dioceses of the Moscow Patriarchate.

  Do you think that the two Churches (Onufry and Epifany) could coexist in Ukraine as separate structures?  Is the world ready for a possible union of these two Churches?  

  Ideally the two churches should be united into one.  But realistically this is not going to happen in the near future.  In fact, these churches are much further apart from each other than they were in 2018, when the Autocephalous Church of Ukraine was founded.  Unfortunately both churches contributed to this drift. The Church of Onufry accuses the Church of Epifany of remaining schismatic, while the Church of Epifany accuses the Church of Onufry of being a projector of Kremlin politics.  Both accusations are wrong and do not help the reconciliation of the Ukrainian Orthodox at all.  The Church of Epifany would like to suppress the other church, but that is not going to happen.  First, because the second remains greater than the first.  And secondly, the violence which the former has exercised against the latter has created an animosity which is difficult to overcome.  However, I foresee a reconciliation of the two churches in the distant future.  To do this, however, each of them must first recognize the existence of the other, then learn to coexist peacefully, and then find a model of union.

  Here are some of the key points in my opinion:  (1) the UOC has “made a sincere effort” to distance itself from Moscow; (2) both the OCU and the UOC are at fault for the current extremely bad relations between the two churches; (3) the UOC continues to accuse the OCU publicly as being schismatic [even if you believe that a person from another church is a heretic or a schismatic, you need not repeatedly call them that in public]; (4) the accusation that the UOC is a projector of Kremlin politics is false;  (5) the OCU desires to suppress the UOC and has used violence at times; (6) the UOC remains greater in size that the OCU; (7) to improve relations between the UOC and the OCU, the churches must “learn to coexist peacefully.”  I believe that the current sad inter-church situation in Ukraine would be improved if both churches exercised a similar candor as opposed to making the other church appear as bad as possible.

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

   

• 29 January 2024: Committee postpones consideration of 8371 without a new date set

  In Ukraine, the Rada’s Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy scheduled a meeting for Friday, January  26 to consider the controversial Draft Law 8371 relating to religion.  This meeting was suddenly postponed, and a new meeting (via video conference) was set for the morning of Monday, January 29.  This meeting has now again been postponed.  The following notice has been posted on the Committee’s website:  “The meeting of the Committee on January 29 was postponed.  The date and time of the event will be announced later.”    https://kompkd.rada.gov.ua/   The notice was posted at 9:30 a.m. on January 29, and the meeting was supposed to begin at 10:00 a.m.  A search of the Internet a few minutes ago has disclosed no explanation for this third postponement.

  For those who have concerns that Draft Law 8371 may infringe on freedom of religion, this postponement without a new meeting being set is good news.  The delay will probably make it unlikely for Draft Law 8371 to be considered for the second reading by the full Rada at its February session.  One may speculate that the further delay may be due to a concern by the Zelensky government that approval of the Draft Law for the second reading may provide an additional argument by those who are not supporting Ukraine’s request for immediate financial help, especially from the United States.

  The Russian news agency RIA Novosti posted an article on January 29 relating to a possible softening of the approach of Ukraine’s legal system against the UOC.  https://ria.ru/20240129/kiev-1923735589.html 

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 25 January 2024: Friday - Rada Committee may approve amended Draft Law 8371

  Ukrainian Draft Law 8371 has been the primary responsibility of the Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy of the Verkhovna Rada.  The Chairperson of the Committee, People's Deputy Mykyta Poturaev, has stated that on Friday, January 26, 2024, the Committee will consider Draft Law 8371 and that the work on the amendments has been completed.  https://risu.ua/obmezhennya-diyalnosti-moskovskogo-patriarhatu-parlament-mozhe-rozglyanuti-v-lyutomu---poturayev_n145735  The expectation is that the Draft Law will be ready for presentation to the full Rada in February.  My personal hope is that a copy of the amended Draft Law 8371 will be immediately available after Friday’s meeting so that people and organizations, both inside and outside of Ukraine, can review it critically and provide input prior to any vote before the full Rada.  The following are some quotations (Google translation) from the article linked above:

  On Friday, January 26, the Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy of the Verkhovna Rada will consider a draft law on limiting the activities of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine.  The chairman of the committee, People's Deputy Mykyta Poturaev ("Servant of the People"), informed the public initiative "Holka" about this . [ https://holka.org.ua/fsb-v-ryasah-zaboronu-parlament-mozhe-rozglyanuty-v-lyutomu-poturayev/?fbclid=IwAR2359PU0LCexnqNquBUyrwxHFpDN3iMy7dVYYtPZ9npvWLxv7TX8uDFvto  ]   "Tomorrow at the Committee we will consider this issue.  We have two projects planned for development.  One legislative initiative from the president regarding the English language (9432) and a government bill (8371) regarding the activities of religious organizations.  I hope that the review will be productive, and we will agree on everything.  For the amendments, everything has already been completed.  The table is ready, but it must be transferred to the Rada's apparatus and then the Conciliation Council will decide," comments Poturaev.  [The Conciliation Council of Parliamentary Factions will decide if the draft law will be placed on the Rada’s agenda for February.]….

  Member of the Committee, People's Deputy Mykola Knyazhytskyi (“European Solidarity”), tells how the review of the amendments took place. "We rejected the amendments from the followers of the Russian world.  The Committee supported part of my proposals to ban the activities of this agency in Ukraine.   We need to get through the committee as soon as possible and consider this draft law in the session hall," Knyazhytskyi said.

  People's deputy Oleksandr Aliksiichuk ("Servant of the People"), who together with his colleague Yulia Klymenko ("Holos"), collected the signatures of parliamentarians to bring the issue to the floor for the first reading last fall, emphasizes that the Verkhovna Rada should support the initiative in February, before the second anniversary of the full-scale invasion.  "I hope that the draft law will leave the specialized committee and will be included in the agenda of the Conciliation Council at the next meeting of the Verkhovna Rada.  I believe that the heads of factions and groups understand all the responsibility and demands of society in the adoption of this draft law and none, God forbid, the personal interests or relations of someone with someone will prevail on the scales of the interests of the country, society, and every conscientious Ukrainian.  The fight for faith is another front with Moscow, which we have no right to lose," said Aliksiichuk.

  Yulia Klymenko briefly summarized why this project should be voted on urgently: "it should be accepted by the second anniversary, because Muscovites are crawling out of all the holes."

  The head of the "Servant of the People" faction, Davyd Arakhamia, has not yet answered the question of the prospects for the government bill to be included in the agenda of the February meeting of the Verkhovna Rada.  It is he or his deputy Andrii Motovylovets who has a decisive influence on the formation of the agenda.

  See also   https://lb.ua/society/2024/01/25/595417_nardepi_rozrahovuyut_priynyati.html ; https://spzh.media/en/news/78562-mp-we-will-vote-to-ban-the-uoc-by-the-anniversary-of-the-invasion 

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 21 January 2024: New legal analysis of Ukrainian Draft Law 8371

  Since last October, the international law firm of Amsterdam & Partners (with offices in London and Washington DC) has been representing the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) with respect to an international response to the attacks against the UOC by the Ukrainian government.    https://amsterdamandpartners.com/press-release-ukrainian-orthodox-church-appoints-amsterdam-partners-llp-to-defend-against-attack-on-religious-freedoms/   The law firm has established a specific website with respect to this representation.  https://savetheuoc.com  On January 3, 2024,  the law firm released and posted on its website a “white paper” with the title Freedom of Religion under Attack in Ukraine.  The full text of the 25-page “white paper” can be read at https://savetheuoc.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Save-the-UOC-White-Paper.pdf.  On January 17, the law firm released a second document entitled Legal Analysis of Ukrainian Draft Law 8371.  This is intended to be a supplement to the “white paper.”  The full text of the Legal Analysis can be read at https://savetheuoc.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Legal-Analysis-of-Draft-Law-8371-Final.pdf .

  The Legal Analysis is in the form of a legal memorandum.  In my practice as an attorney for over 40 years, I have reviewed a great number of legal memoranda.  I read the entire Legal Analysis and can say without reservation that it is a very professional and serious work.  It is not a piece of propaganda.  The Legal Analysis provides to the best of my knowledge the only professional English translation of Draft Law 8371 available anywhere on the Internet.  See page 37 of the Legal Analysis.  The Legal Analysis contains an excellent discussion of the applicable cases of the Venice Commission (European Commission for Democracy through Law) relating to freedom of religion.  The Legal Analysis then applies the principles established by the Venice Commission to the language of Draft Law 8371.  In applying the principles to the actual terms of Draft Law 8371, the Legal Analysis concludes that the draft law completely fails to comply with these principles.

  To the best of my knowledge, the Ukrainian government has not provided any legal study showing that the Draft Law complies with the principles enunciated by the Venice Commission.  During the period November 23-25, over 50 deputies of the Ukrainian Rada signed an appeal to Ruslan Stefanchuk, the speaker of the Rada, asking him to refer Draft Law 8371 to the Venice Commission for its opinion.   https://interfax.com.ua/news/political/950256.html   Stefanchuk refused to do so and still refuses to do so.  https://interfax.com.ua/news/interview/958773.html   The Venice Commission has a procedure for providing “urgent opinions”    https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2018)019-e  A publication of the Venice Commission states:  “For example, if an opinion is needed before an impending referendum or a debate in parliament, it can be issued as ‘urgent opinion’ outside the period of an official plenary session in Venice, so that the authorities in question can make use of Venice Commission legal expertise in time.” https://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Media&lang=EN  One can review the opinions of the Venice Commission, including those involving urgent opinions, at    https://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/documents/by_opinion.aspx?v=all  The following are samples showing the time period between a request for an urgent opinion and the issuance of the urgent opinion:  CDL-AD(2022)017-e (requested 27 April 2022 and issued 27 May 2022); CDL-AD(2022)034 (requested 14 September 2022 and issued 7 October 2022); CDL-AD(2022)037  (requested 1 July 2022 and issued 26 Aug 2022); CDL-AD(2022)045 (requested 15 September 2022 and issued 18 November 2022); CDL-AD(2022)053-e (requested 9 November 2022 and issued 9 December 2022). 

  From the foregoing, it is likely that if Stefanchuk had submitted a request for an urgent opinion at the time the Rada deputies made an appeal for him to seek an opinion from the Venice Commission, there would now be available an issued opinion from the Commission with respect to the Draft Law.  One is left with the question of why Ukraine has not referred Draft Law 8371 to the Venice Commission as an opinion by the Commission could settle much of the controversy surrounding Draft Law 8371.  The only reason that comes to my mind is that Ukraine is concerned that a referral of Draft Law 8371 to the Commission would result in an opinion that the Draft Law does not comply with the principles adopted by the Vienna Commission with respect to freedom of religion.  

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 20 January 2024: Latest sanctions on Hovorun and Uminsky & other news

  On December 29, 2023, Patriarch Kirill issued the following decree relating to Archimandrite Cyril Hovorun:  “Hereby, on the basis of the decision of the diocesan church court of the Moscow diocese dated October 31, 2023, you are deposed from the priesthood in connection with violation of the 25th rule of the Holy Apostles.”  http://moseparh.ru/ukaz-u-02216-ot-29-dekabrya-2023.html (first posted on Jan. 17, 2024)  On October 31, 2023, the Moscow diocesan court had ruled:  “Recognize that, on the basis of the 25th Rule of the Holy Apostles, Archimandrite Kirill (Govorun) is subject to canonical reprimand in the form of demotion from the priesthood.”  http://moseparh.ru/reshenie-eparxialnogo-cerkovnogo-suda-moskovskoj-gorodskoj-eparxii-po-delu-zapreshhennogo-klirika-arximandrita-kirilla-govoruna.html   On September 25, 2023, Patriarch Kirill had issued a decree suspending Archimandrite Cyril.  http://moseparh.ru/ukaz-u-02152-ot-25-sentyabrya-2023.html   It provided as follows:

  “The written commitment of fidelity to the Russian Orthodox Church given by you was repeatedly violated, which was expressed, among other things, in your concelebration with the bishops and clergy of the Church of Constantinople, with which Eucharistic communion was interrupted by the decision of the Holy Synod due to a gross invasion of the canonical territory of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.  In this regard, you, as having violated the priestly oath given by you, in accordance with the 25th rule of the Holy Apostles, are hereby prohibited from serving in the priesthood without the right to wear a cassock and a priestly cross and give a priestly blessing during the consideration of your case in the diocesan court of the Moscow diocese.”

  On January 13, 2024, the Moscow diocesan court issued a decision relating to Archpriest Alexei Uminsky.  http://moseparh.ru/cerkovnyj-sud-g-moskvy-prinyal-reshenie-po-delu-prot-aleksiya-uminskogo.html  This decision provides in relevant part as follows:

  “At the meeting in accordance with Art. 45, paragraph 3 of the Regulations on the Church Court of the Russian Orthodox Church, it is recognized that, on the basis of the 25th Rule of the Holy Apostles, Archpriest Alexei Uminsky is subject to expulsion from the priesthood for violating the priestly oath (oath-breaking) - refusal to fulfill the Patriarchal blessing to read the Prayer for Holy Rus' in the Divine Liturgy.  According to the regulations, the decision is sent for approval to His Holiness Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus'.” 

  Both Archimandrite Cyril and Archpriest Alexei Uminsky are well-known personalities, and both are opposed to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  I have described their backgrounds in prior newsletters.   https://www.unifr.ch/orthodoxia/de/dokumentation/anderson/ (Uminsky – 13 Jan. 2024; Hovorun – 2 Oct. 2023).  Both were found guilty of violating their priestly oath for not following the instructions of the Patriarch or the Holy Synod.  There was a long time period between their taking of the priestly oath and the alleged violations of the oath.  Uminsky was ordained in 1990 – over 30 years before the alleged violation.  Hovorun was ordained in approximately 2002 – over 20 years before the alleged violation.  The following is the text of the priestly oath used in Moscow in 2006:  https://ustav.livejournal.com/3462.html   The canonical basis for defrocking both priests was the 25^th canon of the Holy Apostles.

  The 25^th canon provides in relevant part: “If a bishop, presbyter, or deacon be found guilty of fornication, perjury, or theft, let him be deposed….”  https://orthochristian.com/158256.html   Because the alleged violations did not constitute “fornication” or “theft” and because the alleged violations involve violating the priestly oath, the defrocking must have been based on the findings that Hovorun and Uminsky engaged in “perjury.”  As a retired attorney, I know that violation of an oath at a much later date is not “perjury.”  Rather, perjury involves stating under oath something that one knows is false.   See generally https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perjury  If one says under oath he will “ try in every possible way to carry out the service [of a priest] in everything consistent with the word of God, with the rules of the church and the instructions of the hierarchy” and then decades later fails to follow the instructions of a hierarch, he is not guilty of perjury. 

  An important question is how the 25^th canon is stated in the original Greek.  What is the word in Ancient Greek which is translated into English as “perjury”?  The word is “ἐπιορκία.”   The translation of this word into English is “1. false swearing 2. perjury.”  https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/%E1%BC%90%CF%80%CE%B9%CE%BF%CF%81%CE%BA%CE%AF%CE%B1  See also https://morphological_el.en-academic.com/781950/%E1%BC%90%CF%80%CE%B9%CE%BF%CF%81%CE%BA%E1%BD%B7%CE%B1;  https://vocab.perseus.org/lemma/32660/?filter=urn:cts:greekLit:tlg2048.tlg001.1st1K-grc1   Again, this shows that the Greek word means saying under oath something that is not true.  It is also logical that those who originally wrote canon 25 did not intend the canon to apply to situations such as those involving Hovorun and Uminsky.  It would mean that a church could make any conduct subject to defrocking simply by prohibiting the conduct in the priestly oath.  In this regard it should also be remembered a person becoming a priest does not have the right to negotiate the terms of the priestly oath.   If one does not sign the printed oath presented to him, one is not ordained.   The priestly oath apparently used in Moscow required that the signer act consistently with the instructions of the hierarchy.  If canon 25 is applied to situations where a priest does not follow an instruction of a bishop as required by the priestly oath, it would mean that a bishop could make any conduct subject to defrocking simply by prohibiting it.  In drafting canon 25, the bishops specified only three offenses.  Two of the offenses, “fornication” and “theft,” are very specific serious offenses.  I believe that it is very doubtful that the drafting bishops intended the third offense listed in canon 25, namely "perjury," to be so flexible as to allow a subsequent bishop to make any conduct subject to defrocking simply by the subsequent bishop prohibiting it.  I am not an expert in canon law or ancient Greek.  However, I have practiced law for over forty years, and I believe that the application of canon 25 to Hovorun and Uminsky raises some genuine doubts as to whether canon 25 was properly applied to these cases.

  In other news, a priest has been appointed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate to be the exarch of its newly formed Orthodox Church in Lithuania.  The priest is an Estonian, Father Justinus Kiviloo.  On January 6, he held his first public liturgy in Lithuania as exarch.  Kiviloo was born of a Lutheran family in 1962 in northwestern Estonia.  He converted to Orthodoxy when he was a young adult.  For over 20 years, he served as the deacon for Metropolitan Stephanos of Tallinn and All Estonia (Ecumenical Patriarchate).  In 2013 he was ordained a priest and subsequently served in two different Estonian towns.  Kiviloo has given a long interview at https://novayagazeta.ee/articles/2024/01/15/vselenskii-patriarkhat-dal-liudiam-v-litve-vozmozhnost-molitsia-po-sovesti-interviu-konstantinopolskogo-pravoslavnogo-ekzarkha-iustinusa-kiviloo  He stated that last summer Metropolitan Stephanos had recommended him to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew as the exarch for Lithuania.   This is because Kiviloo had worked closely with Stephanos in creating the structure of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s church in Estonia.  In the interview, Kiviloo made the following interesting statement:  “There were even statements from some Lithuanian politicians that the property of the church, where the Moscow Patriarchate now holds its services, should be taken away.  I was also asked for my opinion - I am categorically against it.  We need to build our own churches and serve there.”  The new exarchate will include ten clergymen and ten communities in different towns across Lithuania.  https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2162671/constantinople-patriarchate-sets-up-church-structure-in-lithuania  In comparison, the Moscow Patriarchate’s church in Lithuania presently consists of “2 monasteries and 50 parishes, in which 62 clergy serve, including 53 priests and 9 deacons.”  https://www.orthodoxy.lt/novosti/4479-sostoyalos-ezhegodnoe-vseobshee-sobranie-litovskoi-pravoslavnoi-cerkvi   Interestingly, nine clerics of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s church in Lithuania have received awards from the U.S. State Department for their roles in promoting religious freedom in Lithuania.  https://www.state.gov/international-religious-freedom-awards/?fbclid=IwAR1pcPNCW0BDUkM7M2EkLYEShETjDzx2buHxrit4cajCr2q61n30XZeYfQU 

  In Estonia, it was reported on January 11, 2024, that Metropolitan Evgeniy (Reshetnikov) of Tallinn and All Estonia (Moscow Patriarchate) must leave Estonia by February 6 when his temporary residency permit expires.  https://ria.ru/20240118/estoniya-1922068636.html  Metropolitan Evgeniy is Russian and has been in Estonia since 2018.  The head of the north prefecture of the Estonian Border Guards issued the following statement:  “Representatives of the Ministry of the Interior have repeatedly met with Reshetnikov to explain to him that he needs to stop vindicating the Kremlin regime and Russia's military actions in his statements.  But despite past warnings, Reshetnikov has not altered his conduct, which is found to be incompatible with Estonia's values and legal environment.  That is why Reshetnikov's actions pose a threat to security.”  The Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has responded to this action as follows: “Today, an official letter was received from the Police and Border Guard Department regarding the decision not to renew the temporary residence permit of Metropolitan Evgeniy of Tallinn and All Estonia.  We are not giving any comments now, but we ask all the faithful children of our Estonian Orthodox Church to strengthen their prayers both for our Primate, Metropolitan Evgeniy, and for our Church.”  https://ru.orthodox.ee/news/palume-tugevdada-palveid-prosim-sugubyh-molitv/

  In Bulgaria on January 6, Patriarch Neophyte “sprinkled the warriors and battle flags of the Bulgarian Army with consecrated Epiphany water.”  https://bg-patriarshia.bg/news/patriarshesko-blagoslovenie-za-velikia-bogoyavlenski-vodosve  In his address, he stated:  “The destructive war against brotherly Ukraine, followed by the no less terrifying for our Christian conscience military clash in the lands sanctified by the God-man presence of the Savior, once again reminded us all of the importance of the army for every nation and state.”  It has been pointed out on the Internet that Patriarch Kirill subsequently addressed a letter of condolence upon the death of Bulgarian Metropolitan Ioannikis of Sliven to the “Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church” and made no mention at all to Patriarch Neophyte.  This stands in sharp contrast to the normal practice of addressing such a letter of condolence to the patriarch under whom the deceased bishop served.  See, for example, https://mospat.ru/ru/news/90351/ (Patriarch Kirill addresses his letter of condolence to Patriarch Theophilos upon the death of Metropolitan Cornelius of Petra.)  It has been speculated on the Internet that this failure to address Patriarch Neophyte was due to his prior reference to the "destructive war against brotherly Ukraine."

  Metropolitan Anthony, head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s DECR, took part in Moscow in the presentation of the Russian-language edition of Pope Benedict XVI’s book, Jesus of Nazareth.   https://mospat.ru/ru/news/91257/  Metropolitan Anthony also wrote one of the prefaces to the Russian-language edition.  Metropolitan Anthony had high praise for Pope Benedict.  For example, the Metropolitan stated:  “However, opening it [Benedict’s book], it is impossible not to be amazed by the colossal erudition of Joseph Ratzinger, who shows in the full sense a ‘universal’ example of mastery of all the riches of traditional Christian exegesis and at the same time an excellent orientation in the problems of modern philosophical hermeneutics, textual criticism and biblical studies in general.”  At the Moscow presentation, Metropolitan Anthony also commented on his many personal communications with Pope Benedict.  The Metropolitan stated:  “I remember the last such meeting very well: we stood at the window, from which there was a beautiful view of the [Russian Orthodox] Church of St. Catherine, where I then served, and the Pope told me that he begins and ends every day by looking at the Russian church.”  https://ria.ru/20240118/mitropolit-1922039747.html

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 13 January 2024: Sanctions involving well-known Moscow priest & other news

  On January 12, the Russian news agency Novosti reported that Archpriest Alexey Uminsky failed to appear for the second time before a Moscow diocesan court.  https://ria.ru/20240112/uminskiy-1920898216.html  Novosti interviewed Archpriest Vladislav Tsypin, deputy chairman of the diocesan court.  Tsypin stated:  Yesterday we waited for him [Uminsky] for 4-5 hours.  He is being summoned to court due to failure to comply with the instructions of the hierarchy, the Patriarch, to read a prayer for Holy Rus.'  This quotation is the most authoritative information to date that the current proceedings against Uminsky are based on his failure to recite this prayer.  The full text of the prayer, composed by Patriarch Kirill in September 2022, can be read at  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5962654.html.   Among other petitions, the prayer requests God to “give us victory” and to “confirm the warriors and all the defenders of our Fatherland.”  On January 3, Patriarch Kirill had issued a decree releasing Uminsky as rector of the Church of the Life Giving Trinity in Khokhly [center of Moscow] and prohibiting him from serving in the priesthood until the end of proceedings before the Moscow diocesan court.  http://moseparh.ru/ukaz-u-0201-ot-3-yanvarya-2024.html

  The Church of the Life Giving Trinity is more than 400 years old.  Uminsky has been rector of the Church since 1993.  He is a well-known personality and has appeared often on television.  The very popular religious website Pravmir gives his biography and links to some of his many articles appearing on the website.   https://www.pravmir.ru/author/user_2139/   His videos on YouTube seem to be countless.  https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%B8%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B9+%D0%90%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B9+%D0%A3%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9  He has hosted various television series, including the popular program “Orthodox Encyclopedia.”

  The action against Uminsky has been big news in Russia.  The following are long articles from some of the more liberal publications:  https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2024/01/06/kazn-na-rozhdestvo;  https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2024/01/08/zachistka-tserkvi-prodolzhaetsya-patriarhu-kirillu-ne-nuzhni-svobodnie-i-zhivie-lyudi-a117794  (article by Sergei Chapnin).  The following is an article from a very conservative website applauding the action against Uminsky: https://tsargrad.tv/news/gromkoe-otstranenie-protoiereja-aleksija-uminskogo-pochemu-na-nego-pojavilsja-zapret_941282  A petition to Patriarch Kirill has been posted online requesting him to reconsider the ban imposed on Uminsky.  The following is an excerpt from the petition:  The decree banning priest Alexei Uminsky from serving will deprive thousands of people of spiritual support.  This is a great tragedy for many believers, for children's hospice patients, for hundreds of prisoners and thousands of homeless people.  In our difficult times, it is important to preserve the opportunity for people to receive spiritual support from a beloved and important priest.  To date, more than 10,000 persons have listed their names on the online petition.  https://letter-patriarch.tilda.ws/ 

  On January 11 the website of the Union of Orthodox Journalists published an article arguing that the act of Patriarch Kirill requiring by his own authority the recitation of the prayer for Holy Rus’ was actually a form of “papism.”  https://spzh.news/ru/zashhita-very/77938-zapret-uminskoho-kak-iskushenie-pravoslavnym-papizmom  The article states:  In this sense, Father Alexey Uminsky, like any other priest, had every right not to read the “special” prayer for the reasons already indicated: it is not in the Service Book, it does not have conciliar origin, it is not approved by the Holy Synod, but is the desire of one person.  The article also states:  To ban a priest from ministry simply for refusing to read a prayer that contradicts his ethical or even political views, clearly has nothing to do with the Kingdom of Heaven, and therefore brings enormous harm to the Church.

  The action against Uminsky is not the first time that the Moscow Patriarchate has taken action against a cleric for protesting or not supporting the position of the Russian Church with respect to Ukraine.  As you recall, Father Ioann Koval, a priest in the Lublino district of Moscow, was found guilty of disobedience by the Moscow diocesan court for repeatedly substituting the word “peace” for the word “victory” in the prayer for Holy Rus’.   https://ria.ru/20230513/svyaschennik-1871542337.html   The diocese court ruled that Koval should be defrocked.  Last June, the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate lifted the penalty of defrocking and restored Koval to the priestly ranks.  Koval is now a priest of the Ecumenical Patriarchate apparently serving in Antalya, Turkey.  Andrey Kuraev, now living in Prague, is compiling on his blog a list of the priests of the Moscow Patriarchate who have been subject to adverse actions because of their positions with respect to Ukraine.  https://diak-kuraev.livejournal.com/ (entry of January 11).  So far, there are ten priests on the list.  Of the listed priests, Uminsky is by far the most well-known.

  On December 27, 2023, the Orthodox feast of St. Stephen, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew presided over the Divine Liturgy at the Church of St. Stephen, used by the Bulgarian-speaking Orthodox community in the Balat district of Istanbul. https://orthodoxtimes.com/ecumenical-patriarch-celebrates-historic-liturgy-at-bulgarian-speaking-orthodox-community-church-in-constantinople/  It was at the Church of St. Stephen in 1860 that Bulgarian bishop Hilarion rejected dependence on the Ecumenical Patriarchate and announced an independent Bulgarian church organization.  It was not until 1945 that the Ecumenical Patriarchate recognized the autocephaly of the Bulgarian Church and ceased considering it to be a schismatic church.  Subsequently, the Church of St. Stephen came under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.  However, the Liturgy last month was the first occasion that an ecumenical patriarch has ever celebrated a service in this church.  In the homily on December 27, Patriarch Bartholomew used this occasion to stress that “only in unity and harmony does the Church fulfill its God-given mission to the world.”   https://ec-patr.org/%cf%80%cf%81%cf%8e%cf%84%ce%b7-%cf%80%ce%b1%cf%84%cf%81%ce%b9%ce%b1%cf%81%cf%87%ce%b9%ce%ba%ce%ae-%ce%b8%ce%b5%ce%af%ce%b1-%ce%bb%ce%b5%ce%b9%cf%84%ce%bf%cf%85%cf%81%ce%b3%ce%af%ce%b1-%cf%83%cf%84/  The homily included the following remarks:

  Today from the sanctuary of this Temple, once a point of problematic reference, we send to everyone an invitation of love and fellowship in unity, not only theoretically in the divine Eucharist, but in all aspects of church life.  We declare our desire for direct contact with all of the local Orthodox Churches and our willingness at the same time to contribute to finding solutions to everything that concerns the Orthodox body, always within the handed-down principles, terms and limits of the ecclesiology of the Eastern Orthodox Church.

  In my opinion this is an interesting invitation.  One must wait and see whether there is a response from other Local Orthodox Churches.

  In Ukraine, Ruslan Stefanchuk, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, gave on January 5 a long interview to Interfax - Ukraine.  https://interfax.com.ua/news/interview/958773.html  He confirmed that he has refused to send the controversial Draft Law 8371 to the Venice Commission.  He was asked whether the Rada would take into account before the second reading of Draft Law 8371 the concerns about the Draft Law expressed by Volker Türk, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.  The High Commissioner had stated on December 19 that the “proposed restrictions to the right to freedom of religion [in Draft Law 8371] do not appear to comply with international human rights law.”  See https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2023/12/russia-should-immediately-cease-its-use-force-against-ukraine-turk   Stefanchuk did not directly answer this question.  However, he did state:  Therefore, I would like that in this particular case, if there are any reservations, let them make them in some form that can be added to the existing draft law.  And for that you need to read it.  That is, I want the logic of the discussion and criticism to begin with the fact of familiarization with the text of this or that legislative act.  And I will be more than happy to consider all of these suggestions for anything.  It is also reported that the Rada’s Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy hopes to submit the Draft Law to the full Rada for the second reading in February.  https://interfax.com.ua/news/political/957721.html 

  The UOC has retained the law firm of Amsterdam & Partners (offices in London and Washington, DC) to represent its interests on the international stage with respect to the actions being taken by the Ukrainian government against the UOC.  The law firm has established a website with the most recent news relating to this topic:  https://savetheuoc.com/  The firm has also authored a 25-page “white paper” entitled “Freedom of Religion Under Attack in Ukraine.”   https://savetheuoc.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Save-the-UOC-White-Paper.pdf (full text)    The “white paper” is quite specific and includes many footnotes.  The following is a 6-minute video available on the firm’s website.   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NUmzCAWZh08&t=65s

  In other news relating to Ukraine, the UOC has issued a statement on December 28 that the ruling UOC bishop of Kherson remains responsible for the entire diocese including the parts now occupied by Russia and that changes in the structure of the diocese can only be made by the UOC.  https://news.church.ua/2023/12/28/xersonska-jeparxiya-dije-v-mezhax-viznachenoji-jiji-statutom-teritoriji-xersonskoji-oblasti/#2024-01-12  As you recall, the Holy Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate decided on December 27 to create a new diocese consisting of the part of the Kherson diocese presently under the control of the Russian Federation.  According to this Moscow decision, the new diocese is placed under the temporary administration of one of the Crimean bishops who has left the UOC.  http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6087932.html (entry  120)  Although the statement of the UOC contradicts the decision of the Holy Synod in Moscow, it is a mild statement and makes no direct reference to the Moscow decision itself.  The mildness of the statement is perhaps due to the desire of the UOC not to irritate the Moscow Patriarchate unnecessarily for fear that the Patriarchate might declare the UOC to be a “schismatic” church.  From the viewpoint of many in the UOC, being a “schismatic” church would mean that the UOC’s sacraments are no longer valid.

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA

• 8 January 2024: Draft Law 8371 - Response of Rada Speaker to comments by UN High Commissioner

  On January 5, Ruslan Stefanchuk, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, gave a long interview to Interfax - Ukraine.  https://interfax.com.ua/news/interview/958773.html  Below are two questions and answers from the interview relating to Draft Law 8371.  In the first answer, Stefanchuk makes clear that he will not seek the opinion of the Venice Commission.  In the second, he answers a question relating to criticism of Draft Law 8371 made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.  On December 19,  Volker Türk, the High Commissioner, had stated:  “A draft law would set out a procedure for dissolving any religious organization with ties to the Russian Federation.  These proposed restrictions to the right to freedom of religion do not appear to comply with international human rights law.”  https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2023/12/russia-should-immediately-cease-its-use-force-against-ukraine-turk   Earlier, Ilze Brands Kehris, the UN’s Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, at a meeting of the Security Council on November 17, issued an invitation to the Ukrainian lawmakers to make use of the expertise of the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights “to assess whether the proposed means are clearly defined and the least intrusive ones possible for achieving the specific aim, and whether the proposed amendments comply with international legal standards.”   https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2023/11/asg-brands-kehris-briefs-security-council-ukraine   The following is a Google translation of the two Q&As:

  Another debatable issue is related to the draft law on banning religious organizations affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church .  After the adoption of this document in the first reading, fifty people's deputies , headed by the first deputy head of the "Servants of the People" faction Andrii Motovylovets appealed to you to send it to the Venice Commission for examination.  Did you fulfill their request?  When does the Council plan to adopt the draft law in the second reading?

  As far as I am informed, Motovylovets withdrew his signature from this appeal.  Secondly, we proceed from the fact that the Venice Commission is not a parliamentary GNEU [Main scientific and expert department of the apparatus of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine] or the main legal department, and that we should send everything there.  We use this mechanism when there are really complex bills.

  I received this appeal and refused to forward it to the Venice Commission.  Moreover, in my opinion, the committee on humanitarian and information policy, which was designated as the main one in the preparation of this draft law, should continue to work professionally and professionally.

  As far as I know, its head Nikita Poturaev has already stated that they will become more active on this issue at the beginning of this year: they will hold a committee and make a decision that will provide an opportunity to ensure a fair approach in the implementation of the law.  It should not apply to one person, selectively, but should be a principle.  Any denomination, any religious organization, any church - as soon as evidence of their cooperation with the Russian Federation appears, they should be subjected to appropriate legislative and democratic measures of influence, with the possibility of a court appeal.  This cannot be done arbitrarily.  Because this is no longer a matter of faith or religion, but of national security.

  That is why I expect such a bill.  As soon as it is ready, I think we will immediately bring it into the hall.

  At the same time, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, called this draft law inconsistent with international legislation on the protection of human rights.  Ukrainian ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets considers this criticism from the UN to be undeserved.  Is the Verkhovna Rada going to take into account the "concerns" expressed by Turk when preparing the document for the second reading? 

  I will touch on a problem of a slightly larger variety.  It's a matter of we all live in a world of myths and clickbait headlines [content whose main purpose is to attract attention and encourage visitors to click on a link to a particular web page]  at times. In order to hold discussions, one must be very deep in the topic. This applies to everything.  And the issue of business trips, and the issue of denominations.

  Immediately, a whole series of myths that are produced are sealed with clickbait headlines, and society begins to form its own vision of it.

  It was very easy for me to work on European integration draft laws, because we had acquis communautaire [a French term referring to the cumulative body of European Community laws, rules, treaties, etc.] standards, and when the discussion began at the level of the general philosophy of myths, we broke them all down with specific norms.  Therefore, I would like that in this particular case, if there are any reservations, let them make them in some form that can be added to the existing draft law.  And for that you need to read it.  That is, I want the logic of the discussion and criticism to begin with the fact of familiarization with the text of this or that legislative act.  And I will be more than happy to consider all of these suggestions for anything.  That is, give specific proposals, because non-specificity kills the essence of the conversation. [My emphasis in large font]

  In response to this invitation, I believe that the first step would be to request a copy of Draft Law 8371 as passed on the first reading.  I have personally spent a number of hours on the Internet seeking to find a copy of Draft Law 8371 as passed on the first reading.  I could not find it on the Rada website or anywhere else.  The version of the Draft Law as it was submitted to the Rada on January 19, 2023, is available at https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/pubFile/1622350.  However, certain changes may have been made after the submission and before the first reading. 

  If one can be sure that one has the latest version of Draft Law 8371, one can then make comments or express reservations on the latest version.  Stefanchuk has stated that he would “be more than happy to consider all of these suggestions for anything.”  In my opinion, it would be sad if the Office of the High Commissioner, or a similar body, does not take advantage of this opportunity to study the latest version and to make specific comments which Stefanchuk has promised “to consider.” 

   

  Peter Anderson, Seattle USA 

• 4 January 2024: "White paper" in support of UOC

  With respect to international matters, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) is now being represented by the law firm of Amersterdam & Partners LLP with offices in London and Washington DC.  On January 3, the law firm released and posted on its website a “white paper” with the title Freedom of Religion under Attack in Ukraine.  The firm’s website is https://amsterdamandpartners.com/.  The press release relating to the white paper is at  https://amsterdamandpartners.com/amsterdam-partners-llp-releases-new-white-paper-detailing-violations-of-religious-freedoms-in-ukraine/ .  The link to the full text of the white paper is https://savetheuoc.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Save-the-UOC-White-Paper.pdf.  The following is a 6-minute video available on the firm’s website.   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NUmzCAWZh08&t=65s  A separate website,  https://savetheuoc.com/, has also been established.  All of the foregoing are in English.

  I have read the entire white paper.  As a lawyer, Robert Amsterdam has the obligation to represent his client and to present the best arguments in support of his client.  Without agreeing with all of Amsterdam’s arguments, I believe that he did an excellent job as a lawyer in preparing the white paper.  The white paper is worth reading, regardless whether you agree with it or not.

   

  Peter Anderson