The aim of this project is to deal with the question of how perception contributes to our knowledge. In doing this, we shall consider both the contemporary debate about knowledge, perception and concepts, and the phenomenological (Husserlian) account of these very same questions. The basic idea is that a certain influential attempt to account for perceptual justification, one which is proposed for example by McDowell (1994) and Brewer (1999), is in stalemate because of an inadequate conception of perceptual experiences, substantially influenced by the Kantian tradition. In trying to criticize that kind of account, we will make at least two claims: first, that some Husserlian insights about the nature of perceptual experience and receptivity might provide us with a suitable framework to make progress in this field; secondly, that even if perceptual content were to be classified as “nonconceptual”, it could still play a justificatory role. More precisely, it seems that some phenomenological notions could turn out to be particularly useful for us: the notion of “fulfilment”, which is (more or less) the phenomenological counterpart of the traditional notion of justification, and the idea of “categorial intuition”, which concerns the possibility of being acquainted with states of affairs (not just objects) in perception. In what follows we will first present the traditional conception of knowledge as true and justified belief, along with the supposed role of perception in this account. Secondly, we will discuss the idea, paradigmatically presented in McDowell (1994), that perception can play a role in our knowledge only as long as it involves conceptual content, and we will show why this is highly problematic. Therefore, we will not just survey the current state of the research, but we will also take a position on which is the best way to approach the problems we want to deal with. Finally, we will try to incorporate in the debate the Husserlian conception of perception, and we will claim that an accurate phenomenological description of experience suggests a framework within which perception can be a source of knowledge.