Strategies in International Relations after Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

(provisional version)

Instructor: Ion Marandici
Dates: 21/22 February, 28/1 March, 7/8 March and 14/15 March
Meeting times: Thursday/Friday 10:15 – 13:30
Office hours: Thursday/Friday 13:30 – 14:00
Location: PER 21, Raum B130 (NOTE: on March 14/15 we will meet in E130)
Type of Course: Blockkurs - BApol01e /BApol02d
Email: ionmarandici@gmail.com

Course Description

This course examines how the Russian invasion of Ukraine has reshaped the liberal international order, challenged existing global rules, and compelled a reassessment of strategic priorities in the West. To understand the resurgence of great power rivalry, we will analyze arguments informed by major theories of international relations: (neo)realism, liberalism, constructivism, and imperialism. We will explore the following interrelated questions: How do existing theories of international relations explain the Russian invasion of Ukraine? How did Ukraine mobilize and resist the invasion? Why did the United States respond to the war the way it did? How has the war transformed the security landscape in Ukraine, the European Union, and NATO? How and why do wars end? Why have diplomacy and mediation efforts failed thus far? How can durable peace be achieved in Ukraine?

            To answer these questions, this course adopts a structured approach. First, we will situate the Russian invasion within the broader debates surrounding America’s global role. Some policymakers and scholars advocate for reduced American involvement abroad, while others argue for a more active US role in global affairs. Consequently, we will consider whether the United States can maintain its global influence by continuing to champion a liberal international order or whether, after Donald Trump’s victory, it will adopt a more realist and isolationist stance. This power alternation has significant implications for Ukraine. So far, the United States has consistently expressed its support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, even though Ukraine is neither a NATO member nor a formal US ally. Despite Washington’s efforts to deter Russia from attacking Ukraine, deterrence ultimately was unsuccessful. We will examine why deterrence failed and why throughout the war US has pursued the escalation management strategy. 

            Second, the Russo-Ukrainian war encompasses multiple topics that are actively being studied by international relations (IR). For example, the conflict has triggered distinct alliances supporting each side. Beyond analyzing the composition of these alliances, we will explore other war-related issues, such as the shifting balance of power in East Asia, the role of ideology, the political economy of war, the influence of leadership, and the notion of genocide. The humanitarian crisis will be analyzed s well. As of January 2025, there were nearly 4 million internally displaced people in Ukraine, 6.8 million Ukrainian refugees, and 14.6 million in need of humanitarian assistance. Hence, we will discuss the impact of violence on children, human rights and civilians. One session will be devoted to the character of military technology, with particular attention to drone warfare, the use of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and nuclear coercion. Another session will address the issue of de facto states in Ukraine and in global politics. We will also undertake a critical examination of the role played by non-state actors, including transnational corporations, international NGOs, private military companies (Wagner group), and global organizations such as the United Nations.

            In all this course will provide a deeper understanding of the multiple dimensions of the Russo-Ukrainian war as well as the forces shaping state behavior, the dynamics of great power rivalries, conflict resolution, peacebuilding and the pressing challenges facing the world in the 21st century.

General Learning Outcomes

• Develop a solid understanding of general and contemporary topics in international relations.
• Gain proficiency in conducting international relations analyses.
• Master techniques for conducting effective academic research on questions pertaining to international conflicts, humanitarian crises and peacebuilding.

Evaluation

Participation (30%)
Presentation (30%)
Final Short Paper (40%)

Communication with the Instructor

 Feel free to talk to me during office hours or contact me per email.  

Schedule

Only the readings with an asterisk (*) are required. The rest are optional.

Session 1 (February 21): Introduction. Why do we study international relations? Major IR Theories. What is a strategy? Games of Strategy. US and the Cold War.

• * Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, The Art of Strategy, 2008, Ch. 1 and 2.
• * Stephen Walt. 1998. “International Relations: One World, Many Theories.” Foreign Policy 110: 29–46.

• * Jack Snyder. 2009. “One World, Rival Theories.”
• * George Kennan, The Long Telegram, February 22,1946.
• * George Kennan, X Article, 1947.
• Paul Kennedy. 1987. “The (relative) decline of America.” The Atlantic Monthly: 29–38.
• Alina Polyakova. 2019. “Are U.S. and Russia in a new Cold War?” Brookings Institute, January 20.
• Thomas J. Christensen. 2021. “There Will Not Be a New Cold War: The Limits of U.S.-Chinese Competition.” Foreign Affairs, March 24.
• Coles et al, 2023. Seven ways Russia’s war on Ukraine has changed the world, Chatham House. 
• Isak Stoddard et al. 2021. “Three Decades of Climate Mitigation: Why Haven’t We Bent the Global Emissions Curve?” Annual Review of Environment and Resources 46.

Session 2 (February 22): From the War on Terror to the Pivot to Asia. US and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. The Neorealist Perspective on the War.

• * William C. Wohlforth. 1999. “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 21:1, 5-41.
• * Christopher Layne. 2002. “Offshore balancing revisited.” The Washington Quarterly 25: 233–248.
• * Hillary Clinton. 2011. “America’s Pacific Century”. Foreign Policy.
• * John Mearsheimer, The causes and consequences of the Ukraine war, Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, 12-27.
• * John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, International Organization, 2017.
• * Nicholas Ross Smith and Dawson, Grant. 2022. “Mearsheimer, Realism, and the Ukraine War” Analyse & Kritik 44, no. 2, pp. 175-200. 
• Robert Delahunty & John Yoo. 2009. The “Bush Doctrine”: Can Preventive War Be Justified.
• Harald Edinger. 2022. “Offensive ideas: structural realism, classical realism and Putin’s war on Ukraine.”
• Felix Rösch. 2022. “Realism, the War in the Ukraine, and the Limits of Diplomacy” Analyse & Kritik 44 (2), pp. 201-218.
• Elise Giuliano. 2018. “Who supported separatism in Donbas? Ethnicity and popular opinion at the start of the Ukraine crisis.” Post-Soviet Affairs 34, no. 2–3: 158–78.
• Taras Kuzio and Paul D’Anieri. 2018. The Sources of Russia’s Great Power Politics. Bristol: E- International Relations Publishing.
• Ion Marandici. 2022. “Structural Bias, Polarized Mediation and Conflict Resolution Failure: A Comparative Examination of the Disputes in Transnistria and Donbas.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 23 (1): 89–113.
• Christopher Layne. 1997. From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand Strategy, International Security.

Session 3 (February 28): Critiques of the Neorealist Explanation.

• * Elias Götz and Per Ekman. 2024. “Russia’s War Against Ukraine: Context, Causes, and Consequences.” Problems of Post-Communism 71 (3): 193–205.
• * Decolonizing Russia: a Moral and Strategic Imperative, Congressional Hearing, June 23, 2022.
• * Maria Mälksoo. 2022. “The Postcolonial Moment in Russia’s War Against Ukraine.” Journal of Genocide Research 25 (3–4): 471–81.
• Roy Allison. 2023. “Russia’s Case for War Against Ukraine: Legal Claims, Political Rhetoric, and Instrumentality in a Fracturing World Order”, Problems of Post-Communism, 1–12.
• Ion Marandici. 2022. “Loss Aversion, Neo-imperial Frames and Territorial Expansion: Using Prospect Theory to Examine the Annexation of Crimea.” Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society 8 (1).

Strategies of Resistance

Ukrainian Resistance

• * Anastasiia Kudlenko. 2023. “Roots of Ukrainian Resilience and the Agency of Ukrainian Society before and after Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion.” Contemporary Security Policy 44 (4): 513–29.
• * Tor Bukkvoll and Frank Brundtland Steder. 2023. “War and the Willingness to Resist and Fight in Ukraine.” Problems of Post-Communism 71 (3): 245–58.

Economic Sanctions

• * Morgan, T. Clifton, Constantinos Syropoulos, and Yoto V. Yotov. 2023. “Economic Sanctions: Evolution, Consequences, and Challenges.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 37 (1): 3–30.
• * Gaur, A., Settles, A. and Väätänen, J. 2023, “Do Economic Sanctions Work? Evidence from the Russia-Ukraine Conflict.” Journal of Management Studies 60: 1391-1414.
• Beauregard, P. (2022). International emotional resonance: Explaining transatlantic economic sanctions against Russia. Cooperation and Conflict, 57(1), 25-42.

Legal Strategies

• * ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, March 17, 2023.
• ICC arrest warrants for senior Russian officials ‘a crucial step towards justice’, Amnesty.org, June 25, 2024.    

Session 4 (March 1): Liberalism, Constructivism and Imperialism.

• * Jeffrey W. Meiser. 2018. Introducing Liberalism in International Relations Theory, E-International Relations.
• * Sarina Theys. 2018. Constructivism, E-International Relations.
• Paul Post and Johannes Urpelainen. 2015. “How International Organizations Support Democratization: Preventing Authoritarian Reversals or Promoting Consolidation?” World Politics, 72-113.
• Martha Finnemore and Alexander Wendt. “When ‘Old’ Constructivism Was New: Reflections on Classical Constructivism.” Perspectives on Politics 22, no. 4 (2024): 1248–68.

Leaders and Ideology

• * Taras Kuzio. 2023. “Imperial nationalism as the driver behind Russia's invasion of Ukraine.” Nations and Nationalism, 29(1), 30–38.
• * Marlene Laruelle. 2008. Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, Introduction.
• * Botakoz Kassymbekova. 2023. Europe’s last empire: Putin’s Ukraine war exposes Russia’s imperial identity, February.

• * Kseniya Oksamytna. 2023. “Imperialism, Supremacy, and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine.” Contemporary Security Policy 44 (4): 497–512.
• * Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Speech at the United Nations, Sep 19, 2023.
• * Vladimir Putin. 2021. “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” July 12.  
• Petr Kratochvíl and Míla O’Sullivan. 2023. “A War like No Other: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine as a War on Gender Order.” European Security 32 (3): 347–66.
• Artem Shaipov and Yuliia Shaipova. 2023. “It’s High Time to Decolonize Western Russia Studies,” Foreign Policy. February 11.
• Olga Onuch and Henry E. Hale, The Zelensky Effect, 2023.
• Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, 2012.
• Andrei Kolesnkiov, Blood and Iron: How Nationalist Imperialism Became Russia’s State Ideology, 2023.  
• Vera Tolz and Stephen Hutchings. 2023. “Truth with a Z: Disinformation, War in Ukraine, and Russia’s Contradictory Discourse of Imperial Identity.” Post-Soviet Affairs 39 (5): 347–65.
• Michael McFaul. 2020. “Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy.” International Security 45 (2): 95–139.
• Katri Pynnöniemi and Kati Parppei. 2024. “Understanding Russia’s War against Ukraine: Political, Eschatological and Cataclysmic Dimensions.” Journal of Strategic Studies 47 (6–7): 832–59.
• US Senate Commission on Cooperation and Security in Europe, Russia’s Imperial Identity, 2024.
• Martin Kragh and Andreas Umland. 2023. “Putinism beyond Putin: The Political Ideas of Nikolai Patrushev and Sergei Naryshkin in 2006–20.” Post-Soviet Affairs 39 (5): 366–89.  

Session 5 (March 7): The Return of Great Power Politics.

America, Russia and Ukraine. A Simulation Game.

• * Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchement,” International Security 37 (3), 2012.
• * Daniel Drezner. 2013. “Military primacy doesn’t pay (nearly as much as you think).” International Security 38: 52–79.
• * The White House, Donald Trump Administration, US National Security Strategy, 2017.
• * The White House, Biden-Harris Administration, US National Security Strategy, 2022.
• * Janice Stein. 2023. Escalation management in Ukraine: “Learning by doing” in response to the “threat that leaves something to chance”. Texas National Security Review, 6(3).
• Mitchell Orenstein, The Lands In Between, Oxford University Press, 2024.
• Stephen Walt. 2011. The end of the American era. The National Interest 116: 6–16.
• Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, 2014, 1–177.
• David Lake. 2013. “Legitimating Power: The Domestic Politics of U.S. International Hierarchy.” International Security 38, no. 2: 74–111.

War Technology, Wagner, Convicts

• * Tom Sauer. 2024. “How Useful Are Nuclear Weapons in Practice? Case-Study: The War in Ukraine.” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 7 (1): 194–210.
• * Kimberly Marten. 2019. “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner Group.” Post-Soviet Affairs 35 (3): 181–204.
• * Mykola Bielieskov, Outgunned Ukraine bets on drones as Russian invasion enters third year, Atlantic Council, 2023.
• * Timothy Wright, Europe’s missile renaissance, IISS, 2024.
• Sophia Anastazievsky. 2024. “What We Owe to Ukrainians: A Moral Perspective on Nuclear Coercion and Military Intervention.” Ethics & International Affairs 38(1): 31–53.  
• James Pattison. 2024. “Ukraine, Wagner, and Russia’s Convict-Soldiers.” Ethics & International Affairs 38(1): 17–30.
• Christian Enemark. 2024. “Returning the War to Russia: Drones and Discrimination in the Defense of Ukraine.” Ethics & International Affairs 38(1): 54–63.
• Elena Pokalova. 2023. “The Wagner Group in Africa: Russia’s Quasi-State Agent of Influence.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, July, 1–23.

Session 6 (March 8): De Facto States. Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Taiwan, the Donbas Republics.

• * Pål Kolstø.  2024. “Eurasia’s de Facto States after Russia’s Attack on Ukraine: Client Reactions to Patron Decline.” Problems of Post-Communism, December, 1–12.
• * Ion Marandici. 2020. “Multiethnic Parastates and Nation-Building: The Case of the Transnistrian Imagined Community.” Nationalities Papers 48, no. 1: 61–82.
• * Jaroslava Barbieri. 2023. “Raising Citizen-Soldiers in Donbas: Russia’s Role in Promoting Patriotic Education Programmes in the Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics.” Ethnopolitics 23 (5): 515–36.
• Ion Marandici. 2024. “Great Power Competition, Clientelism, and De Facto States: Transnistria and Taiwan Compared.” Nationalities Papers, 1–22.
• Ion Marandici and Alexandru Leșanu. 2020. “The Political Economy of the Post-Soviet De Facto States: A Paired Comparison of Transnistria and the Donetsk People’s Republic.” Problems of Post-Communism 68 (4): 339–51.
• Pål Kolstø. 2020. “Biting the Hand That Feeds Them? Abkhazia–Russia Client–Patron Relations.” Post-Soviet Affairs 36 (2): 140–58.
• James Ker-Lindsay. 2018. “The stigmatisation of de facto states: disapproval and ‘engagement without recognition.” Ethnopolitics 17 (5).

East Asia and the Russo-Ukrainian War. Power Transitions.

• * Christopher Layne, The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana, International Affairs 94, Issue 1, 2018, 89–111.
• * Sheena Chestnut Greitens. 2022. “China’s Response to War in Ukraine.” Asian Survey 62 (5-6): 751–781. 
• * Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis, Press Release, February 24, 2023.  
• * United States Institute for Peace, China’s Dilemmas Deepen as North Korea Enters Ukraine War, 2024.
• * Ben Blanchard, Taiwan studies Ukraine war for own battle strategy with China, Reuters, March 8, 2022.
• * Ann Marie Murphy, Ukraine war highlights differences between Indonesian and US foreign policy frameworks, EastAsiaForum, August 5, 2022.  
• EU and China Summit Focuses on War in Ukraine, Deutsche Welle, April 1, 2024.
• Zenel Garcia and Kevin Modlin, Sino-Russian Relations and the Ukraine War, Parameters 52(3), 2022, 19-34.
• Ronald Tammen et al., Power Transitions – Strategies for the 21st Century, Ch. 1, 7–8.
• Stephen G. Brooks and William Wohlforth, “The Once and Future Superpower: Why China Won’t Overtake the United States”, Foreign Affairs March-April 2016, 91-104.

Session 7 (March 14): Consequences of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine.

• * Patrick Mello. 2024. “Zeitenwende: German Foreign Policy Change in the Wake of Russia’s War Against Ukraine.” Politics and Governance 12.
• * Marta Migliorati. 2024. “New Nordic Pathways? Explaining Nordic Countries’ Defence Policy Choices in the Wake of the Ukrainian War.” Journal of European Public Policy 31 (10): 3249–74.
• * Rex Mainoo Yeboah, Ghana’s Position Against Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Will Continue to Hold - President Akufo-Addo, Ghana Today, March 1, 2023.   
• Volodymyr Kulyk. 2023. “National Identity in Time of War: Ukraine after the Russian Aggressions of 2014 and 2022.” Problems of Post-Communism 71 (4): 296–308.
• Ion Marandici. “Z-Propaganda and Semiotic Resistance: Contesting Russia’s War Symbols in Moldova and Beyond” Comparative Southeast European Studies 71, no. 4 (2023): 585-616.

     Refugees and Civilian Population

• * Rizzi, Damiano et al. 2022. “Running Away from the War in Ukraine: The Impact on Mental Health of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees in Transit in Poland” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 19, no. 24: 16439.
• * UN Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner, September 1 - Nov 30, 2024.   

Genocide

• * Mike Corder. 2024. In Ukraine’s genocide case against Russia, the UN’s top court says it has jurisdiction, Associated Press, February 2.
• * Martin McKee et al., How can the international community respond to evidence of genocide in Ukraine? 2022.
• * Denys Azarov, Dmytro Koval, Gaiane Nuridzhanian, Volodymyr Venher, Understanding Russia’s Actions in Ukraine as the Crime of Genocide, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 21, Issue 2, May 2023, 233–264.
• * Jade McGlynn. 2024. Russia Is Committing Cultural Genocide in Ukraine, Foreign Policy, April 23. 
• * Greta Uehling. 2024. Inside Russia’s Campaign to Steal and Indoctrinate Ukrainian Children, July 2.
• William A Schabas, Genocide and Ukraine: Do Words Mean What We Choose them to Mean?, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 20, Issue 4, September 2022,  843–857.
• Andreas Umland. 2024. “Russia’s Forcible Transfers of Unaccompanied Ukrainian Children: Responses from Ukraine, the EU and Beyond,” SCEEUS Report No. 1, 2024.
• Straus, S. 2022. Ukraine and the politics of political violence. Violence: An International Journal, 3(1), 3-10.
• Alexander Etkind. 2022. “Ukraine, Russia, and Genocide of Minor Differences.” Journal of Genocide Research 25 (3–4): 384–402. doi:10.1080/14623528.2022.2082911.
• Yulia Ioffe. 2023. “Forcibly Transferring Ukrainian Children to the Russian Federation: A Genocide?” Journal of Genocide Research 25 (3–4): 315–51.
• Olena Oleksiyivna Stadnyk et al. 2023. The issue of the genocide of the Ukrainian people in modern conditions (Historical aspect), International Journal of Advanced and Applied Sciences.

Peacebuilding and conflict transformation

• * Hugh Miall. 2004. Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task.
• * E. Sylvers. 2022. “Italy Circulates 4-Point Peace Plan.” Wall Street Journal. 20 May.
• Jacob Bercovich and L. Simpson. 2010. “International mediation and the question of failed peace agreements: improving conflict management and implementation.” Peace & Change 35: 68–103.  

Session 8 (March 15): Student Presentations

Final paper due: March 22, 4:00 pm.

Wichtig: Für diesen Blockkurs bei der Einschreibung in die Prüfung im System die Option "Einschreibung ausserhalb der Prüfungssession" wählen. 

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